RICHARD CLEGG V CROWN EQUIPMENT CORP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RICHARD CLEGG,
UNPUBLISHED
April 22, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 188885
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 94-416924-NP
CROWN EQUIPMENT CORPORATION,
an Ohio Corporation,
Defendant-Appellee,
Before: Michael J. Kelly, P.J., and Saad and H.A. Beach,* JJ.
SAAD, J (Dissenting).
I dissent. While the majority opinion carefully recites the law of products liability, it is equally
careful to avoid defining the “defect” at issue – just as plaintiff failed to identify any defect. That
something mechanical no longer works is not a substitute analytically or legally for proving that a product
is defective. Indeed, products wear out, require routine maintenance (as here), and may not work for a
myriad of reasons unrelated to a defect. Simply because Kuczynski (who as the employer’s agent, had
motive to point a finger at the manufacturer), labels a machine “defective” because it did not work,
does not create or define a defect. Kuczynski’s statement does not prove that something was wrong
with the machine, as manufactured by defendant.
Here, defendant unambiguously established that plaintiff failed to pinpoint any defect in the
product, as required by Michigan law. Klinke v Mitsubishi, 219 Mich App 500, 510; 556 NW2d
528 (1996); Bullock v Gulf & Western Manufacturing, 128 Mich App 316, 319; 340 NW2d 274
(1983). As a result, plaintiff theorized a defect by arguing that, if a switch wears out, the manual should
have detailed when and how to fix the switch – and that defendant’s failure to do so constitutes the
“defect.” This ignores the fact that no one has identified that anything was wrong with the machine as it
left the manufacturer. This also ignores the fact that the employer was responsible for maintenance of
the forklift, yet the employer essentially ignored the manufacturer’s instructions in the manual to check
the switches regularly.
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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The majority’s opinion also ignores the “but for” causation argument of defendant which would
also, independently mandate affirmance of the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s case. That is, given the
speed at which plaintiff operated the forklift and the very limited space available, (approximately nine
feet) even if the “plugging” mechanism worked, the forklift would have crashed into the freezer racks.
Because plugging required thirteen to fifteen feet to stop (as compared to 5 ½ to just over 6 feet to stop
with the brakes), plaintiff’s use of the forklift in the confined space would have caused the crash even in
the absence of any alleged defect.
Further, had the forklift simply crashed into the freezer racks, plaintiff would not have sustained
the injuries he did. It was because plaintiff exited the vehicle while it was still in motion (contrary to a
prominent warning glued to the forklift in plain view of the operator), that he was injured. Absent his
reckless driving and his exiting the forklift contrary to explicit warnings, these injuries would not have
occurred, regardless of the alleged, but unproven and unidentified defect. Accordingly, I would affirm,
concluding that the trial court properly granted summary disposition.
/s/ Henry William Saad
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