FREMONT PUBLIC SCHOOLS V DEPT OF EDUCATION
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*STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
FREMONT PUBLIC SCHOOLS and FREMONT
PUBLIC SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION,
UNPUBLISHED
May 30, 1997
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, STATE OF
MICHIGAN and SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC
INSTRUCTION,
No. 191329
Newaygo Circuit Court
LC No. 95-15513-CZ
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and MacKenzie and A.P. Hathaway*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants appeal as of right from an order granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). We reverse and remand for entry of an order granting summary
disposition to defendants.
I
Plaintiffs brought suit challenging defendants’ formula for calculating funding for adult education
programs in the 1993-1994 school year under MCL 388.1707d; MSA 15.1919(1007d), referred to
as § 107d,1 and in the 1994-1995 school year under MCL 388.1707e; MSA 15.1919(1007e),
referred to as § 107e2. The amount of funding for adult education programs is determined on the basis
of “full-time equated membership” (FTE), the number of full-time program participants if part-time
students are included on a pro rata basis. Plaintiffs contended that defendants’ formula improperly
reduced the size of their adult education FTE in both the 1993-1994 and 1994-1995 school years
based on the district’s failure to meet program attendance and completion requirements under MCL
338.1707; MSA 15.1919(1007), referred to as § 1073. Plaintiffs argued that the failure to meet the §
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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107 performance requirements should have only resulted in a deduction from the dollar amount of
funding, not a reduction in their FTE. The parties filed cross-motions for summary disposition pursuant
to MCR 2.116(C)(10). The trial court concluded that although the statutes were ambiguous, plaintiffs’
formula was more consistent with the express language of the statutes. We find that the circuit court
erred in interpreting §§ 107d and 107e as it did because its construction is contrary to the statutes’ plain
language and renders the words relating to § 107 adjustments in those statutes meaningless.
II
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Cardinal Mooney High School v
Michigan High School Athletic Ass’n, 437 Mich 75, 80; 467 NW2d 21 (1991); Smeets v Genesee
Co Clerk, 193 Mich App 628, 633; 484 NW2d 770 (1992). Adjustments under § 107 are mentioned
twice in § 107d:
(2) Subject to…section 107, the amount a district…shall receive [in 1993
1994 state aid for adult education]…shall be an amount equal to the gross membership
allowance per pupil…received by the district in 1992-93, for up to a maximum number
of participants in 1993-94 equal to 80% of the 1992-93 full-time equated adult
education membership in the district…as counted in the 1992-93 fourth Friday
report…and as adjusted under section 107….
Stated simply, § 107d provides that state funding will be calculated by multiplying the 1992-1993 per
pupil allowance ($3,567.05) by eighty percent of the district’s 1992-1993 FTE, and that 1992-1993
FTE is computed by reference to the fourth Friday count as adjusted under § 107. The resulting figure
is then “[s]ubject to section 107.”
Contrary to plaintiffs’ arguments, this formula does not result in a double deduction. The
obvious purpose of the § 107 adjustment is to tie the amount of funding not to the number of students
who merely enroll in an adult education program, but rather to the number of students who actually
attend and complete the program, as evidenced by the audit and reimbursement requirement in that
statute. Adult education programs are not compulsory; for a variety of reasons, enrollees may sign up
for classes but not complete them. When adult education students enroll but do not attend or complete
courses – stated otherwise, when the district fails to meet the performance standards -- the fourth
Friday enrollment count becomes an artificially inflated figure that is not reflective of the true number of
students actually served by a district’s adult education program. Initial enrollment figures must be
adjusted to account for student attrition in order to more accurately reflect the true number of students
benefiting from the program. If the school district fails to meet the performance standards and the
unadjusted, initial enrollment is used to formulate the next year’s aid payment, the calculation based on
that inflated figure defeats the statutory purpose of tying the amount of aid to the actual number of
participants served by the district. Therefore, not only must the school district reimburse the state for
the previous year’s overpayment under § 107, but the number of participants for the previous year must
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be adjusted from the initial count to the actual number who attended and completed the program, as
reflected in the adjustments under § 107.
Similarly, § 107e specifically provides that the basis for calculating the number of FTEs is the
number “in the final audited 1993-1994 participant count, after adjustments under former section
107, [and] as adjusted for the change in the basis for determining full-time equated participants from
480 to 900 hours.” Like § 107d, this section explicitly states that the number of FTEs must be adjusted
to reflect the actual number of full-time equated participants after audit under § 107. This is precisely
what defendants’ formula did.
Furthermore, the versions of § 107 in effect during the school years at issue expressly provided
that school districts were to reimburse the state for its funding of students who failed to attend or
complete their programs. Had the Legislature intended school aid to be formulated as plaintiffs contend,
any reference in §§ 107d and 107e to the § 107 adjustments would have been completely unnecessary
because the deductions were already mandated by § 107 itself. Thus, plaintiffs’ interpretation cannot be
sustained because it renders the statutory language in §§ 107d and 107e relating to adjustments under §
107 mere surplusage. Altman v Meridian Twp, 439 Mich 623, 635; 487 NW2d 155 (1992). The
circuit court erred in granting summary disposition in favor of plaintiffs and in denying summary
disposition in favor of defendants.
II
Ten days after entry of the order granting plaintiffs’ motion, the Legislature retroactively
amended § 107e in response to this case and another case, Newaygo Public Schools v Dep’t of
Education, Newaygo circuit case no. 94-14873-CZ. 1995 PA 130, § 1, immediately effective June
30, 1995.4 Two paragraphs were added to clarify the role of § 107 adjustments in determining funding.
The amended statute clearly mandated use of the formula employed by defendants, contrary to the
circuit court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of plaintiffs. Defendants immediately moved
for reconsideration, but the motion was denied. On appeal, defendants contend that the court erred
when it failed to grant their motion for reconsideration. We agree.
The holding of Romein v General Motors Corp, 436 Mich 515, 533; 462 NW2d 555
(1990), aff’d 503 US 181; 112 S Ct 1105; 117 L Ed 2d 328 (1992), is inapplicable to the instant case
because the amendments were a clarification of the original legislation, not a modification of existing law.
The effect of clarifying amendments was addressed in Detroit v Walker, 445 Mich 682; 520 NW2d
135 (1994). In that case, our Supreme Court s
tated that “[i]t is well settled . . . that when an
amendment is enacted soon after controversies arise regarding the meaning of the original act, ‘it is
logical to regard the amendment as a legislative interpretation of the original act.’” Id. at 697, quoting
Detroit Edison Co v Revenue Dep’t, 320 Mich 506, 519-521; 31 NW2d 809 (1948). In such
cases, “the amendment . . . clarifies what the . . . [legislative] intent had been all along.” Id. Although in
this case plaintiffs attempt to frame the issue as whether the Legislature could retroactively affect the trial
court’s decision and order, the relevant question is whether the trial court erred by denying defendants’
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motion for reconsideration in the face of cogent evidence that the court’s interpretation of § 107e was
clearly at odds with the legislative intent “all along.” Because the amendments to § 107e were a
legislative interpretation of that statute demonstrating that the Department’s formula was consistent with
the legislative intent behind that statute, the trial court erred when it denied defendants’ motion for
reconsideration.
Reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting defendants’ motion for summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
/s/ Amy P. Hathaway
1
Section 107d was repealed by 1993 PA 336, § 3, effective October 1, 1994.
2
Section 107e was repealed by 1995 PA 130, § 3, effective October 1, 1995.
3
Like § 107d, § 107 was repealed by 1993 PA 336, § 3, effective October 1, 1994. However, the
performance criteria of § 107 were incorporated into § 107e when it was in effect.
4
This statute was also repealed by 1995 PA 130, § 3, effective October 1, 1995.
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