JAMES PECORA V CITY OF LANSING
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JAMES PECORA,
UNPUBLISHED
October 3, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 196191
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 94-079310 NZ
CITY OF LANSING,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Doctoroff, P.J., and Cavanagh and Saad, J.J.
MEMORANDUM.
Plaintiff appeals by right summary disposition which, in pertinent part, was granted as to his
Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act and Handicapper’s Civil Rights Act claims on statute of limitations
grounds, MCR 2.116(C)(7). Plaintiff concedes on appeal that, to the extent his complaint alleges acts
by defendant occurring prior to December 28, 1991, it is time barred by the three year period of
limitations.
Plaintiff contends, however, that paragraphs 58, 64, 68, 114, 153, and 163 of his complaint
allege acts of discrimination occurring within the three year limitations period. With respect to the
Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act claims, nowhere in plaintiff ’s complaint does he identify himself as a
member of a protected class or group; thus, his complaint was subject to dismissal in that respect for
failure to establish a prima facie case under the ELCRA. Roberson v Occupational Health Centers,
220 Mich App 322, 330; 559 NW2d 86 (1996). Similarly, while his HCRA claim did identify a basis
for finding plaintiff to be handicapped within the statute, in no way did it identify how the alleged
wrongful conduct by defendant or its agents was related to plaintiff ’s handicap, and thus also failed to
plead a prima facie case. Stevens v Inland Waters, Inc, 220 Mich App 212, 215; 559 NW2d 61
(1996).
In any event, paragraphs 58, 64, and 68 of plaintiff ’s complaint related to Count I, breach of
contract, as to which summary disposition was granted on substantive grounds which plaintiff has not
challenged here. Those acts were not alleged to be acts of discrimination and the statute of limitations is
irrelevant to those portions of plaintiff ’s complaint.
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As to the remaining paragraphs of plaintiff ’s complaint, numbers 114, 153, and 163, these
consist of conclusory assertions of improper conduct, without identifying any specific facts. Such
allegations are improper under MCR 2.111(B)(1) and are thus ignored, accordingly, for summary
disposition purposes when assessing whether plaintiff ’s complaint pleads a viable cause of action.
Dacon v Transue, 441 Mich 315, 330; 490 NW2d 369 (1992). Since, without those conclusory
allegations, plaintiff concedes that his complaint pleads no improper conduct within the period of
limitations, summary disposition on that basis was properly granted.
Affirmed.
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Henry W. Saad
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