IMPERIAL OIL CO V REMUS INDEPENDENT OIL CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
IMPERIAL OIL COMPANY, WEBB OIL
COMPANY and LEWIS C. JOHNSON, INC.,
UNPUBLISHED
March 11, 1997
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 187659
LC No. 92-009665-CE
REMUS INDEPENDENT OIL COMPANY, a/k/a
REMUS OIL COMPANY, WILLIAM J. WEBB,
SR., WILLIAM WEBB, JR., ROBERT WEBB,
MEGHANN WEBB, a Minor, KATIE WEBB, a
Minor, ROBIN WEBB, a Minor, SALLY WEBB,
RACHAEL WEBB, a Minor, DAVID WEBB, a
Minor, and ERIC MARPLE,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Michael J. Kelly and M.J. Talbot,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from the trial court’s grant of summary disposition to defendants
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) regarding plaintiffs’ contribution, indemnification and contract claims for
the cleanup costs incurred when they discovered environmental contamination on their property.
In 1986, plaintiffs bought defendant individual shareholders’ corporation and corporate
holdings, including a parcel containing a gas station. Defendant individual shareholders made
representations and warranties regarding this and other properties purchased, stating that there was no
basis for or exposure to liability existing on the demised premises. Subsequent excavation at the
property revealed petroleum contamination on the site and the existence of two abandoned,
underground storage tanks previously undisclosed to plaintiffs. As required by Michigan environmental
law, plaintiffs began site remediation. Plaintiffs then sued defendant individual shareholders and the
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* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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company from which these defendants had originally purchased the property, seeking contribution and
indemnification for remediation costs.
Plaintiffs first argue that the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs’ indemnification claim against
the Webb individual shareholder defendants for lack of a genuine dispute of material fact because there
existed a question of fact regarding whether these defendants were required by their stock purchase
agreement to indemnify plaintiffs for plaintiffs’ instant environmental liability. We agree and reverse.
The Webb individual shareholder defendants agreed in the stock purchase agreement to indemnify
plaintiffs in relevant part for “any and all damages . . . or deficiencies of any nature resulting from . . .
breach of representation, or warranty contained in this agreement, [or] any material inaccuracy in any
such . . . representation, . . . or warranty . . .” (Complaint and jury demand, 7/31/92, Exhibit B, ¶ 7.1).
These defendants warranted in the agreement that they knew “of no existing or threatened fact or
condition that might cause a material, adverse change in Company’s business after the Closing”.
(Complaint and jury demand, 7/31/92, exhibit B, exhibit 4.00, ¶ 19).
Drawing reasonable inferences from expert affidavit testimony that the contamination at the site
predated plaintiffs’ purchase of the property, reasonable minds could differ regarding whether the Webb
individual shareholder defendants knew of the contamination in 1986; ergo, it was not impossible for this
claim to be supported by evidence at trial. Baker v Arbor Drugs, Inc, 215 Mich App 198, 202; 544
NW2d 727 (1996); Osman v Summer Green Lawn Care, Inc, 209 Mich App 703, 705; 532 NW2d
186 (1995). Drawing reasonable inferences from expert affidavit testimony that the on-site
contamination was degraded with age, that no existing pipes led to the contaminated tanks and that the
on-site contamination predated 1986, reasonable minds could also differ regarding whether the
contamination was an existing or threatened fact or condition in 1986. Further, although plaintiffs’
instant liability arose due to a statutory change in the Michigan Environmental Response Act, MCL
299.601 et. seq.; MSA 13.32(1) et. seq.,1 giving the above-quoted contract language a natural
interpretation per In re Loose, 201 Mich App 361, 367; 505 NW2d 922 (1993), this Court notes that
the soil and groundwater contamination present in this case could have caused a “material adverse
change” in plaintiffs’ business after 1986 even without this statutory change; this contamination could
have migrated offsite or to the surface, engendering various tort claims against and treatment necessities
for plaintiffs. At least, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to plaintiffs, a record might be developed
upon which reasonable minds could differ regarding whether the existence of the instant soil and
groundwater contamination might have caused a material, adverse change in plaintiffs’ business after
1986. Finally, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to plaintiffs, a record might be developed upon
which reasonable minds could differ regarding whether plaintiffs’ liability arose from a material
inaccuracy in the Webb individual shareholder defendants’ representation that no such condition existed
at plaintiffs’ contaminated property in 1986.
Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs’ breach of warranty claim
against the Webb individual shareholder defendants for lack of a genuine dispute of material fact,
because there existed a question of fact regarding whether these defendants warranted in their stock
purchase agreement that the instant contamination did not exist. We agree, and reverse. For the
reasons set forth in the indemnification discussion above, there also existed a genuine issue of material
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fact regarding whether a breach of the above-mentioned stock purchase agreement warranty occurred
and whether this breach should have resulted in liability on the individual Webb shareholders’ part to
indemnify plaintiffs for plaintiffs’ remediation costs.
Reversed.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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To the extent that defendants claim that MERA may not be retroactively applied, we note that the
retroactive application of MERA is not unconstitutional. Kelley v EI du Pont de Nemours, 786 F
Supp 1268 (ED Mich, 1992); aff’d 17 F3d 836 (CA6, 1994); United States v RW Meyer, Inc, 889
F2d 1497, 1506 (CA6, 1989); US v Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co, 810 F2d 726,
732-733 (CA8, 1986), cert den 484 US 848; 108 S Ct 146; 98 L Ed 2d 102 (1987); Kelly v
Thomas Solvent Co, 714 F Supp 1439, 1443-1445 (WD Mich, 1989). See also Romein v General
Motors Corp, 436 Mich 515; 462 NW2d 555 (1990), aff’d 503 US 181; 112 S Ct 1105; 117 L Ed
2d 328 (1992); Johnson v Harrischfeger Corp, 414 Mich 102, 117-118; 323 NW2d 912 (1982);
Grieb v Alpine Valley, 155 Mich App 484, 487; 400 NW2d 653 (1986)
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