Attorney Grievance v. McCulloch
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket (Subtitle AG) No. 82 September Term, 2005 ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. CAROL LONG McCULLOCH Bell, C.J. Raker *Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene JJ. Opinion by Bell, C.J. Filed: March 19, 2007 *Wilner, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conferen cing of this case while an active member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Cons titution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion. Bar counsel, acting on behalf, and with the approval, of the petitioner, the Attorney Grievance Comm ission of M aryland, filed in th is Court, pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751,1 a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action charging the respondent, Carol Long McCulloch, with violations of various of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, as adopted by Maryland Rule 16-812, namely, Rules 1.1, Competence,2 1.2, Scope of Representation,3 1.3, Diligence,4 1.4, Communication,5 1.5, Fees,6 1.15, Safekeeping 1 Maryland Rule 16-751, as relevant, provides: (a) Commencement of disciplinary or remedial action. (1) Upon approva l of Com mission. U pon app roval or direc tion of the C ommissio n, Bar Co unsel shall file a Pe tition fo r Discip linary or R emed ial Actio n in the C ourt of Appe als. 2 Rule 1.1 provides: A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and prepar ation rea sonab ly necessa ry for the r eprese ntation. 3 Rule 1.2 p rovides, as re levant: (a) Subject to paragraph s (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client s decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and, when appropriate, shall consult with the c lient as to the means by which they are to be pursu ed. A law yer may take suc h action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client s decision whether to settle a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client s decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the c lient will testif y. 4 Pursuant to that Rule [a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promp tness in r eprese nting a c lient. 5 Rule 1.4, as pertinent, provides: (a) A law yer shall: * * * * (2) keep [a] client reasonably informed about the status of [a] matter; [and] (3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information. Property, 7 1.16, Declining or Terminating Representation,8 8.1, Bar Admission and * * * * (b) A law yer shall explain a matter to the extent reaso nably necessa ry to permit th e client to make inform ed dec isions re gardin g the rep resenta tion. 6 Rule 1.5 p rovides, as re levant: (a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreason able fee or an unreas onable am ount for ex penses. Th e factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the lega l serv ice p rope rly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the natu re and leng th of the pro fessional rela tionship w ith the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) w hether th e fee is f ixed or conting ent. 7 Maryland R ule 1.15 pro vides, in pertin ent part: (a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained pursuant to Title 16, Ch apter 600 o f the Ma ryland Rules. O ther proper ty shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and of other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years after termination of the representation. (b) A lawyer may deposit the lawyer's own funds in a client trust account for the sole purpose of paying bank service charges on that account, but only in an amount necessary for the purpose. 2 Disciplinary Matters,9 8.4, Misco nduct, 10 and Maryland Rule 16-604, Trust Account- (c) Unless the client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, to a different arrangement, a lawyer shall deposit into a client trust account legal fees and expenses that have been paid in advance, to be withdrawn by the lawyer o nly as fee s are ear ned or e xpens es incu rred. 8 As relevant, Rule 1.16 provides: * * * * (d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client s interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent p ermitted by other la w. 9 Pertinently, Rule 8.1 provides: An ap plicant for ad mission or re instatemen t to the bar, or a la wyer in connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary ma tter, shall not: * * * * (b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful d ema nd for inform ation from an ad miss ions or disciplinar y auth ority, except that this Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protecte d by Rul e 1.6. 10 Rule 8.4, as relevant, provides: It is professio nal miscon duct for a la wyer to: * * * * (b) com mit a crim inal a ct tha t refl ects adverse ly on the la wyer s ho nesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; (d) engage in con duct that is prejudicial to the administration of ju stice[.] * * * * 3 Required Deposits.11 The petition also alleged that the respondent violated Maryland Code (2004, 2006 Cum . Sup p.) § § 10-304 , Deposi t of tr ust m oney,12 and 10-306, Misuse of trust mon ey, 13 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article.14 We referred the case, pursuan t to Rules 16-752 (a), 15 to the Hon orable Thomas F. 11 Maryland Rule 16-604 provides: Except as otherwise permitted by rule or other law, all funds, including cash, received and accepted by an attorney or law firm in this State from a client or third person to be delivered in whole or in part to a client or third person, unless received as payment of fees owed the attorney by the client or in reimbu rsement fo r expense s properly adv anced on behalf of the client, shall be deposited in an attorney trust account in an approved financial institution. This Rule does not apply to an instrument received by an attorney or law firm that is made payable solely to a client or third person and is tra nsmitte d directl y to the clie nt or third person . 12 Maryland Code (2004, 2006 Cum. Supp.) § 10-304 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article provides: (a) General requirement. Except as provided in subsectio n (b) of this section, a lawyer expeditiously shall deposit trust money into an attorney trust accoun t. (b) Exceptions - Direction of court. Subsection (a) of this section does not apply if th ere is a cou rt ord er to the c ontrary. (c) Same - Real estate transaction. Notwiths tanding su bsection (a) o f this section or any other law, a lawyer may disburse, at settlement in a real estate tra nsactio n, trust m oney tha t the law yer receiv es in the transac tion. 13 Section 10-306 proscribes a lawyer s use [of] trust money for any purpose other than the purpo se for w hich the trust mo ney is entr usted to the law yer. 14 Initially, the respondent was not charged with any violations related to her trust account; they were added by petitioner, without objection, several months after the initial petition wa s filed. Subs equently, the pe titioner aband oned the a llegations relate d to Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.5. 15 Rule 16-752 (a) provides: (a) Order. Upon the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, the Court of Appeals may enter an order designating a judge of any circuit court to hear the action and the clerk responsible for maintaining the 4 Stansfield, of the Circuit Court fo r Carroll County, for hearing p ursuant to Rule 16-7 57 (c). 16 After a hearing, at w hich the resp ondent ap peared an d participated , the court found th e following facts by clear and convincing evidence. The resp ondent w as retaine d by Jeffrey A. Con nelly, the comp lainant, to repre sent him in his pending divorce action. The retaine r agreeme nt provided for the resp ondent to b e paid at the rate of $180.00 an hour for her services and an initial retainer of $2,500.00, against which the respondent s hourly rate billing would be charged. The complainant paid the retainer by check. On the same day she received the retainer check, the respondent deposited that check in her operating account, even though not all of the retainer had then been earned. Sub sequ ently, beginning about two weeks after the retainer was paid, the complainant began a series of e-mails to the respondent, urging her to move forward on his case. Despite these e-mail urgings, it was not until July 16, 2004, about a month later, that the respondent informed the complainant that the docume nts required to file his divorce action record. The order of designation shall require the judge, after consultation with Bar Counsel and the attorney, to enter a scheduling order defining the extent of discovery and setting dates for the completion of discovery, filing of motions, and hearing. 16 Maryland Rule 16-757 (c) provides: (c) Findings and conclusions. The judg e shall prepa re and file o r dictate into the record a statement of the judge's findings of fact, including findings as to any evidence regarding remedial action, and con clusions of law. If dictated into the record, the statement shall be promptly transcribed. Unless the time is extended by the Court of Appeals, the written or transcribed statement shall be filed with the clerk responsible for the record no later than 45 days after the conclusion of the hearing. The clerk shall mail a copy of the statement to each party. 5 were in prog ress. [17] Thereafter, by e-mail dated August 5, 2004, the complainant discharged the respon dent, indicatin g that he w ould seek other counsel and requesting a complete refund to be paid to him by August 12, 2004. Despite sending the complainant a letter, dated the same day, August 5, containing copies of a letter and the original Complaint she had prepared and a bill sho wing a cr edit of $ 1,4 74.00 du e the com plainant, sans check, on August 7, 2004, the respondent sent the complainant an e-mail in which she asked that he reconsider his decision to discharge her. Other than an inconclusive exchange of e-mails - the complainant stating his desperate need for the refund and the respondent conceding that he w ould be be tter off with someone who would give him the same consideration he had given her - almost three months passed before there was any other communication with the respondent with respect to the case.18 17 It was disputed whether the delay in commencing work on the complainant s case was due to inattention, a s the comp lainant allege d, or to the co mplainan t s failure to provide all of the information necessary to prepare the pleadings, as the respondent alleged. The respondent also contended that, in a telephone conversation, the complain ant asked h er to delay filing p leadings pe nding rece ipt of a prop osal from his wife s counsel. Resolving the conflict, the hearing court observed: Respondent quite correctly points out that the Complainant did not testify in this m atter, nor was a d epositio n from him ad mitted in eviden ce. Accordingly, the only evidence we have concerning the conversations between the C omplainant and R espondent during this time frame are provided by the testimony of the Respondent, who contends there was an absence of complete information from which she could have moved forward with his case. 18 The complainant purported to send the respondent an e-mail dated October 22, 2004, advising the Respondent that he had reconsidered his decision to terminate her services an d asking h er to continu e her repres entation of him, and f urther stating th at if she did no t wish to do so, the rema ining balan ce of his reta iner with he r was to be sent to 6 The complainant filed his complaint with the petitioner, which complaint bar counsel forwarded, by letter da ted No vemb er 1, 200 4, to the respondent, with the request that she respond to it within 15 days. The respondent did not respond to that letter or to the two subsequent letters, one sent by certified mail, made necessary by that f ailure, until March 30, 2005. By that time, in addition to the bar counsel letters just mentioned, the complainant had written directly to the respondent, seeking a refund of the $1,474.00 the respondent had advised him he was due, and bar counsel had written yet another letter to the respon dent, this time, in addition, se eking cop ies of her trus t account and her client cards. When the respondent responded, she also included with her response to the complain t an amen ded bill for the client. According to that bill, the credit due the complainant was $880.00, some $594.00 less than reflected on the prior bill. The respondent refunded that amount to the complainant directly f rom he r trust acc ount, after she settled an unrelated personal injury case, as to which she received a fee of $960.00. The respondent s operating account balance in June 2004 was a negative one, and it remained a negative balance at the time a refund of at least E ight Hu ndred E ighty Do llars ($8 80.00) was cle arly due th e Com plainan t. From the foregoing facts, the hearing court concluded, by clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent violated Rules 1.4 (a) (3), 1.15 (a), 1.16 (d), 8.4 (b), (c) and (d) of the Rules o f Professio nal Cond uct, Rule 16-604 and §§ 10-304 and 10-306 of the Business him at her soonest convenience. In the amended petition, the petitioner conceded that the complainant sent this e-mail to his own e-mail address and respondent did not receive it, at least not at that time. 7 Occupations and Professions Article. The Rule 1.4 (a ) (3) and the Rule 8.1 (b ) violations rela te to the respondent s failure to respon d, to bar couns el and to the com plainan t. While its conclusion with respect to bar counsel and Rule 8.1 is clear and straight-forward, the hearing court explained, as to the complainant s reques t and Rule 1.4 (a) (3): [T]he gravamen of [bar counsel s] contention is that if the e-mail w ere included with a letter of November 1, 2004, which the Respondent admitted she had not read, and even after becoming aware of it on December 1, 2004, did not respond to it, the Rule re quires som e type of respo nse whe n a client asks that you either continue the representation and presumably actively pursue the matter for which the attorney had be en eng aged, o r refun d the reta iner. The Court believes that there is an inherent requirement in this Rule that such a response b e reasonab ly prompt. W hile facts and circumstances may justify days or even weeks in respondin g, certainly the length of time involved here is sufficient to find a violation of this Rule by clear and convin cing ev idence . With regard to the Rules 1.15 and 16-604 and § 10-304 violations, it was clear to the hearing court that the respondent received the retainer, deposited the unearned portion in her operating account rather than her escrow account and, [c]ompounding the problem, did not provide an explanation for not timely depositing it in escrow. In addition, the hearing court observed that a review of the Respondent s bank records clearly indicates that she commingled the Complainan t s unearned retainer with her own funds, and she exhausted the same prior to having performed the work she promised to do for him. It did not find credible, and therefore rejected, the resp ondent s explanation for not depositing the retainer in her escrow account, to verify that the check [was] good, p resumab ly before she w ould continu e to perf orm w ork on behalf of the C ompla inant. 8 Acknowledging that the respondent eventually refunded the unearned fee, the hearing court concluded that Rule 1.16 (d) was violated nonetheless when she did not do so pr omp tly. Addressing the discrepancy between the two bills that the respondent generated, each showing a different credit due the complainant, the court said: Although the difference in the two statements provided to the Complainant and the difference between the credit balance amounts could raise a question of why there was a revision of the bill or how some item was n ot included in calculating the credit balance due the Complainant, we are left with the fact that the Respondent testified concerning problems obtaining bookkeeping and assistance services during that period of time and explained the error that resulted in this change. Further, the Complainant accepted the check sent by the Respondent in the low er amoun t, presumab ly in full payment o f his refund . With regard to the Rule 8.4 violations and the § 10-306 violation, the he aring court concluded: There is no questio n that the R esponde nt, after having deposited the Complainant s retainer into her operatin g acco unt, spe nt it. She clearly had to secure funds from another matter some six (6) months later in order to have sufficient funds from which to send a refund to the Complainant. There is no other inference to be drawn from the evidence other than the Respondent spent the fun ds imp roperly fo r person al purp oses. On the other hand, it rejected the petitioner s argument that the respondent had committed theft, explaining: There was a dispute as to the amount of the refund due until the Complainant accepted the refund check tendered by Respondent. While the Court feels that these rules and sta tutes [sic] have been violated by clear and convincing evidence, the Court does not find that these action s resulted fro m the requ isite crimina l intent to constitu te Thef t. The hearing court also commented on issues in the Respondent s testimony, as 9 follows: In the first place, she testified that essentially she had trouble engaging adequate or any assistance with the bookkeeping functions in her office, and was further plagued with extensive problems surrounding the death of her friend, who also fun ctioned as an investigator. Tragically, it appears that that death occurred under very suspicious circumstances, and while we are not privileged to the criminal nature of these circumstances, the bottom line is that the Court finds n o evidenc e to dispute th e Respo ndent s testim ony in this regard. However, the practice of law, especially in the Family Law area, most often requires an attorney to prioritize the needs of the various clien ts in order to attend to all m atters related to all of the clients in the attor ney s pra ctice. That is very demanding at times and is often easier said than d one, but errors in time frames for response, refunds, or other matters of this type, certainly should not be allowe d to drift into th e excessive time fram e outlined in this case, not only for the efficient handling of clients matters, but also for the proper functioning of a law practice. While there may be considerations of the mitigating factors in this case by the Court of Appeals, this Court does not see any of the arguments advanced by the Respondent in her proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as sufficient to rise to the level that the Findings of this Co urt made by clear and convincing evidence are corr ect. Neither the petitioner nor the respondent took exceptions to the findings and conclusions of the hearing court. The petitioner, however, did file Petitioner s Exceptions to Findings of Fact and Recommendation for Sanction, in which it recommended that the respondent be disbarred. It relies on Attorney Grievance C omm n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 773 A.2 d 463 (20 01); Attorney G rievance C omm n v. Blum, 373 Md. 275, 818 A.2d 219 (2003); Attorney G rievance C omm n v. Duva ll, 384 Md. 234, 863 A.2d 291 (2004); Attorney G rievance C omm n v. Roberts , 394 Md. 137 , 904 A.2d 557 (2006). In Vanderlinde, we reiterated and reem phasized th e well settled p rinciple that Misappropriation of funds by an attorney is an act infected with deceit and dishonesty and ordin arily will result in disbarment in the absence of 10 compelling extenuating circumstances justifying a lesser sanction. Vanderlinde, 364 M d. at 406 , 773 A .2d at 48 0, quoting Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Bakas, 323 Md. 395, 403, 593 A.2d 1087, 1091 (1991), which, in turn, cited Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Ezrin , 312 Md. 603, 608-09, 541 A.2d 966, 969 (1988). We then state d, em phatically: Ac cord ingly, we reiterate once again the position we announced in Kenney. Moreover, we expound upon it by holding that, in cases of intentional dish onesty, misappropriation cases, fraud, stealing, serious criminal conduct and the like, we will not accept, as compelling extenuating circumstances, anything less than the most serious and utterly debilitating mental or physical health conditions, arising from any source that is the root cause of the misconduct and that also result in an attorney's utter inab ility to conform h is or her conduct in accordance with the law and with the MRPC. Only if the circumstances are that compelling, will we even consider imposing less than the mos t severe sanct ion o f disbarm ent in case s of s tealing, d isho nesty, fraudulent conduct, the intentional misappropriation of funds or other serious crimina l condu ct, whe ther occ urring in the prac tice of la w, or o therwi se. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. at 413-14, 773 A.2d at 485. Underlying the rule is the recognition that [u]nlike matters relating to compe tency, diligence and the like, intentional dishonest conduct is closely entwined with the most important matters of basic character to such a degree as to make intentional dishonest conduct by a lawyer almost beyond excuse. Id. at 418, 7 73 A.2d at 488. T hus, Vanderlinde and its prog eny make c lear that [d]is barment ordinarily should be the sanction for intentional dishonest conduct. Id. See Attorney Grievance Com m'n v. Pennington, 387 Md. 565, 597, 876 A.2 d 642, 66 1 (2005); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Lane, 367 M d. 633, 6 46, 790 A.2d 6 21, 628 (2002 ). In Vanderlinde, the respondent attorney, as she freely acknowledged, had on many 11 occasions over a period of time [] misappropriated m oney of the Association [ her employer] for her own use. 364 Md. at 381, 773 A.2d at 466. Therefore, there simply was no issue of the intention with which she acted; she offered only mitigation, the pressures of her life and the impairment of her mental faculties, including her periods of depression, id., hoping thereby to moderate the sanction. This C ourt reje cted tha t mitigatio n. Id. at 414-15, 773 A. 2d at 485-86. Blum was found to have violated, in the representation of several clients, numerous Rules and Rules of Professional Conduct, including , inter alia, Rule 8.4 (c), and statutes including § 10-306, involving client funds and misrepresentation. Among the misconduct sanctioned were the d eposit of un earned reta iners in his operating account, the use of those unearned fees before they were earned and the failure to return the unearned portion of a fee to a client. There were n o mitiga ting fac ts offer ed or fo und. 373 Md. at 304, 818 A.2d at 236. In summarizing the basis for the disbarment sanction, the Court said: Blum refused to return M s. Dianat's money to he r when sh e terminated his representation, and then altered a check, which he provided to her new attor ney, in order to create the illusion that he had paid her. Blum also took funds that clients had given to him in anticipation of future services and deposited such fun ds into his pe rsonal and opera ting accounts for his own benefit, before he had earned those funds. Behavior such as this, in and of itself, in the absence o f mitigating c ircumstanc es, ordinarily wa rrants disbarment. 373 M d. at 303 , 818 A .2d at 23 6. In Duvall, the respondent attorney had been found by the hearing court to have committed multiple viola tions of the R ules of Pro fessional C onduct, inc luding failing to 12 account for the unearned portion o f a retainer, fa iling, despite be ing reques ted to do so to refund that unearned portion to the client and using those funds, which constituted trust funds, for a purpose other than that for which it was entrusted to the responde nt, and previously had been disciplined. 384 Md. at 241, 863 A.2d 2 95. We determined that disbarme nt was the appropriate sanction an d, so, ordered her disbarm ent. The petitioner argues, emphasizing the hearing court s factual findings and conclusions, especially that Respondent s conduct violated Rule 8.4 (c), and the absence of any finding o f extenua ting circum stances, that Vanderlinde and its progeny control the disposition of this case. It submits: The most serious aspect of this matter is that Respondent violated her fiduciary responsibility to Complainant by spending funds tha t were give n to her in trust for her personal purposes at a time when those funds were the property of the c lient. As a result of her dishonesty, she did not have funds available to give the complainant which her own billings stated she owed him. Disba rment is the app ropriate sanctio n for th is misco nduct. Maintaining that there have bee n no com pelling exten uating circu mstances shown in this case - in fact, the hearing court went to great pains to make that point - , and, although conceding that the con duct sub judice is less egregious than either Blum or Duvall, the petitioner emphasizes nevertheless the seriousness of the respondent s violations, urging that that alone warrants disbarment. It adds and reiterates: Respondent abused the trust the client had placed in her by spending money that belonged to him on herself. She compounded this wrongdoing by refusing to refund Complainant the money she admitted she owed him for almost eight months after his first request for a refund, an d by f ailing to answer Bar Coun sel s req uest fo r inform ation ab out this m atter for almost f ive mo nths. 13 As we hav e seen, the re sponden t did not take any exception s. In fact, she e xpressly conceded that, although she did not agree with all of the find ings mad e by the hearin g court, none of the findings was clearly erroneous. Moreover, the respondent was not reluctant to admit that she did two very wrong things and that [she] expect[ed] there to be consequences for those wrong things that [she] did. One of those wrong things that she did and wh ich she read ily admitted was depositing into her operating account a retainer check when not all of the amount represented by the check had not been earned. Nor did she offer any excuses or try to explain those wrong things away. To be sure, the respondent indicated that she had reasons for what she did, but she made clear that they were not, nor inten ded to be, excuses. Rather than merely accept a sanction, which she said she was tempted to do, the responde nt, professing a desire to continue a 28 year career representing people in such matters as domestic violence, n otwithstand ing the stresso rs involved , asks the C ourt to impose a sanction other than disbarment. Noting that the Peer Review Committee recommended dismissal, which she believes to be insufficient, and finding a distinction between her misconduct and that in the cases on which the petitioner relies, she believes that something short of disbarment, although she would not be more specific, is appropriate. We are inclined to the view of the resp ondent w ith regard to the sanction. In urging the hearing court to find that the respon dent vio lated R ule 8.4 (b), (c) and (d), the petitioner argued that because misapp ropriation of funds he ld in escrow constitutes the crime of 14 Theft , the respondent committed the crime of theft. Although the hearing court found that the responde nt s condu ct did violate each of the subsections of Rule 8.4 charged and even referred to the respondent s spending of the unearned portion of the retainer as basic misapp ropriatio n, it very clearly and emphatically found that these actions [did not] result[] from the requisite criminal intent to constitute Theft. The petitioner interprets the hearing court s affirmation that the rules and statute had been violated by clear and convincing evidence to be dispositive of the sanction, it being a finding that the conduct was dishonest and deceitful. The respondent takes the opposite position, maintaining that her argument of lack of inten t carried the day. The finding is at best ambiguous, indicating tha t, at the least, the hearing court had some do ubt as to the level of the respo ndent s culpability. Disbarment should not rest on such a finding. Moreover, as indicated, the respondent has shown remorse: she expressly did not except to the findings or conclusions of the hearing court and, indeed, conceded their adeq uacy. She also accepted responsibility for the misconduct and did not seek to minimize or otherwise avoid consequences that might flow from it. We have recognized that [f]rom the responde nt's remorse..., that a repeat of th e miscond uct was u nlikely, admittedly not mentioned, could have been inferred. Attorney Grievance Comm 'n v. Kova cic, 389 Md. 233, 239, 884 A.2d 673, 676 (2005 ). Fina lly, the resp ondent h as no prior grie vance hi story. Bearing in mind the purpose of attorney discipline, which we have stated repeatedly, to protect the public and not to punish the errin g attorn ey, see Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. 15 Rees, 396 M d. 248, 254 , 913 A.2d 68, 72 (20 06); Atto rney G rievance Com m'n v. Wallace, 368 Md. 277, 289 , 793 A.2d 535 , 542 (2002); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Hamby, 322 Md. 606, 611, 589 A.2d 53, 56 (1991); Attorney Grievance C omm'n v. M yers, 302 Md. 571, 580, 490 A.2 d 231, 23 6 (1985); Atto rney G rievance Com m'n v. Lockhart, 285 Md. 586, 597, 403 A.2d 1241, 12 47 (1979 ), we are satisf ied that susp ending the responde nt indefinitely is the app ropriate sanctio n. IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-761, FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY G R IE V A N C E COMMISSION AGAINST CAROL LONG McCULLOCH. 16
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