ALDEN K KIRSCHNER V PROCESS DESIGN ASSOC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ALDEN K. KIRSCHNER and NAOMI F.
KIRSCHNER,
UNPUBLISHED
May 9, 1997
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
No. 182861 and 183858
LC No. 88-08420
PROCESS DESIGN ASSOCIATES, INC.,
Defendant,
and
GENERAL ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA,
Garnishee-Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Gribbs, P.J., and Saad and J.P. Adair,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
I
FACTS
Garnishee-defendant General Accident Insurance Company of America (“GAI”) appeals from
a judgment entering summary disposition against it and in favor of plaintiffs. We reverse.
After Alden Kirschner1 was injured in a chemical accident at work, he brought a products
liability action (raising eleven theories of liability) against several parties, including defendant Process
Design Associates, Inc. Process Design had allegedly designed, manufactured and installed the
equipment that caused the injury, and GAI insured Process Design.
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Plaintiffs proceeded to trial against Process Design only, and GAI defended the action under a
reservation of rights because some of plaintiffs’ allegations (negligent design) were excluded from
coverage under the applicable policy. GAI sent, and Process Design admits receiving, three letters
setting forth the details of the reservation of rights; it is undisputed that Process Design understood that
GAI would not indemnify Process Design if the jury reached a verdict based upon negligent design or
engineering.
On June 7, 1989, Process Design received interrogatories from plaintiffs; asking in relevant part
if “there [was] any policy of insurance covering the Defendant [Process Design] on the date of this
incident?” Process Design responded with the following answer: “General Accident Insurance
Company, P.O. Box 16666, Columbus, Ohio, $1,000,000.00 coverage.” There were no follow-up
questions or later discovery about exclusions.
On June 23, 1989, GAI sent the following letter to plaintiffs’ trial counsel:
As I have indicated to you we have just begun the investigation into this matter and are
attempting same under a reservation. Once we have resolved all coverage and liability
issues I will advise accordingly. Should you have any questions, please feel free to
contact me at the above captioned number.
Plaintiffs ultimately received a jury verdict which was based solely upon a negligent design
theory for which coverage was excluded under the policy. Plaintiffs then brought a garnishment action
against GAI to satisfy the judgment. The trial court found that the policy exclusion was applicable, and
that GAI had adequately reserved its rights as against Process Design. However, the trial court
concluded that GAI did not properly notify plaintiffs or the court of the exclusions, and, therefore, GAI
was estopped from asserting the exclusions during the garnishment proceedings against plaintiffs.
Hence, the trial court granted summary disposition in favor of plaintiffs. We reverse.
II
ANALYSIS
GAI argues that the lower court erred as a matter of law in ruling that Process Design’s answer
to the interrogatory was a basis to estop GAI from enforcing the policy exclusions against plaintiffs. We
agree.
The general rule is that “[n]o attorney-client relationship exists between an insurance company
and the attorney representing the insurance company’s insured. The attorney’s sole loyalty and duty is
owed to the client, not the insurer.” Michigan Millers v Bronson Plating, 197 Mich App 482, 492;
496 NW2d 373 (1992). Process Design’s counsel submitted an affidavit stating that in his
representation of Process Design, he concentrated only upon the fact that Process Design did not design
the tank in question; although he was aware that the defense was under a reservation of rights, he never
concerned himself with the coverage issue.
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Plaintiffs assert that, despite the general rule that an attorney owes his duty to his client, Process
Design’s counsel was taking orders from GAI when he aided Process Design in answering the
interrogatories. However, plaintiffs offer no facts to support this contention. We do not agree with
plaintiffs that “it is rather apparent” that Process Design and its counsel were taking their cue from GAI
when they answered the interrogatory. Because plaintiffs fail to support their conjecture, as required by
MCR 2.116(G)(3), the trial court erred in granted summary disposition in favor of plaintiffs.
Had there been evidence that GAI was responsible for the interrogatories the trial court still
erred because the answers were neither false nor misleading. Many of the eleven allegations in the
complaint were not based upon negligent design or engineering, and, therefore, Process Design did have
coverage for “the type of claim” involved in the matter. Process Design’s answer to the general
question was fair and honest.
GAI also contends that, where Process Design was fully aware of the reservation of rights, the
trial court erred as a matter of law: (1) in concluding that GAI had to notify plaintiffs of coverage
limitations, and (2) in ruling that the lack of notice to plaintiffs prejudiced plaintiffs such that GAI should
be estopped from asserting its policy exclusions. The fundamental question to be addressed is whether
a defendant’s liability insurer has a duty to notify a plaintiff about a potential lack of coverage. Under
Michigan law, there is no such duty.
Our courts have consistently held that the insurer must notify its insured, but not the plaintiff, of a
reservation of rights. See, e.g. Meirthew v Last, 376 Mich 33, 39; 135 NW2d 353 (1965)..
Smit v State Farm Ins Co, 207 Mich App 674, 525 NW2d 528 (1994), also demonstrates
the error of plaintiff’s position and the trial court's ruling here. In Smit, the plaintiff was injured when he
was struck by a vehicle owned by one defendant and driven by another defendant. State Farm, the
insurer of one defendant, sent a letter to plaintiff’s counsel stating that State Farm denied liability based
upon two policy provisions. A judgment was entered against the defendant insured by State Farm, and
plaintiffs obtained a writ of garnishment directed to State Farm. State Farm sought summary
disposition, arguing that the policy did not cover the injuries – however, State Farm relied upon different
provisions than it had relied upon in its original letter to plaintiff’s counsel. The trial court there found
that State Farm was estopped from asserting policy defenses not raised in the original letter:
Plaintiffs’[the injured and his spouse] right to recover depends on their status as
assignees and as garnishors, both of which require a showing that [the insured] would
have been entitled to recover against State Farm. In their status as judgment creditors,
plaintiffs are entitled to recover against garnishee-defendant, State Farm, only to the
extent that the principal defendant [the insured], could recover against State Farm.
Similarly, the assignment of [the insured’s] rights under the State Farm policy allows
plaintiffs to claim the benefit of the waiver and estoppel doctrines, but only to the extent
that [the insured] herself would be entitled to do so. Accordingly, the proper focus is
whether [the insured] could have established the inequity necessary to outweigh “the
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inequity of forcing the insurer to pay for a risk for which it never collected premiums.”
Smit, 207 Mich App at 683. (Emphasis added).
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Most importantly for the instant case, in footnote six, the Smit court also explained:
To the extent that . . . Lee [v Evergreen Regency Corp, 151 Mich App 281; 390
NW2d 183 (1986)] suggests that prejudice to the plaintiff-garnishor, who is neither the
insured nor the insured’s assignee, is relevant in determining the plaintiff-garnishor’s right
to claim waiver or estoppel in his own right and thereby recover in a garnishment
proceeding against the principal defendant’s insurance company, w disagree. Smit,
e
207 Mich App at 683-684, n 6.
Smit shows here the trial court erred when it estopped GAI from asserting a policy defense
against plaintiff in the garnishment proceeding. The trial court found that GAI provided Process Design
with adequate notice of its reservation of rights. Under the authority of Meirthew and Smit, this should
have been the end of the trial court’s inquiry. However, the trial court proceeded to consider the
prejudice to plaintiffs when it estopped GAI from denying coverage. This was not a proper focus for
the trial court, because plaintiffs had no greater rights than did Process Design.
We reject Cozzens v Bazzani Bldg Co, 456 F Supp 192 (E.D. Mich 1978), (a federal district
court found that “the carrier owes certain responsibilities not only to the insured but also to the opposing
party and to the court.” 456 F Supp at 202) because Cozzens is in direct conflict with Smit, which is
binding upon us.
Finally, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred when it determined that the reservation of
rights letters to Process Design were sufficient to provide notice of GAI’s intent to deny coverage. In
light of the content of the three letters sent, and the affidavits of Process Design personnel
acknowledging that they knew GAI was defending under a reservation of rights on the negligent design
and engineering claims, this argument lacks merit.
In summary, the trial court correctly determined that GAI provided adequate notice to Process
Design that the defense was under a reservation of rights; but the court erred in estopping GAI from
denying coverage under the policy. Because the court found that the policy exclusion was applicable,
and because the court erred by estopping GAI from asserting this exclusion, summary disposition should
not have been granted in favor of plaintiffs, but rather should have been granted in favor of GAI.
Reversed and remanded for entry of summary disposition in favor of GAI.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ James P. Adair
1
Naomi’s claim is derivative of Alden’s claim.
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