JOSEPH LEE SEWELL V TRACEY BENNETT SEWELL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JOSEPH LEE SEWELL,
UNPUBLISHED
January 17, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 181919
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 94-412431
TRACEY BENNETT SEWELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and T. G. Kavanagh* and D. B. Leiber,** JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right a judgment of divorce granting plaintiff custody of the parties’ five
children. We affirm but remand for entry of an order amending the amount defendant shall receive
through plaintiff’s pension.
I
On appeal, defendant first contends that the trial court committed error requiring reversal in
awarding custody of the parties’ five minor children to plaintiff. Specifically, defendant claims that, in
evaluating the statutory factors set forth in MCL 722.23; MSA 25.312(3)1, the trial court made findings
against the great weight of the evidence. We disagree.
A
We review a trial court’s custody decisions to determine whether the trial court committed a
palpable abuse of discretion, clearly erred on a major issue, or made factual findings that contravene the
great weight of the evidence. MCL 722.28; MSA 25.312(8); Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871,
* Former Supreme Court Justice, sitting on the Court of Appeals by
assignment pursuant to Administrative Order 1996-10.
** Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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876-877; 526 NW2d 889 (1994); Ireland v Smith, 214 Mich App 235, 242; 542 NW2d 344
(1995). A trial court’s factual findings regarding the various statutory factors are upheld on appeal
unless the evidence “clearly preponderates in the opposite direction.” Fletcher, supra at 879;
Wiechmann v Wiechmann, 212 Mich App 436, 439; 538 NW2d 57 (1995); Deel v Deel, 113 Mich
App 556, 559; 317 NW2d 685 (1982).
B
Defendant claims that the trial court clearly erred in finding that the evidence favored plaintiff on
factor (c), “the capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child with food, clothing,
medical care, or other remedial care recognized and permitted under the laws of this state in place of
medical care and other material needs.” We disagree. The evidence showed that, when the children
were living with defendant before plaintiff was awarded temporary custody, plaintiff continued paying
most of the mortgage and taxes on the marital home, assumed the parties’ car and insurance payments,
and gave defendant money to feed and clothe the children. Although this left defendant with few
expenses, she was apparently unable to make due without supplementing her income by breeding bull
mastiff dogs in her home. Not only did this turn the children’s home, literally, into a doghouse where
dog feces and urine littered the floor, but the dogs ruined furniture and some of the children’s clothes.
Furthermore, defendant allegedly began buying dog food with the money plaintiff gave her for child care
expenses. Defendant failed to remove all the dogs despite evidence that the children sustained flea bites
and the trial court’s order requiring her to remove the dogs as a condition for regaining custody.
Additionally, defendant forced her minor children to care for and clean up after the dogs during the
twelve hours she was away from home each night, blamed the children for the existence of dog
excrement in the house, and left the children in the sole care of her sixteen-year-old daughter. Plaintiff,
on the other hand, has a steady job and was planning to purchase his own home with money being held
in escrow pending the resolution of this lawsuit. Also, after plaintiff gained temporary custody, he
ensured that the children ate, wore clean clothes which he laundered, and received medical attention for
their flea bites. Furthermore, plaintiff provided adult supervision for his children while he was at work
and continued to provide for his family during his separation from defendant. Under these
circumstances, we conclude that the trial court’s findings on this factor was not against the great weight
of the evidence. Fletcher, supra at 876-877, 900.
C
Defendant also argues that the trial court found against the great weight of the evidence on
factor (j), “the willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and encourage a close and
continuing parent-child relationship between the other parent or the child and the parents.” Again, we
disagree. While defendant had custody after the parties’ separation, defendant forbade plaintiff from
entering the house or seeing the children. In fact, the record shows that defendant repeatedly interfered
with and prevented plaintiff from exercising regular visitation and would even cut short telephone calls
between plaintiff and his children. Further, contrary to defendant’s representations that plaintiff offered
defendant no visitation opportunities after he assumed custody, the trial court provided a detailed
visitation schedule as part of the interim custody order that transferred custody to plaintiff. Not only is
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the record devoid of evidence that plaintiff interfered with this visitation schedule, but the record shows
that defendant abused the visitation schedule by failing to comply with its terms and missing scheduled
opportunities to visit her children. Further, contrary to the evidence that defendant interfered with
plaintiff’s attempts to visit his children, plaintiff testified that he was willing to foster a relationship
between the children and the noncustodial parent. Accordingly, the trial court’s finding as to factor (j)
was not against the great weight of the evidence. Id.
D
Defendant next contends that the court erred reversibly in failing to make a factual determination
concerning the existence of an established custodial environment. We disagree. In the findings of fact
prepared by the trial court, the court concluded “by a standard of clear and convincing evidence that
physical custody of the children be awarded to plaintiff.” Because the trial court’s conclusion is
supported by the clear and overwhelming weight of the evidence, we conclude that the trial court’s
alleged failure to make a determination regarding an established custodial environment is harmless.
Fletcher, supra at 882; see Russow v Aranda, 206 Mich App 456, 458; 522 NW2d 874 (1994).
Aside from the various factors negatively impacting on defendant’s parenting skills, it is apparent from
the court’s findings that it was aware of current and prior custody arrangements and familiar with the
effects each arrangement had on the children. Indeed, the court’s opinion noted that the children
resented having to care for the dogs, that one child kept running away from defendant, and that “the
stress of Defendant’s home conditions has eroded the children’s sense of security and ‘sanctuary’ with
their mother.” Further, the trial court recognized that defendant provided the children an unsafe,
unsanitary, and unsatisfactory living environment, that defendant thwarted opportunities to improve her
unacceptable parenting skills, and that there “is no need or desire to maintain continuity of the former
lifestyle.”
E
Further, defendant claims generally that the trial court clearly erred in making findings on each of
the remaining custody factors and claims that the trial court’s decision to award custody of the parties’
five children to plaintiff was not in the children’s best interest. We disagree. After a thorough review,
we are not convinced that the court’s findings contravened the great weight of the evidence. Fletcher,
supra at 876-877, 900. Furthermore, the evidence in support of the trial court’s custody decision is
overwhelming, and the court’s findings are not impeached by defendant’s unsupported claims,
references to self-serving testimony, and argumentative refutations of the trial court’s conclusions.
Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in and agree with the trial court’s determination that the
children’s best interests were served by awarding plaintiff their custody. Id. at 879-880, 900; Deel,
supra at 559.
II
Next, defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award defendant
attorney fees. We disagree. The decision whether to award attorney fees is reviewed on appeal for an
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abuse of discretion. Vollmer v Vollmer, 187 Mich App 688, 690; 468 NW2d 236 (1991).
Generally, attorney fees are not recoverable as an element of costs or damages unless expressly allowed
by statute, court rule, or judicial exception. Brooks v Rose, 191 Mich App 565, 574-575; 478 NW2d
731 (1991). However, a trial court has broad discretion to award attorney fees in this case where such
fees are necessary to carry on or defend the action. Id.; Vollmer, supra at 690. Because there was no
showing that defendant was unable to carry on or defend this action, Vollmer, supra at 690, or afford
her attorney, Keen v Keen, 145 Mich App 824, 831; 378 NW2d 612 (1985), and because defendant
was employed throughout the duration of the separation, had most of her bills covered plaintiff, and was
awarded her fair share of the marital estate, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
award attorney fees to defendant. Vollmer, supra at 690.
III
Defendant also argues that the trial court’s distribution of the marital estate, specifically the
division of the proceeds of a prior personal injury lawsuit, was grossly unfair. We disagree. This Court
first reviews the lower court’s factual findings regarding the property settlement for clear error. Sparks
v Sparks, 440 Mich 141, 151; 485 NW2d 893 (1992). If the factual findings are not clearly
erroneous, then this Court reviews the trial court’s division of marital property de novo to determine
whether it is fair and equitable in light of the facts. Id.
The division of the proceeds from plaintiff’s accident settlement was fair and equitable.
Steckley v Steckley, 185 Mich App 19, 23-24; 460 NW2d 255 (1990). Plaintiff, not defendant, is the
party who was injured in the work-related accident for which he received a settlement. There was
evidence that defendant did not care for plaintiff during his disability and her sole claim in the personal
injury lawsuit was for loss of consortium. Also, plaintiff provided support for defendant and the children
during their separation and was in the process of purchasing a home and furnishings for the children. As
such, he had a greater claim to the proceeds, as he will continue to experience pain and suffering, has a
greater need for the funds, and now must support a family of six. In contrast, defendant was given the
marital home, her car and $1,500 to repair it, is no longer financially responsible for supporting her five
children, and is currently employed. Accordingly, in light of the circumstances, the property distribution
settlement and the order awarding defendant $7,500 of plaintiff’s personal injury settlement was fair and
equitable. See also Wilson v Wilson, 179 Mich App 519, 522; 446 NW2d 496 (1989).
IV
Defendant further contends that the trial court erred in issuing a Qualified Domestic Relations
Order (QDRO) that inaccurately reflected the agreement reached at a settlement hearing. We agree.
The trial court may not modify property divisions that the parties have reached by consent and finalized
in writing or on the record. Zeer v Zeer, 179 Mich App 622, 624; 446 NW2d 328 (1989). The court
must uphold such settlements and cannot set them aside absent fraud, duress, mutual mistake, or severe
stress. Hall v Hall, 157 Mich App 239, 244; 403 NW2d 530 (1987). In the present case, plaintiff
and defendant stipulated that defendant is entitled to half the pension plaintiff had accumulated until the
divorce judgment was entered. Though the judgment referenced this agreement, it failed to account for
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any accrual that may occur to said pension benefits over time. Plaintiff concedes that he never intended
to curtail any increases in the value of defendant’s share of the pension benefits. Accordingly, we
remand this case with instructions to the trial court to reenter the QDRO in order to insure defendant’s
entitlement to any increase in the value of her portion of plaintiff’s pension. See also Bers v Bers, 161
Mich App 457, 463-464; 411 NW2d 732 (1987).
V
Finally, defendant argues that the court improperly relied on evidence that was neither admitted
at trial, nor viewed by defendant. We disagree. Pursuant to MCL 722.627(1)(g); MSA
25.248(7)(1)(g), all reports created by an agency in connection with a custody matter are confidential
but may be disseminated to the court if it determines that the information is required to decide the issues
before it. As such, contrary to defendant’s assertions, the trial court properly reviewed the protective
services and family first reports. Furthermore, we conclude that the court’s findings are adequately
supported by the evidence
Affirmed in part and remanded for amendment to and reentry of the Qualified Domestic
Relations Order. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Thomas Giles Kavanagh
/s/ Dennis B. Leiber
1
MCL 722.23; MSA 25.132(3) provides:
“Best interests of the child” means the sum total of the following factors to be
considered, evaluated, and determined by the court:
(a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parties
involved and the child.
(b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child love,
affection, and g
uidance and to continue the education and raising of the child in his or
her religion or creed, if any.
(c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child
with food, clothing, medical care, or other remedial care recognized and permitted
under the laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material needs.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment,
and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
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(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial
home or homes.
(f) The moral fitness of the parties involved.
(g) The mental and physical health of the parties involved.
(h) The home, school, and community record of the child.
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court considers the child to be
of sufficient age to express preference.
(j) The willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and encourage a
close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent or
the child and the parents.
(k) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directed against
or witnessed by the child.
(l) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child
custody dispute.
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