PEOPLE OF MI V GORDON EDWARD GRAINGER JR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 27, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 191447
Schoolcraft Circuit Court
LC No. 95-6056 FH
GORDON EDWARD GRAINGER, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Sawyer and Markman, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his convictions by jury of larceny of property valued at more
than $100 (larceny), MCL 750.356; MSA 28.588, unauthorized driving away of an automobile
(UDAA), MCL 750.413; MSA 28.645, and criminal sexual conduct in the third degree (CSC III).
MCL 750.520d(1)(a); MSA 28.788(4)(1)(a). He was sentenced to concurrent terms of two to five
years’ imprisonment for the larceny conviction, two to five years’ imprisonment for the UDAA
conviction, and three to fifteen years’ imprisonment for the CSC III conviction. We affirm.
Defendant, with the assistance of his girlfriend, took a handgun, a locksmith kit, and an
automobile from her parents’ home. He was also accused of having had sexual intercourse with the
minor girlfriend.
Defendant first argues that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to support a
conviction of CSC III. In a CSC III prosecution, the prosecution bears the burden of proving that the
defendant engaged in sexual penetration with a person between thirteen and sixteen years of age. MCL
750.520d(1)(a); MSA 28.788(4)(1)(a). In the instant case, it is undisputed that the girlfriend was
fifteen at the time of intercourse and she testified at trial that penetration occurred. A complainant’s
testimony alone may be sufficient to prove penetration. People v Robideau, 94 Mich App 663, 674;
289 NW2d 846 (1980), aff’d 419 Mich 458; 355 NW2d 592 (1984). The attempted impeachment of
the minor does not render this evidence insufficient as it was the jury’s responsibility to evaluate her
credibility. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 514-515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich
1201 (1992). Therefore, sufficient evidence was presented to allow a rational trier of fact to find that
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the essential elements of CSC III were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Hampton, 407
Mich 354, 368; 285 NW2d 284 (1979); Wolfe, supra at 513-516.
Defendant next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely object when the
complainant related three statements made by defendant, which statements are alleged to constitute
hearsay.
Defendant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the
complainant testified that defendant had stated that he would use the gun to “kill anyone that got in his
way,” that he had offered to kill her parents, and that he suggested that she “act dumb in court.”
As set forth in MRE 801(d)(2), “a statement is not hearsay if .. . [t]he statement is offered
against a party and is (A) his own statement . . . .” The first and second statements set forth above fall
within MRE 801(d)(2) because they were defendant’s own statements and pertained to defendant’s
motive in taking the handgun, meaning they were offered against him. The third statement, that the
complainant act “dumb” in court, was also defendant’s own statement, and was offered against him in
the sense that it suggested that he was requesting the complainant to perjure herself, or, more
specifically, that the complainant’s truthful testimony would incriminate him. Therefore, these statements
did not constitute hearsay. The failure to make a groundless objection does not constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel. See People v Rodriguez, 212 Mich App 351, 356; 538 NW2d 42 (1995).
Defendant also asserts that the challenged statements were objectionable on other grounds, but
these issues were not properly presented on appeal because they were not set forth in defendant’s
statement of the questions presented, as required by MCR 7.212(C)(5). Lansing v Hartsuff, 213
Mich App 338, 351; 539 NW2d 781 (1995). In any event, given the fact that the complainant offered
direct testimony supporting all the elements of all the crimes of which defendant was convicted, there
was no reasonable probability that the exclusion of the contested testimony would have altered the result
at trial. Therefore, even had these statements been admitted improperly, the failure of trial counsel to
object to their admission would not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. People v Stanaway,
446 Mich 643, 687-688; 521 NW2d 557 (1994).
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
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