PEOPLE OF MI V JAMES N YANT
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 13, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 177846
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 93-129187-FC
JAMES N. YANT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Griffin and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL
750.520b(1)(e); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(e), one count of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797,
five counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA
28.424(2), and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon, MCL 750.224f; MSA 28.421(6).
Defendant also pleaded guilty to being a third habitual offender, MCL 769.11; MSA 28.1083. He was
sentenced to terms of life imprisonment for the CSC convictions and twenty-five to forty years’
imprisonment for the armed robbery conviction. Those sentences were vacated, and defendant was
sentenced to a single term of life imprisonment for the habitual offender conviction. Defendant was also
sentenced to two years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm convictions and three to five years’
imprisonment for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial because of several instances of prosecutorial
misconduct. We disagree. Appellate review of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is generally precluded
absent objection by counsel because the trial court is otherwise deprived of an opportunity to cure the
error. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687; 521 NW2d 557 (1994); People v McElhaney, 215
Mich App 269, 283; 545 NW2d 18 (1996). An exception exists if a curative instruction could not
have eliminated the prejudicial effect or where failure to consider the issue would result in a miscarriage
of justice. Stanaway, supra; People v Nantelle, 215 Mich App 77, 87; 544 NW2d 667 (1996).
This Court reviews claims of prosecutorial misconduct on a case by case basis, examining the pertinent
portion of the record to evaluate the remarks in the context they were made. People v Bahoda, 448
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Mich 261, 266-267; 531 NW2d 659 (1995); People v Legrone, 205 Mich App 77, 82-83; 517
NW2d 270 (1994). The test of prosecutorial misconduct is whether the defendant was denied a fair
and impartial trial. McElhaney, supra at 283.
First, defendant argues that the prosecutor’s cross-examination of him improperly implied that
the previous defense attorney withdrew because he knew defendant’s story was false and refused to
participate in presenting it to the jury. A defense witness testified at trial that she went to the victim’s
home with defendant on the night of the incident and stayed there during the incident. The prosecutor
questioned the witness and defendant as to why the witness had not been brought forward sooner in the
case. During defendant’s cross-examination, the following exchange occurred:
Q [Prosecutor]: -- you indicated that you had this great concern for this woman who
was present during the course of time when you were having sex with this person. How
often have you talked to her? How often have you told her, “No, I don’t want you to
come forward”?
A [Defendant]: Well, I didn’t tell her I didn’t want her to come forward.
Q: Okay, so obviously she’s lying about that?
A: No, I didn’t say that. She --- my attorney suggested that we did not --- as far as
come forward, she already came forward. There was no other time for her to come
forward, except for today. She had, you know --- both my attorneys, my previous one
and Mr. Brown [current defense counsel], have known about her and known about her
being there with me.
Q: The other attorney who withdrew and refused to represent you, correct?
A: No. I had fired him because we had had a misrepresentation. Yes, and I let him
go.
Q: Is that what the order said, that you fired him?
A: I don’t remember what the order said, but he withdrew, yeah.
Defense counsel objected, stating that questions involving the attorney-client privilege and why the
previous counsel may have withdrawn were not permissible. The prosecutor responded that defendant
had raised the issue, but she would not pursue the matter further. No curative instruction was
requested.
Defendant argues that the only interpretation for the prosecutor’s questions was that the
previous defense attorney withdrew because he knew defendant’s story was false and refused to
participate in presenting it to the jury. The lower court record contains an order permitting defendant’s
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original counsel to withdraw from the case. The order indicates that the motion to withdraw was made
orally, but no reason is given for the withdrawal.
We agree that the way in which the prosecutor phrased her question regarding whether
defendant’s previous attorney “withdrew and refused” to represent him could have implied to the jury
that the attorney withdrew because he did not believe defendant’s story and refused to participate in
presenting it to the jury. However, we do not believe that the attorney-client privilege was violated as
argued by defense counsel when making the objection. Under MCL 767.5a(2); MSA 28.945(1)(2),
communications are privileged and confidential when they are necessary to enable an attorney to serve
as an attorney. People v Johnson, 203 Mich App 579, 584-585; 513 NW2d 824 (1994). The
purpose of the privilege is to enable a client to confide in an attorney, secure in the knowledge that the
communication will not be disclosed. Id. at 585. Although the statement by defendant that he fired the
attorney because they had a “misrepresentation” indicates that any further questions on the matter may
have revealed privileged communication and advice, because the prosecutor did not pursue the matter
further after defense counsel objected, there was no violation of the attorney-client privilege. Moreover,
a curative instruction could have eliminated any prejudicial effect of the prosecutor’s questions and,
therefore, defendant was not denied a fair trial.
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor’s questions implied that the current defense counsel
was participating in the fraud, and that this theme was revisited in the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument
when the prosecutor stated that defense counsel deliberately misrepresented the facts. However,
defendant did not object to these remarks.
Defendant argues that the prosecutor’s argument was an attempt to personally attack the
credibility of his counsel and mislead the jury. Although a prosecutor is free to argue the evidence and
all reasonable inferences from the evidence as it relates to the prosecution’s theory of the case, Bahoda,
supra at 282, a prosecutor cannot personally attack the defendant’s trial attorney because this type of
attack can infringe upon the defendant’s presumption of innocence, People v Kennebrew, 220 Mich
App 601, 607; 560 NW2d 354 (1996). However, remarks that might otherwise be improper may not
require reversal when they address issues raised by defense counsel. People v Simon, 174 Mich App
649, 655; 436 NW2d 695 (1989).
The prosecutor in this case stated that defense counsel made “major misstatements” and that
defense counsel deliberately tried to have the jury misinterpret or misunderstand some of the trial
testimony. Although we agree with defendant that the prosecutor’s remarks were excessive, we also
find that they were made in response to defense counsel’s arguments. In his closing argument, defense
counsel argued that the victim hung up on the 911 dispatcher, that Deputy Boes walked around the
victim’s home and did not see anything out of place and found the area clear, that the hospital nurse
used quote marks in her report to indicate what the victim told her after the incident but that none of the
statements were in the police report, and that no fingerprints of anyone other than defendant’s fingerprint
on a light were found anywhere in the house. The prosecutor properly responded to these arguments
by highlighting what the evidence supported and did not personally vouch for defendant’s guilt. There
was no error requiring reversal. See People v Phillips, 217 Mich App 489, 497-498; 552 NW2d
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487 (1996) (the prosecutor’s remarks during rebuttal argument were not improper where the
prosecutor charged that the defense counsel had inaccurately summarized the evidence presented and
did not personally attack the defense counsel or shift the jury’s focus from the evidence to the defense
counsel’s personality).
Next, defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly elicited testimony during his re-cross
examination with regard to his claim that he was a police informant without providing evidence to
support her assertions. Defendant failed to object to the prosecutor’s questions. Because a curative
instruction could have eliminated any prejudicial effect and failure to consider the issue would not result
in a miscarriage of justice, appellate review of the prosecutor’s remarks is precluded. Stanaway,
supra; McElhaney, supra; Nantelle, supra.
Finally, the prosecutor’s questioning of defendant about a police statement made by Tina Vitale
was improper because it assumed facts not in evidence. See People v Drake, 142 Mich App 357,
360; 370 NW2d 355 (1985). Nevertheless, we do not believe defendant was denied a fair trial
considering that the police statement was ultimately entered into evidence, that defense counsel was able
to extensively question the witness about the statement, and that the trial court instructed the jury that the
questions asked by the attorneys were not to be considered as evidence.
We affirm.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
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