PEOPLE OF MI V KEVIN DWAYNE BOWMAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
FOR PUBLICATION
November 15, 2002
9:20 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 230381
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 99-006516-FC
KEVIN DWAYNE BOWMAN, a/k/a KB,
Defendant-Appellant.
Updated Copy
February 14, 2003
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Bandstra and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury convictions of first-degree murder, MCL 750.316,
and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts and Procedural History
This case arises from the murder of a midlevel Grand Rapids area drug dealer found shot
to death in his apartment. Forensic evidence admitted at trial indicated that the victim had been
shot several times at close range while asleep in his bed. However, no evidence of forced entry
into the apartment, which was generally secured by a deadbolt, was found.
Evidence offered at trial indicated that on the eve of his death the victim was in
possession of a large amount of cash and cocaine and was alone in the apartment with defendant,
who, despite being described as the victim's "shadow," was considered an "outsider" in a tightly
knit group of associates centered around the victim. After the murder, defendant gave to the
police and several individuals a number of inconsistent accounts regarding his whereabouts at
the time of the murder. Defendant also began uncharacteristically spending money and was
observed wearing more expensive clothing than usual. At about that same time, defendant was
arrested and jailed for reasons unrelated to the murder and, while in jail bragged to a fellow
inmate that he had killed someone who had "disrespected" him. Defendant further related details
of the killing that were consistent with the victim's murder but that only the killer and those who
actually examined the body would have known at that time. Defendant also told the inmate that
he had stolen both cash and cocaine in conjunction with the murder.
During the course of the year-long investigation into the murder, defendant spoke with
the police on several occasions. Although initially denying any involvement in the killing and
theft, defendant ultimately acknowledged that he "may" have shot the victim, but indicated that
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he must have blacked out because he could not specifically recall the events of that evening. On
the basis of this evidence, the jury convicted defendant as stated above. Defendant now appeals
as of right, raising allegations of evidentiary and instructional error.
II. Analysis
A. Hearsay Concerning Motive and Intent of Others
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by declining to allow him to present
hearsay testimony regarding persons other than himself who may have harbored a motive and
intent to kill the victim. Specifically, defendant claims that the court should have admitted
testimony that the victim was "upset" after driving from a meeting with a fellow drug dealer to
the home of a friend, and that a mechanic who knew the victim heard someone in his automobile
repair shop boasting that he had killed a man by shooting him in the head. Defendant claims that
the first of these statements was admissible as either a present sense impression or excited
utterance under MRE 803(1) or (2), and that the second was admissible as a statement against
penal interest under MRE 804(b)(3). We disagree.
We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of
evidence. People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 494; 577 NW2d 673 (1998). With respect to the
admissibility of the first challenged statement, a present sense impression is defined under MRE
803(1) as "[a] statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant
was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter." This Court is not overly literal
in construing the phrase "immediately thereafter" and will allow a statement made less than a
minute or even several minutes after the event observed to qualify under this exception. See
People v Cross, 202 Mich App 138, 142; 508 NW2d 144 (1993). However, the statement at
issue here was not made merely a few minutes after the conversation being related took place,
but following a drive of an indeterminate length from one house to another, and then in a
separate conversation with someone not present during the first conversation. To call such an
account a "present sense impression" is to rob the phrase of its meaning, and we will not interpret
the language of this evidentiary rule in a sense so contrary to its "'fair and natural import.'" See
People v Morey, 461 Mich 325, 330; 603 NW2d 250 (1999), quoting People ex rel Twitchell v
Blodgett, 13 Mich 127, 168 (1865) (Cooley, J.). Accordingly, we do not conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion by declining to admit the subject statement under MRE 803(1).
We similarly find no support for defendant's contention that this testimony was
admissible as an excited utterance under MRE 803(2). The excited utterance exception applies
only to a statement that arises from a truly "'startling occasion'" and was "'made before there has
been time to contrive and misrepresent.'" People v Kreiner, 415 Mich 372, 378-379; 329 NW2d
716 (1982), quoting People v Gee, 406 Mich 279, 282; 278 NW2d 304 (1979). In addition to
considering whether there was time to fabricate the statement, a court must also consider whether
the declarant's emotional state would have permitted such fabrication. People v Edwards, 206
Mich App 694, 697; 522 NW2d 727 (1994). Under none of these standards does the statement in
question qualify as an excited utterance. Although defendant offered some detail regarding the
substance of and circumstances giving rise to the challenged testimony, the fact that one drug
dealer was "upset" after seeing another does not suggest any "startling" event. Indeed, we have
found the sexual harassment of a corrections officer at work two days before being murdered
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(allegedly in connection with the harassment) not to have constituted a startling event, McCallum
v Dep't of Corrections, 197 Mich App 589, 592-593, 604; 496 NW2d 361 (1992), and have
similarly ruled that viewing a daughter's body in an open casket four days after she was
murdered is not a startling event that allows the admission of a hearsay statement under MRE
803(2), People v Lobaito, 133 Mich App 547, 558-559; 351 NW2d 233 (1984). In light of these
precedents, a disagreement, even a heated or upsetting one, between drug dealers simply cannot
be regarded as a "startling event." Moreover, the time between the event in question and the
statement itself gave the victim "time to contrive and misrepresent" before making the statement,
Kreiner, supra, and it does not appear that the victim's emotional state when he made the
statement necessarily would have excluded the possibility of such fabrication, Edwards, supra.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the statement as an
excited utterance under MRE 803(2).
We similarly find no error in the trial court's decision not to admit the second statement
in question, i.e., that, at some indeterminate point, a mechanic heard a certain "Little Tony," who
allegedly owned a handgun similar to that with which the victim was killed and was affiliated
with a drug organization rival to that of the victim, remark that he had killed someone by
emptying a gun into him, and in the process had kicked in both a front door and a bedroom door.
Defendant sought to admit this statement under MRE 804(b)(3), which permits the admission of
hearsay statements against the penal interest of the declarant. However, under this rule, "[a]
statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the
accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness
of the statement." MRE 804(b)(3). The requirement of corroborating circumstances for the
application of this exception to the general rule excluding hearsay has been enforced in a number
of our cases, including People v Jensen, 222 Mich App 575, 582-583; 564 NW2d 192 (1997),
vacated in part on other grounds, 456 Mich 935 (1998), People v Underwood, 184 Mich App
784, 788; 459 NW2d 106 (1990), and People v Sanders, 163 Mich App 606, 610; 415 NW2d
218 (1987), and we agree with the trial court that the evidence proffered here lacked such
corroborating circumstances. Indeed, the condition of the doors in the victim's apartment
actually contradicted the statement. Accordingly, the statement was insufficiently trustworthy to
warrant its admission into evidence under MRE 804(b)(3), and the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in so ruling.1
B. Instruction on Reasonable Doubt
Defendant next argues that the trial court's instructions regarding the standard for finding
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt were erroneous. The trial court instructed the jury that
1
Defendant also asserted at trial, without any elaboration, that this statement was admissible as
"a present sense impression or excited utterance." However, like the previously discussed
statement, there is nothing to indicate that this statement was made "while" or even within a few
minutes after the killing being discussed took place. MRE 803(1); Cross, supra. Nor was there
any indication that the statement was made "while the declarant was under the stress or
excitement" caused by that allegedly startling event. MRE 803(2).
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[p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt simply means evidence presented here which
after you have assessed it leaves you firmly convinced in your own mind that he's
guilty. If you are firmly convinced based on the evidence, then you have been
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt.
. . . If based on your careful consideration of the evidence and whatever
inferences follow from the evidence you're firmly convinced that [defendant] is
guilty of some criminal offense, then you may find him guilty.
If, on the other hand, based on the evidence, the lack of evidence, and
inferences which follow, there's a real possibility in your mind, not just a mere
possibility, that he's not guilty, then, of course, he's entitled to the benefit of the
doubt and has to be found not guilty.
Defendant argues that the instruction, by equating proof beyond a reasonable doubt with proof
that leaves the jurors "firmly convinced" of guilt without any "real possibility" of innocence,
diluted the standard for a criminal conviction and therefore constituted structural error that
deprived him of a fair trial and requires automatic reversal. See Neder v United States, 527 US
1, 8; 119 S Ct 1827; 144 L Ed 2d 35 (1999). We disagree.
Defendant cites, and we are able to find, no case in which any appellate court has found
the challenged instruction, which was taken from the pattern criminal jury instructions developed
by the Federal Judicial Center, to be constitutionally defective. See Federal Judicial Center,
Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, pp 17-18. To the contrary, this instruction has been upheld in
a number of federal cases, see, e.g., Harris v Bowersox, 184 F3d 744, 751-752 (CA 8, 1999), and
United States v Artero, 121 F3d 1256, 1257-1259 (CA 9, 1997), and has been highly praised in
the concurring opinion of a United States Supreme Court justice:
[W]e have never held that the concept of reasonable doubt is undefinable,
or that trial courts should not, as a matter of course, provide a definition. . . .
*
*
*
. . . . The Federal Judicial Center has proposed a definition of reasonable
doubt that is clear, straightforward, and accurate. That instruction reads:
"[T]he government has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. Some of you may have served as jurors in civil cases, where
you were told that it is only necessary to prove that a fact is more likely true than
not true. In criminal cases, the government's proof must be more powerful than
that. It must be beyond a reasonable doubt.
"Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly
convinced of the defendant's guilt. There are very few things in this world that
we know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require
proof that overcomes every possible doubt. If, based on your consideration of the
evidence, you are firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty of the crime
charged, you must find him guilty. If on the other hand, you think there is a real
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possibility that he is not guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and
find him not guilty." Federal Judicial Center, Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions,
at 17-18 (instruction 21).
This instruction plainly informs the jurors that the prosecution must prove
its case by more than a mere preponderance of the evidence, yet not necessarily to
an absolute certainty. The "firmly convinced" standard for conviction, repeated
for emphasis, is further enhanced by the juxtaposed prescription that the jury must
acquit if there is a "real possibility" that the defendant is innocent. This model
instruction surpasses others I have seen in stating the reasonable doubt standard
succinctly and comprehensibly. [Victor v Nebraska, 511 US 1, 26-27; 114 S Ct
1239; 127 L Ed 2d 583 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).]
Considering the absence of authority finding this instruction to be erroneous, and the weight of
authority upholding and commending it, we find no basis for a determination of error.
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Finally, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of firstdegree murder, either on the theory that he acted with premeditation or that he committed the
crime in the course of another felony, in this case, larceny. The elements of first-degree murder
are that the defendant killed the victim and that the killing was either "willful, deliberate, and
premeditated," MCL 750.316(1)(a), or committed in the course of an enumerated felony, such as
larceny, MCL 750.316(1)(b). Defendant was convicted under both theories.
We review de novo challenges to the sufficiency of evidence in criminal trials to
determine whether, when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecutor, a
rational trier of fact could have found all the elements of the charged crime to have been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 723; 597 NW2d 73 (1999).
Viewed in this light, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. The evidence that
defendant killed the victim was overwhelming. He confessed to the police and to a fellow
inmate. Further, there was overwhelming circumstantial evidence of his guilt, including
opportunity, presence at the crime scene, improvement in his financial circumstances
immediately after the victim's death, and defendant's apparent knowledge of details about the
killing that no one but the police and the murderer could have known.
With respect to premeditation, the evidence is even more compelling. In the first place,
there is the manner of the death. The victim was shot multiple times at close range while lying
asleep, two of the bullets having penetrated his face. One cannot, under normal circumstances,
kill a sleeping person at close range in any fashion other than with premeditation, especially
when the person is a close companion and benefactor. As made clear by the pathologist's
testimony, there was no evidence suggesting sudden rage or self-defense, or any other
circumstance under which an unpremeditated killing might occur. Moreover, defendant's own
jailhouse confession admitted not only premeditation, but motive, i.e., that the victim
"disrespected" him. Defendant's statement regarding the disrespect was, moreover, corroborated
by independent evidence concerning the relationship between defendant and the victim. Given
this evidence, a rational trier of fact could conclude that, in the middle of the night, when the two
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were alone, defendant shot the sleeping victim at point-blank range, resentful of the
condescending treatment he felt he was receiving. Viewed in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, this evidence is more than sufficient to establish premeditation beyond a reasonable
doubt.
There was also more than sufficient evidence to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
the murder was committed in the course of a larceny. Evidence at trial indicated that money,
drugs, and guns belonging to the victim were in his apartment immediately before he was shot,
but that these items were missing when the victim's body was discovered. This in itself would be
enough, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that the murder was committed in the course of larceny. However, there was
also evidence of defendant's newfound wealth immediately following the crime, including his
throwing a large outdoor party on Memorial Day and his noticeably more expensive wardrobe.
Combined with the evidence that it was defendant who committed the murder, and that he knew
that the victim had the missing items in his possession, this was more than sufficient evidence to
show beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the larceny.
We affirm.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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