PEOPLE OF MI V KENNETH MICHAEL HARRIS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 4, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 165220
Macomb Circuit Court
LC Nos. 92-002000;
92-002001;
92-002002
KENNETH MICHAEL HARRIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Reilly and W.C. Buhl*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of five counts of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(f); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(f). He was sentenced to concurrent terms of
twenty-five to forty years’ imprisonment. Defendant now appeals as of right. We affirm.
I
Defendant first argues that there were numerous instances during trial where he was denied
effective assistance of counsel.1 In order to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
defendant must first show that counsel’s performance was below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Defendant must overcome a strong presumption
that counsel’s assistance constituted sound trial strategy.
Second, defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error,
the result of the proceeding would have been different. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687-688;
521 NW2d 557 (1994).
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Defendant avers that he was denied effective assistance of counsel by his attorney’s failure to
call Dr. Walter Guevara as a witness at trial because defendant did not have the money to pay for the
doctor’s fee. Defendant claims that his counsel failed to recognize that he had the right to independent
psychiatric testimony at the expense of the government if he was indigent. We disagree.
MCL 768.20a(3); MSA 28.1043(1)(3) provides an indigent criminal defendant with the
opportunity to prepare a defense of insanity at public expense by the appointment of an expert witness,
chosen by defendant, who may testify as to the underlying medical basis for the defense. People v
McPeters, 181 Mich App 145, 151; 448 NW2d 770 (1989).2 However, because defendant did not
plead insanity, his sanity at the time of the sexual assaults was not a question at trial. Rather, in light of
defendant’s admission that he had sexual intercourse with the complainant, his attorney attempted to
show that the complainant was a willing participant in the intercourse. Therefore, because defense
counsel was not required to introduce Dr. Guevara’s testimony at trial, his conduct did not fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness. Therefore, defendant was not denied effective assistance of
counsel.
Defendant did not preserve the remaining eight claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that he
raised because he failed to argue the merits or cite any authority in support of his claims.3 People v
Piotrowski, 211 Mich App 527, 530; 536 NW2d 293 (1995); People v Jones, (On Rehearing), 201
Mich App 449, 456-457; 506 NW2d 542 (1993). However, after thoroughly reviewing the record,
we find that defendant did not establish that trial counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, or that there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the proceeding would have
been different.
II
Defendant next argues that he was denied a fair trial by improper comments made by the
prosecutor during closing argument. However, because defendant did not object to the prosecutor’s
comments at trial, appellate review is precluded, unless failure to review the issue would result in a
miscarriage of justice or if a cautionary instruction could not have cured the prejudicial effect.
Stanaway, supra at 687. Although the prosecutor may have appealed to the fears and prejudices of
the jury regarding the sexual abuse of children by highlighting their susceptibility and the fact that children
are “our most prized assets,” we believe that any prejudicial effect of that comment could have been
cured with a cautionary instruction to the jury. Moreover, the comment did not produce a miscarriage
of justice in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt.
Similarly, although defense counsel should have objected to the prosecutor’s improper
comments, the failure to do so did not deny defendant the effective assistance of counsel because there
is no reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different if he had.
Stanaway, supra at 687-688.
III
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Defendant next argues that he was denied his right against self incrimination by virtue of the
testimony of Clinton Township Police Detective Thomas Albin, in which he stated that defendant did not
make a statement to the police after he was read his Miranda rights.
Although defendant failed to object to the admission of Detective Albin’s testimony at trial,
review is nevertheless appropriate where a significant constitutional question is involved. People v
Alexander, 188 Mich App 96, 101; 469 NW2d 10 (1991). Where the defendant has not objected to
the admission of evidence, but there was plain error, reversal is not required unless the error affected the
substantial rights of the defendant. An error affects the substantial rights of a defendant if it affected the
outcome of the proceedings. People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 552-553; 520 NW2d 123 (1994).
The prosecution may not use a defendant’s exercise of his Fifth Amendment right to remain
silent against him at trial; a defendant’s silence during police questioning may be used only to impeach
his assertion that he made a statement. People v Gilbert, 183 Mich App 741, 747; 455 NW2d 731
(1990).
Defendant contends that the prosecutor deliberately elicited from Detective Albin that defendant
invoked his right to remain silent in order to substantiate defendant’s guilt, and that Detective Albin
should have known that he could not testify as to defendant’s silence following the Miranda warnings.
We disagree. The prosecutor merely asked detective Albin what he did after placing defendant under
arrest. There is no indication that he intended or attempted to elicit from him that defendant refused to
make a statement. It is not clear whether Detective Albin purposely testified as to evidence that he
knew was inadmissible in order to show that defendant was guilty; however, we do not believe that his
testimony established or alluded to defendant’s guilt. This was not a situation where the prosecutor
asked defendant why he did not make any statement to the police if he was not guilty. Rather,
Detective Albin, in describing the events that took place after defendant’s arrest, mentioned that he did
not make a statement to the police. Moreover, even if the testimony was erroneously admitted, the
error did not affect the substantial rights of defendant because there was abundant other evidence from
which a jury could convict him of first-degree CSC.
Defendant also argues that defense counsel’s failure to object to the testimony denied him
effective assistance of counsel. However, as noted, there was no indication that Detective Albin’s
testimony connoted that defendant was guilty because he did not give a statement to the police.
Furthermore, because the admission of the testimony did not affect the outcome of the proceedings,
defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel.
IV
Defendant also argues that the testimony of Dr. Joseph Flynn regarding what the complainant
told him during the medical examination was not admissible because it did not fall within the medical
exception to the hearsay rule. Because defendant did not object to the admission of Dr. Flynn’s
testimony at trial, the issue is not preserved. MCR 103(a)(1). However, this Court may take notice of
plain errors that affect the substantial rights of a party, even if no objection was made at trial. Grant,
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supra at 546. An error affects the substantial rights of a defendant if it affected the outcome of the
proceedings. Id. at 552-553.
Dr. Joseph Flynn was an emergency room physician at Mount Clemens General Hospital. He
testified that he examined the complainant on April 29, 1992. He took a history from the complainant
and was told that the complainant “was forced into rectal intercourse on that day at approximately 4:15,
4:30 in the afternoon. And [he] was also told that there was six to seven other episodes over the past
two to three months.” Dr. Flynn was “told that there was forced oral intercourse a week before that.”
Dr. Flynn further testified that the complainant’s anus had been traumatized and that the complainant
told him that he and his family were threatened. Dr. Flynn testified that the complainant told him that “he
was hit with a rope for having a bad report card.” The prosecutor asked Dr. Flynn what the
complainant’s emotional reaction was when he conducted the medical examination and spoke with him.
Dr. Flynn replied that “[h]e was an emotionally upset child.”
“‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” MRE 801(c). Statements made
for purposes of medical treatment or medical diagnosis in connection with treatment and describing
medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character
of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably necessary to such diagnosis and treatment
are excluded from the hearsay rule. MRE 803(4). The declarant must have the self-interested
motivation to speak the truth to treating physicians in order to receive proper medical care, and the
statement must be reasonably necessary to the diagnosis and treatment of the patient. People v
McElhaney, 215 Mich App 269, 280; 545 NW2d 18 (1996). Further, when the patient is over ten
years old, as here, a rebuttable presumption of truthfulness arises. People v Crump, 216 Mich App
210, 212; 549 NW2d 36 (1996).4
Dr. Flynn testified that a general physical examination entails “a history of the chief complaint,
followed by an examination that would be directed towards any type of evidence that would support a
diagnosis of an assault.” Dr. Flynn then explained the history that the complainant gave him for
purposes of conducting a physical examination. The complainant explained to Dr. Flynn that he was
anally and orally penetrated, and he explained how and why he was “threatened” and “enticed” into
“these activities.” The complainant’s statements likely allowed Dr. Flynn to structure the examination
and questions to the exact type of trauma that he had recently experienced. See McElhaney, supra at
282-283. Sexual abuse cases involve medical, physical, developmental, and psychological
components, all of which require diagnosis and treatment. Id. at 283. Therefore, because the
complainant’s statements to Dr. Flynn were reasonably necessary to his diagnosis and treatment, they
were properly admitted under MRE 803(4). Furthermore, the statements were cumulative to the
complainant’s testimony and are, therefore, harmless. McElhaney, supra at 283.
Defendant also argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney
did not object to the admission of Dr. Flynn’s testimony regarding what the complainant told him.
However, because Dr. Flynn’s testimony was admissible pursuant to MRE 803(4), defense counsel had
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no basis to object to the testimony. Therefore, defendant was not denied effective assistance of
counsel.
V
Next, defendant argues that the testimony of Dr. Flynn, Officer Terzo and the complainant’s
brother, vouched for the complainant’s credibility and produced manifest injustice. Because defendant
did not object to the admission of this testimony at trial, this Court may only take notice of plain errors
that affected defendant’s substantial rights. Grant, supra at 546.
Defendant relies on People v Beckley, 434 Mich 691; 456 NW2d 391 (1990), in which a
majority of the Supreme Court held that, in a case involving sexual abuse of a child, an expert witness
may testify that the behavior of the victim is consistent with that of child sexual abuse victims generally.
However, the expert may not testify with regard to whether the victim’s allegations are truthful or
whether sexual abuse in fact occurred. People v Garrison (On Remand), 187 Mich App 657, 658;
468 NW2d 321 (1991). Beckley and Garrison are distinguishable from the present case inasmuch as
the witnesses in this case did not testify as experts with respect to child abuse and did not compare the
complainants’ behavior with that of other victims. Defendant’s substantial rights were not affected.
Defendant also claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel by his attorney eliciting
that Officer Terzo and Dr. Flynn believed that the complainant was a victim of sexual assault. We
disagree. Although defendant perceives that defense counsel elicited a response that was damaging to
him, it is not clear that defense counsel was not pursuing a certain strategy in asking this question. In
fact, he may have been attempting to elicit that the witnesses formed the opinion that the complainant
was a victim of sexual abuse based only on the complainant’s word. Defendant did not overcome the
presumption that counsel’s assistance constituted sound trial strategy. Moreover, even if defense
counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms, defendant has not shown that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. Rather, the complainant’s graphic testimony
coupled with defendant’s admission that he had intercourse with the complainant was enough, without
more, for the jury to convict defendant.
VI
Finally, defendant argues that the testimony of the complainant’s brother and father was
improperly admitted because it was inadmissible hearsay. Once again, defendant did not object to this
testimony at trial, therefore, our review is limited to whether there was error affecting defendant’s
substantial rights. Grant, supra at 546.
We do not believe that the testimony of the brother was inadmissible hearsay, to which defense
counsel should have objected. First, defendant does not explain why the brother’s statement that
defendant waited until parents left in the morning to spend time with the neighborhood children was
improper. His statement was not hearsay; rather it was an observation made by the brother regarding
matters within his personal knowledge pursuant to MRE 602.
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The complainant’s brother’s testimony that the complainant told him defendant had been
molesting him was cumulative of the complainant’s testimony at trial and did not affect defendant’s
substantial rights. We are not persuaded that the failure of defendant’s counsel to object was prejudicial
and therefore, reject defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Defendant also argues that the testimony of the complainant’s father was inadmissible hearsay
and therefore improperly admitted. The complainant told his father that defendant was molesting him on
April 29, after defendant had sexually assaulted the complainant in his home. Thus, the complainant’s
statement arose out of a startling event, was made before he had an opportunity for contrivance and
related to the circumstances of the startling event. MRE 803(2). Therefore, its admission was proper
as an excited utterance. The fact that the complainant’s father testified that the complainant was crying
is not hearsay because it was merely the complainant’s father’s observation of what the complainant
was doing at the time he told him about the molestation. He similarly described that the complainant
was afraid when he spoke with Officer Terzo. MRE 602. Finally, there is no indication that the
complainant’s father’s statement that the family moved was hearsay. He stated that the complainant and
the rest of the family were being harassed by defendant’s friends and family. The complainant’s father
did not testify as to any statement made by an out of court declarant. He simply expressed the reasons
his family moved from the neighborhood. Accordingly, defendant was not denied effective assistance of
counsel by his attorney’s failure to object to its admission.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Maureen Pulte Reilly
/s/ William C. Buhl
1
Five of the claims of ineffective assistance argued by defendant are discussed in greater detail under
the other issues presented in defendant’s brief on appeal. Therefore, we address whether he was
denied effective assistance of counsel on those bases under the appropriate section of this opinion and
we discuss the other nine instances under this first section.
2
Defendant claims that defense counsel did not recognize Ake v Oklahoma, 470 US 68, 74, 105 S Ct
1087, 84 L Ed 2d 53 (1985). In that case:
[T]he United States Supreme Court held that, when an indigent defendant has made a
preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the crime is likely to be a significant
issue at trial, the state must provide the defendant access to a psychiatrist to prepare for
this issue. The Court held that in such cases the State must, at a minimum, assure the
defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate
examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense. This
is not to say, of course, that the indigent defendant has a constitutional right to choose a
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psychiatrist of his personal liking or to receive funds to hire his own. [McPeters, supra
at 150-151.]
3
Because the other five preserved claims are addressed under subsequent sections, we only address
one claim under this section of the opinion.
4
Although defendant argues that the ten factors established in People v Meeboer, 439 Mich 310; 484
NW2d 621 (1992), must be evaluated to determine whether the statements of a child to a medical
professional bear the sufficient induce of trustworthiness to be admitted pursuant to MRE 803(4), this
Court specifically held that the factors do not need to be evaluated where the child is over ten years of
age. People v Van Tassel (On Remand), 197 Mich App 653, 662; 496 NW2d 388 (1992).
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