PEOPLE OF MI V TERRENCE DEAN KELLY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 20, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 183620
Calhoun Circuit Court
LC No. 94-001954-FC
TERRENCE DEAN KELLY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and Doctoroff and Markman, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his convictions by a jury of first-degree murder, MCL
750.316; MSA 28.548, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL
750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). Although defendant was sixteen years of age at the time he committed the
instant offenses, he was sentenced as an adult to two years’ imprisonment for the possession of a
firearm conviction and a mandatory term of life in prison without parole for the murder conviction. We
affirm.
Defendant first argues on appeal that insufficient evidence was presented during trial from which
a reasonable jury could conclude that defendant acted with premeditation and deliberation when killing
the victim. We disagree. In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence question, this Court reviews the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could
conclude that the elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440
Mich 508, 515, modified 441 Mich 1201; 489 NW2d 748 (1992). “Inherent in the task of considering
the proofs in the light most favorable to the prosecution is the necessity to avoid a weighing of the proofs
or a determination whether testimony favorable to the prosecution is to be believed. All such concerns
are to be resolved in favor of the prosecution.” People v Herbert, 444 Mich 466, 474; 511 NW2d
654 (1993). In addition, when deciding this issue, this Court will not interfere with the jury’s role of
determining the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses. Wolfe, supra, 514.
In order to convict a defendant of first-degree murder, the prosecution must prove that the
defendant intentionally killed the victim and that the act of killing was premeditated and deliberate.
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People v Anderson, 209 Mich App 527, 537; 531 NW2d 780 (1995). Premeditation and
deliberation require sufficient time to allow the defendant to take a “second look” and may be
established through evidence of the following factors: “(1) the prior relationship of the parties; (2) the
defendant’s actions before the killing; (3) the circumstances of the killing itself; and (4) the defendant’s
conduct after the homicide.” Id. Moreover, intent and premeditation may be inferred from all the facts
and circumstances, People v Safiedine, 163 Mich App 25, 29; 414 NW2d 143 (1987). Due to the
difficulty of proving an actor’s state of mind, minimal circumstantial evidence, and the reasonable
inferences which arise therefrom, is sufficient to satisfy the elements of a crime. People v Reddick, 187
Mich App 547, 551; 468 NW2d 278 (1991); People v Bowers, 136 Mich App 284, 297; 356
NW2d 618 (1984).
Here, we find that although the evidence may not compel the conclusion that defendant’s acts
were done with premeditation and deliberation, the evidence is sufficient to avoid the finding that the
jury’s verdict was based on mere speculation. See People v O’Brien, 89 Mich App 704, 710, 712;
282 NW2d 190 (1979). The evidence presented at trial indicated that defendant and the victim played
video games during the early afternoon on May 3, 1993, that they engaged in a heated debate over who
won, that defendant had a .22-caliber handgun in his possession, and that he left the premises for
approximately six hours and later returned, at which time he and the victim resumed verbal
confrontation. Then, while on the front porch of an apartment building, defendant was heard threatening
to fight the victim and was seen pulling a gun out from under the couch he was sitting on and placing it
into his pocket.
Thereafter, defendant walked to the road where he asked Caldwell (a witness who was present
when the shooting occurred) for a ride, stating that he was “about to pop that nigger,” and after
Caldwell refused, he again approached the porch where the victim and two other men were standing.
Approximately two minutes later Caldwell heard three shots and witnessed defendant run from the
apartment building toward Elm Street. Following the shooting, defendant was seen running down Elm
Street to a small park trail alongside the river, where a witness reported hearing a splash in the water.
The .22-caliber handgun used to commit the murder was later found by police in the river. Finally,
defendant reported nothing to the police and left Michigan the day after the shooting.
We conclude that this evidence presents a prior relationship establishing a motive or purpose for
the killing, a weapon that was positioned in preparation for the homicide and conduct subsequent to the
killing that suggests the existence of a plan. Moreover, given the evidence presented, we find that a
reasonable jury could reasonably reject the conclusion that defendant instead acted in the heat of
passion or with “hot blood." The evidence presented indicated that, although defendant and the victim
argued throughout the day, the argument did not escalate into a physical confrontation. Further, rather
than pulling the gun during a verbal exchange itself, the evidence suggests that defendant instead fired at
the victim’s backside and at a point when little or no arguing was heard.
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the late endorsement
of a prosecution witness three days into the trial. We again disagree. After the prosecution offered its
opening statement and presented the testimony of two witnesses, it moved for the endorsement of a
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witness who was allegedly present when the shooting in question took place and whom the police
interviewed both at the scene and later at the police station. To explain the late endorsement of Angel
Caldwell, the prosecution explained that when Caldwell was initially interviewed by police, she had
given them a false name and address. Therefore, rather than issuing a subpoena to Caldwell, the
prosecution instead unsuccessfully tried to secure the presence of a “Tonya Singer,” a name that also
appeared on its witness list and was given to the defense. Defendant now contends that Caldwell was a
“known” res gestae witness for whom the prosecution had a duty to exercise due diligence in securing
for trial.
Before its amendment in 1986, MCL 767.40; MSA 28.980 required the prosecutor to use due
diligence to endorse and produce all res gestae witnesses. People v Burwick, 450 Mich 281, 287;
537 NW2d 813 (1995). However, under the amended statute, the Legislature has eliminated the
prosecutor’s burden to locate, endorse, and produce unknown persons who might be res gestae
witnesses and has required only that the prosecution give initial and continuing notice of all known res
gestae witnesses, specifically identify witnesses the prosecutor intends to produce and provide law
enforcement assistance to investigate and produce witnesses the defense requests. Id. at 288-289.
Therefore, the statute in question, MCL 767.40a; MSA 28.980(1), “does not impose an obligation on
the prosecutor to discover and produce unknown witnesses, either by the exercise of due diligence or
some lesser burden “ Id. at 287.
Here, we conclude that in accordance with the statute, what was known by the prosecutor was,
in fact, provided to the defense. There is no question that the prosecutor advised defendant of all
known res gestae witnesses, including “Tonya Singer,” at least to the extent that that information had
been made available to the prosecutor. Moreover, it is clear that although the prosecutor knew of at
least one witness who allegedly had been present at the scene and had been interviewed by police, it
was unaware of the existence of Angel Caldwell until after the trial started. Therefore, the prosecutor
was not required to give advance notice of unknown witnesses. Burwick, supra at 291.
After the prosecutor has provided notice to the defense of all known res gestae witnesses, and
has designated who will be produced at trial, MCL 767.40a(1); MSA 28.980(1)(1) allows the
prosecution to delete from or add to the list of witnesses it will produce “at any time” as long as “good
cause” is shown. Burwick, supra at 291. Endorsement or deletion from this list is within the discretion
of the trial court and is reversible only where an abuse is found. Id.
We believe that there is no evidence to indicate that the prosecutor should have been suspicious
of or question the assumed name that Caldwell gave to the police, at least until the subpoenas for trial
were issued. Nor was there any evidence that the prosecution intended to surprise the defendant mid
trial. The trial court correctly concluded that the prosecutor made an honest effort to determine
Caldwell’s true identity after the discrepancy was brought to his attention.
We further believe that the court made every effort possible to protect defendant’s right to a fair
trial by making certain that the defense had access to all documents concerning Caldwell, as well as the
opportunity to interview Caldwell. The trial court went so far as to give defendant the option to recall
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any witnesses for the purpose of cross-examining them and the option to seek a continuance if defense
counsel deemed it necessary after speaking to Caldwell.
Next, defendant argues that the sentencing court abused its discretion when it determined that
he should be sentenced as an adult rather than a juvenile. More specifically, defendant contends that the
court clearly erred in finding that he was not amenable to treatment within the juvenile system, because it
came to that conclusion without first considering defendant’s treatment and progress within the Ohio
reformatory school where defendant was incarcerated for six months before his return to Michigan for
trial in the present case. We disagree.
Pursuant to MCL 769.1(3); MSA 28.1072(3) and MCR 6.931(A), the trial court must
conduct a juvenile sentencing hearing to determine if the best interests of the juvenile and the public
would be served better by placing the minor in the custody of the juvenile offender system or by
sentencing the juvenile as an adult. People v Lyons (On Remand), 203 Mich App 465, 468; 513
NW2d 170 (1994). MCR 6.931(E)(3) provides a list of criteria to be considered by the court in
making its determination, with each given weight as appropriate to the circumstances.
On appeal, we review the lower court’s findings of fact for clear error, reversing only when it is
left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made. The court's ultimate determination
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, where we look to the seriousness and overall circumstances
surrounding the offender and the offense. People v Passeno, 195 Mich App 91, 103-105; 489
NW2d 152 (1992). Our review of the record indicates that the trial court carefully considered each of
the necessary factors, made findings that were clearly supported by the evidence and did not abuse its
discretion in deciding to sentence defendant as an adult.
The evidence presented during the juvenile sentencing hearing established that defendant had an
extensive prior criminal record that was escalating in severity, that defendant had committed the instant
homicide offense with no remorse or justification, that defendant had little concern or respect for others
and would likely be a danger to society if released at the age of twenty-one. Further, we find that
although the court may not have had specific details concerning defendant’s six-month stay in Ohio
juvenile facilities, there was overwhelming evidence presented from which the lower court could
conclude that defendant was not amenable to treatment within the juvenile system. Evidence was
produced indicating that defendant had had a lengthy, repetitive, and unsuccessful involvement with
juvenile authorities while in Michigan, that he had failed to show any progress or willingness to change
his behavior and that he was in fact defiant and uncooperative toward those who attempted to
administer therapy and other forms of treatment. Moreover, there was evidence that defendant’s
behavior was actually getting worse, as defendant himself admitted when making specific reference to
his incarceration in Ohio.
Finally, defendant argues that his mandatory sentence of life in prison without parole constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment and, therefore, must be vacated. We disagree, and note that this Court
rejected an identical argument in People v Launsburry, 217 Mich App 358, 363; 551 NW2d 460
(1996).
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Affirmed.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
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