CULLEY ROBINSON V MICHIGAN BASIC PROPERTY INSUR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CULLEY ROBINSON and
CATHERINE ROBINSON,
UNPUBLISHED
May 30, 1997
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 191048
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 94-424251-CK
MICHIGAN BASIC PROPERTY INSURANCE
ASSOCIATION, a Michigan Corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Kelly and Gribbs, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right the dismissal of their claim for failure to post security for defendant's
costs as ordered by the trial court. Plaintiffs ask this Court to reverse the trial court's order denying
plaintiffs’ motion for remediation and its order of dismissal. We reverse and remand for remediation.
Plaintiffs brought this action seeking an order requiring defendant to provide insurance coverage
in the amount of $116,685.33 for loss of their home in a fire. Defendant denied liability, claiming that
the loss was excluded from coverage under the insurance policy, the fire being the result of arson
committed by or at the behest of plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs' first attorney moved to withdraw as counsel following a conversation with a defense
witness. The trial court granted the motion and entered an order on May 4, 1995, adjourning mediation
for a minimum of thirty days and directing plaintiffs to obtain new counsel within thirty days if they
intended to be further represented in this matter. Plaintiffs failed to obtain new counsel within the
allotted time and instead retained new counsel two days before the scheduled mediation. At mediation,
plaintiffs' new counsel attempted to make an appearance on their behalf. However, the trial court and
the mediation panel refused to admit plaintiffs’ attorney to the mediation hearing. The matter mediated
for $10,001.
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Following mediation, the trial court denied plaintiffs' motion for remediation and granted
defendant's motion for security for costs. The trial court dismissed this action because plaintiffs failed to
comply with the latter order.
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to grant their motion for
remediation, arguing that the trial court violated their right to civil representation by barring their attorney
from participating in the mediation hearing. Plaintiffs further advance that they are entitled to remediate
this matter with their counsel present. We agree.
We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny remediation for an abuse of discretion. See
Kattula v D G Standhardt Assoc’s, Inc, 132 Mich App 49, 55 (1984). We will find an abuse of
discretion only when, reviewing the facts upon which the trial court acted, an unprejudiced person
would say a mistake has been made. Torrico v Detroit-Macomb Hospital Corp, ___ Mich App ___;
___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 184860, rel’d 2/7/97) slip opinion at 3.
The Michigan Constitution guarantees “[a] suitor in any court of this state has the right to
prosecute or defend his suit, either in his own proper person or by an attorney.” Const 1963, Art I, §
13; Rocky Produce, Inc v Frontera, 181 Mich App 516, 517; 449 NW2d 916 (1989). If the suitor
chooses to prosecute his or her suit with the assistance of an attorney, “the attorney may appear by an
act indicating that the attorney represents a party in the action.” MCR 2.117(B)(1); id. Such an act
gives rise to an inference that the act constituted an appearance if (1) the attorney was aware of the
pending legal proceedings, and (2) the attorney intended to appear at the proceedings on behalf of the
client. Ragnone v Wirsing, 141 Mich App 263, 265-266; 367 NW2d 369 (1985).
We find that plaintiffs’ counsel properly “appeared” at the mediation hearing on behalf of his
clients, as consistent with MCR 2.117(B)(1), by agreeing to represent plaintiffs at mediation, physically
appearing at the proceeding, and informing the mediation panel that he was plaintiffs’ attorney and
intended to represent them. Therefore, the trial court should have allowed plaintiffs’ attorney to be
admitted to the mediation hearing.
Defendant, however, argues that the trial court’s refusal to allow plaintiffs’ counsel to appear
was justified, because plaintiffs failed to timely retain an attorney as mandated by the trial court’s May 4,
1995, order. Following plaintiffs’ counsel’s withdrawal, the trial court entered an order adjourning
mediation for a minimum of thirty days and requiring plaintiffs to retain “new counsel if they intend[ed] to
be represented by an attorney.” Plaintiffs did not comply with the latter part of this order; rather, they
obtained counsel two days prior to the scheduled mediation on June 24, 1995. Nonetheless, plaintiffs
caused no delay by obtaining counsel beyond the date contemplated in the order. Because plaintiffs did
not seek to further adjourn mediation following their noncompliance with the order, the trial court was
unjustified in denying counsel’s proffered appearance before the mediation panel. Accordingly, we
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to correct its error and, instead, denied
plaintiffs’ motion for remediation.
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Defendant further posits that the trial court’s error was harmless. We reject this argument.
Usually, an unjustified denial of the right to representation by counsel in a civil matter is so offensive to
the maintenance of a sound judicial process that it can never be regarded as harmless. See Heshelman
v Lombardi, 183 Mich App 72, 85; 454 NW2d 603 (1990). Moreover, it is impossible to determine
what the outcome of the mediation hearing would have been had plaintiffs been represented by counsel.
Plaintiffs further argue that the trial court abused its discretion by granting defendant’s motion for
security for costs, and requiring plaintiffs to post a $25,000 bond which they failed to do. Plaintiffs urge
us to vacate the order for security for costs and reverse the order of dismissal for plaintiffs’ failure to
post the bond.
In support of its motion, defendant argued it was entitled to security for costs for the following
reasons: (1) plaintiffs sought $116,685.33 for their fire loss, yet the matter mediated for only $10,001;
(2) defendant exercised good faith to settle, despite the fact that it established it had strong affirmative
defenses to plaintiffs’ action; and (3) plaintiffs were at fault in causing discovery and other delays. The
first two grounds supporting defendant’s motion for security for costs may be directly attributable to the
trial court’s unjustified refusal to allow plaintiffs’ retained counsel to represent them at the mediation
hearing. In light of this, we vacate the trial court’s order for security for costs and reverse its order of
dismissal without prejudice to revisiting the issue after mediation is finalized when the trial court will be
better able to determine the appropriateness of granting defendant’s motion for security for costs.
We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. No party may tax costs
pursuant to MCR 7.216(C), neither party having prevailed in full.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
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