TWP OF SANDS V WALTER RACINE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
TOWNSHIP OF SANDS,
UNPUBLISHED
June 24, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
KENDRICK S. THOMPSON, LEDA
THOMPSON, KATHY FOULKS, STEVE
FOULKS, EULAINE HARTWIG, JAMES
HARTWIG, GAIL HEALY, JUDD HEALY,
RAYMOND C. HILLER, MI Y. HILLER, BART
KIDDER, JAMES KIDDER, CAROL MYERS,
ROBERT MYERS, NANCY OLSON, HELEN
PETERS and ROGER PETERS,
Intervening PlaintiffsCross Appellants,
v
No. 192408
Marquette Circuit Court
LC No. 92-027490-CZ
WALTER RACINE,
Defendant-AppelleeCross Appellee.
Before: O'Connell, P.J., and Sawyer and Markman, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Township of Sands sought an injunction to prevent defendant from continuing the non
conforming use of his property as a racetrack and intervening plaintiffs sought an abatement of the
operation of the racetrack on the ground that it was a nuisance. The trial court denied the injunction
finding that defendant had not abandoned the valid non-conforming use and that the use did not
constitute a nuisance. Plaintiff and intervening plaintiffs (hereinafter collectively referred to as
“plaintiffs”) now appeal these decisions as of right. We affirm.
-1
The parties agree that defendant’s property was used as a racetrack prior to the adoption of the
township zoning ordinance and that it, therefore, was a valid non-conforming use at the time the zoning
ordinance was adopted. Plaintiffs argue that the prior owner of the land abandoned the non-conforming
use when races were not held at the track in 1976 and 1977 and that defendant abandoned the non
conforming use when he conducted activities that were non-commercial from 1986 through 1990.
Defendant argues that there was continual racing of some form or another on the track through 1976
and 1977 and that the totality of circumstances, including related non-commercial activities from 1986
through 1990, evidenced his intent not to abandon the non-conforming use.
This Court reviews the trial court’s decision de novo giving great weight to its findings. Rogers
v City of Allen Park, 186 Mich App 33, 36; 463 NW2d 431 (1990). The trial court’s findings of fact
will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Eveline Twp v H & D Trucking Co, 181 Mich App 25,
29-30; 448 NW2d 727 (1989). With regard to plaintiffs’ argument that racing ceased in 1976 and
1977, there is conflicting evidence. The prior owner testified that racing stopped during that time but a
race car driver testified that there was continual racing from 1969 through 1987 or 1988. Although the
evidence of continued use was hardly overwhelming, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in
finding that there was racing on the track from 1969 through 1985.
Plaintiffs further argue that defendant lost the non-conforming use status when he did not
conduct races for profit on the premises from 1986 through 1990. We disagree. Michigan law requires
that, in order to show abandonment of the nonconforming use, the township must show both nonuse
and an intent to abandon the use. Dusdal v City of Warren, 387 Mich 354, 360; 196 NW2d 778
(1972); Fredal v Forster, 9 Mich App 215, 231; 156 NW2d 606 (1967). The township was
required to demonstrate “an intent to abandon the use and some act or omission on the part of the
owner or holder which clearly manifests his or her voluntary decision to abandon it.” Norton Shores v
Carr, 81 Mich App 715, 721; 265 NW2d 802 (1978). During the 1986-1990 period, defendant,
apparently suffering from financial circumstances that prevented regular race-track use, nevertheless
sought out information on how to maintain the non-conforming use, maintained the property in a manner
adequate to keep it usable as a racetrack and conducted occasional race-related activities at the track.
In his actions, defendant made a sufficient showing that he had no intention of abandoning the use of the
property as a racetrack. The trial court did not clearly err, based on the above case law, in finding that
defendant did not abandon the non-conforming use.
Plaintiffs argue that the non-conforming use should have been abated because defendant
expanded the use by bringing concrete slabs and a trailer onto the property. The trial court did not err
in finding that the concrete slabs were not an expansion of the non-conforming use in light of testimony
that such slabs were going to be used to replace already existing earthen pads at the racetrack. Such
maintenance of the racetrack is not an expansion of the non-conforming use. City of Madison Heights
v Manto, 359 Mich 244, 250; 102 NW2d 182 (1960). Further, the trial court’s decision to deal
separately with the trailer and not abate the entire non-conforming use is not an unreasonable decision
and is affirmed. Norton Shores, supra at 724.
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Next, while plaintiffs are correct that public policy favors the gradual elimination of non
conforming uses, id. at 720, because there was no abandonment of the use in this case, this policy was
not relevant to the trial court’s decision and its failure to take cognizance of this policy does not require
reversal. The cases cited by plaintiffs exclusively address this policy in the context of the expansion of
non-conforming uses rather than in the context of the abandonment of such uses.
Plaintiffs also argue that this Court should find that, if the trial court had ruled on the estoppel
issue, it would have affirmed the rule of non-estoppel of the township and eliminated any reliance alleged
by defendant on the recommendations of township officials as a basis for finding that he had not
abandoned the nonconforming use. The trial court correctly noted in its opinion that it was unnecessary
to address the estoppel issue because of its decision with regard to abandonment. Although the trial
court noted that defendant spoke with township officials regarding how to maintain his grandfathered
status, it referenced this only as an example of how defendant had demonstrated that he did not intend
to abandon the non-conforming use. The trial court did not find that the township was estopped from
raising the issue on the basis of these conversations.
Intervening plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in failing to find that the operation of the
racetrack constituted a nuisance in fact. We disagree. The trial court’s findings that the noise from the
track did not cause actual physical discomfort to anyone, and that the time and duration of the noise was
reasonably limited, are adequately supported by the record. Dusdal, supra; Smith v Western Wayne
Co Ass’n, 380 Mich 526, 536; 158 NW2d 463 (1968). Further, the trial court’s findings that the area
is heavily wooded and is neither as residential as plaintiffs claim nor as rural as defendant claims are
supported by the exhibits contained in the record. The trial court’s handling of this issue by limiting the
time, duration and decibel level of the races and by retaining supervision of the case assures plaintiffs of
“ready and speedy relief should an actionable nuisance develop because of excessive noise.”1 Smith,
supra at 545.
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O'Connell
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
1
In view of the potential tensions between the parties' enjoyment of the use of their respective
properties, we encourage the trial court to retain its supervision of this matter for a reasonable period of
time. Perhaps even more significantly, however, defendant's counsel indicated his client's recognition of
the need to take into consideration the interests of the intervening plaintiffs. Whatever legal rights are
afforded defendant by this Court's decision, there is nothing that precludes him from undertaking, as a
good neighbor in the community, additional accomodations to the intervenors that may be reasonably
possible.
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