LAWRENCE JAMES LADEMAN V DIANE MARIE LADEMAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LAWRENCE JAMES LADEMAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 9, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 184723
LC No. 94-412828
DIANE MARIE LADEMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Reilly, P.J., and Sawyer and W.E. Collette,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Diane Marie Lademan appeals as of right from the March 17, 1995, judgment of
divorce. We affirm.
Defendant’s brief contains two issues that directly challenge the property division and the
award of alimony. First, defendant argues that the trial court’s findings of fact as to the exclusion of
certain trust assets from the marital estate were clearly erroneous, constitute an abuse of discretion
and a clear error of law. Second, defendant argues that the court “committed a clear error of law in
dividing the assets and in the sum of alimony/spousal support awarded where it failed to consider all
evidence presented and/or made it’s [sic] decision with disregard for the evidence presented.”
Defendant’s arguments are difficult to discern. Defendant does not identify the specific findings that
she contends are clearly erroneous. Rather, the thrust of the first argument seems to be that under
the circumstances, the court abused its discretion by not awarding the marital home to defendant
“free and clear” of the mortgage held by plaintiff’s family trust, and the thrust of the second argument
seems to be that “substantial” alimony should have been awarded. Accordingly, we will address the
arguments in this manner.
When a party challenges a trial court’s division of property, we first review the trial court’s
findings of fact for clear error. McDougal v McDougal, 451 Mich 80, 87; 545 NW2d 357 (1996).
If the trial court’s factual findings are upheld, then we review the trial court’s dispositional ruling for
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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fairness and equity in light of those facts. Id. The dispositional ruling should be affirmed unless we
are left with the firm conviction that the division was inequitable. Id.
We have reviewed defendant’s arguments with respect to the court’s factual findings, and we
are not persuaded that the findings are clearly erroneous. Furthermore, considering defendant’s
arguments concerning the property division and the spousal support award, we are not left with a
firm conviction that the dispositional ruling was inequitable.
Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the court did not disregard the plaintiff’s interest in a trust
created by his mother, who was deceased at the time of trial. The trust was worth approximately
$800,000, which is to be divided equally between plaintiff and his sister after their father’s death. As
recognized by defendant, plaintiff’s father has a right to invade the principal during his lifetime. At the
time of the trial, plaintiff’s father was seventy-one years old, which defendant characterizes in her
brief as “very elderly.” According to defendant, “given [plaintiff’s] father’s age and wealth,
[plaintiff’s interest in the trust] was a virtual certainty.” The trial court disagreed with defendant’s
position and recognized the difficulty in awarding defendant an amount for an interest in the trust
when the amount plaintiff would ultimately receive was uncertain until his father’s death.
Plaintiff’s father might die tomorrow, God forbid, and the plaintiff would come into a
significant amount of money. On the other hand, plaintiff’s father might contract a
long and catastrophic illness. Once again, God forbid, which can wipe out the trust.
The court stated that it considered “these potentials” in its division of property and the award of
alimony. Under the circumstances, we are not left with a firm conviction that the court’s handling of
plaintiff’s interest in the trust was improper or that the property division as a whole was inequitable.
We are also not left with a firm conviction that the award of alimony was inadequate. The
court expressly considered the conduct of the parties, the length of the marriage, the ability of the
parties to work, the source and amount of property awarded, the ages of the parties, present
situation and needs, health, the standard of living to which the parties have become accustomed, and
equity. The court ordered plaintiff to pay $200 per week for five years from the date of the
judgment. Considering the circumstances, particularly the substantial liabilities that plaintiff assumed
under the judgment, we are not left with a firm conviction that the award of alimony was inequitable.
Defendant also argues that the trial judge’s “exhortation that he preferred not to hear
evidence of fault in the trial of this matter constitutes an abuse of discretion and a clear error of the
law.” We have read, in context, the court’s statements to the parties with regard to presentation of
evidence concerning fault and find no legal error or abuse of discretion. The court did not preclude
the parties from admitting evidence regarding fault, and expressly considered the issue in making its
findings. Defendant’s claim that the court proceedings were “irregular”, warranting a new trial, is
without merit.
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Affirmed.
/s/ Maureen Pulte Reilly
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ William E. Collette
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