FLORENCE RECTOR V ART VAN FURNITURE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
FLORENCE RECTOR and HAROLD W. RECTOR,
UNPUBLISHED
March 21, 1997
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 184772
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 94-471910-NO
ART VAN FURNITURE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Corrigan, C.J., and Doctoroff and R.R. Lamb,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal by right the order granting summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no
genuine issue of material fact) to defendant and dismissing plaintiffs’ premises liability action. We affirm.
Plaintiff1 Florence Rector slipped2 on a step and injured herself while exiting a store of
defendant Art Van Furniture. Plaintiff claimed that she did not anticipate or notice the single step, which
was at the door of the store between the showroom floor and the sidewalk. Defendant moved for
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that it had not breached a duty owed to
plaintiff because the step was open and obvious. Defendant asserted that plaintiff clearly knew about
the step because she had used it to enter the store. The circuit court granted defendant’s motion.
Plaintiff argues that the court erred in ruling that the step was open and obvious. This Court
reviews de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition. Ladd v Ford Consumer
Finance Co, Inc, 217 Mich App 119, 124; 550 NW2d 826 (1996). A motion for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual basis underlying a plaintiff’s claim and permits
summary disposition when, except as to the amount of damages, no genuine issue of material fact exists
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When deciding the motion, the court
considers the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions and other documentary evidence available to
it in a light most favorable to the opposing party. Id. at 124-125.
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
-1
The parties agree that plaintiff was a business invitee on defendant’s property. An invitee is a
person who enters the land of another on an invitation that carries with it an implication that reasonable
care has been used to prepare and make safe the premises. Eason v Coggins Memorial Christian
Methodist Episcopal Church, 210 Mich App 261, 263; 532 NW2d 882 (1995). An invitor must
warn of hidden defects, but has no duty to warn of open and obvious dangers unless the invitor
anticipates harm to the invitee despite the invitee’s knowledge of the defect. Id. at 263-264. Whether
a danger is open and obvious depends upon whether it is reasonable to expect an average user with
ordinary intelligence to discover the danger upon casual inspection. Id.
Bertrand v Alan Ford, Inc, 449 Mich 606; 537 NW2d 185 (1995), represents the most
recent case from our Supreme Court to address open and obvious dangers. The Court stated that a
step is something that people encounter every day. Thus, under most circumstances, a reasonably
prudent person will look where he is going, will observe steps, and will take appropriate care for his
own safety. Under ordinary circumstances, the overriding public policy of encouraging people to take
reasonable care for their own safety precludes imposing a duty on the possessor of land to make
ordinary steps “foolproof.” Therefore, the harm is not unreasonable. Id. at 616-617. Where the steps
are unusual because of their character, location, or surrounding conditions, then the possessor of land
must exercise reasonable care. Id. at 617. If the proofs create a question of fact that the risk of harm
was unreasonable, the existence of a duty and its breach become questions for the jury to decide. Id.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, summary disposition was appropriate.
Plaintiff asserts that the step was dangerous because she did not realize the step was there when she
exited the store. Plaintiff, however, had entered the store through the same door and had not slipped on
the step. Plaintiff has not asserted that the step’s character or location caused her injury. She
essentially avers that she forgot the step existed. She acknowledges that she was speaking with a
salesperson as she exited the store. Plaintiff thus did not take reasonable care for her own safety on
account of her distraction. Plaintiff has not established that the step was unusual or that it posed an
unreasonable risk of harm. Bertrand, supra at 621. Moreover, the photographs in the record show
that the step was open and obvious. This is not a case where the placement of the step and surrounding
conditions created an unreasonable risk of harm. Bertrand, supra at 624.
Additionally, the analysis whether a danger is open and obvious does not revolve around
whether action could have been taken to make the danger more open or more obvious. Rather, the
equation involved is whether the danger, as presented, is open and obvious. Novotney v Burger King
Corp (On Remand), 198 Mich App 470, 474-475; 499 NW2d 379 (1993). The pertinent question is:
would an average user with ordinary intelligence have been able to discover the danger and the risk
presented upon casual inspection? Id.
It is not unreasonable for an invitee to expect a step when entering a store. The step was in
plain view. Despite the affidavits presented by plaintiff, an ordinary user could have ascertained, upon
casual inspection, the nature of the step. The evidence from plaintiff was not sufficient to create a
dispute of fact. The step and the dangers posed by the step were so obvious that plaintiff reasonably
should have discovered them. Plaintiff has not raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding the open
and obvious danger of the step.
-2
The following passage from Novotney is instructive:
A sidewalk . . . is for all practical purposes a simple product. Its nature, as well as any
dangers present, is apparent upon casual inspection by an average user with ordinary
intelligence. That is, a person can observe in what direction a sidewalk goes, and what
incline the sidewalk presents, upon casual inspection. [Id. at 474.]
The Court also stated that it was irrelevant whether the plaintiff in Novotney actually saw the handicap
ramp that caused her fall. Id. at 475. Correspondingly, it is not relevant whether plaintiff here saw the
step. The Court in Bertrand quoted that an expectation of harm “`may arise . . . where the possessor
has reason to expect that the invitee’s attention may be distracted, so that he will not discover what is
obvious, or will forget what he has discovered, or fail to protect himself against it. . . .’” Bertrand,
supra at 611-612 (citing 2 Restatement Torts 2d, § 343A, comment f, p 220). We decline to rule that
defendant should have expected harm when plaintiff had used the same step in entering the store.
Affirmed. As the prevailing party, defendant may tax costs under MCR 7.219.
/s/ Maura D. Corrigan
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Richard Ryan Lamb
1
Because plaintiff Harold Rector’s claims are derivative, in this opinion “plaintiff” will refer to only
Florence Rector.
2
Although the parties have labeled this case as a “slip and fall,” plaintiff’s statement of facts in her
appellate brief reflects that she did not actually fall: “[Plaintiff] therefore stepped down very hard on her
right foot and was prevented from falling by the salesperson who grabbed her as she fell.”
-3
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