KEITH COTTRILL V DUNIGAN BROS INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
KEITH COTTRILL,
UNPUBLISHED
April 1, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
v
No. 182931
Jackson Circuit Court
LC No. 94-068747-CZ
DUNIGAN BROS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Bandstra and M. J. Talbot*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals, and plaintiff cross appeals, from a judgment of the circuit court entered
upon a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff on his Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act (HCRA), MCL 27.1101
et seq.; MSA 3.550(101) et seq. claim. We reverse.
Plaintiff was employed by defendant beginning in June of 1988 to maintain equipment. In June
of 1992, plaintiff began suffering from prepatellar bursitis. The bursitis caused his leg to swell and
become inflamed to the point he could not bend it. Plaintiff recovered and was able to return to work in
early September 1992, having not worked since June 17. However, after working one day, he was
terminated.
At trial, plaintiff’s supervisor, John Dunigan, testified that plaintiff was terminated because of
poor job performance. According to Dunigan, the decision to terminate plaintiff had been reached by
himself and defendant’s president, Joseph Dunigan, shortly before plaintiff’s bursitis arose. However,
they decided to delay the termination under after plaintiff recovered. Joseph Dunigan confirmed this
version of events.
A number of issues are raised on appeal, one of which is dispositive: did the trial court err in
denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition. We agree with defendant that it did. At issue is
whether plaintiff is handicapped within the meaning of the HCRA. We conclude that he is not.
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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MCL 37.1202(1); MSA 3.550(202)(1) provides in pertinent part as follows:
An employer shall not:
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(b) Discharge or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to
compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of a
handicap that is unrelated to the individual’s ability to perform the duties of a particular
job or position.
First, we note that if plaintiff was, in fact, terminated because of poor job performance, that he
is not entitled to the protections of the above statute because he was not terminated because he was
handicapped. That aside, however, we still do not believe that plaintiff comes within the provisions of
the act. One of two conditions exist: either (1) plaintiff was fully recovered from his bursitis or (2) he
was not and the bursitis would recur. In the first case, plaintiff was no longer handicapped and,
therefore, not protected by the act. In the second case, plaintiff is still not protected by the act because
it is undisputed that he was unable to perform his job when suffering from bursitis.
The trial court rejected defendant’s motion by relying on Rymar v Michigan Bell Telephone
Co, 190 Mich App 504; 476 NW2d 451 (1991). However, the trial court’s reliance on Rymar is
misplaced for the same reason expressed by this Court in Hatfield v St Mary’s Medical Center, 211
Mich App 321, 329; 535 NW2d 272 (1995):
While we question the soundness of the reasoning in Rymar, we conclude that
we are not constrained to follow it because Rymar is distinguishable.
Unlike the plaintiff in Rymar, plaintiff in this case never alleged that defendant
denied her adequate leave time.
Finally, plaintiff also argues that he is entitled to the protections of the HCRA because, at the
time of his termination, the bursitis did not affect his ability to perform his job. Again, however, if
plaintiff was completely cured, then he was no longer handicapped. If he was not, then his condition did
affect his ability to perform his job and he was not entitled to the protections of the act. It would be
illogical in cases of chronic, recurring conditions to allow termination only when the employee was
unable to work and not during an interlude of health when he was able to work. First, it overlooks the
basic fact that a key element of the ability to perform a job is the ability to report to work and perform
the job on a consistent basis. Excessive absenteeism, regardless of the cause, is itself an inability to
perform the job. Second, it would provide a tremendous disincentive for an employer who chose to
leave an employee on the payroll during a period of disability, providing an opportunity to possibly heal
as well as to retain medical and other benefits during a period in which it would be difficult, if not
impossible, for the employee to obtain new employment and new benefits.
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For the above reasons, we conclude that defendant was entitled to summary disposition.
Accordingly, it is unnecessary to address the remaining issues raised.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction. Defendant being the prevailing party, it may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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