Lanzaron v. Anne Arundel County

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Lanzaron v. Anne Arundel County, Maryland, et al., No. 22, September Term 2007 HEADNOTE: Where the Anne Arundel County Code, in Article 3, authorizes the Board of Appeals generally to grant variances from any of the provisions of the zoning code (Article 28), and in Article 3 lists specific provisions to which the Board may not grant variances, the application of that power in granting a time variance is a lawful exercise of the Board s authority unless Article 3 prohibited such a grant. In the case at bar neither Article 3 nor Article 28 prohibited the grant of the time variances at issue here. Circuit Co urt for Anne A rundel Co unty Case No. C-06-111902 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 22 September Term 2007 Antho ny Lanz aron, et u x. v. Anne A rundel Co unty, Maryland , et al. Bell, C. J. Raker Harrell Battaglia Greene Wilner, Alan M. (Retired, specially assigned) Cathell, Dale R. (Retired, specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by Cathell, J. Filed: November 9, 2007 Crandell Cove, Inc. ( appellee ), a n on-profit co rporation o rganized to construct a residential facility for the elde rly in Anne Arundel County, applied for and received a special exception and va riances enablin g it to con struct a n ursing h ome. A subsection of Article 28 of the Ann e Arund el County Code req uired the sp ecial excep tion and va riances to be utilized within specific time frames. As a result of difficulties encountered complying with the time limitations and pursuant to a broad reading of Article 3 of the Anne Arundel County Code authorizing the granting of variances from the p rovisions of the zoning article (Article 28), appellee requested a time variance permitting a one-year extension to implement the use authorized by the special exception and variances or obtain a building permit, and an additional one and o ne-half years to complete the fac ility and ha ve it fully o peration al. That request was initially granted by Anne Arundel County s Administrative Hearing Officer (the Hearing Officer ). The Lanzarons ( appellants ), who are neighboring landowners, appealed the Hearing Officer s approval to the Anne A rundel Co unty Board of Appeals (the Board ), which issued a written decision that upheld the Hearing Officer s action and granted appellee s time variance.1 Appellants then filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel Cou nty, w hich affi rmed the deci sion of th e Bo ard. F inall y, appellants noted an a ppeal to the Court of Special A ppeals. Before th e case was heard by that Court, we issued a w rit of cer tiorari, on our ow n initiativ e, Lanzaron v. Anne Arundel County , 399 Md. 32, 922 A.2d 573 (2007), in respect to the following issue: 1 In this appeal we are only concerned with the Board s grant of the time variance. Did the Anne Arundel County Code in effect at the relevant time authorize the Board to extend by variance the Code s deadline for project implementation and completion under Crandell Cove s previously authorized variances and special exception? We hold that the variance pow er at issue in this case authorized the Board to issue time variances, and that under the language used here, the general variance p ower fo und in Article 3 reaches all provisions in Article 28 of the Anne Arundel County Code (the Zoning Code) except where the general power is restricted by specific language limiting the general variance powe r. I. Facts Appellee sought to c onstruct a co ngregate liv ing facility 2 in Anne Arundel County on property that was sp lit zoned R 1-Reside ntial District and OS-O pen Spa ce District. On February 25, 2003, appellee obtained from Anne Arundel County initial zoning approva l in addition to a special exc eption and certain variances th at would allow for the development of a suitable living facility on a portion of the land. These initial approvals were appealed by appellants, but those appeals were ultimately dismissed by the Board on September 11, 2003. That decision became final after 30 days, when no petition for judicial review of the initial approvals was filed. 2 The phrase congregate living facility was used by appellee in its b rief to refer to a living facility that: [W]ould provide affordable housing, and a modest level of assistance with daily activities, for elderly adults who are no longer able to live alone o r maintain th eir home s. -2- As a result of difficulties in obtaining the necessary permits for construction under multi-tiered County and State require ments, app ellee was u nable to comply w ith the statutory time restriction applicable to the original zoning variances found in Article 28, requiring that a building permit be obtained within one year of the variance grant, and that construction be completed within two years of the grant. 3 Additionally, it was unable to comply with the statutory time restrictions applicable to the original sp ecial excep tion, which required that action to implem ent the use be initiated within one year of approval and that the use be completed and in operation within tw o years of app roval. 4 Therefore, on September 10, 2004 (allowing for tolling, within one year of the date the initial appro vals became final after the 3 The zoning provision, found in Article 28 of the Anne Arundel County Code (the Code ) (unless otherwise stated, all references are to the Code in effect at the time) stated, in relevant p art: § 11-102.2. Lapse of variance. (a) Except as provide d in subsections (b) and (c ) of this se ction, a variance granted under the provisions of this article shall become void unless a building pe rmit confo rming to plans for w hich the va riance wa s granted is obtained within one year of the grant and construction is completed within two years of th e grant. Anne Arundel County Code (1985, 2004 Supp.), Article 28, § 11-102.2. 4 That sectio n of the C ode states, in re levant part: 12-107. Rescission. (a) Except as provide d in subsection (b) or subsection (c) of th is section, approval of a special exception is rescinded by operation of law if: (1) action to implement the use is not begun within one year after the decision of the approving authority; and (2) the use is not completed and in operation within two years after the decisio n. Anne Arundel County Code (1985, 2002 Supp.), Article 28, § 12-107. The provisions relating to the Board of Appeal s power to grant variances and special excep tions are found in Artic le 3, infra, of the County Code. -3- Board dismissed appellants initial appeal to the Board), appellee requested a time variance to extend the expirations of its variances and special exception under the original zoning approvals. Appellants objected to the variances of the time restrictions and a hearing was held before the Administrative Hearing Officer of Anne Arunde l County on December 9, 2004. The Hearing Officer ultimately granted the time variance,5 and that decision was appealed by the appellants to the Board of Appeals. Accordingly, a hearing was held on June 29-30, 2005. Th ere, appellan ts raised seve ral issues, includ ing the auth ority of the Bo ard to grant such variances, the timeliness of the request for the time variances, and whether the appellees met the statutory standards set forth in the Code to grant such a variance. The local imple mentation of M d. Code (1957 , 2005 Repl. Vo l.), Article 25A, § 5 s grant of genera l authority to gran t variances is f ound in A rticle 3, § 2-10 7 of the County Code. It state s, in relevant p art: § 2-107. Standards for granting variance. (a) The Coun ty Board of Appe als may vary or modify the provisions of Article 28 [the Zoning Code] of this Code when it is alleged that practical difficulties or unnec essary hardsh ips preven t carrying out the strict letter of that article, provided the spirit of law shall be observed, public safety secured, and su bstantia l justice d one. (A lteration added .) Anne Arundel County Code (1985, 2004 Supp.), Article 3, § 2-107. 5 App aren tly, Anne Arundel County consistently considered the time restriction to be subject to the general variance power. At oral argument, we were advised that more than 130 similar time variances have been granted since 1995. -4- On Januar y 11, 200 6, the Board issued a well-reasoned decision granting the time variance. It considered the statutory factors found in A rticle 3, § 2-10 7 of the C ode in granting the time variance, and made appropriate findings of fact. Those findings of fact are not at issue in this case. The Board made no findings as to whether it had the au thority to grant th e varian ce. While not determ inative in the in stant case, the C ounty Council has since clarified its future intent whether time variances may be granted by the Board, by code amendment enacted in May 2005. The new provision states: § 18-1 6-405 . Time period after which variances and special exceptions are void. (a) Expiration by operation of law. A variance or special exception that is not extended or tolled expires by operation of law unless the applicant within 18 months of the granting of the variance or special exception (1) obtains a building permit or (2) files an application for subdivision. Thereafter, the variance or special exception shall not expire so long as (1) construction proceeds in accordance w ith the perm it or (2) a record plat is recorded among the land records pursuant to the application for subdivision, the applicant obtains a building permit within one year after recordation of the plat, and con struction pro ceeds in ac cordance with the pe rmit. (b) Extension for phasing or other good cause. In deciding an application for a special exception use, the Administrative Hearing Officer may extend the time periods set forth in subsection (a) for the use and any variance granted in c onnection with it when the application includes a phasing plan or sets forth facts that demonstrate other good cause why the time periods set forth in su bsection (a) r easonab ly cannot be m et. (c) Extension by variance. An applicant may file an application for a variance to extend the tim e periods set forth in subsection (a). -5- (d) Tolling. The pendency of litigation may toll the time periods set forth in subsec tion (a) to the exte nt prov ided by la w. Anne Arundel County Code (2005), Article 18, § 18-16-405.6 On February 7, 2006, appellants filed a petition for judicial review challenging the Board s decision. Anne Arunde l County and appellee res ponded to the petition on February 14, 2006, and February 24 , 2006, resp ectively. Oral arg uments w ere heard in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County on October 11, 2006. There, the review was prim arily centered on the issue that is presently before this Court, i.e., whether the Board had the authority to grant the time variances to the expiration periods of the special exception and variances g ranted at the tim e of the orig inal zoning approva l. An order affirming the Board s decision was issued on October 12, 2006, by the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. On November 2, 2006, appellants noted an appeal to the Court o f Special Appeals. Before the case was heard, this Court issued a writ of certiorari on May 9, 2007. 6 Appellants argue in their brief that this subsequent action taken by the County Counc il, in specifically gra nting the B oard the po wer to gra nt time variances, implies that such a power did not exist prior to the Code s modification in 2005. While in light of our decision, it is not necessary to directly resolve this issue, we note that the Co unty Council s actions in 2005 could also be interpreted mer ely as a belt and suspenders approach clarifying the issue that, a s a result of th is case, was then pend ing in the co urts and is presently before us. -6- II. Standard of Review As stated ab ove, appellants contend th at the Boa rd of Ap peals had n o authority to grant the time variance, and as such, their administrative decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law. In re viewing a n agency de cision, this Co urt has stated: [A] reviewing court may always determine whether the administrative agency made an error of law. Therefore, ordinarily, the court reviewing a final decision of an adm inistrative agen cy shall determ ine (1) the leg ality of the decision and (2) whether there was substantial evidence from the record as a whole to supp ort the d ecision . Baltimore Lutheran High School Ass n, Inc. v. Employment Sec. Admin., 302 Md. 649, 662, 490 A.2 d 701, 70 8 (1985). M ore recently, w e have state d that: A court s role is limited to determin ing if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency s findings an d conclus ions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclu sion of law. United Parcel Service, Inc. v. People s Counsel, 336 Md. 569, 577, 650 A.2d 226, 230 (1994). See, e.g., Evans v. Burruss, __ Md. __ (2007) (No. 1, September Term, 2007) (filed Octob er 12, 20 07), Watkins v. Sec y, Dep t of P ub. Safety & Corr. Serv s, 377 Md. 34, 46, 831 A.2d 1079, 1 086 (2 003), Catonsville Nursing Home, Inc. v. Loveman, 349 Md. 560, 568, 709 A.2d 749, 753 (1998), Younk ers v. Prince George s County , 333 Md. 14, 19, 633 A.2d 861, 86 3 (199 3). -7- III. Discussion As indicated, the power to grant variances is set forth in the Anne Arundel County Code, Article 3, § 2 -107, wh ich specifica lly states: The C ounty Board of App eals may vary or modify the provisions of Article 28 of this Code . . . . Appellan ts contend that the power to issue variances to the provisions of Article 28, enumerated in Article 3 o f the Code, is limited by the m ore specific provisions f ound in Article 28. More specifically, they argue that certain Article 28 subsections where time limitations are discussed,7 serve as evidence of the leg islative intent to limit by time the entire 7 Those exceptions are as follows: (b) With respect to a varianc e for a sub station, the app roving au thority may, for good cause shown, extend the time periods set forth in subsection (a) of this section by up to two and one-half years each. (c) In years in which wet season percolation testing is suspended or otherwise delayed, a variance granted on properties restricted to wet season testing shall becom e void unle ss a building permit con forming to plans for which the variance is granted is issued within one year of the completion of the first available wet season percolation test and con struction is co mpleted w ithin two year s of the issuanc e of the buildin g perm it. Anne Arundel County Code (1985, 2004 Supp.), Article 28, § 11-102.2. (b) A special exception f or a clay and borrow pit or sand and gravel operation is rescinded by operation of law if action to implement the use is not begun within one year after approval of all necessary permits, but no later than two years from the date of the granting of the special exception, unless the applicant has diligently pu rsued all permits and not received them despite due diligence. (c) With respect to a special exception for a substation, the approving authority may, for goo d cause sh own, ex tend the time periods set f orth in subsections (a)(1) and (2) of this section by up to tw o and one-half years each. Anne Arundel County Code (1985, 2002 Supp.), Article 28, § 12-107. -8- variance and special exception provisions. Appellants further contend that the general language found in the special exception and variance provisions also tend to establish the legislative intent to limit the variance power of those provisions. Appellants also argue that other specific time exceptions in the Code mean that the general variance power cannot be otherwise exercised to modify the time requirements.8 Their arguments dealing with specific exceptions to the variance and special exception provisions found in other subsections misconstrues the legislative intent behind those subsections, in addition to misconstruing the mean ing of th e plain la nguag e foun d in Ar ticle 3 tha t grants th e gene ral varia nce po wer. In Rose v. Fox Pool Corp., we stated: When called upon to construe a particular statute, we b egin our an alysis with the statutory language itself since the words of the statute, construed according to their ordinary and natural import, are the primary source and most persuasive evidence of legislative intent. 335 Md. 351, 359 , 643 A.2d 906 , 909 (1994) (citing Comptroller v. Jameson, 332 Md. 723, 732, 633 A .2d 93, 97-98 (1993)). It is clear that there is nothing in the plain language of Article 3 that limits the ability of the Board to grant the time variances at issue in the case at bar. In the instant c ase, there is also nothing in the language of the time p rovisions of Article 28 to indicate that they were enacted to evidence an intent on the part of the Coun ty Council to furth er limit an already ex pressed genera l powe r to gran t varianc es. 8 As indicated in our opinion in the instant case, the application of the general power to grant v ariance s may (or m ay not) ap ply to these provisio ns as w ell. We do n ot, however, resolve such issues because they are not before us in this case. -9- To find the legislative intent put forth by appellants would require this Court to go beyond the plain lang uage of th e general v ariance po wer of th e statute. This is inconsistent with the general rules of statutory construction. When the language of a statute is plain and clear and expresses a meaning consistent with the statute s apparent purpose, no further analysis of legislativ e intent is ordina rily require d. Rose v. Fox Pool Corp., 335 Md. at 359, 643 A.2d at 910 (citing Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515, 525 A.2d 628, 633 (1987)). The language of the variance power granted to the Board by Article 3, § 2-107(a) clearly states that it applies to the provisions of Article 28. That means that it applies to all of the provisions of Article 28, excep t as prov ided in A rticle 3. That variance pow er, contained in Article 3, clearly states in subsectio n (d) to which provisions of Article 28 it does not apply, and the provisions at issue in the case at bar are not among those listed.9 Accordingly, Article 3 applies to all of the provisions o f Article 28 unless a sec tion states spe cifically that such section may not be modified by the use of the general variance provision. As the variances and special exception for which appellee seeks to obtain time variances are in Article 28 and nowh ere in either Article 28 or in Article 3 is there any express statement that variances of the time requirement may not be granted, the plain language of Article 3 is clear. 9 That exception states, in relevant part: (d) This section does not apply to Title 1B, § 15-104.1 , or to the prov isions of A rticle 28 of this Code that are applicable to development in the Odenton Growth Management Area. Anne Arundel County Code (1985, 2004 Supp.), Article 3, § 2-107(d ). -10- In Alviani v. Dixon, 365 Md. 95, 775 A.2d 1234 (2001), while upholding a variance granted in that case, we noted a section of the general variance provisions of the Anne Arundel County Code that pointed out a specific exception, supra, of the kind that could trump the genera l variance provisions. In Article 3, § 2-107, where the general variance power is found, the re is a specific subsection that provides, as we stated in Alviani, (d) This section [§ 2-10 7] d oes not ap ply to Title 1B, § 15-104A of Article 28 of this Code. Alviani, 365 Md. at 111, 774 A.2d at 1243. In order for the time limitations urged by ap pellants to be applied in th e instant case , to be that type of specific exception that would immunize the time requirements from the general variance provisions, similar language and placement would norm ally be requ ired. It sim ply does not exist under the language, placement and circumstances of the present case. We held in Alviani: The Code grants the Board the authority to grant variances from sections within the code, except for the titles and sections enumerated in section 2107(d) aforesaid. The local legislative body clearly kn ew that it co uld excep t certain parts of the Code from the application of the variance provisions. [This] section . . . was n ot one o f the sec tions tha t was ex cepted . Alviani, 365 Md. at 111, 775 A.2d at 1243 . The legisla tive body clearly kn ew how to create exceptions and whe re to put them , i.e., n ormally in the same sections where the general variance power was created Article 3, § 2-107. The time r equireme nts at issue in the case at bar are simply not exceptions to the general variance provisions of Article 28. Add ition ally, we have long held that when a zoning decision has been made authorizing a particular action, which, by statute, must be taken by a certain time, that time, -11- generall y, does not b egin (or con tinue) to run during a period in which opponents or other governmental agencies (o r even in some cases circumstances) have created conditions, such as permitting p rocesses, ap peals or oth er litigation, that block the taking of the particular action. We said in Nutter v. City of Baltimore, 230 Md. 6, 15-16, 185 A.2d 360, 364-65 (1962), that: The language of Sec. 44 leaves little doubt, in our view, that the period of limitations for both the obtention of a building permit or a certificate of occupancy and the exercise of the rights and privileges approv ed by the Board and gran ted by the perm it or certificate runs from the date of the final action which allowed the valid issuance of the permit or certificate, either by the Zoning Commissioner if there was no appeal to the Board, or by approval of issuance by the Board, if the re is no appeal to the City Court, or by that Court if there is no a ppeal to this C ourt, or by th is Court if the final action is here. . . . We agree with Judge Foster that Sec. 35 (g) 3 of the ordinance, which gives power to the Board upon ap peal in specific cases to vary the terms of the ordinance, authorizes the granting, in proper cases, of extensions of time for the exercis e of priv ileges p reviou sly officia lly granted by the Bo ard. (Emp hasis ad ded.) Other states have similarly held. In Belfer v. Bldg. Comm r, 363 Mass. 439, 444-45 (1973), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, held: We conclude that the relief f rom time lim itations given in cases . . . where a legal impe diment ex ists to the use of a benefit, should also be given where an appeal from the granting of the variance creates equally real practical impedim ents to the use of a benefit. Otherwise a variance which was law fully awarded can be frustrated by the delay inherent in an appeal. Unless an appeal tolls the tim e period , many va riances would be me aningle ss. The Supreme C ourt of Rhode Island, in Tantimonaco v. Zoning Bd., 102 R.I. 594, 599-600, 232 A.2d 385, 388 (1967), stated: -12- The petitioners [oppon ents] argue that on this record it is clear that the subsequent decision of the board . . . is illegal and should be quashed. In support thereof they make several contention s, one of w hich is so clea rly without merit as to be disposed of at once. It is, that by the terms of the Johnston ordinance, a building permit expires if not acted u pon with in six months. No work having been done within the six mo nths . . . , they contend it was automatically vacated or revoked. [P]etitioners challenged the validity of that permit by seeking a review of the board s decision with the filing of their petition for certiorari . . . . Although the filing of such a petition does not act as a stay . . . common prudence understan dably acts as a brake against incurring obligations, the benefits of which would be cancelled by an adverse decision of this court. Apart from the question as it may be affected by a change in the zoning regulations, we think it clear that the requirement of activating a permit set forth in an ordinance does not apply during such time as the legality of a permit is open to question by reason of litigati on am ountin g to an a ppeal f rom the issuanc e thereo f. Compare French v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning, 658 A.2d 102 3 (D.C. 1995) (co urt construed a statute s language as specifically prohibiting a stay of enforcem ent) and Go ld v. Kamin , 170 Ill.App.3d 312, 524 N.E.2d 625 (1988) (court noted that the time had expired because no stay or extension was sought du ring the initial time period). Nutter v. City of Baltimore, supra, is a case that is even more relevant to the granting of time variances than indicated above. While the holding in that case was specific to the Baltimore City Code, we find its reasoning to be instructive in this case. There, various citizens objected to the construction of an apartment house in B altimore City. Amon g their several arguments, they contended that: [T]he Board [of Appea ls] has no righ t or powe r to extend the effective life of its approval of a variance or special exception, which it has -13- previously approv ed, beyon d the six month s period . . . . 10 Nutter, 230 Md. at 9, 185 A.2d at 361. In that case, the variance power gave the Board the power: to authorize upon appeal in specific cases such variance from the terms of this Article as is n ecessary to avo id arbitrariness and so tha t the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed and substantial justice done. Nutter, 230 Md. at 13, 185 A.2d at 363. The trial court, which was later affirmed by this Court sta ted, in relevan t part: In my opinion th e Board, in this case, had the power to vary the terms of the ordinan ce by granting the time extensions as it did. . . . Common knowledge and expe rience disclo ses it is frequen tly impossible to c omplete a ll steps necessary in the development of a large building project within the restricted period of time. I cannot believe it was the intention of the framers of the ordinance to impose impossible conditions on builders or fetter the Board with an arbitrary and unchangeab le time limitation which the B oard would be without power to extend in any case. * * * G reat difficulty co uld only result from a hard and fast rule denying the Board power to act as it has and which power the Board has been exercising for many years. Many cases have shown that Maryland adheres to the doctrine that long established practice and procedures on the part of administrative agencies are not to be disregarded except fo r the most compe lling urgent reasons. Quoted in Nutter, 230 Md. at 13-14, 185 A.2d at 363-64. We stated in Nutter that: [W]e think that Judge Foster s reasoning and conclusions were essentially sound. Nutter, 230 Md. a t 14, 185 A.2d a t 364. Nutter was affirmed and has never been overruled. 10 The statute involved in Nutter provided : [T]he permit shall be obtained and the privilege granted thereunder shall be exercised . . . within twelve months . . . . and that permits obtained by a special exception or variance shall be exerc ised by the grantee therein named within six months from the date of the final actio n which made the permit valid. Nutter, 230 Md. at 12, 185 A.2d at 363. This language, in relevant p art, is essentially the same as the provisions in the present case. -14- The general variance power contained in Article 3 is not specifically limited by the time provisions at issue, and we therefore see no significant difference in the variance power granted to the Board in Nutter and the variance power granted to the Board in the case currently before us. Both variance powers, i.e., Anne Arundel County and the City of Baltimore at the time of Nutter, apply to the provisions of their respective Articles without any limitation to which provisions these variance powers may apply (except as stated in Article 3 ). Anothe r state, in a similar c ase dealing with time v ariances, he ld that: The power of the Board to vary or modify the application of any of the regulations or provisions with respect to construction includes the pow er to vary provisions relating not only to the manner of construction, but the time of constru ction. Scarpati v. Feriola, 8 A.D.2d 111, 116 (N.Y. App. Div. 1959). There, the Court held that the grant of power to modify any provision in the zoning code applied to time extensions because the time requirements were in the zon ing cod e. Id. at 116-17 . While in that case, the variance power specifically applied to any of the provisions of the zoning ordinance, there is no limiting langu age in the A nne Aru ndel Cou nty Code va riance prov ision to indica te that there are a ny sections in A rticle 28 to which the variance power does not apply except for tho se spec ifically enu merate d in Ar ticle 3, § 2 -107(d ), supra. Turning again to the general language of the variance requirements, we find no ambiguity in the provisio ns. Article 28, § 11-102.2(a) provides that: [A] variance granted under the provisions of this article shall become void . . . (emp hasis adde d). Appe llants -15- argue that in choosing the word shall the governing legislative body, i.e., the Anne Arundel County Council ( Coun ty Council ), ev idenced a n intent to limit th e powe r to vary this provision. With regard to the special exception provision, found in Article 28, § 12-107, appellants make the same contention with regard to the phrase approval of a special exception is rescinded by operation of law . . . . We disagree with appellants interpretation. The use o f sh all a nd rescinde d by o pera tion of la w imply only that under ce rtain circumstances not applicable here a variance is to be voided and a spe cial exceptio n is to be rescinded if there is no further action on the part of any party to extend the time. Under such a circumstance, no no tice of the expiration would be required . But this auto matic voiding and rescission can be avoided by timely invocation of the general variance provision found in Artic le 3, supra, which allows for the variance o f any of the p rovisions of Article 28, which n ecessarily includes the time limitation p rovisions. T his is what was done here.11 Fina lly, we take note of the fact that Anne Arundel County has issued more than 130 time extension variances since 1995. We reiterate the language of the Nutter Court, when it stated: Great difficulty could only result from a hard and fast ru le denying the Board power to act as it has and which power the Board has been exercising for many years. Many cases have shown that Maryland adheres to the doctrine that long 11 In their brief, appellants have stated several canons of construction that instruct the court to apply specific provisions over general provisions, where the two conflict. As we have just demon strated, however, there is no co nflict betw een the ge neral and sp ecific provisions at issue h ere. Article 3 authorized a variance of any of the provisions of Article 28. The tim e limitations w ere found in Article 28 . Thus there is no conf lict. -16- established practice and procedures on the part of administrative agen cies are not to b e disreg arded e xcept f or the m ost com pelling u rgent re asons . . . . Nutter, 230 M d. at 14, 185 A.2d at 36 4. We see no reason to disregard the long-sta nding practice in this case, wherein the Hearing Officer and Board of Appea ls, acting with in their auth ority, granted a time variance under the general provisions of the ordinance that was supported with sound reasoning and in compliance with the provisions set forth in the Anne Arundel County Code. Further, as noted by the Board of Appeals, a great deal of work has gone into this project. The New York court in Scarpati took specific note of the demonstration of the great difficulties im posed in c arrying out the tim e condition s when it stated: Any result other than the one recommended would be harsh, inequitable and unjust. . . . During that period construction . . . was processed to completion at a cost of ap proximate ly $750,000. A lending institution has given a mortgage for ov er $700,000, which the Federal Housing Administration has insured . All of the 61 a partments a vailable for sale in this co-operative apartmen t house ha ve been s old. App roximately 62% of the members of the co-ope rative ar e vetera ns. The prem ises are now complete ly occupied. Scarpati, 8 A.D.2d at 1 16. W e tak e note of similar ef forts by appellee in the instant case, when the Board in their Memorandum Opinion stated: We are surprised that the Petition er was ab le to accomplish as much as it did because of the uniqueness of the property, the extensive review and approval process, and the legislative issues that the Petitioner had to overcome. The Petitioner has only had approxim ately four years to w ork on this project, but yet has jum ped thr ough h oops to get this f ar. -17- IV. Conclusion A plain-language re ading of the statute, in addition to traditional rules of statutory construction, clearly authorize d the Boa rd to grant a time variance. Therefore, we hold that the variance powe r granted to the Board in Article 3, § 2-107 authorized it to issue time variances of the provisions of Article 28, § 11-102.2 and § 12-107. JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS T O B E P A I D BY APPELLANTS. -18-

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