PEOPLE OF MI V JEREMY STEVEN VASQUEZ
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 11, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 176917
LC No. 94-009021-FH
JEREMY STEVEN VASQUEZ,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Wahls, P.J., and Cavanagh and J.F. Kowalski,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The prosecution appeals by leave granted the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion to
suppress evidence seized during the execution of a search warrant. We affirm.
After a controlled buy of marijuana at a house occupied by defendant and his family, the police
obtained a search warrant for the premises. The police officers who gathered to execute the warrant
were advised that one of the individuals thought to live at the house was known to carry a shotgun. As
the officers approached the house, a person looked out the front window and saw them. The officers
observed movement toward the rear of the house. After yelling, “Police, search warrant,” an officer
kicked the front door open and entered the house. Less than a second elapsed between the
observation of someone looking out a window and the officers’ forced entry. During the search, the
police seized 9.8 grams of marijuana, paraphernalia associated with the sale and use of marijuana, and
envelopes indicating that defendant lived at the house.
The prosecution does not dispute that it failed to comply with the knock-and-announce statute,
MCL 780.656; MSA 28.1259(6). However, it argues that its lack of compliance was excused by
exigent circumstances. We disagree. A trial court’s decision ruling on a motion to suppress evidence
will not be disturbed on appeal unless it was clearly erroneous. People v Solomon, ___ Mich App
___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 181158, issued 12/20/96) slip op p 1.
The knock-and-announce statute provides:
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
-1
The officer to whom a warrant is directed, or any person assisting him, may break any
outer or inner door or window of a house or building, or anything therein, in order to
execute the warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused
admittance, or when necessary to liberate himself or any person assisting him in
execution of the warrant. [MCL 780.656; MSA 28.1259(6).]
If police officers have a basis to conclude that evidence will be destroyed or lives will be endangered by
delay, or if events indicate that compliance with the knock-and-announce statute would be a useless
gesture, strict compliance with this statute may be excused. People v Polidori, 190 Mich App 673,
676; 476 NW2d 482 (1991).
Here, the trial court’s finding that exigent circumstances did not exist was not clearly erroneous.
In People v Williams (Aft Remand), 198 Mich App 537, 545-546; 499 NW2d 404 (1993), this
Court summarized the cases in which exigent circumstances have been found:
In practice, substantial compliance has been found or has been excused where the
officers have been observed before knocking and where, after knocking, officers have
heard running and other suspicious noises inside. See, e.g., People v Jackson, 179
Mich App 344, 346-347; 445 NW2d 513 (1989), sentence vacated 437 Mich 866
(1990) (as officers approached, a woman was seen running from the front porch into
the house); People v Slater, 151 Mich App 432, 434-440; 390 NW2d 260 (1986)
(after officers knocked, they observed defendant running up the stairs inside the house);
People v Brown, 43 Mich App 74, 77-90; 204 NW2d 41 (1972) (after police
knocked, they heard running inside away from the front door); People v Doane, 33
Mich App 579, 581-584; 190 NW2d 259 (1971), rev’d on other grounds 387 Mich
608 (1972) (after knocking, officers saw defendant and his wife observing them through
a window instead of opening the door).
The facts here are distinguishable from the facts in all of the above cases. In Slater, supra, Brown,
supra, and Doane, supra, the police knocked before the running was observed. Similarly, in Williams,
supra, p 544, the police observed several people running after the police had announced their presence.
In applying the totality of the circumstances, there is a distinction, not necessarily a determinative one,
between seeing movement away from the front door upon arrival and seeing the same movement after
the police have announced their presence. Similarly, there is a distinction between the police seeing
someone notice their arrival from a window and seeing the same thing after they have knocked on the
front door and waited for a response. See Doane, supra, p 581. Finally, this case is distinguishable
because of the total lack of detail about the observed movement. The testimony at the suppression
hearing does not reveal what kind of movement was observed. For example, how many people were
observed in the house prior to the forced entry? How many of these people moved? Was the
movement swift, as in someone running? Did the movement appear to be in response to the police
presence? The lower court record does not answer any of these questions.
-2
Noncompliance with the knock-and-announce statute will not be excused where police do not
allow a reasonable time for the occupants to open the door if no suspicious movements are heard to
justify an immediate intrusion. Williams, supra, p 546. Although the police here had been warned that
one of the persons expected to be inside the house customarily carried a shotgun, this fact alone is not
determinative. After reviewing the record, we are not left “with the definite and firm conviction that the
trial court made a mistake” in granting defendant’s motion to suppress. Id.
The prosecution also argues that the trial court should have adopted the remedy provided by the
knock-and-announce statute rather than granting defendant’s motion to exclude the seized evidence.
We disagree. Under the Fourth Amendment, the lawfulness of a search or seizure will depend upon its
reasonableness. Polidori, supra, p 676. Because there is no formula for the determination of
reasonableness, each case must be decided on its own facts. Id. The requirement that officers identify
themselves and state their authority and purpose before entering a private residence has its roots in the
Fourth Amendment. Id. Consequently, when the method of entry violates the knock-and-announce
statute, the exclusionary rule may come into play if the Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness is
also offended. Id., p 677. Here, as in Polidori, supra, pp 677-678, the lack of exigent circumstances
rendered the search and seizure constitutionally invalid as well as statutorily illegal. See also People v
Asher, 203 Mich App 621, 624; 513 NW2d 144 (1994). There is no dispute that evidence seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment is subject to the exclusionary rule. Polidori, supra, p 678.
Affirmed.
/s/ Myron H. Wahls
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ John F. Kowalski
-3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.