FRANKLIN WOLFE V FERRANTI SCIAKY INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
FRANKLIN WOLFE and ANNA WOLFE,
UNPUBLISHED
September 12, 1997
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 183678
Monroe Circuit Court
LC No. 93-101942 NP
FERRANTI SCIAKY, INC., a Delaware
corporation,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware
corporation,
Defendant.
Before: Young, P.J., and White and P. D. Schaefer*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal the circuit court’s order granting defendant Ferranti Sciaky (defendant)
summary disposition on statute of limitations/repose grounds. MCR 2.116(C)(7). Plaintiffs challenge
the circuit court’s application of the period of limitations/repose governing actions against architects,
professional engineers or contractors arising from improvements to real property, MCL 600.5839;
MSA 27A.5839,1 rather than the period of limitations governing product liability claims, MCL
600.5805(9); MSA 27A.5805(9). We remand.
I
The facts viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff are that plaintiff suffered severe hand
injuries on March 27, 1990, while performing job duties as an automatic welder repairman at Ford’s
Monroe plant. The Sciaky line 8 (line 8) is an automatic welding machine system located in the plant.
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Line 8 welds automobile wheels together and performs various other functions. After the wheels are
welded, they travel down the line to a paint station. It was at line 8’s paint station that plaintiff was
injured. Plaintiff Franklin Wolfe (plaintiff) alleged that defendant manufactured, sold, installed and
maintained the line 8 system.2 The line 8 system was installed in the 1970s.3
On the date in question, plaintiff was called to line 8 because a malfunction occurred at the line’s
paint station. An electric eye under and behind the paint station directs a light beam at the wheel and, if
operating properly, the light beam makes contact with the receiver after passing through the valve stem
hole. If the light does not pass through the valve stem hole, the line shuts down. Plaintiff testified at
deposition that he had had experience with malfunctioning electric eyes in this area before he was
injured. He testified that he went to the paint station and as he was inspecting the machine, rested his
hand on the wheel, at which time, without warning, line 8 reactivated and immediately dragged his left
hand into an unguarded pinch point. Plaintiff acknowledged that he did not lock out power to the line
before inspecting it, and explained that he did not do so because had he done so, the electric eye could
not have been tested because the power would be off, and because he expected the machine to have a
cycle interrupt—a safety device that prevents accidental reactivation of a machine after a malfunction
occurs. Plaintiff testified at deposition that such a cycle i terrupt circuit was installed soon after his
n
injury.
Plaintiffs filed the instant complaint on March 26, 1993, alleging negligence and breach of
warranty against defendant.4 Plaintiffs alleged that the conveyor line’s sudden movement and exposed
pinch point were due at least in part to defendant’s design, manufacture, sale, supply, installation and
maintenance of line 8, and that defendant breached the following duties to plaintiff: to reasonably
design, test, manufacture, market and maintain said equipment; to reasonably protect against
foreseeable dangers and prevent harm to intended users, including plaintiff, when the equipment is used
for its intended purpose, including adequate control of movement of the conveyor line and adequate
guarding of pinch points; to provide adequate safety guards and other protection devices and
mechanisms so as to protect operators against the foreseeable dangers and injuries of said equipment,
including unexpected start-ups and exposed pinch points; to adequately instruct as to the installation,
maintenance and operation of the machinery, including the provision of hazard warnings, maintenance,
and repair; to provide adequate controls and operating systems; and to adequately warn operators.
Plaintiffs’ breach of warranty count alleged that in placing its product into the stream of
commerce, defendant made certain implied and express warranties regarding its product, which it
breached, including, but not limited to, warranties that its product was fit for its intended and foreseeable
uses; was reasonably safe and free from all hazards, risks, dangers and defects; and was of
merchantable quality.
Defendant moved for summary disposition on several grounds, including that plaintiffs’ claims
were barred by the statute of limitations/respose governing actions against architects, engineers and
contractors arising out of an improvement to real property. MCL 600.5839; MSA 27A.5839.
Defendant argued that line 8 was an “improvement to real property,” defendant was a “contractor,”5
and more than six years had elapsed between the date of the occupancy, use, or acceptance of the
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improvement to real property, and the date this action was filed. Defendant submitted no affidavits in
support of its motion.6
Plaintiffs’ response to defendant’s motion for summary disposition argued that defendant had
produced no evidence to establish that the injury-causing machine was an “improvement to real
property,” that defendant had admitted to being the manufacturer and supplier of the injury-producing
machine, and had admitted that plaintiffs’ action was brought under the product liability statute, MCL
600.2945 et seq.; MSA 27A.2945 et seq. Plaintiffs further asserted that line 8 was “not integral nor
incorporated into the design of the Monroe Ford plant. It was put in long after the plant was built and it
appears that it has been moved and reconfigured since its original installation.” Plaintiffs argued that
their claims “relate to a very specific part of what Defendant identifies as Sciaky line #8, i.e., a station
on an automatic welding machine where paint is sprayed onto wheels which have been welded together
earlier on the line.”
The circuit court’s opinion granting defendant’s motion addressed only the statute of limitations
argument, stating in pertinent part:
The most instructive case on point seems to be Adair v Koppers, 741 F.2d 111 (CA 6,
1984). This is a Sixth Circuit case arising out of Ohio. It involves a dispute over
whether a piece of industrial equipment (specifically a coal transportation device) is to
be considered an “improvement”, i.e., a part of the property in question. The court
held that it was. If this decision is followed, then plaintiff’s claim would be barred, and
Defendant’s motion should be granted.
It is the opinion of this Court that the item known as “Sciaky Line #8” more properly is
classified as an improvement to property and thus as part of the real property.
Therefore, in light of the controlling statutes, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is hereby
granted. Prevailing party shall prepare the appropriate order.
II
In reviewing a motion for summary disposition filed under MCR 2.116(C)(7), we accept as true
all well-pleaded allegations and construe them most favorably to the nonmoving party. Wade v Dep’t
of Corrections, 439 Mich 158, 162-163; 483 NW2d 26 (1992). We also consider all documentary
evidence submitted by the parties. Harrison v Dep’t of Corrections, 194 Mich App 446, 449; 487
NW2d 799 (1992). The motion should not be granted unless no factual development can provide a
basis for recovery.
A
In support of its motion for summary disposition, defendant relied on Fennell v Nesbitt, Inc,
154 Mich App 644; 398 NW2d 481 (1986), and Adair, supra, which was found persuasive therein.
Adair was a diversity action involving Ohio law. In Adair, the plaintiff sought damages for injuries to his
arm, which had been caught between a pulley and belt on a conveyor in the coal-handling system at a
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Republic Steel by-product coke plant. The defendant, Koppers, had designed and built the conveyor
and the entire plant in 1923. Koppers constructed eighty ovens to replace sixty-four existing ovens and
modified the coal handling system in 1949, but had not performed any services with regard to the
conveyor since. 741 F2d at 112. The plaintiff brought suit in 1981, alleging negligence, strict liability,
and breach of express and implied warranties. Koppers filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing
that the plaintiff’s suit was barred by Ohio’s statute of repose for designers and builders. The plaintiff
argued in response that the conveyor was not an improvement to real property.
The Adair court, noting that the Ohio Supreme Court had not interpreted the term
“improvement to real property” as used in Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.131, adopted what it referred to as
a common-sense interpretation, looking to the following definition of “improvement:”
‘[A] permanent addition to or betterment of real property that enhances its capital value
and that involves the expenditure of labor or money and is designed to make the
property more useful or valuable as distinguished from ordinary repairs.’
The Adair court added:
In applying the definition of “improvement,” courts consider whether a modification
adds to the value of the property for the purposes of its intended use, as well as ‘the
nature of the improvement, its relationship to the land and its occupants, and its
permanence” . . . [741 F2d 114. Citations omitted.]
***
In considering the nature of the conveyor, we note that experts for both parties
characterized it as an essential component in a larger system. The conveyor on which
Adair was injured, Conveyor A, is the first in a line of conveyors used to transport coal
from railroad tracks through various processing facilities to the coke ovens. Adair’s
expert stated that Conveyor A “is an integral part of the related processing equipment;”
Koppers expert called it “a permanent and integral part of the coal conveying system of
the coke plant.” Adair has attempted to limit the focus of this inquiry to Conveyor A, or
even to the pulley and belt involved in Adair’s accident. Such components are arguably
in the nature of equipment, rather than improvements. Adair’s proposed limitation is too
narrow, however. While Koppers’ suggestion that the entire factory complex be
considered as a single unit sweeps too broadly, the nature of the conveyor can best be
understood in light of its “integral” role in the coal handling system. . . .
The coal handling system, which transports raw material to processing facilities, is
essential to the operation of the factory as designed and enhances the utility of the
property.
***
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Smith’s [plaintiff’s expert] assertion that Conveyor A can be removed does not conflict
with the District Court’s finding that the coal handling system is permanent. The
conveyors have remained in place since their construction in the 1920s. According to
the specifications and drawings, Conveyor A is bolted in place and supported by steel
angles on a concrete footing. A walkway and a handrailing are located on either side of
the conveyor belt. Some elevated conveyors are housed in steel sheathing, while
Conveyor A is placed below ground level, largely in a tunnel. This degree of physical
annexation, combined with the length of time the system has remained intact, despite the
sale of the property, supports Koppers’ affidavit stating that “the coal conveyor system,
including Conveyor ‘A’, was a permanent installation.”
Thus, there is no question of material fact concerning the nature of the conveyor as an
integral component of an essential system, its usefulness to the purpose of the factory,
and its permanence. We affirm the holdings of the District Court that Conveyor A is
“an improvement to real property” under section 2305.131, and that the statute bars
suit against Koppers for designing or building the material handling system. [741 F2d at
114-116.]
The plaintiffs in Fennell, supra, filed suit against the professional engineering firm that had
designed the heating-ventilation-air conditioning (HVAC) system used in the school where they taught.
The plaintiffs alleged that the faulty design and construction of the HVAC system created harmful
atmospheric conditions, and that continuous exposure to these conditions caused them to suffer
respiratory and other problems. The defendant performed its last services in connection with the
HVAC system sometime before April 30, 1975. The plaintiffs filed their actions between April and
September 1982.
The circuit court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that the statute of limitations/repose applicable
to engineers and architects was not applicable because the HVAC system was not an “improvement to
real property,” and that the HVAC system was a product the defendant placed in the marketplace and
thus the three-year statute of limitations, MCL 600.5805(9); MSA 27A.5805(9), governed:
This claim is also without merit. While no Michigan case law has specifically defined the
term “improvement to real property” within the meaning of the engineers and architects’
statute, we are persuaded by the rationale of the federal appellate decision in Adair v
The Koppers Co, Inc, 741 F2d 111 (CA 6, 1984). Considering the Ohio architects’
statute, the Adair court found that a conveyor system used to transport coal in a factory
was an improvement to real property. The court ruled that there was “no question of
material fact concerning the nature of the conveyor as an integral component of an
essential system, its usefulness to the purpose of the factory, and its permanence.” Id.,
p 116.
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A common-sense application of the term convinces us that the HVAC system in this
case is integral to the use of the school. We reject the plaintiffs’ product liability
allegations for the same reasons that the Adair court did:
This would be contrary to the intent behind section 2305.131, which
protects designers and builders from all actions arising from defects in
an improvement. (Citation omitted). Although Adair cites many cases
to support his contention, none deals with the situation before us—an
attempt to maintain a product liability action where the defective entity
has been held an improvement and where a negligence action has been
held barred by the statute of repose of designers and builders. We
decline to undercut the protective purpose of section 2305.131 by
excluding a “product liability” action for defects in an improvement from
the coverage of the statute. [741 F2d 116.]
Accordingly, we conclude that the term “improvement to real property” s
hould be
construed to include the design of the HVAC system and to preclude maintaining a
cause of action under MCL 600.5805(9); MSA 27A.5808(9). [154 Mich App at
650-651.]
Another case defendant relied on below is Matthews v Beloit Corp, 807 F Supp 1289 (WD
Mich 1992). The plaintiff in Matthews was injured while on the job at a paper-manufacturing factory.
The court held that the stack calendar machine at which plaintiff was injured, which was incorporated
into and functioned exclusively as a component of the paper making machine, was an “improvement to
real property.” Id. at 1290-1292. The Matthews court applied the four factors set forth in Adair -
whether a modification adds to the value of the property for the purposes of its intended use, and “the
nature of the improvement, its relationship to the land and its occupants, and its permanence,” -- and
denied the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration, upholding its decision that Michigan’s statute of repose
barred the plaintiffs’ claim. Id. at 1290, 1292-1293. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the
stack calendar be viewed as one component of the machine:
. . .the stack calender [sic] which allegedly caused Mr. Matthews’ injuries was an
essential component in a larger system. Without it or some substitute, the S.D. Warren
Company could not produce paper of the same quality. Therefore, the stack calender
[sic] must not be viewed in isolation but as a component of the entire papermaking
machine.
The entire papermaking machine is approximately 350 feet long and between 24 and 25
feet wide. It occupies two stories of a building at S.D. Warren Company’s plant. The
machine is supported by base plates which are permanently affixed to the concrete
floor. Mr. Matthews testified that the papermaking machine is approximately a
block long in length and that the machine is interconnected with the building.
The basement below the machine houses a conveyor system which is also a
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component of the machine. The machine manufactures paper in one continuous
process from the wet, pulp beginning to the finished paper product. The
machine is, in effect, the factory—albeit, protected by a roof and walls. In fact,
the walls and roof were designed to accommodate the papermaking machine
rather than vice-versa. [807 F Supp at 1292. Emphasis added. Italicized emphasis
in original.]
Defendant cited additional Michigan cases where the statute was applied, but the term
“improvement to real property” was not at issue.7
B
During the pendency of this appeal, in Pendzsu v Beazer East, Inc, 219 Mich App 405; 557
NW2d 127 (1996), this Court adopted the reasoning of Adair and held that its analysis is consistent
with the purpose of Michigan’s statute of repose. One of the two plaintiffs in Pendzsu worked as a
truck driver/cement mixer/warehouse worker for Standard Fuel Engineering and Zero Refractories, and
alleged that in the course of his employment, he worked in areas, including buildings owned by Ford and
National Steel, where asbestos-containing materials were used, exposing him to harmful asbestos fibers.
The second plaintiff, McGhee, worked as a laborer-maintenance worker at Great Lakes Steel. His
duties included working near furnaces where asbestos-covered steam lines were located. McGhee
alleged that he was exposed to airborne asbestos fibers when the furnaces were rebuilt. Both filed
product liability suits.
The defendant was the successor in interest to Koppers Company, which was the contractor
for the installation of two coke ovens at the Ford Rouge plant in the 1930s and relined the ovens in the
1960s and 1979. Koppers also performed relining and enlargement to blast furnaces and coke ovens
at Great Lakes Steel in 1973.
The circuit court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition on the basis that the
plaintiffs’ claims were barred by MCL 600.5839; MSA 27A.5839. The plaintiffs argued on appeal
that the defendant’s work was not an improvement, but rather constituted repair work. This Court
applied Adair and affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary disposition:
Here, the material facts are not in dispute. Defendant was retained to design,
manufacture and install two coke ovens at the Ford Rouge plant in the 1930s.
Defendant relined the ovens in the 1960s and in 1979. The relining process requires the
rebuilding of brick contained within the oven that becomes worn out after continued use.
Similarly, defendant was the engineering and procurement contractor for relining and
enlarging the blast furnaces and coke ovens at Great Lakes Steel in the 1960s and in
1973. Plaintiffs do not dispute the characterization of the installation of a coke
oven or a blast furnace as an “improvement.” Similarly, the integral role of the
coke ovens and blast furnaces as entities in their respective plants is not in
dispute.
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The fact that the brick which defendant installed in the relining process will eventually
wear out is not dispositive. Rather than looking solely to the permanency of a
component, that factor is merely one of the factors to consider in determining whether a
modification adds to the value of the realty for the purposes for which it was intended to
be used. Adair, supra, pp 114-115. Like the conveyor system at issue in Adair,
supra, p 115, and the heating-ventilation-air conditioning (HVAC) system at issue in
Fennell, supra, p 651, there is no genuine issue of material fact that the relining of the
coke ovens and blast furnaces was “integral” to the usefulness of the respective plants.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in applying the statute of repose to plaintiffs’
claims against defendant. Adair, supra, p 115, Fennell, supra, p 651.
Next, plaintiffs argue that the statute of repose does not apply to defendant in its role as
a supplier. We disagree. First, plaintiffs never identified the exact building materials for
which they claim defendant is liable as a supplier. In any case, it is not disputed that
defendant was a contractor for purposes of the statute of repose. The statute of repose
controls “any action” against a contractor for injury which arises “out of the defective
and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property.” MCL 600.5839(1); MSA
27A.5839(1). Although Michigan case law has not specifically addressed the problem
of a hybrid situation under the statute of repose, this Court rejected the plaintiffs’
attempt in Fennell, supra, pp 650-651, to characterize the HVAC system as a product
placed into the marketplace. That is analogous to the claim here since, if this Court had
accepted the Fennell plaintiffs’ argument, the Fennell defendant would have been the
supplier of the HVAC “product.”
This issue is also analogous to how the UCC deals with a contract that involves a
mixture of goods and services. In that context, the court must determine whether the
contract’s predominant factor, its thrust, its purpose, is the rendition of service, with
goods incidentally involved, or is a transaction of sale, with labor, incidentally involved.
Higgins v Lauritzen, 209 Mich App 266, 269; 530 NW2d 171 (1995). Here,
assuming arguendo that a supplier of building materials is not controlled by the statute of
repose, the supplying of building materials was incidental to defendant’s role as a
contractor in this case. [219 Mich App at 411-413. Emphasis added.]
III
We conclude that defendant failed to provide sufficient facts to establish that the instant case
involves an improvement to real property under MCL 600.5839; MSA 27A.5839.
Defendant described line 8 in its motion for summary disposition as
. . . a system on Ford’s premises which moves wheel rims down a conveyor line where
several operations are performed on them by machinery, not manpower.
***
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. . . the Sciaky line # 8 is an improvement to real property. It clearly adds to the value
of the property. Ford is in the business of making automobiles, which includes the
manufacture of wheel rims for those automobiles. The Sciaky line # 8 is an integral part
of this manufacturing process. In addition, the Sciaky line # 8 is a large conveying
system that is connected to wires and pipes and it is permanent.
Plaintiffs’ response to defendant’s motion for summary disposition argued that defendant had
produced no evidence to establish that line was an improvement to real property. 8 Plaintiffs argued that
line 8 was “not integral nor incorporated into the design of the Monroe Ford plant. It was put in long
after the plant was built and it appears that it has been moved and reconfigured since its original
installation.”9
Defendant failed to set forth facts necessary to the circuit court’s determination whether line 8
was an improvement to real property for purposes of MCL 600.5839(1); MSA 27A.5839(1) and, if
so, whether the defect involved an integral component of the improvement. Defendant did not state
when or for what purpose the Monroe plant was built; did not explain the circumstances of line 8’s
design, manufacture and installation; did not shed light on the placement or dimensions of line 8 or how it
is affixed to the building;10 and did not provide facts from which to deduce the extent and importance of
line 8’s role in the plant’s operations, or the relationship between the plant’s operations and the structure
and design of the plant.11
In light of defendant’s failure to present sufficient facts from which the circuit court could
conclude that line 8 was an improvement to real property, we vacate the order granting summary
disposition and remand for further proceedings.12
/s/ Robert P. Young, Jr.
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Philip D. Schaefer
1
MCL 600.5805(10); MSA 27A.5805 provides:
The period of limitations for an action against a state licensed architect, professional
engineer, land surveyor or contractor based on an improvement to real property shall be
as provided in section 5839.
2
Ford’s answer to plaintiffs’ complaint admitted that defendant was the manufacturer, seller, installer
and maintainer of the line 8 machinery.
Defendant’s answer responded to this allegation with “defendant neither admits nor denies for lack of
sufficient knowledge or information as to form a belief, but leaves the Plaintiffs to their proofs.”
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3
We have gleaned some of this information from defendant’s joinder of Ford’s motion for change of
venue, which is not at issue here. Defendant stated therein that the decision to purchase the line 8
machine was made by Ford employees, who issued the request to purchase line 8. Defendant further
stated that it designed and manufactured line 8 in Chicago, Illinois, and that line 8 was assembled and
inspected in Chicago. Further the line was accepted in Chicago by Ford employees before being
transported to Monroe for installation. Defendant attached to its joinder an affidavit of defendant’s
president stating that when Ford contracted with defendant to manufacture a piece of machinery, the
machinery was designed, manufactured and assembled in Chicago; that upon completion the piece of
machinery was shipped to the Monroe Ford plant; and that in order to build a piece of machinery to
Ford’s specification and approval, the design is approved by Ford employees, but the primary design,
manufacture and assembly occurs at defendant’s facilities in Chicago.
Attached to Ford’s supplemental memorandum in support of change of venue were the depositions of
two Ford employees, Poupard and Briggs. The questioning at deposition was limited to the issue of
venue, with agreement that they could be called back for more substantive questioning. In any case,
Poupard testified he had been a control applications engineer at Ford’s Monroe plant since 1972. He
testified that he was involved with the purchase of line 8, and estimated that it was in the 70s, possibly
the late 70s. Poupard sat in on the original line-up with potential vendors where the vendors presented
proposals, and was involved in the selection of the successful bidder. Boupard also followed the
machine through building and delivery to the plant and testified that the vendors are given specifications
by Ford. Boupard testified that at the time the purchase of line 8 was initiated, there was other Sciaky
equipment at the plant, perhaps six spot welder lines. Spot welders differ from automatic welders in the
method of attachment. Boupard testified that Ford Monroe plant personnel installed the machine at the
plant, and when asked “Anybody from Sciaky assist them?” answered “yes.” Boupard also testified
that he was involved in one repair or modification of line 8 since its purchase, that being the attempted
installation of a vision system to detect the quality of the weld, but that the system would not do
everything the vendor promised, and the vendor was not defendant.
Briggs testified that he had been employed at the Monroe plant since 1984 and had been supervisor of
safety and security for five years. He testified that his duties include coordinating all the safety activities
in the plant and interfacing with MIOSHA. Briggs testified that he did not believe that there was another
Sciaky line 8 machine in any other Ford plant, or anywhere in the continental United States, adding “We
are the only ones in the Continental United States making wheels.” Briggs testified that he had observed
repairs or maintenance on machines such as the line 8, and that Monroe plant employees make the
decision that a machine needs repair or maintenance.
4
The complaint also alleged intentional tort against defendant Ford Motor Company. The parties later
stipulated to Ford’s dismissal. An order to that effect was entered on December 13, 1994.
5
Defendant noted in its motion that the definition of contractor includes any corporation which makes an
improvement to real property. MCL 600.5839(4); MSA 27A.5839 provides:
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As used in this section, “contractor” means an individual, corporation, partnership, or
other business entity which makes an improvement to real property.
6
Defendant’s motion attached six exhibits: plaintiffs’ complaint, excerpts from plaintiff’s deposition, and
four cases.
7
These cases all assumed that improvements to real property were involved, and that assumption
appears to have been sound in each case. Cliff Forest Products Co v Al Disdero Lumber Co, 144
Mich App 215; 375 NW2d 397 (1985), involved roof support components; Smith v Quality
Construction Co, 200 Mich App 297; 503 NW2d 753 (1993), involved building repairs;
Witherspoon v Guilford, 203 Mich App 240; 511 NW2d 720 (1994), involved a guardrail; and
Beauregard-Bejou v Pierce, 194 Mich App 388; 487 NW2d 792 (1992), involved a staircase.
8
We are aware, having thoroughly reviewed the lower court file, that plaintiff argued in response to
defendant’s motion that discovery had not been completed and that depositions remained to be taken
including of Ford personnel “who can speak to the mobility of the line and its history.”
At the December 21, 1994, hearing on defendant’s motion, at which plaintiffs’ lead counsel
(Christopher Holliday) was present, plaintiff’s counsel argued, among other things, that “nothing has
been shown to establish that this is an improvement to real property, there has been no testimony
introduced about that. I don’t think there have been no [sic] photos introduced, there’s been nothing
introduced to show that it is. Defense counsel responded that
this is an issue of law for the court and the cases that we cite also make it clear that
plaintiff has admitted to enough facts to establish that this was clearly an improvement to
real property, (one) we are a contractor, they admit it, (two) we’re the ones that put it
in, they admit that, (three) it was an intrical [sic] part to the plant system and
components. We know that from the plainitff’s testimony. He worked with this
conveyor for some 20-plus years. It was what the whole plant, the Ford plant, was
about down there. The Sciaky No. 8 line wasn’t installed the week before his accident.
He had actually been the troubleshooter, working on the line and repair of it if it was
necessary, for a good share of his work life at Ford, so there’s nothing new that’s going
to come from a new expert’s dep or from some Ford employee who was not an
eyewitness, that will be germane to the factual determinations you have to make.
The court then rescheduled the hearing to give plaintiffs’ counsel opportunity to depose Ford
employees. On January 19, 1995, at the second hearing defense counsel stated that plaintiffs’ counsel
had decided not to depose Ford personnel. Plaintiffs’ lead counsel was not present, and attorney
Haddad responded “I believe so” when the court asked him if there had been no further discovery.
9
We note that while plaintiff failed to support its responses to defendant’s motion for summary
disposition with the requisite evidence, the initial burden is on defendants to produce facts sufficient to
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support the assertion that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.
10
The mere statement that it is connected to wires and pipes does not aid our analysis.
11
Neither defendant nor plaintiff set forth in their summary disposition briefs any of the facts gleaned
from the motion to change venue. See note 3. We observe, however, that the testimony referred to in
note 3 does not establish that line 8 is an improvement to real property.
12
Defendant’s remaining arguments were not addressed by the circuit court and may be renewed on
remand.
-12
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