Forster v. Hargadon

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NANCY FORSTER v. EDWARD R. K. HARGADON, Misc. No. 8, 2006 T. Petition for writ of prohibition, mandamus, or other relief dismissed because relief requested, if warranted, is available in two pending cases in Court of Special Appeals. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. N o. 8 September Term, 2006 ______________________________________ NANCY S. FORSTER v. EDWARD R. K. HARGADON ______________________________________ Raker Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene Eldridge, Jo hn C. (Re tired, specially assigned) Wilner, A lan M. (R etired, specially assigned), JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Wilner, J. ______________________________________ Filed: April 11, 2007 Before us is a petition by Na ncy S. Forster, the Public Defe nder of Ma ryland, for a writ of prohibition, writ of mandamus, or other appropriate relief, in which she asks that we vaca te a directive a nd order iss ued by Edw ard R. K . Hargado n, a judge o f the Circu it Court for Baltimore City, that Ms. Forster believes are both substantively unlawful and constitute an impermissible local rule. With the petition was a motion to stay the directive and order pending our decision on the petition, which we granted. The order, which is set out below, imposes certain procedural requirements on parties who file exceptions to the report of a master in juvenile cases and permits the court to dism iss the excep tions if those r equireme nts are not m et. The direc tive directs the court cler k to enter the order in eac h exceptio ns case, so th at the order a nd its requ irem ents will be ca se-speci fic. W e sha ll dismiss the p etitio n and rev oke the stay. BACKGROUND Maryland Rule 2-541 authorizes the judges of a Circuit Court to appoint one or more standing masters and to refer cases to those masters. The role of the master, as set forth in Rule 2-541 , is to conduct a hearing in the m atter and make a repo rt to the court that includes the master s findings of fact, conclusions of law, recommendations, and a propo sed ord er or jud gmen t. Rule 2 -541 is a rule that applies genera lly to maste rs. Maryland Rule 11-111, which generally tracks provisions in Maryland Code, § 3-807 of the Cts. & Jud. Proc. Article (CJP), provides greater specificity with respect to the procedures governing exceptions taken to a master s report in Juvenile cases.1 With an excep tion not relevant here, Rule 1 1-111a.2. authorizes a Juv enile Court master to hear any case or m atter assigned by the court. Proceeding s before a master are recorded. CJP § 3-807(b)(2); Rule 11-110a. In keeping with the limited role of the master, both the Rule and the statute specify that the findings, conclusions, and recom mend ations o f the m aster do not con stitute fin al order s or fina l action b y the cou rt. Rule 11-111a.2. and CJP § 3-807(d)(1). Within ten days after the conclusion of a disposition hearing, the master must transmit to the judge the entire file in the case, together with a written report of the master s findings, conclusions, and recommendations. A copy of the report is served on each party to the proceeding. Both CJ P § 3-807 (c)(1) and R ule 11-11 1c. permit an y party to file excep tions to any or all o f the m aster s p ropose d findin gs, con clusion s, recom mend ations, o r order. Rule 11-111c. specifies, however, that [e]xceptions shall be in writing, filed with the clerk w ithin fiv e days af ter the m aster s re port is se rved up on the p arty, and shall sp ecify those items to which the party excepts, and whether the hearing is to be de novo or on the record. (Emphasis added). Those requirements are also set forth, in generally similar langua ge, in the statute. See CJP § 3- 807(c)(1) a nd (2). Bo th the Rule and the statu te permit an excepting party, other than the State in a delinquency case, to elect a hearing de 1 Although CJP § 3-807 appears in the subtitle dealing with children in need of assistance, § 3-8A-04 expressly makes that section applicable to delinquency proceedings as well. 2 novo or one on the record made before the master. Rule 11-111 c. and CJP § 3-8 07(c)(2). 2 Both the Rule and the statute make clear that, whether the hearing is de novo or on the reco rd, the hearing shall be limited to those matters to which exceptions have been taken. (Em phasis a dded). See Rule 11-111c. and CJP § 3-807(c)(4). As noted, all of those requirements that exceptions specify whether the hearing before the court is to be de novo or on the record, that, in either event, they specify the issues to which the aggrieved party excepts, and tha t the hearing, whether de novo or on the record, is limited to those matters to which exceptions have b een taken are imp osed by State law and a re Statewide in application, The Circuit Court for Baltimore City is the largest and busiest of the State s 24 Circuit Courts. In FY 2006, it had over 63,500 total filings, including more than 24,500 crimina l cases, 1 7,400 c ivil case s, 11,70 0 fam ily cases, an d 9,700 juvenile cases. Included in the juvenile filings were over 7,100 delinquency cases. The court s 9,700 juvenile filings were almost double the number in the next largest courts, and the 7,100 delinquency filings also far exceeded the number in any other county. During FY 2006, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City conducted more than 83,000 juvenile hearings, which represents more than 50% of the total number of juvenile hearings held throughout the 2 If the State is the excepting party in a delinquency case, the hearing before the court is on the record before the master, although the judge may permit the record to be supplemented b y additional evidence that the judge c onsiders relevant and to w hich there is no ob jection. See CJP § 3-807 (c)(3) an d Rule 11-11 1c. 3 State. Maryland Rules 16-101 and 16-202 charge the Administrative Judge of each Circuit Court with overall responsibility for the management of the court. Rule 16101d.2.(ii), for example, makes the Administrative Judge responsible for the supervision and expeditious disposition of cases filed in the court and the control of the trial calendar and other calendars. Rule 16-202a. requires the Administrative Judge to supervise the assignme nt of action s for trial to ac hieve the ef ficient use o f available ju dicial person nel and to bring pending actions to trial and dispose of them as expeditiously as feasible. Rule 16-101d.3. permits the Administrative Judge to delegate to other judges any of those administrative responsibilities, duties, and functions. In order to manage the court s heavy docket, the Administrative Judge of the Circuit Court for Ba ltimore City, acting pursuant to those and other Rules and the c ourt s case man agemen t plan adop ted pursua nt to Rule 1 6-202b., cre ated division s of the cou rt, designated judges to head those divisions, and delegated some administrative responsibilities to those judges. The Juvenile Division of the court consists of three judges, including a Judge-in-Charge, and ten masters. The masters conduct most of the hearings. Under the court s case management system, the juvenile docket is distributed evenly among eight of the masters, each of whom handle approximately 2,700 cases a year. A ninth master conducts emergency arraignments and shelter care hearings, and the tenth presides over an ov erflow trial court. In FY 20 06, the juvenile masters in B altimore 4 City conducted over 28,000 hearings in delinquency cases. Judge Hargadon was designated as the Judge-in-Charge of the Juvenile Division and, as such, was charged, among other responsibilities, with establish[ing] policies and procedures for the day-to-day operation of the juvenile court subject to the approval of the administrative judge and provid[ing] administrative guidance to the deputy clerk, helping with day-to-day procedural issues. In addition to those administrative duties, the Judge-in-Charge also provides back-up assistance to the presiding juvenile court judges, who conduct hearings of all kind, including both de novo and on-the-record hearings on exceptions to reports from masters. In FY 2006, the judges conducted over 11,000 hearings in delinquency cases. In the furthe rance of h is administrativ e duties as Ju dge-in-C harge of th e Juvenile Division and in further implementation of Maryland Rule 11-111 and CJP § 3-807, Judge Hargad on, after co nferring w ith one or m ore of his c olleagues o n the court, representatives from the State s Attorney s Office, the Public Defender s Office, the Legal Aid Bureau, and the Department of Social Services, and other interested persons and grou ps, develop ed a form order that, on Novem ber 11, 200 6, he directed the clerk to enter routinely in each case in which exceptions had been noted to a master s report. That order, which the Public Defender asks this Court to vacate, provides as follows: An Exception having been filed from a Recommendation of a Master in the abov e-captione d matter, it is, purs uant to Maryland Rule 11-111 and Md. Code Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 35 807, OR DER ED that: 1. The Court m ay, upon motion of a p arty or sua sponte, dismiss the ex ception if the exception does not sta te with spec ificity: a. The items to which the party takes exception; and b. Whether the exc eption hearing is to be hea rd on the record or de novo. 2. If the party filing an exception requests a hearing on the record, and unless the presiding judge or the Judge-inCharge orders otherwise: a. That party shall, no later than 10 days from the date of this ORDER, file a memorandum which: i. Specifies any finding of fact and conclusion of law to which that party is taking exception; and ii. Specifies the reason(s) as to why the Master s recommended finding of fact(s) or conclusion(s) of law is in error; and b. Any other party to the hearing shall file a responsive memorandum no later than 10 days after the filing of the excepting party s memorandum; 3. Pursuant to Md. Code Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-807(c) and Maryland Rule 11-111(c), if the party filing an exception requests a hearing de novo: a. Any evidence presented shall be limited to the specific issues raised in the exception; and b. The Court may rely upon the evidence 6 recorded before the master for any matters to which an exception was not raised. 4. In addition to the delivery of copies of the exception and the memorandum to all parties, the party filing an exception or memorandum shall deliver a copy of the exception and the memorandum to the presiding judge, or if a judge has not been designated, to the Judge-in-Charge. 5. A transcript of the proceedings before the master need not be prepared prior to the hearing on the exception unless the Court so orders. 6. Any issue not specifically set forth in the exception and the accompanying memorandum is waived unless the Court finds there was good cause for not specifying the issue. Although, as noted, Judge Hargadon conferred with a number of interested persons and grou ps, including one or m ore of his ju dicial colleag ues, in deve loping the o rder, it does not appear that the order was ever formally or officially adopted or blessed by the Circuit Court as such, or even by a majority of its members. By reason of his instruction to the Deputy Clerk, however, a copy of the order, once signed by either Judge Hargadon o r another judge in the Juv enile Division, is entered routinely in every exceptions case. In he r petition , the P ublic De fend er co mplains that t he order is unnecess ary, burdensome, illegal, and u nconstitutional and that the directive tha t it be filed in every case constitutes an illegal circuit or local rule in violation of Maryland Rule 1-102" and 7 violates a juvenile s constitutional due p rocess right to have judicial review of a master s findings. More specifically, the Public Defender objects (1) to the requirement that the excepting party file a memorandum within ten days that specifies the finding or conclusion of the master to which the party excepts, which she contends is a burdensome requirement that may delay a hearing on the exceptions, (2) to the provision that any additional evidence to be offered at a de novo hearing w ill be limited to tha t relevant to the issues raised in the exceptions, which she contends effectively eliminates de novo exceptions as an option for the party, and (3) to the prospect of dismissal of the exceptions as a sanction for non-compliance, which she concludes is unauthorized. DISCUSSION In the 231-year history of this Court, following the adoption of our first Constitution in 1776, w e have ha d only three oc casions to o pine in any sign ificant detail on the authority of the Court to issue writs of mandamus or prohibition and the standards for determining when, assuming the authority, such writs might appropriately be issued all withi n the pa st twen ty years. See In re Petition for Writ of Prohibition, 312 Md. 280, 539 A.2 d 664 (19 88); Philip M orris, Inc. v. An geletti, 358 Md. 689 , 752 A.2d 200 (2000); and State v. Manck, 385 Md. 581, 870 A.2d 196 (2005). Although there have been other cases in which the Court was asked to issue such writs and some discussion does appear in some o f those cas es, the princip les presently gov erning bo th authority and propriety 8 come mostly from those three cases, which have taken account of earlier pronouncements. In In re Petition, we set out the framework of analysis. The petition, filed by the State, arose from a criminal action in which, following a jury verdict of guilty, the judge, expressing the view that the verdict was unjust and against the weight of the evidence, ordered a new trial. The State had no right to appeal from that decision, but, arguing that the judge h ad no auth ority to grant a ne w trial on tha t ground, as ked that w e issue a w rit of ma ndam us or pr ohibitio n and v acate th e order . The fi rst ques tion wa s whe ther the C ourt ha d any aut hority to iss ue such a writ. We be gan by n oting an d conf irming t hat this C ourt has only app ellate juri sdiction . In Re Petition for Writ of Prohibition, 312 Md. 280 , 293, 539 A.2d 6 64, 670 (1988). 3 Writs of mandamus and prohibition, however, are common law writs that invoke the original jurisdiction of a court, and, until our decision in that case, it was not at all clear whethe r, or in w hat circu mstanc es, this C ourt ha d any juris diction t o issue s uch a w rit. See id., at 295-9 8, 539 A .2d at 67 1-72. After som e review o f the historica l developm ent of the w rits and earlier c ases in this Court, we declared that we had long recognized the availability of writs such as 3 There are some limite d exceptio ns to that prec ept, but they are e xpressly set forth in the Constitution. Article II, § 6, for exam ple, provides original jurisdiction in the Co urt to resolve disputes arising from the alleged physical or mental disability of the Governor or Lieuten ant Gov ernor. Article III, § 5 provid es original jurisd iction to review contests over legislative redistricting. 9 mandamu s or prohibition, in aid of our appellate jurisdiction, even if we have almost never exercised the power to issue them. Id. at 297. 5 39 A.2 d at 672 . (Emp hasis ad ded). The question posed was what was meant by in aid of appellate jurisdiction whether there had to be an appeal or an appealable judgment before this Court could issue such a writ. An examination of case law around the country convinced us that mandamus or prohibition may issue in aid of appellate jurisdiction even though no appellate proceeding is pending in the appellate court, at least where there is some potentiality of eventual appellate review by appeal or by certiorari. Id. at 302- 03, 539 A.2d a t 675. Having anchored the authority to issue such a writ in the preservation or aid of the Court s ap pellate jurisdictio n, we con sidered the c ircumstanc es under w hich those w rits should issue. We n oted that they w ere, indeed, e xtraordinary w rits, to be issued with great caution . We rejecte d the more extreme n otion that the w rits were av ailable only to control actions beyond the jurisdiction of the lower court and concluded that we may issue a prero gative writ if we believ e the interests o f justice requ ire us to do so in order to restrain a low er court from acting in ex cess of its jurisd iction, otherw ise grossly exceeding its authority, or failing to act when it ought to act. Id. at 307, 539 A.2d at 677. Ou r ultimate con clusion in tha t regard w as that [a]n extraordina ry writ is appropriate only when judicial power has been usurped or if there is a clear abuse of discretion. Id. at 327, 539 A.2d at 687. Borrowing from the Supreme Court s notion that mandamus could but hardly ever should issue in situations like the one before us, 10 we dismissed the petition. The second case Philip M orris arose out of a comprehensive class action against the tobacco industry. When the Circuit Court for Baltimore City certified several classes and set forth a three-ph ase trial schedule, the defenda nts petitioned this Court for a writ of mandam us or prohibition that wou ld decertify the class, arguing that the trial court grossly abused its discretion and acted unlawfully in certifying the classes. Building upon In re Petition and some of the much earlier judicial comments cited therein, we observed that while this Court may, and of right ought, for the sake of justice, to interpose in a summa ry way to supply a re medy wh ere, for the w ant of a spe cific one, the re would otherwise be a failure o f justice, it wa s nonethe less well se ttled in this State th at a writ of mandamus will not be granted where the petitioner has a specific and adequate legal remedy to meet the justice of the p articular case and whe re the law affords [a nother] adequate remedy. Philip Morris v. Angeletti, supra, 358 Md. at 712, 752 A.2d at 212, quoting from Runkel v. Winemiller, 4 H. & McH. 429, 449 (Gen. Ct. Oct. Term 1799) and Brack v. W ells, 184 Md. 86, 90 -91, 40 A.2d 31 9, 321 (1944). Philip M orris was truly an extraordinary case. The Court pointed out that [t]he litigation plan approved by the Circuit Court in this case necessarily involves the commitment of such an extraordinary amount of the judicial and other resources of the busiest trial court in the State that any subsequen t appellate review of the low er court s Class Certification Order is rendered inadequate and ineffective. Id. 358 Md. at 714, 11 752 A.2d at 213. It was for that reason that we undertook a review of that Order and found it to b e wholly inap propriate fo r a variety of reas ons. We th erefore issu ed the wr it and vacated the O rder. State v. Manck arose from a death penalty case in which a trial judge struck the State s notice of intention to seek the death penalty in the belief that, because the indictment failed to allege that the defendant was a principal in the first degree in the murde r of the v ictim, it w as legall y insuffic ient to ch arge a c apital pu nishm ent crim e. The State had no rig ht to appea l from that ru ling, which effectively pre cluded the State from seeking the death penalty, but filed a petition for mandamus, prohibition, or other appropriate relief asking that we direct the judge to vacate his order. Even though, in a later case, we concluded that the basis for the judge s ruling was wholly erroneous4 a belief expressed as well in the dissent in Manck we de nied the w rit on the grou nd that it would n ot have be en in aid of our appe llate jurisdiction b ecause the State had n o right to appeal. Harking back to the holding in Philip M orris that these ex traordinary w rits will not be granted where the petitioner has a specific and adequate legal remedy to meet the justice of the particular case, a critical factor in this case is that the very issues presented in the petition filed by the Public Defender are currently pending in the Court of Special Appe als in tw o cases , In re Marcus J., Sept. Term 2006, No. 2503, and In re Ma rtel R., 4 See Eva ns v. State, 389 Md. 456 , 886 A.2d 562 (2005). 12 Sept. Term 2006, N o. 2502. B oth of thos e appeals a re from the dismissal of exception s to a master s report, pursuant to an order in the form dev ised by Judge Hargad on, for failure to comply w ith the order. B oth of thos e appeals w ere filed by the P ublic Def ender in Decembe r, 2006, but, curiously, although urging the need for swift and extraordinary action by this Court to correct what the Public Defender views as a gross injustice arising from Judge Hargadon s order, the Public Defender, in direct contradiction to a representation made to this Court in her motion to stay Judge Hargadon s order, has agreed to a very substantial delay in the processing of the two pending appeals.5 The Public Defender, on behalf of her two juvenile clients, may raise and have 5 The records of the Court of Special Appeals show that the appeal in In re Marcus J. was noted December 14, 2006, and that the record was transmitted to the Court of Special Appeals on January 30, 2007. Ordinarily, the appellant s brief would be due within 40 days after the filing of the record, and the State s brief would be due within 30 days there after. See Marylan d Rule 8-502 (a)(1) an d (2). In conformance with a stipulation signed by the Office of the Public Defender, however, the due date for the filing of appellant s brief has been delayed for nearly ten months, to January 2, 2008, and the case is not set for argument until March, 2008. The same situation pertains in In re Martel R . The appeal was noted December 13, 2006, and the record was received by the Court of Special A ppeals on January 30, 2 007 the s ame day the r ecord w as received in Marcus J. The Public Defender s brief would ordinarily be due 40 days thereafter, yet the Public Defender stipulated to a nearly nine-month delay, to December 3, 2007, thereby delaying argum ent to F ebruar y, 2008. In her motion to stay Judge H argadon s order, filed in this C ourt in Decemb er, 2006, the Public Defender called attention to the two appeals and stated that [t]he Office of the Pu blic Defe nder likely will se ek to expe dite the abo ve-mentio ned two cases in accordance with Maryland Rule 8-207(b). Moreover, the Office of the Public Defender likely will file a pre-judgment Petition for Writ of Certiorari with this Court in accordance with M aryland Rule 8-302(b), in the above -mentione d two cas es. Obv iously, the Public Defender did neither of those things. Once she received her requested stay, the Office affirmatively allowed the two pending appeals to languish. 13 resolved in those two cases every complaint about Judge Hargadon s order that she raises in this action. She may, as she did in the Circuit Court in those cases, argue that the order is an impermissible local rule, and she may argue that it is substantively invalid. If she loses in the Court of Special Appeals, she may, on behalf of her clients, seek certiorari in this Court; indeed, she cou ld have asked this C ourt to bring the two case s directly before us on a by-pass petition for certiorari, as she told us she likely would do. It is thus clear, really beyond cavil, that the normal appellate process is fully available to resolve her complaints. There is simp ly no basis whatever for this C ourt, by issuing extraordinary prerogative writs that w e have co nsistently mainta ined shou ld be issued rarely and only with great caution, to short-cut that process, especially when the Public Defender has acquiesced in substantial delays in the operation of the normal process. This kind of end run around the normal and available appellate process would do nothing to prevent disorder, from a failure of justice, (Runkel v. Winemiller, supra, 4 H. & McH. at 449; Doering v. Fader, 316 M d. 351, 361 , 558 A.2d 733, 738 (1989); In re Petition, supra, 312 Md. at 30 7, 539 A.2d at 67 8), but would, instead, prom ote such disorder. PETITIO N DISM ISSED A ND ST AY RE VOK ED; CO STS TO BE PA ID BY PETITIONER. 14

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