MICHIGAN STATE EMP ASSN V DEPT OF NATURAL RESOURCE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MICHIGAN STATE EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION,
UNPUBLISHED
January 21, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES,
No. 187887
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 95-79525 CL
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Markman, P.J., and O’Connell and D. J. Kelly,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff union petitioned the circuit court on behalf of a union member to vacate an arbitration
award denying its grievance against defendant employer. The court granted summary disposition in
favor of plaintiff. Defendant employer now appeals by leave granted. We reverse the order of the
circuit court.
John Crane is a conservation officer employed by defendant. He is also a member of plaintiff
union. In August 1993, Crane requested of defendant two days of annual leave, scheduled for the first
two days of firearm deer hunting season in November 1993. Crane explained that this hunting season
would be the first in which his son would be old enough to participate, and that he intended the two of
them to hunt together. This request was initially approved, but the approval was later rescinded.
Plaintiff filed a grievance on Crane’s behalf, contending that the collective bargaining agreement
did not allow defendant to rescind its approval of an annual leave request. The arbitrator concluded that
because the agreement limited defendant employer’s plenary management rights “only by the express
terms of [the] Agreement,” where there was no contractual provision precluding defendant from
rescinding its approval of an annual leave request, defendant had the authority to withdraw its approval.
The arbitrator also found that nothing suggested that defendant’s exercise of this right under the facts of
the present case was arbitrary and capricious. The grievance was, therefore, denied.
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Plaintiff filed a petition in the circuit court, seeking to have the arbitration award vacated on the
ground that the arbitrator had exceeded its authority. Defendant argued, first, that the limitations period
for seeking judicial review of the award had passed, and, second, that because the arbitrator’s task was
contract interpretation, the arbitrator did not exceed its authority in interpreting the contract. The circuit
court declined to reach defendant’s statute of limitations defense, and concluded that the arbitrator had
exceeded its authority. Accordingly, the court vacated the arbitration award. Defendant filed an
application for leave to appeal to this Court, which application was granted by order dated November
14, 1995.
On appeal, defendant presents the same arguments it presented before the circuit court. To
address defendant’s second argument first, we agree that, contrary to the ruling of the circuit court, the
arbitrator did not exceed its authority and that its award should not have been vacated.
Appellate review of an arbitration award is very limited. Gogebic Medical Care Facility v
AFSCME Local 992, AFL-CIO, 209 Mich App 693, 696-697; 531 NW2d 728 (1995). This Court
will not flyspeck the contractual interpretation of an arbitrator, but will determine only “whether the
arbitrator’s award ‘draws its essence’ from the contract. If the arbitrator in granting the award did not
disregard the terms of his employment and the scope of his authority as expressly circumscribed in the
contract, judicial review effectively ceases.” Id., quoting Lincoln Park v Lincoln Park Police
Officers Ass’n, 176 Mich App 1, 4; 438 NW2d 875 (1989).
In the present case, the question whether the arbitrator exceeded its authority turns, obviously
enough, on the authority delegated by the parties to the arbitrator. The collective bargaining agreement
states as follows:
The Arbitrator shall only have the authority to adjust grievances in accordance with this
Agreement. The Arbitrator shall not have jurisdiction or authority to add to, amend,
modify, nullify, or ignore in any way the provisions of this Agreement and shall not make
any award which in effect would grant MSEA or the Employer any rights or privileges
which were not obtained in the negotiation process.
This rather broadly worded provision provides, in essence, that the arbitrator is bound to enforce the
collective bargaining agreement as written and may not expand the rights of either party beyond what is
set forth in the agreement.
While the collective bargaining agreement has provisions addressing the procedure for
approving and denying requests for annual leave, it does not expressly address whether defendant
employer may rescind its approval of such a request. Rather, the agreement contains something of a
residual clause that recognizes that all authority pertaining to operations and management rests with
defendant employer unless the agreement provides otherwise. More specifically, the agreement states
that
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It is understood and agreed by the parties that the Employer possesses the sole power,
duty and right to operate and manage its Departments . . . . The powers, authority, and
discretion necessary for the employer to exercise its rights and carry out its
responsibilities shall be limited only by the express terms of this Agreement. Any term
or condition of employment other than wages, benefits, and other terms and conditions
of employment specifically established or modified by this Agreement shall remain solely
within the discretion of the Employer to determine, modify, establish or eliminate.
[Emphasis supplied.]
Thus, where the agreement does not, in a specific context, expressly divest managerial authority from
defendant employer, this authority remains with defendant. It bears mention that the breadth of this
residual clause strongly suggests that all “rights and privileges” not withheld from defendant employer
are deemed to have been “obtained in the negotiation process.”
Turning, then, to the issue on appeal, we cannot say that the arbitrator exceeded its authority.
The arbitrator was specifically authorized to interpret the collective bargaining agreement in accordance
with its terms. Further, the residual authority granted defendant in the agreement, when coupled with the
fact that rescission of approval of annual leave is nowhere specifically addressed, indicates that the
award of the arbitrator certainly “draws its essence” from the collective bargaining agreement in that it
pertains to matters addressed in general terms by the agreement. Gogebic Medical Care Facility,
supra. Therefore, we reverse the order of the circuit court vacating the arbitration award.
Plaintiff advocates a more extensive review of the collective bargaining agreement, arguing that
various other provisions imply a limitation on defendant’s authority to approve and then rescind its
approval of requests for annual leave. However, our review is not de novo. This Court may not indulge
itself in a detailed exploration of the nuances of contract law in general and this contract in particular, for
to do so would undermine the very purpose of arbitration agreements. See DAIIE v Reck, 90 Mich
App 286, 289; 282 NW2d 292 (1979). The instant arbitrator was authorized to interpret the collective
bargaining agreement and did not violate any of its express terms. Given the limited review appropriate
in this context, Gogebic Medical Care Facility, supra, this is sufficient to withstand plaintiff’s challenge
of the award.
In light of our resolution of this issue, we find it unnecessary to address defendant’s remaining
contention that plaintiff’s action was time-barred.
Finally, we would note there is some question as to whether the issue on appeal is moot. As
iterated in People v Briseno, 211 Mich App 11, 17; 535 NW2d 559 (1995), “[w]here a subsequent
event renders it impossible for this Court to fashion a remedy, the issue becomes moot." Here, plaintiff
brought this action on behalf of Crane because defendant refused to allow Crane, a conservation officer,
annual leave during the first days of firearm dear hunting season in 1993. It is obvious that this Court
cannot somehow allow Crane to spend the first days of deer season in 1993 hunting with his son.
Further, because the present case concerns a private contract, it does not fall within the exception which
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allows consideration of a moot issue where that issue is of public significance. See In re Ford, 187
Mich App 452, 454; 468 NW2d 260 (1991). However, regardless of the mootness of the issue,
defendant clearly prevails on the merits.
Reversed.
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Daniel J. Kelly
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