JACQUELINE WENKEL V DONALD BENCHLEY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JACQUELINE WENKEL,
UNPUBLISHED
April 22, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 186490
Arenac Circuit Court
LC No. 94-004663-NO
DONALD BENCHLEY and BARBARA
BENCHLEY, d/b/a BENCHLEY USED
EQUIPMENT,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
DONALD EUGENE WHEAT and CONNIE
WHEAT, d/b/a WHEAT TIRE,
Defendants.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and E.R. Post*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from a circuit court order granting the Benchley defendants summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). We reverse in part and affirm in part.
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court improperly granted summary disposition on the issue of
premises liability because an issue of fact existed whether the Benchley defendants breached their duty
to maintain their parking lot in a manner that did not create an unreasonable risk of harm to passing
motorists.1 We agree and reverse. To the extent that the trial court can be interpreted as holding that
no duty is imposed on a premises owner to maintain a parking area so that it is reasonably safe for
motorists traveling on an adjacent highway, the court erred. In Langen v Rushton, 138 Mich App
672, 678; 360 NW2d 270 (1984), this Court imposed such a duty on the owner of a shopping center:
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Where the parking lot of a shopping center abuts a public highway, it is entirely
foreseeable that a serious accident may occur between a customer entering or exiting
from the parking lot and a highway motorist. Under such circumstances, we think it
wholly just to impose a burden upon a defendant landowner to design, develop and
maintain a parking area so as to prevent an unreasonable risk of harm to motorists
traveling on adjacent highways.
The Langen Court found such a duty to be “a logical outgrowth of the settled duty of a landowner
toward passing-by-foot travelers.” Id. at 679, citing Bannigan v Woodbury, 158 Mich 206, 207; 122
NW 531 (1909).
Here, plaintiff claimed that the Benchleys breached this duty because their parking lot was
negligently designed and inadequately lighted, affording no warning to oncoming motorists of vehicles
pulling out of the parking lot. Plaintiff alleged that Donald Wheat was pulling out of the Benchleys’
parking lot just before he collided with plaintiff. Wheat testified that he was not in the parking lot but on
the shoulder of the road prior to the accident. However, Wheat told the investigating officers that he
was pulling out of the Benchleys’ parking lot just before the accident and did not mention that he was
making a U-turn. Thus, an issue of fact existed whether Wheat may have been making a left turn out of
the Benchleys’ parking lot just prior to the accident. Cf. Balcer v Forbes, 188 Mich App 509, 513
514; 470 NW2d 453 (1991) (no actionable negligence where the plaintiff’s injuries occurred “a full
block” from the defendants’ parking lot exit and were precipitated by an unforeseeable superseding
cause). Moreover, plaintiff claims that, given time to complete discovery, she could provide the court
with expert testimony or documentary evidence to support her version of the facts by establishing that
Wheat could not have completed a U
-turn from the shoulder. Because a genuine issue of fact was
raised whether a condition of the Benchleys’ parking lot created an unreasonable risk of harm to
motorists, such as plaintiff, traveling on the abutting highway, summary disposition was prematurely
granted. Johnson v Bobbie’s Party Store, 189 Mich App 652, 660-661; 473 NW2d 796 (1991);
Szkodzinski v Griffin, 171 Mich App 711, 715; 431 NW2d 51 (1988).
Plaintiff next argues that a genuine issue of material fact existed whether the Benchleys could be
held liable for Wheat’s negligence because they were involved in a joint venture in tire hauling with
Wheat. Plaintiff alternatively argues that the Benchleys should have been held liable under an
employer/employee relationship. We find it unnecessary to determine whether the tire hauling
agreement between the Benchleys and the Wheats was a joint venture or an employer/employee
relationship because we find that plaintiff has not raised a genuine issue of material fact whether Wheat
was acting within the scope of his agency, which is an element of joint venture liability, Troutman v
Ollis, 164 Mich App 727, 733; 417 NW2d 589 (1987); McLean v Wolverine Moving & Storage
Co, 187 Mich App 393, 400; 468 NW2d 230 (1991), and employer/employee liability, Linebaugh v
Sheraton Mich Corp, 198 Mich App 335, 343; 497 NW2d 585 (1993). Wheat testified that he was
at the Benchleys’ property to pick up a trailer that they had given him for his own use, unrelated to the
tire hauling agreement. Plaintiff presented no
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evidence to contradict this testimony. Thus, summary disposition of this claim was properly granted.
Reversed in part and affirmed in part.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Edward R. Post
1
Although the Benchley defendants apparently conceded the issue of duty on the premises liability
claim, the trial court granted the motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), finding that “[t]here is nothing
to show Benchleys have any liability by premises liability [sic], joint adventure or vicarious liability, such
as master-servant. This was an automobile accident on a highway, and it’s an imaginative pleading by
the plaintiff.”
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