CONSUMERS POWER CO V KIRK LEWIS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY,
UNPUBLISHED
April 15, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 192359
Clare Circuit Court
LC No. 94-900432-CZ
KIRK LEWIS and BETTY LEWIS, a/k/a
BETTYE LEWIS,
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: Young, Jr., P.J., and Fitzgerald and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants appeal as of right an order permanently enjoining them from interfering with
plaintiff’s right to access defendants’ real property. We affirm.
Defendants first argue that the trial court erred in granting plaintiff’s motion for a permanent
injunction because there is an issue of fact as to whether plaintiff’s use of defendants’ land was
permissive. However, defendants’ argument must fail because this fact must be deemed admitted by
defendants. MCR 2.108(A)(1) provides that “[a] defendant must serve and file an answer or take
other action permitted by law or these rules within 21 days after being served with the summons and a
copy of the complaint . . . .” MCR 2.110(B) requires that “[a] party must file and serve a responsive
pleading to (1) a complaint.” MCR 2.111(E)(1) provides that “[a]llegations in a pleading that requires
a responsive pleading, other than allegations of the amount of damage or the nature of the relief
demanded, are admitted if not denied in the responsive pleading.” As explained by one leading
authority, a “[f]ailure to deny can result either from failure to serve and file a required responsive
pleading at all, or failure within that pleading to deny specific matters.” Martin Dean & Webster,
Michigan Court Rules Practice, Authors’ Comments to MCR 2.111, p 190.
In this case, defendants were personally served with a complaint alleging that plaintiff had “a
prescriptive right to make lawful and beneficial use of Defendant’s land consistent with Plaintiff’s needs
to install, inspect, operate and maintain its electrical equipment to include tree trimming.” Within twenty
one days, defendants responded by filing a “Refusal for cause” and a “Refusal for cause without
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dishonor U.C.C. 3-501,” in which they argued only that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over the action. Although plaintiff raised the issue of whether plaintiff had a prescriptive easement at the
hearing on plaintiff’s motion for a permanent injunction, defendants failed to file a written response to
plaintiff’s allegations regarding its prescriptive rights. Because defendants failed to file and serve a
responsive pleading, plaintiff’s allegation that it had a prescriptive right to maintain its electrical
equipment is deemed admitted pursuant to MCR 2.111(E)(1). In light of this admission, we find that
plaintiff’s motion was properly granted. Vergote v K Mart Corp (After Remand), 158 Mich App 96,
103; 404 NW2d 711 (1987).
Next, defendants argue that the trial court erred in determining that it had jurisdiction over their
land. Defendants allege that their property was originally owned by the United States government and
was conveyed directly to their predecessors through a land patent. Defendants argue that because the
State of Michigan never acquired title to their land, this case was not within the jurisdiction of the Clare
Circuit Court. We disagree.
As explained in Bowie v Arder, 441 Mich 23, 39; 490 NW2d 568 (1992):
[J]urisdiction over the subject matter is the right of the court to exercise judicial
power over that class of cases; not the particular case before it, but rather the abstract
power to try a case of the kind or character of the one pending; and not whether the
particular case is one that presents a cause of action, or under the particular facts is
triable before the court in which it is pending, because of some inherent facts which exist
and may be developed during the trial.
MCL 600.605; MSA 27A.605 provides as follows:
Circuit courts have original jurisdiction to hear and determine all civil claims and
remedies, except where exclusive jurisdiction is given in the constitution or by statute to
some other court or where the circuit courts are denied jurisdiction by the constitution
or statutes of this state.
In this case, plaintiff brought a civil claim seeking a civil remedy in circuit court. Defendants
have not provided this Court with any legal authority indicating that the constitution or a statute has given
another court jurisdiction to hear this case. Moreover, we note that this Court and our Supreme Court
have heard and decided a number of cases, included cases cited by defendants, wherein claims
involving federally patented land were heard in the circuit court. See e.g., Jeffries v State ex rel
Director Of Dep’t Of Conservation, 373 Mich 287; 129 NW2d 426 (1964); Klais v Danowski,
373 Mich 262; 129 NW2d 414 (1964); People ex rel Director Of The Dep't of Natural Resources
v Murray, 54 Mich App 685; 221 NW2d 604 (1974); Oliphant v Frazho, 5 Mich App 319; 146
NW2d 685 (1966), rev’d 381 Mich 630 (1969). Accordingly, we conclude that defendants’
contention that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to hear a claim involving their land is without
merit.
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Defendants’ final argument is that the trial court should have sua sponte suggested that they
amend their response at the hearing on plaintiff’s motion. We disagree. MCR 2.118(A)(2) provides as
follows:
Except as provided in subrule (A)(1), a party may amend a pleading only by
leave of the court or by written consent of the adverse party. Leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires.
In this case, defendants never requested leave to amend their responsive pleading. We find no
error in the trial court’s failure to sua sponte suggest an amendment.
Affirmed.
/s/ Robert P. Young, Jr.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
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