WALTER MALCZEWSKYI V STATE LOTTERY BUREAU
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
WALTER MALCZEWSKYI,
UNPUBLISHED
July 15, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 192186
Court of Claims
LC No. 95-015913-CM
STATE OF MICHIGAN and BUREAU
OF LOTTERY,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Neff, P.J., and Wahls and Taylor, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting defendants summary disposition pursuant to
MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10), and dismissing plaintiff’s proposed class action lawsuit for breach of
contract. This case arose out of defendants’ refusal to pay plaintiff prize winnings in the “$5,000
Money Match” instant lottery game. Plaintiff believed he had won a $5,000 prize under his
interpretation of the game rules. We affirm.
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred when it ruled that the lottery ticket was not
ambiguous on its face. We disagree. The directions printed on the front of the game ticket provide that
“if ‘your prize’ matches ‘their prize’ in any game, win that prize amount.” Plaintiff argued that the
phrase “in any game” is a misplaced modifier that allowed the rules to be interpreted to mean that if any
dollar amount in the “your prize” column matched any dollar amount in the “their prize” column, then the
holder was a winner even though the matching icons were not necessarily found in the same horizontal
game row. On the back of the lottery ticket, however, it states that “all tickets, transactions and
winners are subject to lottery rules, directives and state law and any prospective and uniform changes
thereof.” Lottery Bureau Instant Game Directive No. 212 explains that “game” means horizontal row.
The rules adopted by the state with regard to awarding prizes under Michigan’s lottery act, MCL 432.1
et seq.; MSA 18.969(1) et seq., are promulgated pursuant to the administrative procedures act, MCL
24.201 et seq.; MSA 3.560(101) et seq., and are binding on those who choose to participate in the
lottery under principles of contract law. MCL 432.11; MSA 18.969(11); Coleman v Bureau of State
Lottery, 77 Mich App 349, 351; 258 NW2d 84 (1977); Paulsen v Bureau of State Lottery, 167
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Mich App 328, 333-334; 421 NW2d 678 (1988). In purchasing a ticket, the purchaser accepts the
bureau’s “public offer that the purchaser of a lottery ticket would have a chance of winning a prize
according to the advertised rules and procedures of the lottery,” and, in doing so, the purchaser agrees
“to the announced rules for determining prize winners.” Coleman, supra at 351. Since the announced
rules on plaintiff's ticket referenced lottery directives, the trial court properly concluded that Directive
No. 212 was a term of the contract.
Plaintiff’s interpretation of the game rules can stand only when the ticket directions are
considered in a vacuum. In determining that the lottery ticket was not ambiguous, the trial court
properly considered the ticket’s reference to four chances to win, Directive No. 212, and the physical
layout of the ticket, i.e., the existence of four solid horizontal lines across the prize columns. The
horizontal lines and the numbering of the games communicate the fact that the ticket contains four
games, each separated by a solid, horizontal line. To hold that the lottery ticket was ambiguous on its
face by considering only the phraseology relied on by plaintiff would ignore the physical layout of the
ticket. It would also violate the general principle that requires trial courts to construe contracts as a
whole, giving “harmonious effect, if possible, to each word and phrase.” Singer v Goff, 334 Mich
163, 168; 54 NW2d 290 (1952).
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred when it found that no genuine issue of material fact
existed, claiming that he met his burden under MCR 2.116(C)(10) as non-moving party to show that a
genuine issue of material fact existed by submitting evidentiary material. McCart v J Walter Thompson
USA, Inc, 437 Mich 109, 115; 469 NW2d 284 (1991). At the initial hearing, plaintiff provided only
his own affidavit as evidence of the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. He claimed that he was
induced to purchase a ticket upon a reading of the rules on the face of the ticket. Defendants did not
dispute any of the factual allegations contained in plaintiff’s affidavit. Later, in support of a motion for
reconsideration, plaintiff provided the trial court with a report of an expert witness, who stated that the
ticket directions contain a grammatical error.
In support of his claim on appeal that his affidavit and expert’s opinion raise a question of fact
rather than a question of law, plaintiff cites SSC Assocs Ltd Partnership v Gen Retirement Sys of
Detroit, 192 Mich App 360; 480 NW2d 275 (1991). There, this Court held that where the meaning
of a phrase in a contract was disputed, that alone was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact
regarding the parties’ intent. Id. at 366. Plaintiff’s reliance is misplaced. The dispute in SSC involved
the meaning of a phrase found in a private contract drafted by the parties. Id.. at 362. This was not a
private contract and plaintiff did not participate in drafting the contract so there can be no question of
the parties having differing intent at the time the contract was written as was the case in SSC. The terms
of this contract were set by law pursuant to the lottery act and the administrative procedures act. MCL
432.11; MSA 18.969(911); MCL 24.201 et seq.; MSA 3.5600(101) et seq. Also, the plain meaning
of the disputed phrase is not ambiguous when the contract is construed as a whole, i.e., when the ticket
and the game directive are read together. In deciding a motion for summary disposition in a breach of
contract action, a court may interpret the contract if its terms are clear. SSC, supra at 363. Whether
plaintiff was a prize winner under this contract is a question of law and not a question of fact.
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Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in ruling that he failed to state a claim on which relief
could be granted pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8). We disagree. A defendant is not entitled to summary
disposition if the plaintiff’s complaint contains well-pleaded allegations which, if proved, state a claim on
which relief could be granted, i.e., the claim is not so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no
factual development could possibly justify a right of recovery. Wade v Dep’t of Corrections, 439
Mich 158, 163; 483 NW2d 26 (1992); Hansman v Imlay City State Bank, 121 Mich App 424, 427;
328 NW2d 653 (1982). Plaintiff sought relief under a breach of contract theory. On its face, the
complaint contained all the elements of breach of contract and an adequate prayer for relief. However,
while a trial court must accept a complaint’s factual allegations as true and may not look to evidence
beyond the complaint itself, the trial court may not ignore the law in determining the legal sufficiency of a
claim. In this case, Instant Game Directive No. 212 carried the force of law and was properly
considered. That directive established that defendants owed plaintiff no duty to pay the prize money
under the contract as a matter of law. Accordingly, plaintiff failed to state a claim on which relief could
be granted.
Affirmed.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Myron H. Wahls
/s/ Clifford W. Taylor
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