RESIDENTIAL RATEPAYER CONSORTIUM V PSC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
FOR PUBLICATION
January 29, 2002
9:10 a.m.
Appellant,
v
MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION,
THE DETROIT EDISON COMPANY, and
RESIDENTIAL RATEPAYER CONSORTIUM,
No. 228484
MPSC
MPSC No. 00-011800-R
Appellees.
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Appellant,
v
MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION,
THE DETROIT EDISON COMPANY, and
RESIDENTIAL RATEPAYER CONSORTIUM,
No. 228485
MPSC
MPSC No. 00-012121
Appellees.
ABATE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v
MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION,
Respondent-Appellee,
and
THE DETROIT EDISON COMPANY and
RESIDENTIAL RATEPAYER CONSORTIUM,
Appellees.
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No. 228522
MPSC
MPSC No. 00-011800-R
ABATE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v
MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION,
THE DETROIT EDISON COMPANY, and
RESIDENTIAL RATEPAYER CONSORTIUM,
No. 228523
MPSC
MPSC No. 00-012121
Respondent-Appellees.
RESIDENTIAL RATEPAYER CONSORTIUM,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v
MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
and THE DETROIT EDISON COMPANY,
No. 228622
MPSC
MPSC No. 00-011800-R
Respondent-Appellees.
RESIDENTIAL RATEPAYER CONSORTIUM,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v
MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
and THE DETROIT EDISON COMPANY,
Respondent-Appellees.
No. 228623
MPSC
MPSC No. 00-012121
Updated Copy
April 12, 2002
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Bandstra and K.F. Kelly, JJ.
K. F. KELLY, J.
On June 19, 2000, the Michigan Public Service Commission (MPSC) issued two orders,
on its own motion and without notice or a hearing, dismissing with prejudice the Detroit Edison
Company's application for a power supply cost reconciliation for 1999 (MPSC Case No. U11800-R) and its application to implement a power supply cost recovery (PSCR) plan for 2000
(MPSC Case No. U-12121). The dismissals were ordered pursuant to subsection 10d(1) of the
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Customer Choice and Electricity Reliability Act, 2000 PA 141, MCL 460.10 et seq. (Act 141),
which froze residential and nonresidential electric rates authorized or in effect on May 1, 2000,
until December 31, 2003. Separate appeals as of right were filed from the two orders by the
Attorney General (Docket Nos. 228484 and 228485), the Association of Businesses Advocating
Tariff Equity (ABATE) (Docket Nos. 228522 and 228523), and the Residential Ratepayer
Consortium (RRC) (Docket Nos. 228622 and 228623). This Court ordered the appeals
consolidated. We now affirm.
I. Factual and procedural background
As part of the Legislature's decision to deregulate the electric utility industry, it enacted
Act 141, which provides in subsection 10d(1):
Unless otherwise reduced by the commission under subsection (4)
[involving securitization financing], the commission shall establish the residential
rates for each electric utility with 1,000,000 or more retail customers in this state
as of May 1, 2000 that will result in a 5% rate reduction from the rates that were
authorized or in effect on May 1, 2000. Notwithstanding any other provision of
law or commission order, rates for each electric utility with 1,000,000 or more
retail customers established under this subsection become effective on the
effective date of the amendatory act that added this section and remain in effect
until December 31, 2003 and all other electric retail rates of an electric utility with
1,000,000 or more retail customers authorized or in effect as of May 1, 2000 shall
remain in effect until December 31, 2003, unless otherwise reduced by the
commission under subsection (4). [MCL 460.10d(1).]
Thus, Act 141 mandated that residential electric rates authorized or in effect on May 1, 2000, be
reduced by five percent and remain frozen until December 31, 2003, and that nonresidential rates
authorized or in effect on May 1, 2000, also be frozen until December 31, 2003.
At the time Act 141 became effective, June 5, 2000, Edison's 1999 PSCR reconciliation
application was pending in the MPSC pursuant to MCL 460.6j(12)–(16) [MPSC Case No. U11800-R]. In its application, Edison attached an exhibit asserting that the utility had an
overrecovery for the year of more than $13 million, requiring a refund to customers. Edison's
exhibit further indicated a refundable $18.9 million in Fermi 2 capacity performance standard
amounts, which were based on a 1988 MPSC-approved stipulation and settlement agreement
entered into between Edison and certain customers, including ABATE, in MPSC Case No. U8789. In the settlement agreement, Edison had agreed as follows:
For rates in effect from January 1, 1993 through December 31, 2003, a
disallowance will be imposed upon the Company for the amount by which the
three-year rolling average capacity factor for Fermi 2 is less than the greater of
either the simple average capacity factor of the top 50% of U.S. boiling water
reactors or 50%.
* * *
The annual performance standard disallowance shall be the net
incremental cost of replacement power (including capacity and associated
energy).
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Also pending at the time Act 141 became effective was Edison's application to implement a
PSCR plan for 2000 pursuant to MCL 460.6j(3)–(7) [MPSC Case No. U-12121].
On June 19, 2000, acting on its own motion and without notice or a hearing, the MPSC
ordered Edison's reconciliation application in MPSC Case No. U-11800-R "dismissed with
prejudice":
On June 5, 2000, the Commission issued an order in Case No. U-12464
implementing the rate reduction for residential customers and requiring Detroit
Edison to file tariff sheets. With that reduction, all of the retail rates now in effect
may not be changed until at least December 31, 2003 except to reflect the effects
of securitization. A PSCR reconciliation, which is designed to adjust rates for an
over- or underrecovery of the costs of fuel and purchased power, is inconsistent
with subsection 10d(1). Therefore, Detroit Edison's application must be
dismissed.
On that same date, the MPSC issued another order dismissing with prejudice Edison's 2000
PSCR plan application in MPSC Case No. U-12121, citing the same rationale as above.
II
On appeal, appellants contend that the MPSC's interpretation of subsection 10d(1) of Act
141 is unlawful. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
Pursuant to MCL 462.25, all rates, fares, practices, and services prescribed by the MPSC
are presumed, prima facie, to be lawful and reasonable. Michigan Consolidated Gas Co v Public
Service Comm, 389 Mich 624; 209 NW2d 210 (1973); Attorney General v Public Service Comm,
206 Mich App 290, 294; 520 NW2d 636 (1994). An appellant must show by "clear and
satisfactory evidence" that a challenged order of the MPSC is "unlawful or unreasonable." MCL
462.26(8); Michigan Consolidated Gas Co, supra at 639; CMS Energy Corp v Attorney General,
190 Mich App 220, 228; 475 NW2d 451 (1991); Attorney General, supra, 206 Mich App 294.
An MPSC order is unlawful if it is based on an erroneous interpretation or application of the law,
and it is unreasonable if it is not supported by the evidence. Associated Truck Lines, Inc v Public
Service Comm, 377 Mich 259; 140 NW2d 515 (1966); Attorney General v Public Service Comm,
231 Mich App 76, 77-78; 585 NW2d 310 (1998). While a reviewing court must give due
deference to the administrative expertise of the MPSC and may not substitute its judgment for
that of the agency, the judiciary may not abandon or delegate its duty to interpret statutory
language and legislative intent. Attorney General v Public Service Comm, 244 Mich App 401,
406; 625 NW2d 786 (2001).
Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law, which are reviewed de novo.
In re MCI Telecommunications Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 413; 596 NW2d 164 (1999); Attorney
General v Public Service Comm, 247 Mich App 35, 39; 634 NW2d 710 (2001).
B
In dismissing with prejudice Edison's pending 1999 PSCR reconciliation application and
2000 PSCR plan application cases, the MPSC construed the rate freeze provision of subsection
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10d(1) as temporarily supplanting MCL 460.6j pursuant to which PSCR reconciliation and plan
proceedings are conducted. Affirmance is warranted on various grounds.
1. The plain language of the statute
Appellees MPSC and Edison persuasively assert that the rate freeze under subsection
10d(1) precludes any adjustment of rates beyond the terms of Act 141 in light of the plain
statutory language, i.e., "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law or commission order, rates
. . . established under this subsection become effective on the effective date of the amendatory
act that added this section and remain in effect until December 31, 2003 . . . ." "[A]ny other
provision of law" plainly includes the PSCR reconciliation and plan provisions of MCL 460.6j,
and "any other . . . commission order" plainly includes orders issued pursuant to MCL 460.6j or
prior MPSC-approved agreements whereby a utility has agreed to make future rate adjustments.
Thus, the MPSC's interpretation of the statute is entitled to deference because it is consistent
with the plain language of the statute. Attorney General, supra, 247 Mich App 41. Moreover,
because the dismissal orders are not clearly based on an erroneous interpretation or application of
the law, appellants have failed to overcome the presumption of lawfulness. MCL 462.25;
Associated Truck Lines, Inc, supra; Attorney General, supra, 231 Mich App 77-78.
2. The MPSC has authority to suspend a PSCR clause
A PSCR clause is "a clause in the electric rates or rate schedule of a utility which permits
the monthly adjustment of rates," and a PSCR factor is an "element" of electric rates. MCL
460.6j(1)(a), (b). "Pursuant to its authority under this act, the public service commission may
incorporate a power supply cost recovery clause in the electric rates or rate schedule of a utility,
but is not required to do so." MCL 460.6j(2). As a corollary to this discretionary authority, this
Court has held that the MPSC has the authority to suspend an electric utility's PSCR clause for a
specified period as long as the suspension will not result in an increase in rates. Attorney
General, supra, 231 Mich App 79-80; Attorney General, supra, 244 Mich App 406. See also
Residential Ratepayer Consortium v Public Service Comm, 239 Mich App 1, 4-5; 607 NW2d
391 (1999) (suspension authority applies also to gas cost recovery clauses).
Here, viewing, as this Court must, the MPSC's orders as prima facie lawful and
reasonable, the MPSC had discretion whether to impose a 1999 PSCR clause in the first place or
to suspend operation of a clause that had already been imposed. Thus, in light of the rate freeze
mandated under subsection 10d(1), the MPSC properly exercised its discretion to suspend
implementation of a PSCR clause that would have had the effect of adjusting electric rates, in
direct contravention of the freeze.
Appellants contend that the MPSC's interpretation of subsection 10d(1) operates to
retroactively change or modify rates in effect before the effective date of Act 141, June 5, 2000.
Appellants note that statutes are generally viewed as having only prospective application, unless
the Legislature has clearly indicated an intent for retroactive application, and no such intent is
indicated in Act 141. The flaw in this argument, as pointed out by appellees, is that rate-making
orders are prospective in effect. Michigan Bell Telephone Co v Public Service Comm, 315 Mich
533, 547; 24 NW2d 200 (1946); Detroit Edison Co v Public Service Comm, 221 Mich App 370,
376; 562 NW2d 224 (1997). Therefore, by suspending implementation of pending PSCR
proceedings, the MPSC was merely complying with the dictates of subsection 10d(1) that
precluded adjustment of the frozen rates for the specified period.
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Appellants further paint the MPSC's action as a repeal of MCL 460.6j by implication and
contend that such a construction should be disfavored by the courts. "'Repeals by implication are
not favored and will not be indulged in if there is any other reasonable construction. The intent
to repeal must very clearly appear, and courts will not hold to a repeal if they can find reasonable
ground to hold the contrary.'" House Speaker v State Administrative Bd, 441 Mich 547, 562; 495
NW2d 539 (1993), quoting Attorney General ex rel Owen v Joyce, 233 Mich 619, 621; 207 NW
863 (1926). The question whether a statute is repealed by a subsequent statute relating to the
same subject matter involves a determination of legislative intent, and where possible the former
and subsequent statutes must be construed together and reconciled so as to give each force and
effect. Attorney General v Public Service Comm, 161 Mich App 506, 513; 411 NW2d 469
(1987).
Here, Act 141 does not incorporate any express provision for repeal of MCL 460.6j.
However, reading the statutes together as a whole, we agree with appellees that the clear intent of
the Legislature was to temporarily supplant the usual PSCR process so as to implement the rate
freeze provision of Act 141.1 Properly construed, then, Act 141 does not repeal MCL 460.6j, but
rather suspends its operation for a specified period. We adopt this construction because it
resolves any ostensible conflict between the two statutes and gives force and effect to each.
Attorney General, supra, 161 Mich App 513. See also Knauff v Oscoda Co Drain Comm'r, 240
Mich App 485, 492; 618 NW2d 1 (2000) (reading two statutes, claimed to be in conflict,
together as providing alternative methods, independent of one another). Accordingly, we reject
appellants' contention that Act 141 impliedly repeals the PSCR process provisions of MCL
460.6j.
3. Deferential standard of review of MPSC orders
Lastly, given our historically deferential treatment of MPSC rulings, appellants have
failed to overcome the heavy burden of demonstrating by clear and satisfactory evidence that the
challenged dismissal orders were unlawful or unreasonable. MCL 462.26(8); Michigan
Consolidated Gas Co, supra at 639. The MPSC reasonably construed the PSCR clause
adjustments during the rate freeze period to be "inconsistent" with subsection 10d(1).
III
Appellants next argue that the MPSC's dismissal of the pending PSCR proceedings
illegally cut off Edison's customers' rights to millions of dollars in refunds related to PSCR overrecoveries for 1999 and the first half of 2000 as well as Fermi 2 cost disallowances established in
MPSC Case No. U-8789. We hold that appellants have failed to demonstrate that subsection
10d(1) is an unconstitutional violation of their vested property or contract rights to refunds or
credits.
1
Indeed, such a construction is suggested by subsection 10a(12), which provides for an eventual
return to the previous rate-setting method:
After the time period described in section 10d(2), the rates for retail
customers that remain with or leave and later return to the incumbent electric
utility shall be determined in the same manner as the rates were determined before
the effective date of this section. [MCL 460.10a(12).]
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A. Standard of review
Matters of constitutional and statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo by this Court.
Oakland Co Bd of Co Rd Comm'rs v Michigan Property & Casualty Guaranty Ass'n, 456 Mich
590, 610; 575 NW2d 751 (1998); Reynolds v Bureau of State Lottery, 240 Mich App 84, 86; 610
NW2d 597 (2000).
B. Impairment of contract rights
This state's constitution, Const 1963, art 1, § 10, provides that "[n]o bill of attainder, ex
post facto law or law impairing the obligation of contract shall be enacted," which is
substantially identical to the federal constitution, US Const, art I, § 10, which provides that "[n]o
state shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts . . . ." Our state constitutional provision is not interpreted more expansively than its
federal counterpart. In re Certified Question (Fun 'N Sun RV, Inc v Michigan), 447 Mich 765,
776, n 13; 527 NW2d 468 (1994); Taylor v Secretary of State, 216 Mich App 333, 339-340; 548
NW2d 710 (1996).
We agree with appellees that no contract rights are implicated in this case. Although
Edison and certain customers, including ABATE, had entered into a 1988 stipulation and
settlement agreement in MPSC Case No. U-8789 that provided for a 1999 refund of $18.9
million in Fermi 2 capacity performance standard amounts, the settlement agreement did not
establish traditional contract rights in the refund. Because the MPSC has primary jurisdiction to
regulate all public utilities and their rates and conditions of service, see MCL 460.6, the
settlement agreement was without effect unless approved by the MPSC, which it did in an
"Order Approving Settlement Agreement," entered on December 27, 1988. However, the final
paragraph of that order provided as follows:
The Commission specifically reserves jurisdiction of the matters herein
contained and the authority to issue such further order or orders as the facts and
circumstances may require.
Thus, to the extent that any "rights" to refundable amounts were created in MPSC Case No. U8789, such rights are dependent, not on vested contract rights, but on the provisions of the
MPSC's approval order. However, given that the MPSC reserved jurisdiction to issue further
orders in the case as necessary, any claim to a vested interest in the refund amounts was vitiated.
Accordingly, appellants' argument regarding impairment of contract rights must fail.
C. Violation of due process—impairment of vested rights to refunds or credits
Both the state and federal constitutions provide that private property shall not be taken
without due process of law or just compensation. US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 17 and
art 10, § 2. Due process is violated only when legislation impairs vested rights. Taxpayers
United for Michigan Constitution, Inc v Detroit, 196 Mich App 463, 467-468; 493 NW2d 463
(1992).
One who asserts an uncompensated taking claim must first establish that a
vested property right is affected. Minty v Bd of State Auditors, 336 Mich 370,
390; 58 NW2d 106 (1953). To constitute a vested right, the interest must be
"'something more than such a mere expectation as may be based upon an
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anticipated continuance of the present general laws; it must have become a title,
legal or equitable, to the present or future enjoyment of property . . . .'" Id.,
quoting 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed), p 749. Without a property
right, a plaintiff has no basis for challenging a statute on the ground that it
constitutes a confiscatory taking without due process of law. [Fun 'N Sun RV,
supra at 787-788.]
In Fun 'N Sun RV, supra, policyholders in the state Accident Fund filed suit against the state and
the Accident Fund, among others, seeking a determination that the policyholders were the
owners of and entitled to any accumulated reserves in the fund in excess of those needed to cover
liabilities. While the lawsuit was pending, the Legislature enacted a statute, MCL 418.701a,
which authorized the state to sell the fund to a private party and to retain the proceeds. Fun 'N
Sun RV, supra at 770. The Court of Claims granted summary disposition to the policyholders,
finding that they had a vested right to the fund's assets. Upon certification of a question by
request of the Governor, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the statute authorizing the state
to sell and retain the proceeds of the sale of the Accident Fund did not impair the obligation of
contracts or take property rights without due process of law because the policyholders had failed
to demonstrate any ownership of specific property rights or contract rights. Id. at 775-776. The
Court noted that the parties' separate theories of due process and obligation of contract each
required the policyholders to demonstrate an ownership interest in specific property rights or
contract rights. Id. at 775.
Similarly, appellants here cannot make a persuasive claim to a vested right in any
potential refunds. The statutory scheme gives the MPSC discretion whether to incorporate a
PSCR clause in electric rates, MCL 460.6j(2), and this Court has held that the MPSC has the
authority to suspend an electric utility's PSCR clause for a specified period as long as the
suspension will not result in an increase in rates, Attorney General, supra, 231 Mich App 79-80;
Attorney General, supra, 244 Mich App 406. Under such circumstances, any refund under MCL
460.6j is purely speculative, at least until the MPSC issues a final order mandating a refund of
specific amounts. Fun 'N Sun RV, supra at 788-789; Taxpayers United for Michigan
Constitution, Inc, supra at 468. Thus, appellants have failed to establish any vested right to a
refund or credit in this case.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Richard A Bandstra
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
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