PEOPLE OF MI V HUGH LANE JR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 16, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 189483
Cass Circuit Court
LC No. 94-8056-FC
HUGH LANE, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and Doctoroff and Markman, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC I), MCL
750.520b(1)(e); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(e). The trial court sentenced defendant as an habitual offender,
second offense, MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082, to twenty to forty years' imprisonment. Defendant
appeals his conviction and sentence as of right. We affirm.
Defendant first claims on appeal that there was insufficient evidence upon which he could be
convicted of CSC I. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecutor and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that
the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440
Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748, amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992); People v Jacques, 215 Mich App
699, 702-703; 547 NW2d 349 (1996). Defendant was convicted of engaging in sexual penetration of
another while armed with a weapon. MCL 750.520b(1)(e); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(e). Therefore, the
prosecutor had to prove (1) that defendant engaged in sexual penetration of the victim and (2) that he
was armed with a weapon.
The victim, a former girlfriend of the defendant’s, testified that defendant woke her up in her
bed, pulled her by the arm out to his van and began accusing her of infidelity. The victim testified that
defendant struck her on the head, arms and legs numerous times with some type of club, as he yelled at
her and called her vulgar names. The victim identified a broom handle, found in the van during the
search conducted by the police, as the club that defendant struck her with. The victim testified that
defendant then grabbed her by the neck and began choking her, threatening to “rip her throat out.”
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Thereafter, the victim testified that defendant said that if she was going to mess around on him that he
had something for her and pulled out a flashlight. Defendant then ordered her to go to the back of the
van and remove her clothes. The victim testified that she complied with his request because she was
afraid but she cried and begged him to stop. Defendant again struck her on the head. The victim
testified that defendant then told her to get on her knees so that he could put the flashlight inside her and
threatened to put it “inside her butt” if she did not cooperate.
Defendant acknowledged that things got out of hand in the van and that he yelled mean and
obscene things at the victim. Defendant further acknowledged that he backhanded the victim one time
across the face, causing the bruise on her eye, and that he grabbed her by the neck and pushed her
down several times. He also acknowledged that he threatened the victim with a club although he
claimed that he never actually picked up the club. Finally, defendant acknowledged that he asked the
victim if she wanted the flashlight because he wanted her to feel humiliated.
Based on these facts, there is sufficient evidence that defendant engaging in sexual penetration of
the victim while armed with a weapon. The broom handle used by defendant to repeatedly strike the
victim, leaving bruises on her face arms, legs and chest, was a “weapon” within the meaning of the
statute. Moreover, defendant need not have had the weapon in his hands while committing the offense
charged, so long as he has knowledge of the weapon’s location and the weapon was reasonably
accessible to him. People v Davis, 101 Mich App 198, 203; 300 NW2d 497 (1980). Dr. Guzzo’s
testimony that the victim’s injuries were consistent with being struck with the broom handle was further
evidence of defendant’s use of a weapon.
Defendant claims that he could not be convicted of CSC I because the evidence shows that the
victim herself willingly inserted the flashlight into her vagina. It is not clear from the testimony presented
at trial whether the victim or defendant initially inserted the flashlight into the victim’s vagina. The victim
first testified that defendant inserted the flashlight, but later stated that she was not sure because it
happened so fast. The victim was certain that defendant allowed her to take control of the flashlight at
some point because she was screaming and crying in pain; the victim “thought something was going to
break.” Defendant claimed that the victim inserted the flashlight herself but stated that he took hold of
the flashlight at some point.
Even if the victim initially inserted the flashlight, the jury could have reasonably inferred that she
complied with defendant’s demands out of coercion and fear of further physical abuse. In other words,
the jury could have inferred that defendant caused the flashlight to be inserted into the victim’s vagina.
Sexual penetration is defined by MCL 750.520a(l); MSA 28.788(1)(l) as “sexual intercourse or any
other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s body, or of any object into the genital or
anal openings of another person’s body, but emission of semen is not required.” Thus, insertion of a
flashlight into the victim’s vagina would be considered sexual penetration under the statute. However,
the use of “force” is not a necessary element under MCL 750.520b(1)(e); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(e).
Finally, defendant claims that the jury could not find defendant guilty because the victim
subsequently instigated sexual relations with defendant. Defendant testified that, after the incident
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involving the flashlight, the victim came over to him and initiated sexual intercourse. It should be noted
that the prosecutor’s case was based only on the incident involving the flashlight, not the subsequent
sexual intercourse; therefore, the subsequent sexual intercourse has no direct bearing on whether the
victim consented to penetration with the flashlight. Nevertheless, the victim testified that she only
suggested that they have “regular” sex while she was being assaulted with the flashlight because it would
have been less painful than what she was experiencing. As a result of her request, defendant allowed
her to remove the flashlight and they had “regular” sex. It was for the trier of fact to weigh the
credibility of the witnesses and determine which version of these facts to believe. People v Daniels,
172 Mich App 374, 378; 431 NW2d 846 (1988).
Defendant next claims that the trial court erred in admitting photographs of the victim into
evidence because they were more prejudicial than probative and did not fairly and accurately depict the
victim’s condition following the alleged sexual assault. The decision to admit or exclude photographs is
within the sound discretion of the trial court. People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 76; 537 NW2d 909,
modified and remanded 450 Mich 1212 (1995). The proper inquiry is always whether the probative
value of the photographs is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Id.; MRE 403.
At issue are photographs of the victim taken at the at the hospital the day after the assault.
Defendant objected several times to the admission of the photographs at trial. Defense counsel argued
that the photographs were not an accurate representation of the victim’s condition following the assault
because they exhibited unnatural discoloration. In one exhibit, the victim’s face has yellow spots on her
forehead, hair and chin and in other exhibits, there are yellow horizontal stripes alternating with
horizontal purple stripes. Defense counsel argued that the yellow spots made the victim look jaundiced
or as if she had extensive old bruising. In addition, defense counsel argued that it was not clear whether
the purple stripes were bruises or some type of discoloration caused by the camera or by the
photographic development.
With respect to these exhibits, the victim and her attending nurse both testified that the victim’s
skin did not have yellow spots or bands. The nurse further testified that she believed that the
discoloration was caused by the camera. The trial court also cautioned the jury:
As you look at the photographs, you will see it looks like horizontal yellow bands going
across her. From her testimony, those bands are not an accurate depiction of what she
looked like at the time. That has to be something that has occurred through developing
of the film or through taking them.
Therefore, the jury was on notice of the discoloration on these exhibits. The alternating yellow and
purple horizontal bands extended all the way across these exhibits, not just across the victim’s legs;
therefore, a reasonable juror could readily determine that those bands were not bruises. In addition, the
many small rounded bruises on the victim’s face and legs were accurately depicted despite the bands of
discoloration. In addition, other exhibits did not contain the yellow spots or yellow and purple bands
and presented a clear and accurate depiction of the bruises on the victims face and legs.1
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Additionally, defendant argues that the photographs should not have been admitted because
they merely duplicated the victim’s testimony. This argument was never raised before the trial court and
thus, is not properly before this Court on appeal. People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 546; 520 NW2d
123 (1994). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has clearly held that photographs are not excludable
simply because a witness can orally testify regarding the information contained in the photographs. Mills,
supra at 76. Photographs may be used to corroborate a victim’s testimony. Id. The photographs
were probative of defendant’s use of a weapon, specifically a broom handle, and his use of force or
coercion. Taken as a whole, the probative value of the photographs outweighed the danger of unfair
prejudice; therefore, the photographs were properly admitted.
Next, defendant claims on appeal that the trial court committed error when it denied defendant’s
challenge for cause and forced defendant to expend one of his peremptory challenges. The trial court’s
decision on a challenge for cause will be reversed only where this Court finds a clear abuse of
discretion. People v Skinner, 153 Mich App 815, 819; 396 NW2d 548 (1986). During voir dire the
trial court asked the potential jurors if they or any of their friends or relatives had been the victims of
violent criminal acts. One juror stated that her sister had been a victim of domestic violence for the past
eight years. According to the juror, her brother-in-law had recently been prosecuted and spent time in
jail. Defendant made a challenge for cause because the juror told defense counsel that it would be
difficult for these events not to influence her decisions. In denying defendant’s challenge for cause, the
trial court noted that it was satisfied that the juror could serve impartially. Defendant subsequently used
a peremptory challenge to excuse the juror from the panel.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s challenge for cause. Although
the juror told defense counsel that it was difficult for her sister’s situation not to influence her decisions,
she expressly stated that she could hear this case fairly and impartially. She further recognized that
every situation was different and that she could not judge this case based on her sister’s experience.
The trial court was not required to dismiss her for cause. People v Lee, 212 Mich App 228, 249; 537
NW2d 233 (1995).2
Defendant next claims on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing defense
counsel to impeach the victim with regard to a collateral matter -- her alleged perjury in a prior criminal
prosecution also involving defendant. The victim testified against defendant in a 1988 prosecution in
which he was also convicted of assaulting her with a dangerous weapon. Defendant claims that, after
his conviction, the victim recanted her testimony under oath. According to defendant, the victim’s
alleged perjury in the prior proceedings against him was material to defendant’s guilt or innocence in the
instant case because it strongly negated the victim’s credibility. However, the victim was never charged
or prosecuted for perjury nor was defendant’s conviction ever set aside on the basis of the alleged
recantation. Moreover, the prosecutor indicated that the recantation was not under oath but in a letter
she wrote to the trial court following defendant’s conviction.
MRE 608(b) allows cross-examination regarding instances of specific conduct that bear on a
witness’ character for truthfulness or untruthfulness when the evidence is being offered to attack the
credibility of the witness. The impeachment of a witness on a collateral matter is within the sound
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discretion of the trial court. MRE 608(b); People v Slayton, 135 Mich App 328, 337; 354 NW2d
326 (1984). Testimony regarding prior instances of perjury is generally admissible as bearing on
truthfulness. See People v Ramsey, 89 Mich App 260, 268; 280 NW2d 840 (1979). However, in
this case, the victim was not charged or convicted of perjury. Nor was the court presented with the
alleged letter of recantation. Further, as the trial court explained, in order to determine whether the
victim actually perjured herself at trial, or whether the recantation itself was false, the court would have
been required to conduct a “mini-trial” relating to the prior, unrelated case seven years earlier
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by precluding cross-examination on the matter.3
Finally, defendant claims on appeal that, in light of the mitigating factors surrounding his prior
felony conviction, his sentence was disproportionate. Defendant was sentenced as an habitual offender,
second offense, to twenty to forty years' imprisonment. This Court may not consider the sentencing
guidelines in reviewing the sentences for habitual offenders. People v Gatewood, 450 Mich 1025; 546
NW2d 252 (1996); People v Cervantes, 448 Mich 620, 625; 532 NW2d 831 (1995). Appellate
review of an habitual offender’s sentence is limited to considering whether the sentence violates the
principle of proportionality set forth in People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1 (1990).
Cervantes, supra at 631; People v Gatewood (On Remand), 216 Mich App 559, 560; 550 NW2d
265 (1996). A sentence must be proportionate to the seriousness of the crime and the defendant’s
prior record. Milbourn, supra at 635-636, 654.
Defendant was thirty-one years old at the time of sentencing. With respect to defendant’s prior
record, he had pleaded guilty to three misdemeanors: larceny under $100, reckless driving, and
trespassing at the victim’s apartment. Defendant also had the one felony conviction for assault with a
dangerous weapon in 1988.4 Defendant claims that the court ignored the fact that the victim allegedly
recanted her testimony in the prior felony proceeding and that she moved back in with defendant after
he was released from jail in 1991.
The trial court noted that the sentencing guidelines do not apply for purposes of sentencing an
habitual offender, but nevertheless used the guidelines as a starting point. Although sentencing guidelines
do not apply to habitual offenders and may not be considered on appeal, the guidelines may be
considered by the trial court at their discretion. People v Haake, 217 Mich App 434, 438; 553
NW2d 15 (1996). The court noted that the guidelines indicated a sentence of 180 to 360 months but,
after considering defendant’s habitual status, sentenced defendant to 20 to 40 years. Despite
defendant’s contrary assertion, the trial court did consider the victim’s alleged recantation in the earlier
case in fashioning this sentence. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s sentence here.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
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1
Defendant also appears to make the argument on appeal that the photographs were unduly prejudicial,
aside from the discoloration. Defendant failed to state any grounds for undue prejudice separate from
the alleged discoloration; therefore, that portion of his claim is waived. People v Jones (On Reh), 201
Mich App 449, 457; 506 NW2d 542 (1993).
2
Even if the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s challenge for cause, the court’s error
would not warrant reversal in this case. A four-part test is used to determine whether an error in
refusing a challenge for cause merits reversal. There must be a clear and independent showing on the
record that (1) the court improperly denied a challenge for cause, (2) the aggrieved party exhausted all
peremptory challenges, (3) the party demonstrated the desire to excuse another subsequently
summoned juror, and (4) the juror whom the party wished to later excuse was objectionable. Lee,
supra at 248-249. Defendant does not allege that, after he had exhausted all of his available
peremptory challenges, there was an additional objectionable juror that he wished to excuse.
Therefore, there was no prejudice to defendant.
3
By the same token, we feel compelled to state that it would not have been an abuse of discretion for
the trial court to have admitted such evidence under reasonable conditions.
4
The trial court observed that defendant was tried for kidnapping and CSC I but that he was convicted
of the lesser offense of felonious assault
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