CHARLES TENNANT V JAMES E TADRA
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CHARLES TENNANT and KATHLEEN
TENNANT,
UNPUBLISHED
March 7, 1997
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants/Appellees,
v
No. 189876
Allegan Circuit Court
LC No. 93-001630
JAMES E. TADRA and BONITA J. TADRA,
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs/Appellants.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Markey and A.A. Monton,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The Tadras appeal as of right from the decision of the trial court finding no cause of action and
granting judgment for the Tennants. We affirm.
The sole issue for our review is whether the Tadras established their right to ownership of a
portion of the neighboring lot owned by the Tennants, labeled “Parcel D,” either by adverse possession
or acquiescence for the statutory period. Thus, this is an action to quiet title that we review de novo
although the factual findings of the trial court are reviewed for clear error. Michigan Nat’l Bank &
Trust Co v Morren, 194 Mich App 407, 410; 487 NW2d 784 (1992).
The elements of adverse possession are well established: a claim of adverse possession exists
where possession is actual, visible, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous, and uninterrupted for fifteen
years after the cause of action accrued. MCL 600.5801; MSA 27A.5801, Thomas v Rex A Wilcox
Trust, 185 Mich App 733, 736; 463 NW2d 190 (1990). Whether adverse possession is established
depends on the facts of the case and the character of the property in dispute. Id., 737. Here, the
Tennants did not need to take any affirmative possession of the property and could simply hold it for
future use or sale; however, the Tadras needed to show positive and affirmative acts of ownership to
claim title by adverse possession. Barley v Fisher, 267 Mich 450, 453; 255 NW 223 (1934).
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Although the Tadras testified at an earlier deposition that they did not know they were
occupying a portion of the Tennants’ lot until 1987, we will assume for purposes of review that the
Tadras’ occupation of Parcel D was hostile based on their testimony at trial that they knew in 1974 they
were using a portion of the Tennants’ lot but disregarded the true boundary line. Even with this
assumption, the remaining elements of adverse possession were not established by the evidence
proffered by the Tadras.
First, the Tadras’ actions were not open and notorious. The placement of their travel trailer and
various items of debris slightly over the boundary line did not constitute notice that an adverse claim of
possession was being made. Neither did the Tadras’ occasional mowing of the grass or trimming of the
trees reasonably apprise the Tennants that another was assuming control of their property. See
Bankers Trust Co of Muskegon v Robinson, 280 Mich 458, 464-465; 273 NW 768 (1937).
Next, the Tadras’ actions were not continuous and uninterrupted. The mere act of placing a
wire fence along the line of occupation in 1990 after the Tennants complained in 1987 about the
encroachments does not establish adverse possession for the statutory period. Additionally, the
locations of the two trailers between the Tadras’ properties and Parcel D varied. Likewise, the amount
and variety of debris on Parcel D varied. Most significant, when the Tennants demanded that the
Tadras remove their items from Parcel D, the Tadras appeared to have complied and showed no
evidence of their ownership claim.
Finally, despite the Tadras’ argument on appeal that the sand fill created a visible boundary, the
testimony at trial indicated that any new boundary line that was created by the fill line was difficult to
measure and may have even extended beyond the point where a surveyor marked it in 1993. Because
the Tadras did not show these requisite acts of ownership, a cause of action against the Tennants based
on adverse possession did not accrue.
Alternatively, the Tadras argue that they acquired Parcel D by statutory acquiescence because
the Tennants accepted the line created by the sand fill as the new boundary by not seeking to eject the
Tadras from Parcel D either after their complaint in 1987 or in this lawsuit. However, the testimony at
trial did not reveal any substantial period of time when the Tennants believed or treated the line of
occupation as the boundary line. Indeed, the testimony showed that the Tennants requested surveys in
1987, 1992, and 1993 to confirm their suspicions that various items owned by the Tadras were
encroaching the true boundary line. Therefore, a cause of action against the Tennants based on
acquiescence did not accrue.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Anthony A. Monton
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