DALE H HANEY V WILLIAM B HUBBARD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DALE H. HANEY,
UNPUBLISHED
May 16, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 181278
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 92-212744-NO
GRAND TRUNK WESTERN RAILWAY
COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and White and S.J. Latreille*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff brought this negligence action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45
USC 51, for injuries sustained in the course of his employment as a brakeman for defendant railway
company. A judgment was entered on a jury verdict that found defendant to be negligent and awarded
plaintiff $795,000 in damages. Defendant’s post-judgment motions for a new trial or remittitur were
denied by the trial court. Defendant appeals as of right and we affirm.
Defendant first argues that the jury’s finding of liability was against the great weight of the
evidence. A claim that a verdict is against the great weight of the evidence must be raised by a motion
for a new trial. MCR 2.611(A)(1)(e). Because defendant’s motion for new trial in the lower court did
not challenge the jury’s finding of negligence as being against the great weight of evidence, we deem this
issue waived on appeal. 1 Roberts v Auto Owners Ins Co, 135 Mich App 595, 600; 354 NW2d 271
(1983), rev’d on other grounds 422 Mich 594 (1985).
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for a directed verdict on the
basis of Inman v Baltimore & O R Co, 361 US 138; 80 S Ct 242; 4 L Ed 2d 198 (1959). Actions
brought in a state court under FELA are governed by state law with respect to procedural matters and
federal law with respect to substantive matters. See St Louis SW R Co v Dickerson, 470 US 409,
411; 105 S Ct 1347; 84 L Ed 2d 303 (1985); Brady v Southern R Co, 320 US 476; 64 S Ct 232; 88
L Ed 239 (1943); Gortney v Norfolk & Western Ry Co, 216 Mich App 535; 549 NW2d 612
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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(1996). Accordingly, we apply the standard of review under Michigan law in determining whether the
trial court's denial of defendant’s motions for a new trial or remittitur was proper. Id. at 538.
In reviewing a motion for a directed verdict, both trial and appellate courts must view the facts
in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and determine whether reasonable minds could differ as
to whether the plaintiff presented a prima facie case. DiFranco v Pickard, 427 Mich 32, 58-59; 398
NW2d 896 (1986). If a material factual dispute existed, or reasonable minds could have differed, the
issue should have been submitted to the factfinder. Tuttle v Dep't of State Highways, 397 Mich 44,
46-47; 243 NW2d 244 (1976); MCR 2.613(C). In this case, we find that reasonable minds could
have differed on whether plaintiff had presented a prima facie case of negligence.
FELA was intended to increase drastically a railroad employer’s duty to pay damages for
negligence that causes injury to its employees. Inman, supra at 140; Rogers v Missouri P R Co, 352
US 500, 507-508; 77 S Ct 443; 1 L Ed 2d 493 (1957); Blake v Consolidated Rail Corp, 176 Mich
App 506; 439 NW2d 914 (1989). To state a claim under FELA, a plaintiff need only show that the
railroad employer’s negligence “played any part at all” in the resulting injury. Rogers, supra. Under
FELA, a railroad employer has a duty to protect its employees against foreseeable criminal misconduct.
Lillie v Thompson, 332 US 459, 462; 68 S Ct 140; 92 L Ed 73 (1947).
In Inman, the plaintiff was a railroad crossing watchman who was struck by a drunk driver
while flagging traffic for a passing train. The drunk motorist drove around the line of cars waiting for the
train and hit the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued the defendant railroad under FELA for failing to provide him
with a safe workplace. Inman, supra at 138-139. The United States Supreme Court agreed with the
Ohio Court of Appeals that “it was ‘not reasonably foreseeable’ that petitioner ‘would be injured by the
actions of a drunk driver, violating five traffic statutes.’” The Court noted that the plaintiff had been
working at the particular crossing for seven years without incident and that there was no evidence of
similar occurrences or complaints to the railroad. The Court concluded that, “in light of this
background, we believe that the evidence here was so thin that, on a judicial appraisal, the conclusion
must be drawn that negligence on the part of the railroad could have played no part in petitioner’s
injury.” Id. at 140-141.
While Inman is factually similar to our case, there are important distinctions. In this case, ample
evidence was presented that defendant knew or should have known that the Sibley Road railroad
crossing posed a danger to railroad employees engaged in nighttime switching operations nearby.
Several of defendant’s employees who had worked at the Sibley Road switch testified that it was
dangerous due to motorists’ disregard for the crossing signals, and it was well known that drunk drivers
were likely to ignore the signals. Deposition testimony read into evidence showed that the highest rate of
drunk driving and resulting accidents occurred on Friday and Saturday nights and that defendant did not
take relatively simple steps to protect its workers by increasing their visibility, enabling them to turn off
the flashers without placing them near the roadway, or simply using available alternate switches at night.
Expert testimony also established that defendant did not follow the Michigan Manual of Uniform Traffic
Devices, which provided for several simple precautions to ensure that motorists were aware of the
upcoming crossing and were able to see workers directing traffic through the crossing.
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Plaintiff’s case is more similar to Bridger v Union R. Co, 355 F2d 382 (CA 6, 1966), where
the plaintiff was struck by a truck while switching train cars at night at a crossing that was neither well lit
nor visible. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found “ample and cogent evidence of the foreseeability
here in the notice from its [the railroad’s] many employees that this was the most dangerous crossing in
Memphis, as they had so often reported to their employer railroad.” Id. at 386. Accordingly, because
reasonable minds could differ as to whether the plaintiff presented a prima facie case of negligence, the
trial court did not err in denying defendant’s directed verdict motion.
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying its motion for a new
trial or remittitur on grounds that the damages award was excessive because it was the result of juror
passion, sympathy, or prejudice. Defendant further argues that the jury failed to reduce the award to
present value and failed to take into consideration that the award would be exempt from federal income
taxes. We find defendant’s assertions to be unsupported by the record.
A new trial may be granted based on an excessive verdict if it was obtained by improper
methods, or was the result of sympathy or prejudice. If the verdict was within the range of the
evidence, a new trial is not merited. Blake, supra at 523. The burden is on the moving party to show
that the verdict was excessive. Belin v Jax Kar Wash, Inc, 95 Mich App 415, 423; 291 NW2d 61
(1980). Here, based on evidence presented regarding plaintiff’s pain and suffering, medical expenses,
and lost income, plaintiff’s counsel had asked the jury to award plaintiff a total of $1,650,000, and the
jury awarded $795,000. Defendant’s reliance on certain cases where courts have overturned similar
verdicts as excessive is misplaced given the fact that plaintiff’s injuries and resulting permanent disability
were clearly more severe. Considering the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, we conclude
that the verdict was within the range of the evidence and should be upheld.
After-tax income is the proper amount to use in determining wage loss damages i a FELA
n
case. Norfolk & Western R Co v Liepelt, 444 US 490, 494-495; 100 S Ct 755; 62 L Ed 2d 689
(1980). Defendant has presented no evidence aside from the size of the award to suggest that the jury
failed to deduct federal income taxes from the award for lost wages. Given that defendant concedes
that the jury was properly instructed regarding this issue, we decline to address it further. Moreover,
nothing in the record supports defendant’s assertion that the jury failed to reduce any award for future
damages to present value, as required under federal law. See Monessen SW Ry Co v Morgan, 486
US 330; 108 S Ct 1837; 100 L Ed 2d 349 (1988). The trial court properly instructed the jury
regarding this issue and defendant did not object to the instructions as given. The amount of the award
does not suggest to this Court that the jury failed to follow the trial court’s instructions.
Defendant next argues that it was denied a fair trial because the trial court failed to instruct the
jury that defendant was under no duty to install other railroad signal devices at the Sibley Road crossing
unless ordered to do so by the Michigan Department of Transportation. Because defendant never
requested such an instruction, and did not object to the instructions as
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given, we find that this issue has not been properly preserved for appellate review. MCR 2.516(C).
See also Napier v Jacobs, 429 Mich 222, 228; 414 NW2d 862 (1987), citing Kinney v Folkerts, 84
Mich 616, 625; 48 NW 283 (1891) ("[p]arties cannot remain silent, and thereby lie in wait to ground
error, after the trial is over, upon a neglect of the court to instruct the jury as to something which was not
called to its attention on the trial, especially in civil cases"). Accordingly, defendant has not shown
entitlement to appellate relief on this basis.
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding certain collateral
source evidence. We find no abuse of discretion. Under the collateral source rule, a tortfeasor may not
disclaim liability on the basis that the plaintiff may have received compensation for his injuries from
another source aside from payment from that tortfeasor or joint tortfeasor. Citizens Ins Co v Buck,
216 Mich App 217, 227; 548 NW2d 680 (1996). This rule generally prevents tort defendants from
presenting evidence that the plaintiff received insurance benefits covering his injuries, because the victim
is deemed to have paid for the benefits received by way of premium payments. Id. at 227, n 3. The
collateral source rule applies to FELA cases. Eichel v New York Central R Co, 375 US 253, 255;
84 S Ct 316; 11 L Ed 2d 307 (1963) (“the likelihood of misuse by the jury clearly outweighs the value
of this [collateral source] evidence”).
Defendant argues that plaintiff’s testimony regarding lost wages and future medical expenses
misled the jury to believe that he would suffer financial hardship because of lack of income and health
coverage, and so “opened the door” to the admission of collateral source evidence. Review of the
challenged testimony does not support defendant’s argument. Plaintiff did testify regarding the date he
stopped working and the amount of his wages; however, this was appropriate testimony to support his
claim for lost wages, rather than a maudlin claim of poverty. Plaintiff never testified that he had
absolutely no source of income or support. Plaintiff’s testimony clearly established that he did have
health insurance that covered past medical treatments. Although plaintiff testified that his employer
provided health insurance would expire at the end of 1994, his testimony also indicated that he planned
to continue his coverage. In closing argument, plaintiff’s counsel did not claim all future medical
expenses, but only those which would not be covered by medical insurance. Under these facts, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding collateral source evidence regarding plaintiff’s no-fault
insurance benefits.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Stanley J. Latreille
1
While defendant asserted the issue generally in its motion, its argument, presented in issue III of its
brief, was based on Inman v Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 361 US 138; 80 S Ct 242; 4 Led 2d 198
(1959).
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