PEOPLE OF MI V DUSHON L GRANDBERRY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 1, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 193380
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 94-013031
DUSHON L. GRANDBERRY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: White, P.J., and Bandstra and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of felonious assault, MCL 750.82; MSA 28.277, and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2).
Defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms of two years’ imprisonment for the felony firearm
conviction and six months’ to four years’ imprisonment for the felonious assault conviction. Defendant
appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant’s convictions arise out of an apparent family feud culminating in defendant’s shooting
at the complainant, defendant’s brother-in-law.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charges
against him because he was denied his right to due process by the ten-month delay between the time of
the offenses and the time of his arrest.1 We disagree.
The Due Process Clause plays a limited role in preventing unjustified prearrest delay. People v
White, 208 Mich App 126, 134; 527 NW2d 34 (1994). In determining whether dismissal is warranted
by a delay, the defendant must show substantial prejudice to his right to a fair trial and intent by the
prosecution to gain a tactical advantage. Id. In this case, we agree with the trial court that defendant’s
assertion of prejudice was speculative. Moreover, defendant has not alleged that the prosecution
intended the delay to gain a tactical advantage. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err in
denying defendant’s motion to dismiss. Id. at 135.
-1
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial on the
ground that the jury’s verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. We disagree.
To determine whether a verdict is against the great weight of the evidence a judge must review
the whole body of proofs. People v Herbert, 444 Mich 466, 475; 511 NW2d 654 (1993). It follows
that a judge may grant a new trial after finding the testimony of the witnesses for the prevailing party not
to be credible. Id. However, such an exercise of judicial power must be undertaken with great caution,
“keeping in mind the special role accorded jurors under our constitutional system of justice.” Id. This
Court reviews a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. Id.
In this case, the main issue at trial was the identification of defendant as the shooter. Although
the credibility of the complainant’s identification of defendant was called into question by his reluctance
to identify defendant and by the timing of his eventual identification of defendant, the complainant’s
identification was corroborated by the testimony of his son and nephew who also witnessed the
shooting. The trial judge, who had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, expressly
stated that the testimony of the complainant’s son and nephew was credible or, at least, was “not
inherently incredible.” Because competent testimony identifying defendant as the shooter was presented
at trial, we can not find that the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for new trial constituted an
abuse of discretion.
Finally, defendant argues that four instances of prosecutorial misconduct denied him a fair and
impartial trial. However, defendant failed to timely object to the remarks that he now claims as error.
Thus, our review is foreclosed unless a curative instruction could not have eliminated the prejudicial
effect of the remarks or our failure to consider the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice. People
v McElhaney, 215 Mich App 269, 283; 545 NW2d 18 (1996).
With respect to three of the four instances of prosecutorial misconduct alleged by defendant in
this case either no error occurred or a cautionary instruction could have eliminated any prejudice that
did occur. The fourth instance of prosecutorial misconduct alleged by defendant did constitute an
improper, albeit brief, argument. However, a miscarriage of justice did not result where the prosecutor
complied with the trial court’s sua sponte directive to not continue that particular line of argument.
Affirmed.
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
1
In this case, defendant’s offenses occurred in January, 1994. The complaint and warrant for
defendant’s arrest issued in May, 1994. Defendant was not arrested and the information was not filed
until November, 1994.
-2
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