ROY WRIGHT V AMERICAN STATES INSURANCE COMPANY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ROY WRIGHT,
UNPUBLISHED
August 19, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
AMERICAN STATES INSURANCE COMPANY,
No. 190448
Clinton Circuit Court
LC No. 94-007500-NI
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr. and Jansen, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court order granting summary disposition in favor of
defendant and dismissing plaintiff’s complaint for no-fault benefits. We reverse and remand.
The trial court’s grant of summary disposition to defendant is reviewed de novo by this Court.
Tranker v Figgie Int’l, Inc, 221 Mich App 7, 11; 561 NW2d 397 (1997). Review of a summary
disposition motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10) requires us to consider all relevant affidavits,
depositions, admissions and other documentary evidence submitted by the parties in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists upon
which reasonable minds could differ or whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. MCR 2.116(G)(5); Tranker, supra.
The trial court granted summary disposition to defendant based upon its interpretation of MCL
500.3106(2); MSA 24.13106(2). The statute provides:
(2) Accidental bodily injury does not arise out of the ownership, operation,
maintenance, or use of a parked vehicle as a motor vehicle if benefits under the
worker’s disability compensation act . . . are available to an employee who sustains the
injury in the course of his or her employment while doing either of the following:
(a) Loading, unloading, or doing mechanical work on a vehicle unless the injury
arose from the use or operation of another vehicle. . . .
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(b) Entering into or alighting from the vehicle unless the i jury was sustained
n
while entering into or alighting from the vehicle immediately after the vehicle became
disabled.
In interpreting a statute, we must determine and effectuate the Legislature’s intent. To determine
legislative intent, we must focus on the statutory language. If it is clear and unambiguous, the statute is to
be applied as written. If the language is ambiguous, judicial construction is required. Piper v Pettibone
Corp, 450 Mich 565, 571-572; 542 NW2d 269 (1995). In interpreting a statute, the words used in
the statute must be given their ordinary and generally accepted meaning. Yaldo v North Pointe Ins Co,
217 Mich App 617, 621; 552 NW2d 657 (1996).
The no-fault insurance act is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed in favor of
persons who are intended to benefit from it. Putkamer v Transamerica Ins Corp of America, 454
Mich 626, 631; 563 NW2d 683 (1997). The intent of the Legislature in enacting MCL 500.3106;
MSA 24.13106(2) was to “eliminate duplication of benefits for work-related injuries except where the
actual driving or operation of a motor vehicle is involved.” Lee v Nat’l Union Fire Ins Co, 207 Mich
App 323, 327; 523 NW2d 900 (1994).
The trial court applied subsection (a), concluding that because plaintiff’s injury occurred during
the unloading of the truck, no-fault benefits were precluded. Plaintiff argues that subsection (b) should
apply, entitling him to benefits because he was injured while getting out of the truck immediately after it
became disabled. If plaintiff’s vehicle were in fact disabled, we agree that subsection (b) should apply.
A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that specific statutory provisions control over general
provisions. Gebhardt v O’Rourke, 444 Mich 535, 542-543; 510 NW2d 900 (1994).
Thus, the question is whether plaintiff’s truck was disabled within the meaning of MCL
500.3106(2)(b); MSA 24.13106(2)(b). The term “disabled,” as used in MCL 500.3106(2)(b); MSA
24.13106(2)(b), “requires some sort of motor vehicle disability.” Lee, supra at 329. Plaintiff
presented evidence that, because hydraulic fluid had sprayed all over his windows and mirrors, he could
not see out of the cab and therefore could not safely drive. The hydraulic line that burst was connected
to the loading/unloading system of the truck and not its engine.
Keeping in mind that the statute is to be liberally construed, Putkamer, supra, we conclude that
on the facts of this case, as alleged by plaintiff, the truck was functionally disabled. Although the engine
was not affected and the vehicle could be operated, the facts, viewed in a light most favorable to
plaintiff, establish that he was not able to safely drive the truck because his visibility was impaired. We
find that plaintiff established a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether he is entitled to benefits
under MCL 500.3106(2)(b); MSA 24.13106(2)(b). Therefore, the trial court erred in granting
defendant’s motion for summary disposition.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
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