LARRY A PIKE V UNIVERSITY OF MICH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LARRY A. PIKE,
UNPUBLISHED
April 11, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 190784
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 94-003112-CK
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Fitzgerald and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the order granting summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10) in favor of defendant in this case involving claims of handicap discrimination and wrongful
discharge. We affirm.
Plaintiff, who is hearing-impaired, was hired by defendant on October 29, 1990, as a records
clerk at the University of Michigan Dental School Clinic. According to University records, plaintiff was
absent for illness twenty-nine days in 1991 and twenty-three days in 1992. Plaintiff’s absenteeism was
noted in his 1991 performance evaluation completed by his direct supervisor, Joan Shores. In 1992,
Shores was promoted to a higher supervisory position and Debbie Coleman became plaintiff’s
immediate supervisor. Coleman’s 1992 performance evaluation on plaintiff stated that plaintiff’s use of
sick leave was unacceptable and needed improvement. Plaintiff also received counseling at the
University Rehabilitation Department as a result of his excessive sick time. Plaintiff was told during the
counseling session that he needed to attend work regularly.
In 1993, plaintiff was absent for alleged illness commencing on February 17 and continuing until
March 19, when he was placed on suspension. As a result of plaintiff’s suspension, a disciplinary
review conference was held on March 26, 1993, where plaintiff was provided with an interpreter.
According to defendant, plaintiff was provided with four medical forms to be filled out by plaintiff’s
doctors and returned within a two-week period. Plaintiff did not dispute that defendant requested that
the forms be completed, but denied that he was told that the forms had to be returned within two
weeks.
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On May 3, 1993, Shores terminated plaintiff for failure to return the medical forms. Plaintiff’s
employment was terminated effective March 5, 1993.
On August 24, 1994, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant alleging that he was terminated
because of his handicap in violation of the Michigan handicappers’ civil rights act, MCL 37.1101 et
seq.; MSA 3.550(101) et seq. Plaintiff also alleged that his termination was not in compliance with
University guidelines on sick leave. Defendant moved for summary disposition, which was granted by
the trial court. The trial court ruled that the evidence established that plaintiff was terminated for
excessive absenteeism, and that there was no evidence that plaintiff’s deafness was a factor in the
termination. The trial court also ruled that even if plaintiff had presented a prima facie case, there was
no issue of fact regarding whether absenteeism was a pretext for discrimination on the part of defendant.
Finally, the trial court ruled that there was no fact issue regarding whether defendant violated its
employment policies. The trial court granted summary disposition in defendant’s favor regarding both
counts of plaintiff’s complaint.
I.
Plaintiff first claims that the trial court erred in dismissing his employment discrimination claim on
the basis that plaintiff failed to present a prima facie case. We review the trial court’s decision on a
motion for summary disposition de novo. Baker v Arbor Drugs, Inc, 215 Mich App 198, 202; 544
NW2d 727 (1996). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual basis underlying the plaintiff’s
claim. Id. A court reviewing such a motion must consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions,
admissions, and any other documentary evidence in favor of the party opposing the motion. The court’s
task is to review the record evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn from it, and decide whether a
genuine issue regarding any material fact exists to warrant a trial. Id.
To establish a prima facie case of handicap discrimination, the plaintiff must establish: (1) the
plaintiff is “handicapped” as defined in the act; (2) the handicap is unrelated to the plaintiff’s ability to
perform the duties of a particular job; (3) the plaintiff has been discriminated against in one of the ways
set forth in the statute. Doman v Grosse Pointe Farms, 170 Mich App 536, 541; 428 NW2d 708
(1988). Id.
Here, there is no dispute that plaintiff’s deafness is a handicap within the meaning of the statute.
It is also undisputed that the handicap is unrelated to plaintiff’s ability to perform his duties as a records
clerk. Thus, the only element in dispute is whether plaintiff has been discriminated against in one of the
ways set forth in the statute; i.e., whether plaintiff was terminated because of his deafness. To survive a
motion for summary disposition in discrimination cases, the plaintiff must tender specific factual evidence
that could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that the defendant intentionally discriminated against him.
Lyttle v Malady & Howmet Corp, 209 Mich App 179, 187-188; 530 NW2d 135 (1995), lv gtd 451
Mich 920 (1996).
Plaintiff first claims that defendant’s failure to follow its policies and guidelines with respect to
sick time and termination is evidence that plaintiff was terminated because of his handicap. The parties
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have presented three potential sources of University guidelines/policy regarding sick leave. The first
two, the “Sick Time Pay” policy contained in the University of Michigan Staff Handbook for Allied
Health, Office, Professional/Administrative and Technical Employees, and the “Sick Time Pay” policy
contained in the Standard Practice Guide, discuss eligibility for short- and long-term sick leave benefits.
These policies are clearly intended to describe employee benefits; they do not address termination
resulting from excessive sick leave or any steps that must be followed by the University to terminate an
employee for excessive absenteeism. Therefore, plaintiff was not terminated “in violation” of these
policies.
Plaintiff also maintains that he was terminated in violation of the “Sick Time Guidelines”
contained in the School of Dentistry Monitoring Records, and Recall Department, Patient Services
Employee Guidelines (“Employee Guidelines”). The “Sick Time Guidelines” include the following
information:
Excused sick time with pay is granted when an employee is unable to work due to
personal illness or injury or is off work due to a prearranged medical or dental
appointment. With the exception of medical/dental appointments, each separate or
distinct employee absence is defined as an occurrence. An absence of two (2) or more
consecutive days for the same illness or injury is still considered one occurrence. The
number of occurrences and the number of hours of absenteeism within a specific
time period is used to determine whether the employee’s attendance record is
reasonable.
***
If the employment obligation of regular and reasonable attendance is not met, any one
or all of the following steps will be taken to correct the situation:
1. Supervisor may request written verification to substantiate all absences due to illness,
injury, or prearranged medical/dental appointments.
***
5. Employee may be discharged for failure to meet employment obligation for ten (10)
or more absences due to illness or injury occurring within a twelve (12) month period.
[Emphasis added.]
Plaintiff argues that he was terminated in violation of the Employee Guidelines because he had not had
ten absences in the twelve months preceding his termination. An absence of two or more consecutive
days for the same illness or injury is still considered one occurrence under the Employee Guidelines. In
this case, plaintiff left work on February 17 and did not return; therefore, plaintiff maintains that his
absence was just one occurrence.
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In the event that the employment obligation of regular and reasonable attendance is not met, the
Employee Guidelines leave it to the discretion of the supervisor to decide which one or more of the
listed steps to take. Here, Debbie Coleman pursued the first step by requesting plaintiff to provide
written verification of his illness. Plaintiff was requested to provide additional verification at the
disciplinary review conference. Moreover, even accepting plaintiff’s argument that his absence was only
one “occurrence” (even though he was absent for twenty-two days before his suspension and was
absent for a total of forty-one days in the past twelve months), the guidelines do not purport to be an
exclusive list of remedies. We do not interpret the guidelines as providing that an employee may only be
terminated for excessive absences if he or she has ten or more absences within a twelve-month period.
Under plaintiff’s theory, he could be gone from work for an infinite period of time without consequence.
The guidelines specify that the number of occurrences and the number of hours of absenteeism within
a specific time period are used to determine whether an employee’s attendance record is reasonable.
Plaintiff also asserts that Joan Shores admitted at deposition that she did not follow the
Employee Guidelines with respect to terminating plaintiff. However, a review of the relevant deposition
testimony does not support plaintiff’s assertion. Shores admitted that she did not take all of the steps
listed under the “Unexcused Absences” provision; however, those steps were completely discretionary
as the guideline explicitly provides that any one or more of the steps “may” be taken in the case of
excessive unexcused absences. Therefore, plaintiff has not provided any evidence that defendant failed
to comply with its own policies and procedures in terminating plaintiff, let alone that a breach of those
policies or procedures was motivated by plaintiff’s handicap.
Plaintiff claims that Shores’ belief that he was not sick was evidence of discriminatory animus in
light of the medical certifications that he provided. However, the pattern presented in those medical
certifications could raise a question in any reasonable mind regarding plaintiff’s true ability to work.
Moreover, Shores’ belief or disbelief in plaintiff’s illness has no reasonable connection to a
discriminatory motive or intent. Plaintiff also asserts that Coleman discriminated against him based on
his handicap. However, plaintiff did not present anything other than his subjective beliefs in support of
his claims.
Plaintiff also appears to associate discriminatory intent with the fact that he was allegedly
verbally requested at the disciplinary review conference to return four medical forms within two weeks.
Plaintiff claims that he did not know that the forms had to be returned within two weeks, and that any
such request should have been made in writing. Plaintiff further stated that he did not have any control
over the doctors who were asked to complete and return the forms. Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the
medical forms do not provide any evidence of discriminatory intent. First, plaintiff was provided with an
interpreter at the conference. Second, even if it was not communicated to plaintiff that the forms had to
be returned in two weeks, Shores waited a reasonable amount of time (five weeks) before terminating
plaintiff. Finally, plaintiff presents no evidence that his termination for failure to ensure that the forms
were completed and returned by his doctors in a reasonable amount of time indicates discrimination on
the part of defendant.
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Viewing the evidence presented by plaintiff as a whole, this Court does not believe that the trial
court erred in finding that plaintiff failed to present a prima facie case of handicap discrimination. None
of the evidence presented by plaintiff demonstrates discriminatory animus toward plaintiff. To the
contrary, it appears that the staff was so enthusiastic about accommodating plaintiff’s handicap that they
undertook to learn basic sign language. In addition, every effort was made to accommodate plaintiff by
providing him with an interpreter for staff meetings and meetings with his supervisor. Nor did plaintiff
present any evidence that his deafness was a motive for his termination. All of the evidence on the
record indicates that plaintiff was terminated for a long-term pattern of excessive absenteeism.
Even if plaintiff did establish a prima facie case of handicap discrimination, the trial court
correctly concluded that summary disposition would still be proper in this case. Under the burden
shifting analysis, once a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to defendant to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Crittenden v Chrysler Corp, 178 Mich App 324,
331; 443 NW2d 412 (1989). If such a reason is articulated, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who
must show that the legitimate reason put forth by the defendant was not a true reason, but was a mere
pretext for discrimination. Clark v Uniroyal Corp, 119 Mich App 820, 824; 327 NW2d 372 (1982).
In order to survive a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), the plaintiff must
put forth factual allegations to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the proffered reason was a mere
pretext. Id. at 825-826.
In this case, defendant articulated a legitimate reason for terminating plaintiff -- his excessive
absenteeism. Plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence that tends to show that defendant’s reason is
pretextual. It is undisputed that plaintiff was absent due to illness for twenty-nine days in 1991 and
twenty-three days in 1992. The Employee Guidelines provided to plaintiff emphasized the importance
of regular attendance. Plaintiff also admitted that he received counseling at the University Rehabilitation
Department in connection with his employment because of concern over his sick time, where he was
informed that he was required to attend work regularly. Plaintiff was also warned in his 1991 and 1992
performance evaluations that his sick-time was a problem that needed improvement. After being absent
from work from February 17 until March 18 (22 days), plaintiff was placed on suspension which
culminated in the disciplinary review conference held on March 26, 1993. At that meeting, plaintiff was
provided with an interpreter and was asked to return four medical forms that had to be completed by
plaintiff’s doctors. After five weeks the forms had not been returned, and plaintiff was terminated.
II.
Plaintiff also claims that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition with regard to his
claim for wrongful discharge. Plaintiff claims that he was wrongfully discharged due to defendant’s
failure to follow the rules, regulations, and guidelines of the University relative to sick time and/or
termination of employment. Plaintiff further claims that defendant refused to allow plaintiff to proceed
with a grievance procedure, contrary to the terms of the Standard Practice Guide. An action for
wrongful discharge may be based on an employer’s failure to comply with its own procedures for
discharge. King v Michigan Consolidated Gas Co, 177 Mich App 531, 537; 442 NW2d 714
(1989). Whether established procedures were followed is generally a question for the trier of fact.
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Struble v Lacks Industries, Inc, 157 Mich App 169, 175; 403 NW2d 71 (1986). We concluded
above that defendant did not violate any of its sick time policies or guidelines in terminating plaintiff.
Plaintiff claims for the first time on appeal that he was denied access to the grievance process.
A party who fails to raise an issue before the trial court has failed to preserve the issue for appellate
review. Burgess v Clark, 215 Mich App 542, 548; 547 NW2d 59 (1996). Moreover, this Court
was not provided with sufficient information to substantiate plaintiff’s claim.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
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