PEOPLE OF MI V JEREMY DALE BUNKER
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 13, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 187941
Kalkaska Circuit Court
LC No. 94-001419-FC
JEREMY DALE BUNKER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Taylor, P.J., and Hood and Gribbs, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of aiding and abetting armed robbery, MCL
750.529; MSA 283.797, MCL 767.39; MSA 28.979. He was sentenced to 125 to 240 months’
imprisonment. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
On February 26, 1994, at approximately 7:00 p.m., defendant drove the actual robber, John
Hall , to a convenience store and supplied Hall with a ski mask, a sweat shirt, a BB gun and loaned Hall
his gym shoes. Hall then entered the convenience store, pointed the gun at the clerk, and robbed her.
1
I
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in allowing a witness, Vernon Swafford, to testify
that Hall had admitted to committing the robbery and had implicated defendant as an accomplice.
Specifically, defendant argues that this ruling denied him his right to confront Hall and that the trial court
erred in relying on People v Poole, 444 Mich 151; 506 NW2d 505 (1993), to support its conclusion
that this testimony was admissible. We disagree.
Defendant argues that Poole should not be followed because the United States Supreme Court
ruled in Williamson v United States, 514 US 594; 114 S Ct 2431; 129 L Ed 2d 476 (1994), that
collateral statements that incriminate another party in conjunction with self-inculpatory statements are not
admissible pursuant to FRE 804(b)(3). However, the Court’s ruling in Williamson is limited to the
evidentiary issue regarding FRE 804(b)(3) and explicitly does not address whether such statements
would violate the Confrontation Clause. Id. Williamson therefore has no bearing on the Michigan
-1
Supreme Court’s ruling in Poole that such evidence does not violate the Confrontation Clause under
appropriate circumstances.
We find that the trial court did not err in allowing Swafford’s testimony. Under Poole,
admission of testimony does not violate a defendant’s confrontation rights if the declarant was
unavailable and the statement was admissible under a firmly rooted hearsay exception or had adequate
indicia of reliability. Poole, supra at 165. The presence of the following factors would favor admission
of such a statement: whether the statement was (1) voluntarily given, (2) made contemporaneously with
the events referenced, (3) made to family, friends, colleagues, or confederates, and (4) uttered
spontaneously at the initiation of the declarant and without prompting or inquiry by the listener. Id.
Here, Hall voluntarily and spontaneously initiated the conversation with Swafford without
prompting or inquiry. The statement was made to a schoolmate and not the police. “Speaking to
acquaintances unconnected to law enforcement makes declarant’s inculpatory statements eminently
trustworthy.” People v Petros, 198 Mich App 401, 416; 499 NW2d 784 (1993). In addition, the
statement did not shift blame to defendant, but incriminated Hall and mentioned that defendant was with
him at the time and was afraid that they would be caught. Also, the statement was made close in time to
the robbery, and there is no evidence that Hall had a reason to distort the truth or that he made the
statement intending to incriminate defendant in order to seek vengeance or curry favor with the
authorities. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in ruling that there was adequate
indicia of reliability.
We also note that defendant’s argument that this testimony was inadmissible pursuant to Bruton
v United States, 391 US 123; 88 S Ct 1620; 20 L Ed 2d 476 (1968), is misplaced. The United
States Supreme Court clarified Bruton in Richardson v Marsh, 481 US 200, 201-202; 107 S Ct
1702; 95 L Ed 2d 176 (1987). It held that in Bruton, the Court recognized a very narrow exception
to the general rule that a witness whose testimony is introduced at a joint trial is not considered to be a
witness against a defendant if the jury is instructed to consider that testimony only against a codefendant.
Id. at 208. The ruling in Bruton was based on the Court’s determination that the statement at issue was
so directly incriminating against the defendant that in reality the jury could not be expected to follow an
instruction to disregard the codefendant’s statement when assessing the guilt of the defendant. Bruton,
supra at 135-136; Richardson, supra at 207-208. In Lee v Illinois, 476 US 530, 544; 106 S Ct
2056; 90 L Ed 514 (1986), the Court noted that Bruton is inapplicable to a situation, such as this case,
where the effectiveness of limiting instructions in preventing "spill-over" prejudice to a defendant when
his codefendant's confession is admitted against the codefendant at a joint trial is not at issue.
Likewise, defendant’s reliance on People v Watkins, 438 Mich 627; 475 NW2d 727 (1991),
cert den 502 US 1057; 112 S Ct 933; 117 L Ed 2d 105 (1992), for the proposition that detailed
admissions of non-testifying codefendants are not admissible, is misplaced. This Court has determined
that Watkins has no precedential effect because there was no majority opinion. Petros, supra at 406.
-2
II
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor injected inadmissible evidence when he asked
prosecution witness Timothy Baggs a question which he knew, or should have known, would elicit the
fact that Baggs had previously taken a lie detector test. It is well established that results of lie-detector
tests are not admissible at trial. People v Rocha, 110 Mich App 1, 8; 312 NW2d 657 (1981).
However, applying the factors set forth in Rocha, supra at 8-9, we find that error requiring reversal did
not occur as a result of the prosecutor’s question because defendant failed to object and a curative
instruction could have prevented any prejudice to defendant, the reference to the polygraph test was
brief, and no results were admitted. People v Turner, 213 Mich App 558, 575; 540 NW2d 728
(1995); People v King, 215 Mich App 301, 308-309; 544 NW2d 765 (1996).
III
Defendant further argues that the trial court violated the principle of proportionality when it
departed from the minimum guidelines range of 24 to 72 months’ imprisonment and sentenced him to
125 to 240 months’ imprisonment. We disagree. Our review of sentencing decisions is limited to
determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. People v Odendahl, 200 Mich App 539,
540-541; 505 NW2d 16 (1993). A sentence must be proportional to the circumstances surrounding
the offense and the offender. People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). When a
trial court departs from the minimum sentencing guidelines, it is required to state its reasons both on the
record and on defendant's SIR. MCR 6.425(D)(1).
In this case, contrary to defendant’s assertions, the trial court articulated its reasons for
departing from the guidelines range. The trial court explained on the Sentencing Information Report
Departure Evaluation that it believed that defendant “probably planned [the armed robbery] and was
every bit as culpable as the trigger man.” He further indicated that defendant “should have been
sentenced as the leader” and that “the guideline range is insufficient.” In addition, the trial court
adequately stated its reasons for departure on the record. The trial court indicated that the guidelines
were inadequate given the impact of the crime on the community and on the victim, and because
defendant was just as responsible as Hall. The court noted that defendant drove the truck to the
location of the offense and that defendant provided the gun. The court also referred to defendant’s
prior felonies. We find that the trial court adequately articulated its reasons for sentencing defendant
outside the guidelines range. We also conclude that defendant’s sentence was proportional to the
offense and the offender. Milbourn, supra.
IV
Defendant finally claims that the trial court erred in scoring twenty-five points for offense
variable 2. This challenge does not state a cognizable claim for relief. The Michigan Supreme Court
recently ruled that "[a]ppellate courts are not to interpret the guidelines or to score and rescore the
variables for offenses and prior record to determine if they were correctly applied." People v Mitchell,
-3
454 Mich 145, 178; ___ NW2d ___ (1997).
proportionate.
We conclude that the sentence imposed was
Affirmed.
/s/ Clifford W. Taylor
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
1
John Hall was convicted of armed robbery.
-4
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.