PEOPLE OF MI V ALJARRAU L AKINS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
FOR PUBLICATION
December 9, 2003
9:00 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 240359
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-003283-01
ALJARRAU L. AKINS,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 240360
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-003283-02
JAMARIO A. MITCHELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Updated Copy
February 13, 2004
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Zahra and Fort Hood, JJ.
ZAHRA, J.
Following a jury trial, defendants Aljarrau L. Akins and Jamario A. Mitchell were both
convicted of first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316, and assault with intent to rob while
armed, MCL 750.89, arising out of the shooting death of Vito Davis. Mitchell was also
convicted of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL
750.227b. The trial court sentenced Akins to mandatory life imprisonment for his felony-murder
conviction and six to twenty-five years' imprisonment for his conviction of assault with intent to
rob while armed. The trial court sentenced Mitchell to mandatory life imprisonment for his
felony-murder conviction, five to twenty-five years' imprisonment for his conviction of assault
with intent to rob while armed, and two years' imprisonment to be served consecutively for his
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felony-firearm conviction.1 Defendants appealed as of right, and their appeals were consolidated
by order of this Court.2
The most significant issue presented on appeal is whether assault with intent to rob while
armed is a proper underlying felony to support defendants' felony-murder convictions. We hold
that it is. Under MCL 750.316(1)(b), felony murder includes murder committed in the
perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, inter alia, a robbery. Because a person who commits
assault with intent to rob while armed also commits the necessarily included lesser offense of
attempted armed robbery, which is a well-established predicate felony under the felony-murder
statute, we conclude that assault with intent to rob while armed is also a predicate felony under
the felony-murder statute. Accordingly, we affirm defendants' felony-murder convictions.
For reasons more fully set forth in this opinion, we affirm in part and vacate in part.3
I. Facts and Procedure
This case arises from the attempted robbery and the shooting death of Vito Davis.
Defendants and Osiris Cuesta were admittedly at the scene of the shooting. Defendants gave
police conflicting statements relating to the events that led up to the shooting. However, Cuesta,
who was the only eyewitness to the shooting to testify at trial, testified that on the day of the
shooting, he, Akins, and Mitchell were together on Glenwood Street at about 2:00 a.m., when
Antwan Banks approached Akins and had a private conversation with him. Akins then asked
Cuesta and Mitchell if they wanted to help him rob someone who would shortly arrive at the
home of Banks in a 2001 Cadillac. Cuesta and Mitchell agreed to help with the robbery.
Cuesta, Akins, and Mitchell then went to Mitchell's house to retrieve a 9 millimeter
automatic handgun, which Mitchell gave to Akins. The three men returned to Glenwood Street
and waited on the porch of a nearby house for the target of the robbery to arrive. While waiting,
Cuesta and Mitchell decided not to go along with the robbery, and the three men began walking
away down the street. As they were walking away, a Cadillac drove up and stopped near the
home of Banks. Without saying anything, Akins turned around and began walking toward the
Cadillac. Cuesta followed, intending to go along with the robbery.4 Akins walked up to the
passenger side of the Cadillac, hit the butt of the gun against the car window, and fired one shot
into the car. The driver of the Cadillac, Davis, sped away. Akins ran behind the car, pulling the
trigger of the gun but no other bullets were discharged. Davis crashed into a parked van on a
nearby street and died from excessive bleeding from a gunshot wound to his leg. After the
1
In a postconviction order, the trial court vacated Mitchell's sentence for assault with intent to
rob while armed as being violative of double jeopardy.
2
People v Akins, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 30, 2002 (Docket
Nos. 240359, 240360).
3
We vacate Akins's conviction and sentence for assault with intent to rob while armed as
violative of double jeopardy.
4
Cuesta was not sure whether Mitchell followed him.
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shooting, Akins and Cuesta ran from the scene. Cuesta observed Mitchell, running in front of
him toward the home of Akins.
In the days following the shooting, defendants, Cuesta,5 and Banks6 were arrested. Both
defendants gave statements to the police. Akins told the police that he acted as the lookout man
for the robbery, but that Cuesta was the shooter. Mitchell, on the other hand, told the police that
Akins was the shooter, but also that he (Mitchell) had supplied the gun used in the shooting and
that he had expected to get paid for the use of his gun.
Akins moved to suppress his statements to the police, claiming that they were not
voluntarily made. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that the statements were
made voluntarily and, thus, were admissible at trial. Akins and Mitchell were tried together and
convicted by separate juries. After sentencing, the trial court vacated Mitchell's conviction of
assault with intent to rob while armed because it was violative of double jeopardy, given his
felony-murder conviction. This appeal followed.
II. Analysis
A. People v Mitchell (Docket No. 240360)
1. Assault With Intent to Rob While Armed as a Predicate Felony
for Felony Murder
Mitchell first argues that his felony-murder conviction must be reduced to second-degree
murder7 because assault with intent to rob while armed is not one of the enumerated felonies
within the felony-murder statute. The prosecution relies on this Court's vacated opinion of
People v Ross, 242 Mich App 241; 618 NW2d 774 (2000), vacated 465 Mich 909 (2001).8 In
5
Cuesta was charged with felony murder and assault with intent to rob while armed. The
prosecution agreed to dismiss the charge of felony murder against Cuesta if he agreed to plead
guilty to a charge of assault with intent to rob while armed and testify at the trial of Akins and
Mitchell.
6
Banks was convicted by a jury of assault with intent to rob while armed. He was sentenced to
fifteen to twenty-five years' imprisonment. His claim of appeal is currently pending before this
Court (Docket No. 242324).
7
During oral argument, appellate counsel for Mitchell indicated that while Mitchell asked for the
felony-murder conviction to be reduced to second-degree murder, this request was made
improvidently, and the proper remedy is to vacate the felony-murder conviction and reinstate
Mitchell's conviction of assault with intent to rob while armed.
8
A Court of Appeals opinion that has been vacated by the majority of the Supreme Court
without an expression of approval or disapproval of this Court's reasoning is not precedentially
binding. Fulton v William Beaumont Hosp, 253 Mich App 70, 79; 655 NW2d 569 (2002), lv gtd
sub nom Fulton v Pontiac Gen Hosp, 468 Mich 944 (2003).
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Ross, supra at 243, 247-248, this Court held that the offense of assault with intent to rob while
unarmed is a predicate offense under the felony-murder statute.9
Because Ross was vacated, this issue is before this Court once again as an issue of first
impression.10 We review de novo issues of statutory construction and interpretation. People v
Phillips, 469 Mich 390, 394; 666 NW2d 657 (2003). "When construing a statute, our primary
goal is 'to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.' To do so, we begin by
examining the language of the statute." Id. at 395 (citations omitted). If the language of the
statute is unambiguous, a court may read nothing into the words of the statute and must enforce
the statute as written. Id. "'Only where the statutory language is ambiguous may a court
properly go beyond the words of the statute to ascertain legislative intent.'" Id., quoting Sun
Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 (1999). The mere fact that a
statutory scheme may be difficult to follow does not render any portion of a statute ambiguous.
"An ambiguity can be found only where the language of the statute as used in its particular
context has more than one common and accepted meaning. Thus, where common words used in
their ordinary fashion lead to one reasonable interpretation, a statute cannot be found
ambiguous." Colucci v McMillin, 256 Mich App 88, 94; 662 NW2d 87 (2003).
Mitchell argues that assault with intent to rob while armed is not an offense upon which a
felony-murder charge may be predicated. The felony-murder statute provides that a person who
commits the following is guilty of felony murder:
Murder committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson,
criminal sexual conduct in the first, second, or third degree, child abuse in the first
degree, a major controlled substance offense, robbery, carjacking, breaking and
entering of a dwelling, home invasion in the first or second degree, larceny of any
kind, extortion, or kidnapping. [MCL 750.316(1)(b).]
9
Although the Supreme Court did not state its reason for vacating Ross, we note that this Court's
panel in Ross failed to adhere to proper principles of statutory construction when it stated: "The
Legislature could not have intended that the crime of attempted unarmed robbery, but not
AWIR-U [assault with intent to rob while unarmed], the more dangerous of the two crimes, serve
as the basis for a felony-murder conviction." Ross, supra at 247. Our Supreme Court has
repeatedly directed lower courts to refrain from speculating about the intent of the Legislature
beyond the words employed in the statute. Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 465 Mich 675, 683;
641 NW2d 219 (2002); In re MCI Telecom Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 414-415; 596 NW2d 164
(1999). We conclude that Ross reached the correct result, albeit for the wrong reason. Ross
exercised judicial authority to correct a perceived legislative oversight. By contrast, we reach
our result in this case by interpreting and applying the unambiguous language of the felonymurder statute.
10
In People v Gibson, 115 Mich App 622, 626-627; 321 NW2d 749 (1982), this Court
mentioned assault with intent to rob while armed as a predicate felony for felony murder.
However, the issue raised in Gibson was a double jeopardy issue, not whether assault with intent
to rob while armed was a predicate felony under the felony-murder statute. Therefore, the
statement is obiter dictum. People v Green, 205 Mich App 342, 346; 517 NW2d 782 (1994).
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There is no dispute that armed robbery falls within the meaning of the term "robbery" in
the felony-murder statute. Because an attempt to commit an enumerated offense constitutes a
predicate felony under the felony-murder statute, attempted armed robbery also constitutes a
predicate felony. The crux of this issue is whether assault with intent to rob while armed
constitutes an "attempted robbery" under the felony-murder statute. Mitchell correctly points out
that assault with intent to rob while armed is not the same offense as armed robbery, see People v
Kamin, 405 Mich 482, 501; 275 NW2d 777 (1979) (holding that assault with intent to rob while
armed is a lesser included offense of armed robbery), or attempted armed robbery, cf. People v
Sanford, 402 Mich 460, 474; 265 NW2d 1 (1978) (holding that assault with intent to rob while
unarmed is not the same offense as attempted unarmed robbery). But assault with intent to rob
while armed is a necessarily lesser included offense of armed robbery, Kamin, supra at 501, and
attempted armed robbery is a lesser included offense of assault with intent to rob while armed,
People v Patskan, 387 Mich 701, 714; 199 NW2d 458 (1972); People v Bryan, 92 Mich App
208, 225; 284 NW2d 765 (1979). Thus, attempted robbery is established every time assault with
intent to rob while armed is established. Patskan, supra at 713-714; People v Adams, 128 Mich
App 25, 29; 339 NW2d 687 (1983). The distinguishing element between the greater offense of
assault with intent to rob while armed and the lesser offense of attempted armed robbery is the
element of assault. Patskan, supra at 713; cf. Sanford, supra at 473-474 (holding that attempted
unarmed robbery may be committed simply by putting someone in fear, while assault with intent
to rob while unarmed requires an assault with force and violence).11 In order to find a defendant
guilty of assault with intent to rob while armed, a defendant must also necessarily be guilty of
attempted armed robbery. Because attempted armed robbery is a predicate offense under the
felony-murder statute, we conclude that assault with intent to rob while armed is also a predicate
felony under the felony-murder statute. Therefore, Mitchell was properly convicted of felony
murder.
2. The Sufficiency and Weight of the Evidence
Next, Mitchell argues that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to support
his convictions.12 We disagree. In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, this Court must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational
trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Hardiman, 466
Mich 417, 421; 646 NW2d 158 (2002). Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences that
arise from the evidence can constitute sufficient proof of the elements of the crime. People v
Jolly, 442 Mich 458, 466; 502 NW2d 177 (1993).
At trial, the prosecution argued that Mitchell aided and abetted an assault with intent to
rob while armed. "The elements of assault with intent to rob while armed are: (1) an assault
11
"The distinction between the element of intent and attempt is . . . a matter of semantics. Intent
alone is not enough to convict a person of a crime. There must be an act taken in conjunction
with the intent and, once that is done, there is, therefore, an attempt." Patskan, supra at 714.
12
Mitchell also claims that the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence. We consider
this argument in conjunction with Mitchell's claim that the evidence is insufficient to support his
convictions.
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with force and violence; (2) an intent to rob or steal; and (3) the defendant's being armed.
Because this is a specific-intent crime, there must be evidence that the defendant intended to rob
or steal." People v Cotton, 191 Mich App 377, 391; 478 NW 2d 681 (1991) (citation omitted).
The prosecution also charged Mitchell with felony-firearm as an aider and abettor. "The
elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of,
or the attempt to commit, a felony." People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864
(1999). Finally, the prosecution argued that Mitchell committed felony murder as an aider and
abettor. To convict a defendant of felony murder as an aider and abettor, the prosecution must
prove
(1) the crime charged was committed by defendant or some other person, (2)
defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted the commission of
the crime, and (3) defendant intended the commission of the crime or had
knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time that he gave aid
and encouragement. An aider and abettor must have the same requisite intent as
that required of a principal. Thus, "'the prosecutor must show that the aider and
abettor had the intent to commit not only the underlying felony, but also to kill or
to cause great bodily harm, or had wantonly and wilfully disregarded the
likelihood of the natural tendency of this behavior to cause death or great bodily
harm.'" [People v Tanner, 255 Mich App 369, 418-419; 660 NW2d 746 (2003)
(citations omitted).]
Mitchell argues that there was not sufficient evidence to support his convictions as a principal or
an aider and abettor because he abandoned the crime. "Abandonment is an affirmative defense,
and the burden is on the defendant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence voluntary and
complete abandonment of a criminal purpose." People v Cross, 187 Mich App 204, 206; 466
NW2d 368 (1991). We conclude that Mitchell failed to establish abandonment of his criminal
purpose.
The evidence shows that Mitchell gave his gun to Akins, knowing that it would be used
to commit the robbery. Mitchell admitted that he witnessed the crime and saw Akins shoot the
victim. Mitchell also admitted that, notwithstanding his claim of abandonment, he expected to
get paid for the use of his gun. Further, after the shooting, Mitchell expressed an intent go back
to the scene and retrieve the bullets that had fallen out of the gun. From these facts, a jury could
infer that Mitchell did not abandon his criminal purpose, but instead supplied the gun and
watched the attempted robbery with the intent to assist in covering up the crime and the
expectation that he would be paid for his role in the robbery. Further, it can be inferred that
Mitchell knew that the gun he supplied to Akins might be used. Thus, it may fairly be inferred
that Mitchell wantonly and willfully disregarded the likelihood of the natural tendency of this
behavior to cause death or great bodily harm. Tanner, supra at 418. Viewing the evidence in a
light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could conclude that sufficient
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evidence existed to support Mitchell's convictions of felony murder, assault with intent to rob
while armed, and felony-firearm as an aider and abettor.13
B. People v Akins (Docket No. 240359)
1. Akins's Request for an Adjournment of the Trial to Retain
Counsel
Akins first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request to
adjourn the trial so that he could retain the counsel of his choice. We disagree. "We review for
an abuse of discretion a trial court's exercise of discretion affecting a defendant's right to counsel
of choice." People v Fett, 257 Mich App 76, 88; 666 NW2d 676 (2003). "An abuse of
discretion occurs when the result is so contrary to fact and logic that it demonstrates perversity of
will, defiance of judgment, or an exercise of passion or bias." Id.
"The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused the right to retain counsel of choice." Id.
at 80. "However, the right to counsel of choice is not absolute." Id. at 84. "'A balancing of the
accused's right to counsel of his choice and the public's interest in the prompt and efficient
administration of justice is done in order to determine whether an accused's right to choose
counsel has been violated.'" Id., quoting People v Krysztopaniec, 170 Mich App 588, 598; 429
NW2d 828 (1988).
When reviewing a trial court's decision to deny a defense attorney's
motion to withdraw and a defendant's motion for a continuance to obtain another
attorney, we consider the following factors: (1) whether the defendant is asserting
a constitutional right, (2) whether the defendant has a legitimate reason for
asserting the right, such as a bona fide dispute with his attorney, (3) whether the
defendant was negligent in asserting his right, (4) whether the defendant is merely
attempting to delay trial, and (5) whether the defendant demonstrated prejudice
resulting from the trial court's decision. [People v Echavarria, 233 Mich App
356, 369; 592 NW2d 737 (1999).]
In the present case, approximately one month before the trial, Akins wrote a letter to the
trial judge requesting that he be allowed to dismiss his appointed attorney. Akins asserted
13
This same evidence supports the trial court's decision to deny defendant's motion for a new
trial based on the great weight of the evidence. A trial court may grant a new trial if it finds the
verdict was not in accordance with the evidence and that an injustice has been done. People v
Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 269; 662 NW2d 836 (2003). A motion for a new trial based upon
the great weight of the evidence should be granted only where the evidence preponderates
heavily against the verdict and a serious miscarriage of justice would otherwise result. People v
Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 642; 576 NW2d 129 (1998). The trial court's denial of a motion for a
new trial based on the great weight of the evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Abraham, supra at 269. The verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence and, thus,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion for a new trial on this
basis.
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general claims that his attorney was not competently representing him and specifically protested
that his attorney had not filed a motion to have a separate jury from his codefendants. Akins also
informed the trial judge that he sought to retain a new attorney to represent him at trial, but that
the attorney he sought to retain had another trial on the date of Akins's trial. Therefore, Akins
requested that his trial be adjourned.
At a hearing approximately 2-1/2 weeks before trial, Akins again requested that he be
allowed to dismiss his appointed attorney because his attorney was not good enough to represent
him and because he disapproved of his attorney's talking with the prosecutor. Akins again
informed the trial court that the attorney he sought to retain had a schedule conflict with
defendant's trial date. The trial court informed Akins that he was free to retain a new attorney,
but that he would not adjourn the trial.14
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request by Akins for an
adjournment to accommodate the counsel he sought to retain. The trial court was willing to
grant the request made by Akins to dismiss his appointed counsel. The only constraint placed on
Akins was that he would not be granted an adjournment of the trial. Akins was free to retain any
attorney he wanted, as long as that attorney could be present for the scheduled trial date. The
trial court's reluctance to adjourn the trial was reasonable, given that Akins was to be tried jointly
with Mitchell. Thus, it would have been a heavy burden on the trial court and the other attorneys
to adjourn the trial.15 We therefore conclude that Akins was not denied his right to retain counsel
of his choice. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Akins's request for
an adjournment of the trial.
2. Testimony That There Was "Independent Evidence" of Akins's
Guilt
Next, Akins argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting, over his
objection, the testimony of Sergeant Isaiah Smith, who claimed that he had evidence,
independent of Cuesta's testimony, that Akins was the man who shot Davis. "A trial court ruling
admitting evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." People v Hine, 467 Mich 242, 250;
14
The trial court suggested that Akins was trying to adjourn the trial as a delay tactic.
15
We further observe that Akins had no bona fide dispute with his appointed counsel, because
his appointed counsel was responsive to all of Akins's legitimate concerns. Akins's appointed
attorney filed a motion to sever trials or, in the alternative, sever the juries, as requested by
Akins. The trial court granted Akins's request for separate juries. Further, while Akins objected
to appointed counsel's conversing with the prosecutor, conversing with opposing counsel before
the trial is generally a prerequisite to providing effective assistance of counsel. Nothing in the
record supports the conclusion that Akins's appointed counsel did anything improper by speaking
with the prosecutor. The absence of legitimate complaints about the performance of appointed
counsel, together with the fact that Akins declined to retain new counsel to represent him on his
scheduled trial date, supports the trial court's conclusion that the request for adjournment was a
delay tactic.
-8-
650 NW2d 659 (2002). However, Akins maintains this particular evidentiary ruling denied him
his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. Constitutional issues are reviewed de novo. People
v Sierb, 456 Mich 519, 522; 581 NW2d 219 (1998).
Sergeant Smith never provided the substance of this "independent evidence" of Akins's
guilt. Further, neither attorney asked Sergeant Smith to explain his claim of "independent
evidence." However, the prosecution indicated out of the presence of the jury that the
"independent evidence" was Mitchell's statement to the police. To further complicate the issue,
the prosecution raised the existence of this "independent evidence" several times in its closing
argument. Despite overruling Akins's objection to Sergeant Smith's testimony, the trial court
nonetheless gave the following curative instruction to the jury regarding the prosecutor's
statements about Sergeant Smith's testimony of "independent evidence":
Now, during the closing statements by the prosecuting attorney, there was
a statement made regarding independent evidence of the defendant's participation
in these crimes. You are to disregard that statement. The defense was under no
obligation to ask any questions of Sergeant Smith about any independent
evidence. Consider only the evidence that was admitted during this trial.
In Bruton v United States, 391 US 123; 88 S Ct 1620; 20 L Ed 2d 476 (1968), the United
States Supreme Court held that a defendant was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation when the facially incriminating unredacted confession of a nontestifying
codefendant was admitted at their joint trial, even if the jury was instructed to consider the
confession only against the codefendant. People v Banks, 438 Mich 408, 415; 475 NW2d 769
(1991). The prosecution does not dispute that Mitchell's statement was inadmissible against
Akins. Therefore, there exists no foundation for a claim of independent evidence. We conclude
that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting testimony that there was unspecified
"independent evidence" that Akins was the shooter.
In order to determine the standard of review applicable to this error, we must first address
whether this error denied Akins his constitutional right to confrontation. Significantly, the jury
did not see or hear Mitchell's statement to the police. Rather, the jury only heard that there was
some unspecified "independent evidence" that Akins was the shooter. Thus, we conclude that
Akins's right to confrontation was not implicated, and the admission of Sergeant Smith's
testimony amounts to preserved nonconstitutional error. Accordingly, Akins has the burden of
establishing a miscarriage of justice under a "more probable than not" standard. People v
Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
Preliminarily, we note that the curative instruction relating to this issue clearly informed
the jury not to consider the prosecutor's statements in his closing argument about the
"independent evidence." However, it is less clear whether this instruction sufficiently informed
the jury to disregard Sergeant Smith's testimony confirming the existence of the "independent
evidence." But even assuming that this instruction did not inform the jury to disregard Sergeant
Smith's testimony, the admission of this testimony did not more probably than not result in a
miscarriage of justice because of the overwhelming evidence of Akins's guilt that exists in the
trial court record.
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Cuesta's testimony established that Akins was the person who fatally shot the victim.
Furthermore, even if a question existed whether Akins was the shooter, evidence of Akins's guilt
is overwhelming under an aiding and abetting theory. In sum, in light of Cuesta's testimony and
the other evidence against Akins, we conclude that Akins failed to show that it is more probable
than not that the admission of Sergeant Smith's testimony resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
3. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Next, Akins argues that the prosecutor denied him a fair trial by engaging in several
instances of misconduct. Akins first argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by: (1)
eliciting Sergeant Smith's testimony that there was "independent evidence" that Akins was the
shooter, (2) arguing during closing arguments that the jury should convict Akins on the basis of
"independent evidence" that he was the shooter, and (3) attempting to shift the burden of proof to
the defense, arguing that Akins failed to cross-examine Sergeant Smith regarding this
"independent evidence." These preserved allegations of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed
de novo to determine whether the defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial. People v
Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 448; 669 NW2d 818 (2003). "'Issues of prosecutorial misconduct
are decided case by case, with the reviewing court examining the pertinent portion of the record
and evaluating the prosecutor's remarks in context.'" People v Gonzalez, 256 Mich App 212,
222-223; 663 NW2d 499 (2003), quoting People v Noble, 238 Mich App 647, 660; 608 NW2d
123 (1999).
As discussed in Part II(B)(2) of this opinion, the admission of Sergeant Smith's claim of
"independent evidence" of Akins's guilt did not result in a miscarriage of justice. Significantly,
the trial court instructed the jury that it should disregard the prosecutor's statement during his
closing argument regarding independent evidence of Akins's participation in the crime. The trial
court also instructed the jury that the defense was under no obligation to cross-examine Sergeant
Smith about the independent evidence. Additionally, the trial court instructed the jury that the
lawyers' statements and arguments were not evidence and that the prosecution had the burden to
prove Akins's guilt. Therefore, although the prosecutor's statements were improper, any
prejudice was alleviated by the curative instructions given by the trial court.16
4. Voluntariness of Akins's Statements to the Police
16
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor improperly appealed to the jury's sympathy for the
victim during his closing argument. Akins failed to preserve for appeal this incidence of alleged
prosecutorial misconduct. This alleged instance of misconduct occurred when the prosecutor
stated during closing arguments, "Vito Davis is not here. Mr. Davis does not have a son, Mrs.
Davis does not have a son, his brother doesn't have a brother, his cousin does not have a cousin."
This Court has held that "[a]ppeals to the jury to sympathize with the victim constitute improper
argument." People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 591; 629 NW2d 411 (2001). In this case,
however, the prosecutor's comment was isolated and not overly inflammatory, and the prosecutor
did not blatantly appeal to the jury's sympathy. The trial court instructed the jury not to let
sympathy or prejudice influence its verdict. Under these circumstances, defendant was not
prejudiced by the prosecutor's remark, and reversal is not required. Id. at 592.
-10-
Akins next argues that his statements to the police should have been suppressed at trial
because they were made involuntarily. We disagree. This Court reviews de novo a trial court's
ultimate decision on a motion to suppress evidence. People v Beuschlein, 245 Mich App 744,
748; 630 NW2d 921 (2001). Although this Court engages in a review de novo of the entire
record, this Court will not disturb a trial court's factual findings with respect to a Walker17
hearing unless those findings are clearly erroneous. People v Daoud, 462 Mich 621, 629; 614
NW2d 152 (2000). "A finding is clearly erroneous if it leaves us with a definite and firm
conviction that the trial court has made a mistake." People v Manning, 243 Mich App 615, 620;
624 NW2d 746 (2000).
A statement obtained from a defendant during a custodial interrogation is admissible only
if the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment rights.
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 444; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966); Daoud, supra at
632-639. A confession or waiver of constitutional rights must be made without intimidation,
coercion, or deception, id. at 633, and must be the product of an essentially free and
unconstrained choice by its maker. People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 333-334; 429 NW2d 781
(1988). The burden is on the prosecution to prove voluntariness by a preponderance of the
evidence. Daoud, supra at 634. In Cipriano, supra at 334, our Supreme Court set forth a
nonexhaustive list of factors that should be considered in determining the voluntariness of a
statement:
[T]he age of the accused; his lack of education or his intelligence level;
the extent of his previous experience with the police; the repeated and prolonged
nature of the questioning; the length of the detention of the accused before he
gave the statement in question; the lack of any advice to the accused of his
constitutional rights; whether there was an unnecessary delay in bringing him
before a magistrate before he gave the confession; whether the accused was
injured, intoxicated or drugged, or in ill health when he gave the statement;
whether the accused was deprived of food, sleep, or medical attention; whether
the accused was physically abused; and whether the suspect was threatened with
abuse.
No single factor is necessarily conclusive on the issue of voluntariness, and "[t]he ultimate test of
admissibility is whether the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the
confession indicates that it was freely and voluntarily made." Id.
In the present case, the following evidence supported the trial court's ruling that Akins's
statements were voluntary: (1) testimony by Sergeant Smith and Officer Anthony Jackson that,
before Akins made both of his statements, Akins read and initialed a document setting forth his
constitutional rights; (2) testimony by Sergeant Smith and Officer Jackson that the officers read
Akins his constitutional rights and Akins indicated that he understood them; (3) testimony by
Lieutenant Raymon Nolan, Sergeant Smith, and Officer Jackson that Akins did not ask for an
attorney or ask to speak to anybody before he made the statements; (4) testimony by Sergeant
17
People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).
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Smith and Officer Jackson that they made no threats or promises to Akins; (5) testimony by
Lieutenant Nolan, Sergeant Smith, and Officer Jackson that Akins did not appear to be under the
influence of alcohol or drugs; (6) testimony by Sergeant Smith and Officer Jackson that Akins
did not say that he was tired, hungry, or thirsty; (7) evidence that Akins's first statement was
made approximately four hours after he was arrested; and (8) testimony by Officer Jackson that
Akins had an eleventh-grade education.
In contrast, Akins testified at the Walker hearing that he had smoked marijuana, drank
two shots of cognac, and took an ecstasy pill the day before he made the statements to Sergeant
Smith and Officer Jackson. Akins testified that he was "high" when he was arrested and was still
under the influence of ecstasy when he made the statements. Akins testified that he told
Lieutenant Nolan that he had smoked marijuana that day.18 Akins contradicted testimony of the
police officers by testifying that he told the police that he did not want to talk and wanted to call
his mother so she could hire an attorney for him. Akins claimed that the police would not let him
make any calls before he made a statement. Akins also testified that he was handcuffed by the
police. According to Akins, the officers promised Akins that he would be released if he made
the statements. Akins testified that, when he made the statements, he was both hyper from the
ecstasy and tired from staying up late.
The trial court apparently believed the officers' account of what happened, as opposed to
Akins's account. The trial court commented on Akins's demeanor while testifying and his
memory of the events leading up to the statements, and found that Akins's statements were
voluntary. This Court will not disturb a trial court's factual findings with respect to a Walker
hearing unless those findings are clearly erroneous. Daoud, supra at 629. The trial court is in
the best position to assess the crucial issue of credibility. Id. Therefore, applying the Cipriano
factors, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in concluding that Akins's statements
were voluntary and admissible at trial.19
18
Intoxication from drugs or alcohol may preclude an effective waiver of Miranda rights, but is
not dispositive of the issue of voluntariness. People v Leighty, 161 Mich App 565, 571; 411
NW2d 778 (1987).
19
Akins never argued at the Walker hearing that the delay in his arraignment caused his
statements to be involuntary. Accordingly, the trial court never mentioned or made any findings
regarding the delay in arraigning Akins. However, on appeal, Akins briefly mentions this fact in
his argument that his statements were not voluntary. Akins was arraigned five days (at least 106
hours) after he was arrested. A delay of more than forty-eight hours between arrest and
arraignment is presumptively unreasonable, but does not automatically require the suppression of
statements obtained during the detention period. Manning, supra at 643.
When a confession was obtained during an unreasonable delay before
arraignment, in Michigan the Cipriano factors still must be applied. The
unreasonable delay is but one factor in that analysis. The longer the delay, the
greater the probability that the confession will be held involuntary. At some
(continued…)
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5. Double Jeopardy
Finally, Akins argues that his conviction and sentence for assault with intent to rob while
armed must be vacated because they violate the prohibition against double jeopardy.20 Because
this constitutional issue was not preserved for appeal, we review it to determine if there was
plain error affecting Akins's substantial rights. People v Wilson, 242 Mich App 350, 359-360;
619 NW2d 413 (2000).
Akins was charged with assault with intent to rob while armed as the underlying felony
for the felony-murder charge. He was convicted and sentenced on both charges.
"Convictions of both felony murder and the underlying felony offend
double jeopardy protections. People v Gimotty, 216 Mich App 254, 259; 549
NW2d 39 (1996). When a defendant is erroneously convicted of both felony
murder and the underlying felony, the proper remedy is to vacate the conviction
and sentence for the underlying felony. Id. at 259-260." [Wilson, supra at 360,
quoting People v Warren, 228 Mich App 336, 354-355; 578 NW2d 692 (1998),
rev'd in part on other grounds 462 Mich 415; 615 NW2d 691 (2000).]
Because Akins was convicted and sentenced for both felony murder and the underlying felony of
assault with intent to rob while armed, his conviction and sentence for assault with intent to rob
while armed must be vacated.
III. Conclusion
In regard to Docket No. 240360, we conclude that (1) assault with intent to rob while
armed is a proper underlying felony supporting Mitchell's felony-murder conviction, and (2) the
verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence and the evidence was sufficient to justify
a rational trier of fact to conclude that Mitchell was guilty of the crimes beyond a reasonable
doubt. In Docket No. 240359, we conclude that (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Akins's request for an adjournment of the trial so that one specific lawyer of his choice
could represent him, (2) the admission of Sergeant Smith's testimony that there was "independent
evidence" of Akins's guilt did not amount to a miscarriage of justice, (3) Akins was not denied a
fair and impartial trial by the prosecutor's remarks during his closing argument, (4) the trial court
did not clearly err in determining that Akins's confession was voluntary, and (5) Akins's
conviction and sentence for assault with intent to rob while armed must be vacated because they
violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. In summary, we vacate Akins's conviction and
(…continued)
point, a delay will become so long that it alone is enough to make a confession
involuntary. [Id.]
Despite the delay in arraignment in the present case, we conclude that, applying all the Cipriano
factors, the trial court did not clearly err in concluding that Akins's statements were voluntary
and admissible at trial.
20
As discussed, the trial court vacated Mitchell's conviction and sentence for assault with intent
to rob while armed in a postconviction order.
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sentence for assault with intent to rob while armed, and affirm the remainder of Akins and
Mitchell's convictions and sentences.
Affirmed in part and vacated in part.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
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