PEOPLE OF MI V JAMES COON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 20, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 183438
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 94-004573
GEROME NORFLEET,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 183441
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 94-004573
ANTONIO BOSTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 185851
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 94-004573
JAMES COON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and White and A. T. Davis, Jr.*, JJ.
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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PER CURIAM.
Following a joint trial before separate juries on charges arising out of the robbery of a furniture
store during which the store manager was shot and killed, defendant Norfleet was convicted of first
degree murder, MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548, armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797, and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2), and
defendant Boston was convicted of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317; MSA 28.797, and armed
robbery. Defendant Norfleet was sentenced to serve concurrent prison terms of life imprisonment for
murder and twenty to sixty years for armed robbery, consecutive to a two-year term for felony-firearm.
Defendant Boston was sentenced to serve two concurrent prison terms of fifty to seventy-five years for
his murder and armed robbery convictions. Following a separate jury trial, defendant Coon was
convicted of armed robbery for his role in the offense, and was sentenced to serve twenty to thirty years
in prison. Defendants’ respective appeals of right were consolidated by this Court.
In the late afternoon of April 1, 1994, Mohammed “Mike” Berri was shot and killed during the
robbery of the furniture store that he managed in Detroit. Although there were no eyewitnesses to the
murder, witnesses testified that defendants were in the store that afternoon and were seen walking back
toward the store shortly before the murder. On the basis of information provided by an unnamed
informant, police officers arrested defendants Norfleet and Boston four days after the robbery.
Defendant Coon was arrested at his home later that night. After questioning by officers, defendants
signed written statements implicating themselves in the robbery and murder.
No. 183438
Defendant Norfleet first contends that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting Sergeant
Danny Maynard to testify regarding the substance of a tip provided by an unnamed informant.
Defendant argues that the evidence was inadmissible hearsay. We disagree. The trial court’s decision
to admit evidence will not be interfered with on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. People v
McElhaney, 215 Mich App 269, 280; 545 NW2d 18 (1996). The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the evidence in this case because, contrary to defendant’s assertion, the evidence
was not hearsay because it was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but rather
demonstrated Sergeant Maynard’s state of mind by explaining why he took actions that led to
defendant’s arrest. See People v Lewis, 168 Mich App 255, 267; 423 NW2d 637 (1988).
Defendant Norfleet next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence
regarding his involvement in another robbery. Over defendant’s objection, Alburene Grays testified that
the pager found at the crime scene and registered to her was stolen at gunpoint by Norfleet a month
before the murder. Although this evidence may have been logically relevant under MRE 404(b)
inasmuch as it connected defendant to the scene, People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 74; 508 NW2d
114 (1993), we agree with defendant that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence
given that its slight probative value was substantially outweighed by its highly prejudicial nature. In
balancing prejudicial effect against probative value under MRE 403, the trial court should consider
whether presentation of the evidence is necessary to satisfy an element of the prosecution's case or
whether it will merely be cumulative. Id. at 75. Here, defendant’s presence at the crime scene was
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established through the testimony of other witnesses as well as defendant’s own police statement. Thus,
the probative value of the evidence was practically nil. Nonetheless, viewing the admission of this
evidence in the context of the other evidence of defendant’s guilt, and the limiting instructions given by
the trial court, in accordance with VanderVliet, supra, we conclude that any error was harmless.
Defendant Norfleet next argues that the trial court erred in failing to suppress his inculpatory
statement on the grounds that it was the product of physical abuse and made in violation of his right to
counsel. We disagree. Although the determination of whether a defendant’s confession is voluntary is a
question of law, we give ample deference to the trial court’s findings due to its superior position in
viewing the evidence. People v Mack, 190 Mich App 7, 17; 475 NW2d 830 (1991). Upon review
of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession, we find that the statement was freely and
voluntarily made. People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 334; 429 NW2d 781 (1988). Other than the
conflicting testimony of defendant and two police officers, there was no evidence presented with regard
to defendant’s contention that he was physically abused. Giving deference to the trial court’s finding
that the alleged abuse by one officer did not create a coercive atmosphere which prompted defendant to
sign a written statement during later questioning by another officer, we find that the trial court did not err
in determining that the statement was voluntarily made. Mack, supra at 17. With respect to
defendant’s alternate ground for suppression, we decline to address it because the issue is not
preserved for appellate review. People v Lino (After Remand), 213 Mich App 89, 94; 539 NW2d
545 (1995).
Defendant Norfleet next contends that he was denied a fair trial by the prosecutor’s questioning
of witness Alexander Murphy. Because defendant failed to preserve this issue by objecting at trial or
requesting a curative instruction, review is foreclosed unless manifest injustice would result from the
failure to review or the error was so egregious that a curative instruction could not have removed the
resulting prejudice. People v Paquette, 214 Mich App 336, 343; 543 NW2d 342 (1995). No
manifest injustice would result from our failure to review because the prosecutor did not use Murphy’s
testimony as a springboard to introduce substantive evidence under the guise of rebutting the witness’
denial of a prior inconsistent statement. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 693; 521 NW2d 557
(1994). No extrinsic evidence was introduced in this case. Rather, the prosecutor properly used
Murphy’s prior written statement to refresh his recollection and impeach the witness. MRE 612;
People v Malone, 180 Mich App 347, 359; 447 NW2d 157 (1989). Any prejudice arising out of the
prosecutor’s recitation of the content of the statement was eliminated by the trial court’s instruction to
the jury that attorney questions are not evidence.
Defendant Norfleet next argues that the trial court improperly instructed the jury with regard to
both the concept of “reasonable doubt” and the inference that may be drawn from the use of a
dangerous weapon. Because defendant failed to preserve these issues by objecting below, we will
grant relief only if necessary to avoid manifest injustice. People v Van Dorsten, 441 Mich 540, 545;
494 NW2d 737 (1993). No manifest injustice would result from our failure to review because the trial
court’s instructions accurately presented both the concept of reasonable doubt, People v Hubbard,
217 Mich App 459, 482-483; 552 NW2d 493 (1996), and the principle that the jurors could infer
malice from the use of a deadly weapon. People v Martin, 392 Mich 553, 561; 221 NW2d 336
(1974).
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With respect to defendant Norfleet’s final contention, we agree that his conviction of both first
degree felony murder and armed robbery violate his right against double jeopardy under Const 1963,
art 1, § 15. People v Wilder, 411 Mich 328, 347; 308 NW2d 112 (1981). We therefore vacate
defendant’s conviction and sentence for armed robbery. People v Gimotty, 216 Mich App 254, 259;
549 NW2d 39 (1996).
No. 183441
Defendant Boston first argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court erred in
refusing his challenge for cause to a prospective juror, forcing him to exercise a peremptory challenge to
excuse the juror. A four part test is used in determining whether an error in refusing a challenge for
cause necessitates reversal of a defendant’s conviction.
There must be a clear and independent showing on the record that (1) the court
improperly denied a challenge for cause, (2) the aggrieved party exhausted all
peremptory challenges, (3) the party demonstrated the desire to excuse another
subsequently summoned juror, and (4) the juror whom the party wished later to excuse
was objectionable. [People v Lee, 212 Mich App 228, 248-249; 537 NW2d 233
(1995).]
Here, the record does not reflect that defense counsel desired to excuse another juror after she
exhausted all available peremptory challenges. Accordingly, error requiring reversal of defendant’s
otherwise valid conviction did not occur.
Defendant Boston next argues that the trial court erred in failing to suppress his inculpatory
statement on the grounds that it was the byproduct of an illegal arrest and was involuntarily made. We
disagree. A confession that stems from an illegal arrest is not admissible. People v Richardson, 204
Mich App 71, 78; 514 NW2d 503 (1994). A police officer may make a warrantless arrest “[w]hen a
felony in fact has been committed and the peace officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person
has committed it.” MCL 764.15(1)(c); MSA 28.874(1)(c). When, as occurred here, the information
forming the basis of probable cause is obtained from an informant, it “must be comprised of sufficient
facts to permit an independent determination that the person supplying the information is reliable and that
the information is based on something more than casual rumor.” People v Oliver, 417 Mich 366, 374;
338 NW2d 167 (1983). Here, the informant’s knowledge of details of the crime that were not divulged
to the public demonstrates that he was reliable and that his information was based on more than casual
rumor. Giving deference to the trial court’s ability to judge Sergeant Maynard’s credibility when he
testified that defendant was named by the informant as being involved in the crime, we find that the
informant’s tip established the probable cause necessary to support the arrest. Accordingly, the trial
court properly denied the portion of defendant’s motion premised on this ground.
With respect to defendant Boston’s contention that his statement was not voluntarily made, we
find that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. Although the determination of
whether a defendant’s confession is voluntary is a question of law, we give ample deference to the trial
court’s findings due to its superior position in viewing the evidence. Mack, supra at 17. Upon review
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of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession and giving deference to the trial court’s
ability to judge defendant’s credibility, we find that defendant was not coerced into signing the
statement. Considering defendant’s age and his understanding of both his rights and the nature of the
questioning, his assertion that a threat of life imprisonment prompted him to sign the statement is not
credible. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in declining to suppress the statement because it was
voluntarily made. Cipriano, supra at 334. We decline to address defendant’s remaining argument that
the statement was made in violation of his right to counsel because the issue is not preserved for
appellate review. Lino, supra at 94.
Defendant Boston next contends that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting Sergeant
Danny Maynard to testify regarding the substance of a tip provided by an unnamed informant. We
disagree. The trial court’s decision to admit evidence will not be interfered with on appeal absent an
abuse of discretion. McElhaney, supra at 280. As discussed previously, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting the evidence in this case because, contrary to defendant’s assertion in the
lower court and on appeal, the evidence was not hearsay because it was not offered to prove the truth
of the matter asserted. See Lewis, supra at 267. For the first time on appeal, defendant Boston argues
that the evidence was inadmissible because it was irrelevant and, even if relevant, the danger of
prejudice far outweighed its probative value. Because defendant did not assert these bases for
exclusion at trial, the arguments are not preserved for appeal. Lino, supra at 94. Absent manifest
injustice, we will not review unpreserved evidentiary issues. People v Turner, 213 Mich App 558,
583; 540 NW2d 728 (1995). No manifest injustice would result from the failure to review in this case
because the evidence was not decisive to the outcome. Lee, supra at 241.
Defendant Boston next argues that the trial court erred when it failed to examine defense witness
Dedrich O’Neal in order to determine whether he validly invoked his testimonial privilege against self
incrimination. We find no error. Defendant failed to preserve this issue because he did not object
below or in any way assert that the witness invalidly invoked his privilege. A plain, unpreserved error
may not be considered for the first time on appeal unless it could have been decisive to the outcome of
the case, or falls within a category of cases where prejudice is presumed or reversal is automatic. Lee,
supra at 241. Here, the trial court properly excused the witness, defendant’s Boston’s brother, without
further interrogation because he had been named in the police statements of codefendants Norfleet and
Coon as the driver of the car used in the robbery. Any statement during questioning might have
incriminated the witness. People v Lawton, 196 Mich App 341, 346-347; 492 NW2d 810 (1992).
Defendant Boston next contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel by trial
counsel’s failure to impeach the testimony of a witness and inadequately arguing his motion to suppress.
Upon review of the record, we conclude that, even if counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, defendant has failed to show that but for counsel’s performance the
outcome of the trial would have been different. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 338; 521 NW2d
797 (1994). Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to appellate relief on this issue.
Defendant Boston’s final arguments on appeal relate to his sentencing. Defendant initially
contends that the trial court improperly scored Offense Variable (OV) 3 for purposes of
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calculating the sentencing guidelines range. In light of People v Mitchell, 454 Mich 145, 176; ___
NW2d ___ (1997), in which the Michigan Supreme Court held that errors regarding guidelines
calculation do not present a reviewable issue on appeal, we decline to address this issue.
Next, we agree with defendant’s contention that the trial court improperly considered his refusal
to admit guilt in fashioning the sentence. Although a defendant’s lack of remorse and low potential for
rehabilitation are legitimate sentencing considerations, a defendant’s refusal to admit guilt is not. People
v Houston, 448 Mich 312, 323 (Boyle, J.), 326 (Brickley, C.J.); 532 NW2d 508 (1995); People v
Wesley, 428 Mich 708, 713, 725; 411 NW2d 159 (1987). Here, when explaining his sentencing
decision, the trial judge repeatedly referred to defendant’s assertion of his innocence, at one point
stating that he was “incensed” by defendant’s decision to assert his innocence at the hearing. Given this
clear indication that an improper factor was considered, resentencing is appropriate. People v Hicks,
149 Mich App 737, 748; 386 NW2d 657 (1986).
Upon review of the trial court’s remarks, we disagree with defendant Boston’s contentions that
the trial court improperly made an independent finding of guilt with respect to felony murder and
improperly imposed a harsh sentence in order to send a message to the community. The trial court did
not make an independent finding of guilt, but rather permissibly considered that the evidence was
sufficient to convict defendant of the higher offense of which he was acquitted. People v Shavers, 448
Mich 389, 393-394; 531 NW2d 165 (1995). The trial court also properly considered the protection
of society and the deterrence of others from committing like offenses when it sentenced defendant.
People v Johnson, 173 Mich App 706, 709; 434 NW2d 218 (1988). In light of our determination
that defendant must be resentenced, we express no opinion on whether the sentence imposed was
proportionate.
No. 185851
Defendant Coon first asserts that the prosecutor failed to present sufficient evidence to convict
him of armed robbery. When determining whether sufficient evidence was presented, we must view the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could
find the essential elements of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440
Mich 508, 514; 489 NW2d 748, modified 441 Mich 1201 (1992). The elements of the offense of
armed robbery are: (1) an assault; and (2) a felonious taking of property from the victim’s person or
presence (3) while the defendant is armed with a dangerous weapon or an article used or fashioned to
appear to be a dangerous weapon. MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797; People v King, 210 Mich App
425, 428; 534 NW2d 534 (1995). A defendant may be charged as a principal but convicted as an
aider and abettor. Turner, supra at 568.
Defendant argues that the evidence established as a matter of law that he voluntarily abandoned
any attempt to commit the offense when, as stated in his second statement to the police, he fled the store
after defendants Norfleet and Boston drew their handguns. Voluntary abandonment is an affirmative
defense to a charge of criminal attempt. People v Kimball, 109 Mich App 273, 286; 311 NW2d 343,
modified 412 Mich 890 (1981). See also People v Shafou, 416 Mich 113, 123; 330 NW2d 647
(1982) (opinion of F
itzgerald, C.J.). Because defendant was charged with armed robbery, not an
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attempt, the defense is inapplicable to this case. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, there was sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant aided and abetted an armed robbery by preparing for the crime and
then joining his codefendants in the store with the intent to rob it.
Defendant Coon next contends that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress his
second written statement on the ground that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda
rights. Although a reviewing court engages in a de novo review of the entire record, we will not disturb
a trial court’s factual findings regarding a knowing and intelligent waiver unless they are clearly
erroneous. People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 30; 551 NW2d 355 (1996). The prosecutor must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that, under the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation, a suspect properly waived his Miranda rights. Id. at 27. “To establish a valid waiver, the
state must present evidence sufficient to demonstrate that the accused understood that he did not have
to speak, that he had the right to the presence of counsel, and that the state could use what he said in a
later trial against him.” Id. at 29. Upon review of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
waiver in this case, we find that the trial court did not clearly err in determining that defendant
understood his rights. Defendant’s signing of a written waiver is strong evidence that the waiver was
valid. Id. at 31. There is no evidence on the record even remotely suggesting that defendant, who was
twenty years-old at the time of the questioning, did not have the mental ability to comprehend his rights.
Given the interrogating officer’s uncontradicted testimony that there was no indication that defendant
was unable to understand his rights when they were read to him, the trial court did not err in denying the
motion to suppress.
Lastly, defendant Coon argues that his twenty- to thirty-year sentence is disproportionate. A
sentence must be proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and the offender. People v Milbourn,
435 Mich 630, 650; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). Because the sentence imposed was within the eight to
twenty year guidelines range calculated for defendant’s offense, it is presumptively proportionate.
People v Daniel, 207 Mich App 47, 54; 523 NW2d 830 (1994). Upon review of the offense and the
offender, defendant has failed to demonstrate the existence of “unusual circumstances” necessary to
rebut the presumption. People v Piotrowski, 211 Mich App 527, 532; 536 NW2d 293 (1995).
While defendant may not have pulled the trigger or taken money from the store, he willingly participated
in the planning and carrying out of a robbery that resulted in a death. Accordingly, we find that he trial
court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant. People v Odendahl, 200 Mich App 539,
541; 505 NW2d 16 (1993).
Defendant Norfleet’s conviction and sentence for armed robbery is vacated. Defendants’ other
convictions are affirmed, but remanded for resentencing in No. 183441. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Alton T. Davis, Jr.
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