Attorney Grievance v. Lawson

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Attorney Grievance Commission v. Jeffrey Lawson, Misc. Docket, AG No. 15, September Term 2006. [Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules 1.4 (a) (Communication), 1.5 (Fees), 1.15 (Safekeeping Property), 1.16 (d) (Declining or Terminating Representation), 8.4 (c) and (d) (Misconduct); Maryland Rules 16-604 (Trust Account Required Deposits) and 16-609 (Prohibited Transactions); held: Respondent violated MRPC 8.4 (c) and (d) by attempting to renegotiate his fee agreement during the course of representation under threat of withdraw al. Respon dent violated MRP C 1.4 (a) by fa iling to respon d to his client s s pecific questions regarding the case and not informing his client of an upcoming hearing date or the results of the hearing. Respondent violated MRPC 1.5 and 1.16 (d) by charging unreason able fees and refusing to promptly refund unearned fees upon termination of representation. Respondent violated MR PC 1.15 , Maryland R ule 16-60 4, and M aryland Rule 16-609 by failing to deposit unearned fees into his attorney trust account upon receipt of those funds. Fo r these violatio ns, Respo ndent sha ll be indefinite ly suspended from the practice of law w ith the right to reapply for admission after on e year.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket AG No. 15 September Term, 2006 ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. JEFFREY LAWSON Bell, C.J. Raker Harrell Battaglia Greene Wilner, Alan M. (retired, specially assigned) Cathell, Dale R. (retired, specially assigned), JJ. Opinio n by Batta glia, J. Filed: October 11, 2007 The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland ( Petitioner ), acting through Bar Counsel and pursuant to M aryland Rule 16-751 (a), 1 filed a petition for disciplinary or remedial action against Respondent, Jeffrey Lawson on June 7, 2006. Bar Counsel alleged that Responden t violated Maryland Ru les of Professiona l Cond uct ( M RPC ), 1.3 (Diligence), 2 1.4 (Comm unication), 3 1 Maryland Rule 16-751 (a) provides: (a) Commencemen t of disciplinary or remedial action. (1) Upon approval of [the Attorney Grievance] Commission. Upon approval or direction of the [Attorney Grievance] Commission, Bar Counse l shall file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals. 2 Rule 1.3 provides: A lawyer shall ac t with reaso nable diligence and promptn ess in representing a client. 3 Rule 1.4 provides: (a) A law yer shall: (1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client s informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0 (f), is required by these Rules; (2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter; (3) promp tly comply with reasonable requests for information; and (4) consult w ith the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer s conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Maryland Lawyers Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the exten t reasonably necessary to permit the client to mak e informed decisions regarding the representation. 1.5 (Fees), 4 1.15 (Safekeepin g Property), 5 4 Rule 1.5 p rovides in p ertinent part: (a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perfo rm the legal serv ice p rope rly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular e mploymen t will preclude other employment of the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) wheth er the fee is f ixed or con tingent. (b) The scop e of the rep resentation a nd the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for whic h the client w ill be respons ible shall be commu nicated to the client, pref erably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, except when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same b asis or ra te. Any chan ges in the ba sis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the client. 5 Rule 1.15 provides in relevant pa rt: (a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer s possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer s own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained pursuant to Title 16, Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules. Other property shall be identified as such (contin ued...) 2 1.16 (Declining or T erminating Represe ntation),6 and 8.4 (Miscon duct), 7 as well as 5 (...continued) and appropriate ly safeguarde d. Comp lete records of such account funds and of other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years after termination of the representation. *** (d) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreem ent with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, sha ll promptly render a ful l accounting rega rding suc h pro perty. (e) When in the course of representation a law yer is in possession of property in which two or more persons (one of whom may be the law yer) claim interests , the property sha ll be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. The lawyer shall promptly distribute all portions of the property as to whic h the inte rests are not in d ispute. 6 Rule 1.16 states in pertine nt part: (d) Upon termina tion of r eprese ntation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client s interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrend ering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law. 7 Rule 8.4 p rovides in re levant part: It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (contin ued...) 3 Maryland Rule 16 -603 (Duty to Main tain Account), 8 Maryland Rule 16-604 (Trust Account -- Re quired Deposits), 9 7 (...continued) (a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers Rules of Professional Condu ct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another; *** (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice . . . . 8 Maryland Rule 16-603 provides: An attorney or the attorney s law firm shall maintain one or more attorney trust accounts for the deposit of funds received from any source for the intended benefit of clients or third persons. The account or accounts shall be maintained in this State, in the District o f Colum bia, or in a state c ontiguou s to this State, and shall be with an approved financial institution. Unless an attorney maintains such an account, or is a member of or employed by a law firm that maintains such an account, an attorney may n ot receiv e and acce pt fu nds a s an a ttorn ey from any source intended in w hole or in part for the benefit of a client or third person. 9 Maryland Rule 16-604 states: Except as otherw ise permitted by rule or other law, all funds, including cash, received and accepted by an attorney or law firm in this State from a client or third p erson to be delivered in whole or in part to a client or third person, unless received as payment of fees owed the attorney by the clien t or in reimbursement for expenses properly advanced on behalf of the client, shall be deposited in an attorney trust account in an (contin ued...) 4 and Maryland R ule 16-609 (Prohib ited Transactions). 10 In accordance w ith Maryland Rules 16 -752 (a) and 16-75 7 (c), 11 we referred the petition to Judge Robe rt E. Cahill, Jr. of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County for an evidentiary hearing and to make findings of fact and conclusion s of law. Ju dge Cah ill held 9 (...continued) approved financial institution. This Rule does not apply to an instrument received by an attorney or law firm that is made payable solely to a client or third person and is transmitted directly to the client or third person. 10 Maryland Rule 16-609 states: An attorney or law firm may not bo rrow or pledge any funds required by these Rules to be deposited in an attorn ey trust account, obtain any remuneration from the financial institution for depositing a ny funds in th e accoun t, or use any funds for any unauthorized purpose. An instrument drawn on an attorney trust account may not be d rawn payable to cash o r to bearer. 11 Maryland Rule 16-752 (a) states: (a) Order. Upon the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, the Court of Appeals may enter an order designating a judge of any circuit court to hear the action and the clerk responsible for ma intaining the record. The order of designation shall require the judge, after consultation with Bar Counsel and the attorney, to enter a scheduling order defining the extent of discovery and setting dates for the completion of discovery, filing of motions, and hearing. Maryland R ule 16-75 7 (c) states in p ertinent part: (c) Findings and conclusions. The judge shall prepare and file or dictate into the record a statement of the judge s findings of fact, including findings as to any evidence regarding remedial action, and conclusions of law. 5 a hearing on January 31, 2007 and issued Findings of Fact and Conclus ions of L aw on A pril 19, 2007, in which he found by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent had violated MRPC 1.4 (a), 1.5, 1.15, and 8.4 and Maryland Rules 16-604 and 16-609: FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW BACKGROUND On February 8, 2006, the Court of Appeals of Maryland transmitted this matter to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County for the purpose of conducting a hearin g pursu ant to M aryland R ule 16- 757. E dward Smith, J r., Esquire, entered his appearance for the Respondent on November 21, 2006. Before commencement of the hearing, the Court granted in part the Petitioner s Motion for Sanctions, precluding Respondent from testifying that he had used an attorney trust account to escrow the legal fee that forms part of the subject matter of this action, based on his refusal to disclose information about that accoun t prope rly sought in discovery. The hearing was held on January 31, 2007. CHARGES All of the charges lodged against the Respondent arise from an attorney-client relationship which commenced on April 24, 2005 when Timothy Dean ( Dean ) retained the Respo ndent to represent him in litigation filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Dean and two (2) related corporate entities had b een sued by Dean s b usiness asso ciate, Shedr ic 6 Wallace ( Wallace ), over disag reements concerning their ownership of a restaurant. The Respondent, who had been admitted to practice law in Maryland for some thirteen (13) months before being retained by Dean, accepted a legal fee of $5,000.00 from Dean, and prepared and had Dean sign a written fee agreeme nt on Ap ril 24, 2005 . Respon dent entere d his appearance on behalf of Dean and the two related entities on April 28, 2005. He confirmed in an e-mail to Dean on May 23, 2005 that he would vigorously represent all Defendants in the litigation. He filed a Motion to Dismiss/for Summary Judgment and sent discovery pleadings to Wallace on behalf of Dean and the related entities on May 26, 2005. In late May, he began insisting that he be paid an additional $5,000.00 to represent the two (2) related corporate entities. Dean , on behalf of the other entities, refused. Respondent immedia tely began thre atening to w ithdraw. R esponde nt prepared and sent to Dean, on June 21, 2005, a Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel for the Defendants. Dean filed a pro se opposition to this, based on the fact that he had made a flat fee paymen t to Respo ndent for r epresentatio n through trial. On August 11, 2005 , the Circuit Court ordered that Respondent s appearance be withdrawn. Previous to this Order allowing Respondent to withdraw his appearance on behalf of the Defendants, specifically on July 19, 2005, another attor ney, Edward A. Malone, Esquire, had entered his appearance on behalf of these Defe ndants . Also on July 19, Mr. Malone filed a Counter Complaint on 7 behalf of all Def endants and a Third-Party Complaint. On December 1, 2006 a Settlement Order was filed and the case was dismissed on December 22, 2006, with Dean paying Wallace in excess of $6 5,000.00 to resolve all dispute s. As a result of a complaint letter purportedly authored by Dean on August 8, 2005, dealing primarily with the unreasonableness of the Responden t s fee, and his failure to refund it or any part of it after withdrawing his appearance, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland has charged Lawson with violating certain of Maryland s Rules of Professional Condu ct, as well as procedural Rules governing attorney trust accounts. Specifically, it is alleged that the Respondent has violated the following provisions: Rule 1.3 Diligence A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client. Rule 1.4 Communication (a) A lawyer shall keep a client re asonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information. (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent rea sonably nece ssary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. Rule 1.5 Fees (a) A lawyer s fees shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the fee include the following: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the 8 questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal serv ice p rope rly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the result obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or b y the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the p rofessiona l relationship w ith the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) wheth er the fee is f ixed or con tingent. (b) When the lawyer has not regularly rep resented the client, the basis o r rate of the fee sha ll be comm unicated to the client, pref erably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation. Rule 1.15 Safekeeping P roperty (a) A law yer shall hold pro perty of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer s possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer s own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained pursuant to Title 16, Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules. O ther property shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and of other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years after termination of the representation. (b) Upon receiving funds or other pro perty in which a client or third person has an interest, a lawye r shall promptly notify the 9 client or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by ag reement w ith the client, a law yer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person , shall promp tly render a ful l accounting rega rding suc h pro perty. (c) When in the course of representation a law yer is in possession of property in which both the lawyer and another person claim interests, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until there is an accou nting and s everance of their interests. If a dispute arises concerning their respective interests, the portion in dispute shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. Rule 1.16 Declining or Terminating Representation (d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client s interests, such as giving re asonable n otice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, su rrendering papers an d property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not bee n earne d. The law yer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law. Rule 8.4 Misconduct It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of an other; *** (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. 10 Maryland Rule 16-603 Duty to Maintain Account An attorney or the attorney s law firm shall maintain one or more attorney trust accounts for the deposit of funds received from any source fo r the intende d benefit o f clients or third persons. The acco unt or accounts shall b e maintaine d in this State, in the District of Columbia, or in any state contigu ous to this State, and shall be with an approved financial institution. Unless an attorney maintains such an accou nt, or is a member of or employed by a law firm that maintains such an account, an attorney may not receive and accept funds as an attorney from any source in whole or in part for the benefit of a client or third person. Maryland Rule 16-604 Trust A ccount-R equired Depos it Except as otherwise permitted by rule or other law, all funds, including cash, received and accepted by an attorney or law firm in this State from a client or third p erson to be delivered in whole or in part to a client or third person, unless received as payment of fees owed by the attorney by the client or in reimbursement for expen ses properly advanced on behalf of the client, shall be deposited in an attorney trust account in an approved financial institution. This Rule does not apply to an instrument received by an attorney or law firm that is made payable solely to a client or third person and is transmitted directly to the client or third person. Maryland Rule 16-609 Limited Transaction An attorney or law firm may not borrow or pledge any funds required by these Rules to be deposited in the attorney s trust account, obtain any remuneration from the financial institution for depositing any funds in the account, or use any funds for any unauthorized purpose. An instrument drawn on an attorney trust account may not be d rawn payable to cash o r to bearer. Essentially, in the Petition, the Attorney Grievance Commission charges the Respondent in four (4) discrete areas: 11 First, with regard to the provis ions governing attorn ey diligence, promptness, and failure to pro tect a client s interest upon termination, the Respondent is charged with failing to file a Counterclaim against Wallace; and failure to promptly transmit his office file to his successor counsel, Mr. Malone. Respondent defends by asserting that the Counterclaim could have been and, in fact, was filed by his successor and that, in any event, he was ethically prohibited from filing the Counterclaim. He asserts that he transmitted his office file to his successor in a timely fashion. Second, with regard to the provisions governing communication with a client, the Respondent is charged with failing to inform D ean that the C ircuit Court for Baltimore City had scheduled a hearing on the Mo tion to Dismiss/for Summary Judgment on July 6, 2005 and failing to inform Dean after the hearing that the motion was denied. He is also c harged w ith failure to pro perly commu nicate the terms of the Fee Agreem ent and fa ilure to commu nicate to Dean the reasons for not filing the Counterclaim. Respondent asserts that the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss did not require Dean s attendance, and so there was no n eed to info rm him of the hearing date or the outcome of the hearing . Third, with regard to the cited provisions governing attorney dishonesty, fraud or deceit and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, Respon dent is accused of misleading Dean concerning his plans for 12 charging legal fees in the future. It is alleged, in essence, that the Respondent planned to initially ch arge D ean a $ 5,000.0 0 flat fe e, and then to insist upon additional payments, in the form of separate fees for the representation of the two (2) corporations, at a later date. In th e alternative, it is alleged that the fact that Responden t attempted to change the agreement in the midst of his representation was dishonest and deceitful and amounted to conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. Respondent asserts that the proof does not meet the clear and convincing standard on thee questions. Fourth, with regard to the provisions concerning reasonable attorneys fees and the holding and disposition of those fees after being engaged, the Respondent is charged with charging an unreasonable fee; failing to escrow th e fee befo re it was earned; and failing to segregate and return the fee once he learned that Dean was insisting upon a re fund of all or part of it. Respondent asserts that the amount of the flat fee charged, $5,000.00, was patently not un reasonab le in light of the scope of the initial undertaking; that he never had a duty to escrow or safe-keep the fee payments because they had been earn ed (if com pared to what Respondent would have charged on an hourly basis) by the time the dispute arose; and that the flat fee arrangement was, in any ev ent, perm issible w ithout th e need to place the fee in trust. H e maintains that Respondent had a right to demand additional comp ensatio n. FINDINGS OF FACT 13 Respondent was admitted to the Bar of the Court of Appeals of Maryland on April 1, 2004 . At all times relevant to this mater, he maintained an office for the practice of law in Baltimore County, Maryland. At the inception of the engagement giving rise to this disciplinary action, the Respondent had been practicing law for some thirteen (13) months. He was, at all times relevant hereto a solo practitioner. He testified that he had maintained a law clerk s position w ith Jimmy A . Bell, PC, an Upper Marlboro practitioner, before being admitted to the Bar, and on his Professional Sketch indicates that he was an Associate, Law O ffice o f Jimm y A. Bell, P C, 200 3. On or about April 13, 2005, an action was filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City bearing the caption SHEDRIC WALLACE v. TIMOTHY DEAN and DEAN AND WALLACE INCORPORATED and T. D. BISTRO, INC., Case N o. 24-C-0 5-04165 CN. W allace alleged in his suit that he and Dean formed Dean and Wallace Incorporated for the purpose of owning and operating a restaurant in the Fells Point n eighbo rhood of Ba ltimore C ity. He alleged that Dean had shut him out of the business in early April 2005. He sued Dean and the corporations for breach of contract, interfere nce with prospective advantage, fraud and breac h of fiduc iary duty. The fifth count in the Complaint was a shareholder s derivative action. The theory advanced against T. D. Bistro, Inc. was that when Dean shut Wallace out of the business, he transferred the lease of the restaurant property into the name of T. D. 14 Bistro which Dean solely owned. A jury trial was prayed. While service on th e Defen dants wa s not mad e until April 26, 2005, sometime before A pril 22, 2005 , an attorney w ith whom Dean h ad a prior lawyer-client relationship, Jimmy A. Bell ( Be ll ), received a copy of the Complaint from Dean, or from the attorney for Wallace. Bell determined that he had a possible conflict and could not represent Dean or any of the other defenda nts in the litigation; and would refer the matter to other counsel. Accordingly, Bell arranged a meeting between Dean and the Respondent at Dean s restaurant in B altimore to ac commo date the refe rral. While B ell believed that he could not represent Dean or the entities because of a conflict of interest, he had himself drafted (or had someone else do so at his direction) responsive pleadings to be filed in the Baltimore Cit y litigation, and had charged Dean $2,500.00 to draft these pleadings.1 He brought these with him to the meeting or otherwise delivered them to Respondent just after the meeting. 1 While Bell is not a subject of these disciplinary proceedings, he testified at the hearing . His failure to recognize that there was absolutely a conflict in either he or the Respondent representing a Defendant that is partially owned by the Plaintiff (Dean & Wallace Incorporated was owne d in part by Wallace); his failure to appreciate that ghost writing pleadings in litigation where the lawyer is in a conflict is a violation of Rule 1.7; and his referrals to this litigation as a pimple and a small case were, to be charitable, troubling. 15 At the meeting (or before), Respondent was also given a copy of the Comp laint setting for th the names of all three (3) Defendants. Bell testified, cred ibly, that the Res ponden t knew tha t there were three (3) D efendan ts to be represented at the time of the meeting. He testified , again credibly, that he and the Respondent discussed whether or not there might be a conflict with one attorney representing all three (3) Defendants, but ultimately, the Respondent agreed with Dean that he would represent all three (3) Defendants. Bell testified that he thought a $5,000.00 flat fee for representation of all three (3) Defend ants through trial would be fair, and he so advised the Respondent. He testified that he thought this to be the case because he had already drafted responsive pleadings on behalf of the three (3) Defendants, or in other words, done all the w ork . . . . On April 22, 2005, Respondent wrote a letter to Dean a nd had it hand delivered. In this letter, Respondent acknowledged that he had received a copy of the Com plaint from Bell and h e specifically disc ussed that the Complaint named three parties as Defendants, namely, Dean, Dean and Wallace, Incorporated and T. D. Bistro, Inc. In the letter, Respondent discussed the fact that the case was probably not removable to Federal Court because of the absence of complete diversity as to these D efendan ts. Respon dent ends his letter by asking Dean to please read the enclosed Attorney-Client Fee Agree ment. It is not clear which version of the Fee Agreement was attached 16 to this letter. Ultima tely, on April 24, 2005, Respondent hand delivered another letter to Dean transmitting another iteration of the Attorney-Client Fee Agreement. This Agreement, which was between Lawson Law, LLC and Dean only was signed by Dean on April 24.2 The Court finds by clear and 2 The version of the Agreement that was signed by Dean is part of Plaintiff s Exhibit 1 (attachm ent 1 to Exhibit 1). The version of the April 24, 2005 letter entered in evidence as Defendant s Exhibit 4 is followed by two (2) unsigned versions of the Attorney-Client Agreement w ith signature lines for Dean & Wallace Incorporated and T. D. Bistro, Inc. Ordinarily, the existence of these other iterations of the Agreement would be curious, but not material. Here, if material at all, the word processing changes would tend to support a finding that Respondent knew he was being engag ed to repres ent three (3) s eparate parties before he sent the Fee Agreement to Dean. convincing evidence and beyond any doubt that the Respo ndent knew, be fore April 22, 2005 that there were three (3) individual D efendan ts who had been sued in the Baltimore City litigation and who required representation. The Responden t s testimony at trial that he did not have a copy of the Complaint at the meeting at Dean s restaurant or when he presented the Fee Agreement to Dean was not credible. The Respondent s testimony that he did not know or appreciate that there were thre e (3) individual Defendants who were the subjects of this suit in Baltimore City and who needed representation when he 17 initially set the fee for that representation is not credible.3 3 Respondent was given a copy of the Complaint at or before the first meeting; he wrote to Dean on April 22, 2005 discussing the existence of three (3) individual Defendants; bo th Bell and Dean testified that Responden t s representation of the three (3) Defendants was discussed at the initial meeting; On April 28, 2 005, Res ponden t entered his appearance on behalf of Dean, Wallace and Dean, Incorporated and T. D. Bistro, Inc.; and, he ultimately filed a Motion to Dismiss on behalf of all three (3) entities. While the actual Fee Agreement is between the Respo ndent and Dean o nly, the evidenc e is overwhelming that Responden t knew that there were three (3) Defe ndants to be represented in the Baltim ore City litigation f rom the ve ry beginning o f his involv emen t. The Attorney-Client Fee Agreement itself, that is, the version ultimately signed by Dean on A pril 24, 2005, is somew hat confusing. It was not made less so when Responden t attempted to explain the Agreem ent to Dean in e-mails, or to testify as to what it meant before this Court. In the written Agreement, Respondent agrees that he will represent Dean through trial of your civil cas e in the Circ uit Court fo r Baltimore City filed or to be filed by Shedric Wallace. The Agreement states: 4. NON-REFUNDABLE CHARGEABLE RETAINER. You agree to pay Lawson Law, LLC a fee for legal services in the amount of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) (U.S.D.), in exchange for our agreement to represen t you through trial in this matter. This amount w ill cover a no n-refund able retainer in the amount of Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00) (U.S.D.), with the 18 balance of the fee representing a substantial discount of the anticipated costs of this litigation, which will include, at least, a counter suit against Mr. Wallace. In exchange for this benefit, Lawson Law, LLC will receive a one-third (1/3) of any recovery, up to and inclu ding trial, plus costs. Any unearned portion of the $5,000.00 fee will be refunded to [ sic] although , due to discounted rate you have been charged in lieu of the hourly fee of $250.00 per hour, the amount of legal time require d for your cas e will likely exceed the amou nt your are [sic] required to pay out of pocket and this possibility is not likely under t he circu mstanc es. *** 5. COSTS AND OTHER CHARGES (a) In general - L awson L aw LL C will bill client for additional costs and expenses in performing legal services under this agre emen t . . . . *** 6. DISCHARGE AND WITHDRAWAL You may discharge Lawson Law, LLC at any time. We may withdraw with your consent or for good cause. Good cause includes your breach o f this agreem ent, your refusa l to cooperate with us or to follow our advice on a material matter or any fact or circumstance that would render our continuing representatio n unlaw ful or uneth ical. When our services conclude, all unpaid charges will become due and payable. After our services conclude, we will, upon your request, deliver your file to you along with any funds or property of yours in ou r possession , except to the extent that such property serves to secure payment of some outstanding charge. When you discharge Lawson Law, LLC, you become liable for 19 payment of the hourly rate for all charges in curred to date. This means that if you receive a discount for legal services, your early termination will require you to pay all costs and fees through termination as if you retained Lawson Law, LLC strictly on a n hour ly basis . . . . Ultimate ly, Dean did pay Respondent $5,000.00, in installments of $2,500.00 each, on April 26, 2005 and May 23, 2005. Respondent s testimony as to what the Attorney-Client Fee Agreement meant was as follows: Q. Didn t the fee agreement that you provided to Mr. Dean indicate that you would represent him in the litiga tion through trial? A. That I d rep resent him th rough trial? Q. Yes. A. Yes. Q. And that the fee would be $5,000.00, correct? A. Yes. Q. All right. As of April the 26th, had you represented him throug h trial? A. As of April 26th - Q. - of 2005, when you received the first check, had you represented him through trial? A. Yeah, I received th e first check on April 26 th. It wasn t payable on A pril 26 th, from wha t I rec all. It was payab le in M ay. Q. All right. In May of 2005, had you 20 represented Mr. De an throug h trial? A. No, I had not. Q. Well, then how can you say that you d earn ed th e mo ney? A. Because, as I said in the retainer, that the retainer was a non-refundable, chargeab le retainer - Q. All right. $2,500.00? A. I wasn t finishe d. answer? What about the second Can I finish my As I said in the retainer, the retainer was a non-refundable, chargeable retainer, meaning that the hou rly rate that I wou ld normally charge is the basis for the amount that I charged. That s how I get to the chargeable. If there would be anything that would be due to Mr. Dean as a refund, it would be based on that. I would subtract the amount of work that I did and then give him back anything less than the amount that he was charged. For example, if I did $4,99 9.00 wo rth of work, I would give him back $1.00. Q. Are you finished? A. Yes. Q. All right. Mr. Lawson , did Mr. Dean hire you to work at an hourly rate? 21 A. No. Q. All right. correct? A. No. Q. He hired you with the understanding that you would represent him through trial for $5,000.00 , correct? A. No. Q. Well, then what we re the writings that you were giving him? A. The writing said $5,000.00, costs, and a third. Q. Oka y. But as far as the attorney fees, $5,000.00 was what you agreed to represent h im for for tria l? A. I agreed to represent him for $5,000.00, and a third o f any reco very, and costs. So, if the recovery ended up being $400,000.00, it would be $500,000 [sic] plus one-third of -- Q. That wasn t my que stion. M y question was, did you agree to represent h im through trial for $5,000.00? A. I think I ve an swered th at question. don t know if - Q. Well, I don t believe you have. move on. He hired you for a flat fee, I Let s The Court finds that the Respondent entered into a flat fee 22 arrangement with Dean, which required him to defend Dean, Wallace and Dean Incorporated and T. D. Bistro, Inc., through the conclusion of trial in the Wallace matter, in the Circuit Court for Baltim ore City. This fee also included the preparation of a counter suit ag ainst W allace. The fee for these services was $5,000.00. If there was an affirmative recovery against Wallace, Respondent would be entitled to an additional fee equivalent to one-third (1/3) of the amount of that reco very. In addition, Dean agreed to pay costs as incurred by Respondent including long distance telephone charges, messenger and delivery fees, postage, transcript fees, subpoena fees, etc. The terms Non-Refundable Chargeable Retainer and NonRefund able Retainer used in paragraph 4 of the Agreement are without meaning. It is plain that the flat fee was, in fact, refundable (paragraph 4: Any unearned portion of the $5,000.00 fee w ill be refu nded . . . . ; paragraph 6: After our services conclude, we will, upon your request, deliver . . . any funds or property of yours in our possession . . . . ), and it is equally clear that Respondent failed to place any portion of the $5,000.00 payment into an escrow accou nt. Respondent entered his a ppearanc e on beha lf of all three (3) Defend ants on Ap ril 28, 20 05. On May 23 , 2005, the Respondent e-mailed Dean stating: As we discussed on the issue of conflict of 23 interest in the litigation b y Mr. Walla ce, each party sued could hav e indepen dent coun sel. This would be particularly true if Dean and Wallace, Inc. sued in proper capacity. It should be a Plaintiff along with Mr. Wallace. However, as Mr. Wallace has listed Dean and Wallace, Inc. as a Defend ant and as you have con sented to representation by Lawson Law, LLC of all Defend ants at this time, such should satisfy the Rules. In time, it may be wise to bring in othe r counsel. We will monitor the events as they unfo ld. I do want to continue to represent T. D. Bistro, Inc./Timothy Dean Bistro. As you know, I will vigorously represent all Defendants in the interim. Please do not retain separate counsel without first discussing it with me and seeking my input. Such is not necessary at this time. On May 24, 2005, Respondent informed Dean, for the first time, that he would require that retainers be signed for Dean and Wallace, Incorporated and T. D. Bistro, Inc. This was done by e-mail and the Respondent use the word retaine r to me an writ ten agre emen t. On May 26, 2005, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss/for Summary Judgement/Statement of Grounds and Authorities and a Discovery Notice (certifying that he had sent Interrogatories, a Request for Production of Docum ents and a Request for Admission of Facts and Genuineness of Docum ents to Wallace s attorney) in the Circuit Court action. The Motion was filed on behalf of all three (3) Defendants; the discovery pleadings on behalf of Dean and Wallace Incorporated only. On May 31, 2005, Respondent 24 e-mailed Dean again and informed him that he would require an additional $2,500.00 fee for representation of Dean and Wallace, Incorporated, and yet an additional $2,500.00 fee for the representation of T. D. Bistro, Inc.4 On the same day, Dean returne d the Respond ent s e-mail rejecting any further 4 Attached to this communication was a form of hourly billing summary which Respondent asserted established that he had spent $12,750.00 in time on the matter during the preceding month, if his time was billed at a rate of $250.00 per hour (Petition er s Exhib it 1, Tab 1, E x. 3). It is unclear how Respondent could have run up $12,750 .00 in fees, p rincipally to put tog ether a mo tion that, appare ntly, had alread y been prepa red and b illed for by M r. Bell. But the more important point is that Respondent appears to have be en using th is hourly billing comparison to justify the proposed charge in the flat fee billing arrangem ent. This w as not a pro per bargain ing tool. paym ent. He wrote that it is impossible to pay $12,000.00 for one motion being filed . . . . Apparently, Dean was referring to the original $2,500.00 payment which he had made to Mr. Bell, the $5,000.00 payment that was made to Respo ndent, and the addition al $5,000.0 0 payment th at was being requested by the Respondent. Dean appears to have miscalculated and was $500.00 short of the total fee that Respondent was actually requiring at that point. In any event, the Respondent replied by e-mail of June 1, 2005 stating: All that s owed is $5,000.00 - not $12,00 0.00. I know non-lawyers can t understand, but the one motion was no simple motion, especially if it disposes of five claims. Let s not pretend. I can t remain on a case that I m not paid for. 25 Everyone has go t bills and I ve go t my own . I don t appreciate excuses and I don t give them. I m sure you u nderstand that. I will exit from this case this w eek, if nece ssary. I don t wa nt to go, but this is b usiness. I w ill, if necessary. Even if I leave, it won t change the fact tha t I will still n eed to b e paid f or my w ork . . . . Dean responded to this e-mail, again taking the position that he and the Respondent had a deal, requiring representation through trial for the $5,000.00 fee. Dean stated that If you fail to continue representation I will have no choice but to contact Bar C ounse l for your m iscond uct. Respondent replied stating that neither Bar Counsel nor any attorney can negate the fee for service s payable by Dean and W allace, In c. and T . D. Bis tro, Inc. On June 7, 2005, Dean wrote a letter to Respondent, again stating that he was concerned about the given fees and would like to have this matter discussed in greater detail with b oth attorney, Jim Bell, and yourself. On the same date, Respondent faxed a letter back to Dean, continuing in his effort to persuade Dean to pay an additional $5,000.00 for the representation of Dean and Wallace Incorporated and T. D. Bistro, Inc. He stated: You will also find a copy of the original E ntry of Appearance, a copy of which you possess. This Entry was not filed, but was the one prepared before Lawson Law, LLC received the Complaint and summonses for each of th ese defen dants in the action. Yo u will note that on the Entry, as well as on the Fee A greemen t, you are listed in your individual c apacity alone, n ot with Dean & 26 Wallace, Inc. or T. D. Bistro, Inc. Even if you had been listed together, Maryland courts interpreting the Maryland Rules of Professional Condu ct have ack nowled ged that a fee which m ay have bee n reasona ble when made may become unreason able in light of changed circumstances. A fee of $5,000.00 for one la w firm to represent three separate clients in this complex litigation is unreasonably low, particularly in light of the time, labor, sk ill required, the amount of time to be taken from other ca ses, etc. . . . On June 21, 2005, Respondent and Dean exchanged communications. Dean sent an e-mail stating: Good morning Jeff I hope all is well. The purpose of this e-mail is to fin d out wh at is the status of the Mo tion to Dismiss? When time permits please give me a call. Respondent wrote back but did not answer Dean s question concerning the Motion to Dismiss. Instead, Respondent sent Dea n a copy of a Motion for Leav e to Withdraw as Counsel in the litigation. Though Respondent s cover letter stated that Lawson Law LL C and Jeffrey Law son, Esquire intend to file this Motio n to Withdraw as Counsel in your case, Dean believed that the Motion had been filed, since it had a certificate of service, and , on June 3 0, 2005, D ean actually filed Timothy D ean s Op position to C ounsel s M otion to Withdraw as Counse l. On the same date, Respondent filed a Motion for Judicial Notice and Reply to Plaintiff s Response to Motio n to Dism iss/for Sum mary Judgm ent, asking that the Court accept certain facts as established for the purposes of the 27 Motion to Dismiss /for Sum mary Judgm ent. On July 6, 2005, R esponde nt attended a hearing o n the M otion to Dismiss/for Sum mary Judgment. Respon dent did no t inform D ean that a hearing had been scheduled and did not inform D ean that the M otion to Dismiss was denied without prejudice on the same date. On July 14, 2005, Respondent actually filed his M otion to Withdraw as Coun sel on beh alf of all three (3) Defendants. He wrote Dean that same day stating that As your actions and course of conduct, along with others, have led me to conclude that you attempted to utilize Law son Law , LLC to f oster your effo rts to commit fraud on the cou rt and, perhaps th e Plaintiff in th e civil action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Lawson Law cannot, in good fath, submit further pleadings and papers on your behalf . . . . O n July 19, 200 5, Edwa rd Malo ne, Esquire entered his appearance in the Baltimore City litigation on behalf of all three (3) Defendants. On the same date, he filed a Counter-Complaint on behalf of Dean and Wallace Incorporated and T. D. Bistro, Inc., only against Wallace, and a Third-Party Complaint against Wallace s wife and another corporation as well. On Augus t 8, 2005, M r. Malone wrote R esponde nt, asking fo r his file in the Wallace v. Dean case, and stating that any further delay will hinder th is office in com pelling W allace to produ ce disco very. On August 11, 2005, the Court ordered that Respondent s appearance be withdrawn. On August 31, 28 2005, that Order was docketed, and the Respondent sent his office file to Mr. Malone on the same date. Substantial pleading a nd, appare ntly discovery took place in the action during the ensuing fifteen (15 ) months, cu lminating in a settlement o f all claims, evidenced by the filing of a Settlement Order on December 1, 2006 and stipulations of dismissal thereafter. Dean paid Wallace some $65,000.00 to resolve all claims and presum ably to acquire Wallace s interest in the restaurant business. Respondent never filed a Counterclaim against Wallace as agreed. Edward Malone filed the Counterclaim against Wallace on the date that he entered his appearance. Respondent s testimony on this issue was that he consciou sly decided not to file a Counterclaim against Wallace because he had developed concerns about Dean s being truthful, and reached a conclusion that it wouldn t be ethical fo r me to file a co mplain t agains t Mr. W allace . . . . Respondent testified repeatedly that he informed Dean of this in a letter.5 Respondent never produced such a letter at trial despite repe ated attemp ts of he and his attorney to locate it. 5 I wrote h im a letter, I believe it was in May, telling him that in light of the conversations I had with the people with Rewards Network and their being their telling me about Mr. Dean being there, and Mr. Wallace and Mr. Dean actually meeting with the Rewards Network rep resentatives at the Bistro itself after he had told me he did n t know anything abo ut it, you know , that it just 29 led me to believe that he and Jim were not really being truthful about what was going on. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW DILIGENCE, PROMPTNESS AND FAILURE TO PROTECT A CLIENT S INTERESTS UPON TERMINATION The Petitioner has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the Re spond ent viola ted Ru le 1.3 or Rule 1 .16 (d). With regard to the alleged violation of Rule 1.16 (d), the evidence before the Court is that the Respondent sent his office file to Mr. Malone on August 31, 2005 - the exact date on which the Circuit Court for Baltimore City docketed the August 11, 2005 Order allowing the Respondent to withdraw. There is no evidence that during the time period July 19, 20 05 (whe n Mr. M alone enter ed his appearance) through August 31, 2005 (when Respondent ultimately did send his office file to Mr. Malone), Dean or the related entities were in default w ith regard to discovery obligations. Indeed, there is no evidence that Malone had any particular need for Respondent s office file during this time perio d. He had drafted and filed a Counter-Complaint and a Third-Party Complaint and did not appear hampered in his preparation of the defense by not having Responden t s office file during that time period. In any event, the Petitioner has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent did not take ste ps to the exte nt reasonab ly practicable to p rotect a client s 30 interests in not transmitting his office file to M alone sooner. With regard to the allegation that the R espon dent br eache d Rule 1.3 by failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in filing a Counterclaim, again, the Court finds that the Petitioner has failed to meet the burden of establishing a violation by clear and convincing evidence. Based on the assertions made in his letter of complaint, Dean would appear to believe that the Respondent risked a time bar by no t filing a Co unterclaim a long with the Motion to Dismiss/for Summary Judgement in late May. However, the Motion was filed pursuant to Rules 2-311, 2-322 (b)(2) and 2-501. Rule 2-321 (c) provide s as follow s: Autom atic extension. When a motion is filed pursuant to Rule 2-3 22, the time f or filing an answer is extended without special order to 15 days after entry of the court s order on the motion or, if the court grants a m otion for a m ore definite statement, to 15 days after the service of the more definite statem ent. Rule 2-331 (d) which governs the timing of the filing of a Counterclaim, provides as follows: Time for filing. If a party files a co unterclaim or cross-claim more than 30 days after the time for filing that party s answer, any other party may object to the late filing by a motion to strike filed within 15 days of service of the counterclaim or cross-c laim . . . . Since the Motion to Dismiss/for Summary Judgment was denied on 31 July 6, 2005, Respondent had until July 21 , 2005 to file and answer pursuant to Rule 2-3 21 (c ); and he had 30 days after that within which to file a Counterc laim pursuant to Rule 2-331 (d). Even if he had filed the Counterc laim beyond that e xtended d ate, it would not have been time barred, but rather, simply subject to being struc k if the De fendants w ere unable to ultimately establish that any delay did not prejudice other parties to action. See, Rule 2-331 (d). In any event, Mr. Malone had entered his appearan ce w ithin 15 days of the July 6, 2005 denial of the Motion to Dismiss/for Summary Judgement and filed the Counter-Complaint. None of the Defendants was prejudiced by the timing of th e filing of the Counte r-Comp laint, and non e was pla ced in jeopardy by the fact that the Respondent did not file the Counterclaim at the same time that he filed the Motion to D ismiss/for Summa ry Judgement. There is simply nothing grievable about the Respondent s failure to earlier file a Counterc laim except, possibly, that he failed to inform Dean that there was ample time within which to do so. Despite this, the Respondent robustly and repeatedly asserted at trial that he consciously decided not to file a Counterclaim against Wallace because he had developed grave concerns about Dean s honesty, and reached a conclusion that it would not be ethical to assert a Counterclaim against Wallace in the litigation. Respondent testified that he put all of this in a letter 32 to Dean to e xplain why he was not filing the Counterclaim, a letter that he was never a ble to pr oduce . While the proof is wanting w ith regard to the charges of failing to act promptly and diligently, this Court must observe that Respondent lacked credibility in his defense on this issue - this C ourt is not persuaded that ethics caused Respondent to refrain from filing this pleading and is likewise not persua ded tha t Respo ndent w rote De an with his con cerns. COMMUNICATION Petitioner maintains that the Respondent violated Rule 1.4 (a) by failing to inform Dean that the hearing on the Motion to D ismiss/for Summa ry Judgement was scheduled for July 6, 2005, and thereafter, that the Motion had been denied. Petitioner also asserts that the Respondent violated Rule 1.4 (b) by not explaining: (1) the terms of the fee agreement; and (2) the reason for not filing a Counterclaim. Petitioner has establish ed a violation by Respon dent of R ule 1.4 (a) by clear and convincing evidence. Respondent correctly observes at page 11 of his Memorandum that the Motion to Dismiss hearing did not require D ean s appea rance. He then argues that because Dean did not h ave to app ear to testif y, it was unnecessary to inform him of the hearing date. The facts, however, have less to do with whether Dean was necessary as a witness than with the notion that every lawyer s client is entitled to an swers to b asic 33 questions concerning the progress of litigation. On June 21, 2005, Dean sent a specific e-mail stating The purpose of this e-mail is to find out what is the status of the Motion to Dismiss ? The C ircuit Court d ocket entries indicate that notices of the Motion Hearing were sent to Respondent on June 20, 2005 and June 22, 2005 establishing the hearing date of July 6, 2005. Respondent responded to Dean s e-mail the same d ay it was sent, June 21, 2005 - not by simply informing Dean of the July 6, 2005 hearing date - but by transmitting the pro posed Motio n to W ithdraw as Cou nsel. While Dean s appearance was not necessary at the July 6, 2005 hearing, and while the client is not necessarily required to be informed of every proceeding or d evelopment in a case, clearly, at a minimum, when a client addresses a specific inqu iry to his attorney like this, he is entitled to an answer under the Comm unication ru le. Likewis e, having e xpressed a specific interest in the Motion to Dismiss/for Summary Judgment, Dean was entitled to have been informed that it had been denied. Respondent plainly violated Rule 1.4 (a) by not keeping Dean reasonab ly informed about the status of the matter and by not promptly complying with a reasonable request for information. The Petitioner has failed to establish a Rule 1.4 (b) violation by clear and convincing evidence. Dean was, at the very least, a sophisticated consumer of legal services. There was no evidence presented warranting a 34 conclusion that he required an explanation of the terms of the Attorney-Client Fee Agreem ent. More over, since th is Court has not been persuaded that the Respondent consciou sly examined the landscape of facts in the Wallace matter and determine d to refrain f rom filing a Counterc laim for ethical reasons, there would not logically have been a need to have communicated with Dean about those reasons. DISHONESTY, FRAUD, DECEIT AND CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE The Court does not conclude that the Respondent entered into the Attorney-Client Fee A greem ent with Dean , planning or intending to later increase his flat fee for representatio n of the D efendan ts in the Baltimo re City litigation from $5 ,000.00 to $ 10,000.00 . Rather, this Court determines that between April 24, 2005 and May 24, 2005, the Respondent reached a conclusion that the Wallace litigation was neither a pimple nor a small case, as ch aracterized b y Mr. Bell; and that a $5,000.00 flat fee was grossly insufficient to cover his time exposure for even a minim ally competent representation of the Defendants through trial. The Respondent determined to deal with this by seeking to extract from Dean an additional $5,000.00, using a pretext of a realization that there were two additional related defe ndants sued in the Baltimore City case w ho required representatio n. Instead of simply informing Dean that he had grossly underestimated the scope of the 35 undertaking and asking to renegotiate the flat fee, the Re sponden t engaged in a ploy to increase his fee by suggesting that he d id not know there w ere additional defendants; or that, somehow, those a dditional defendants w ere being unjustly enriche d by receiving the benef it of his representation without being cha rged for it. In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Kerpelman, 292 Md. 228, 438 A.2d 501 (1981), the Court of Appeals co ncurred in a trial judge s determination that an attempt to change a fee arrangement mid-way through representation was dishonest, deceitful and prejudicial to the administration of justice. There, the trial court found that Kerpelman had undertaken the representation of a client in a family law matter, agreeing to charge a $2,000.00 retainer and $70.00 per hour for his services. During the actual trial of the underlying case, Kerpelm an presented his client with a new, written Agreement as to Fee. The client signed this new agreement under the circumstances, which basically stated that the fee could be increased based on success at trial. After trial, Kerpelman sent his client a bill for $8,500.00. He later sued the client and attempted to raise the fee to $25,000.00. W ith regard to the original effort to change the fee agreement, the trial judge found clear and conv incing evid ence that: Either the respondent quoted a fee based on an hourly rate of $70.00 knowing that he was not going to abide by such an agreement if the case 36 was won or, having won the case, decided that the time was prop itious to extrac t a larger fee than had been agreed upon. Engaging in such conduct involves dishonesty and deceit and is prejudicial to the administration of justice and f urthermore reflects on the respondent s fitness to practice law. The Court o f App eals con curred in that re sult. Attorney Grievance Commission v. Kerpelman, 292 Md. 228, 242, 43 8 A.2d 501, 50 9 (198 1). See also, Attorney Grievance Commission v. Milliken, 348 Md. 486, 518, 704 A.2d 1225 (1998) (Court of Appeals upholds a finding that receipt of a fee in full and failure to perform any work whatso ever is disho nest, deceitfu l, fraudulent and pre judicial to the adm inistratio n of jus tice). W hile Kerpelman s effort was more egregious than that of the Respondent (Kerpelman s effort to extract a higher fee having been made during the actual course of a trial), this Court believes that the Kerpelman Decision stands for the proposition that, generally, it is deceitful and dish onest for a lawyer to threaten to cease advancing or protecting his client s intere sts in litigation in order to renegotia te his fee ag reement. T his is precisely wh at occurred in this case. The conduct here should be distinguished from that of the attorn ey in Attorney Grievan ce Com mission v. M cLaugh lin, 372 Md. 467, 813 A.2d 1145 (2002), where the attorney accepted a fee of $72,00 0.00 from four (4) clien ts knowing that he had not done and clearly did not p lan to do the legal work 37 that he was hired to complete. The evidence in this case do es not supp ort a conclusion that this Respo ndent inten ded to take a flat fee of $5,000.00 and not do the work required to get the underlying litigation throug h trial. Rather, th is Court concludes that Respondent wanted to continue to represent Dean and the related entities - he simply decided that he was entitled to a higher fee for doing so at some point after agreeing to accept a fee of $5,000.00. While he did not wait for a time in the progress of the litigation as propitious as the moment chose by Kerpelman, this Court is convinced, to the clear and convincing standard, that the Respondent made a deliberate ch oice to try to renegotiate the fee agr eement in this case under threat of withdrawing and causing Dean to lose the value of the fee arrangement which he had struck with the Respondent originally. This, under the standard established in Kerpelman, supra, constitutes a violation of Rules 8.4 (c ) and (d). There is no evidence that the R esponde nt lied to or attem pted to defraud Dean - he never wrote to Dean or otherwise commu nicated w ith him to suggest that he did not know there were three (3) Defendants when he set the original fee, in his various efforts to convince Dean to pay more on and after May 31 , 2005. Howe ver, he did ta ke that positio n at the hear ing, while under oa th, and, hav ing done s o, likely violated R ule 3.3 bef ore this Co urt. ATTORNEYS FEES It is alleged in the Petition that Respondent failed to maintain an 38 attorney trust acc ount in violatio n of M aryland R ule 16- 603. A s indicated, because Respondent failed to disclose information about his attorney trust account in discover y, this Court ruled , before trial, that the Respondent was precluded from testifying that he had used an attorney trust account to escrow funds paid to him by Dean in the subject matter. Counsel for Respondent proffered, before commencement of the hearing, that Respondent did, indeed maintain an attorney trust account at the Chevy Chase Bank, but conceded that no portion of the $5,000 .00 paymen t made to h im by Dean was placed in that account. This Court is not persuaded that the Respondent failed to maintain an attorney tru st accou nt in vio lation of Marylan d Rule 16-60 3. This Court has accepted and does accept cou nsel s proff er that the R esponde nt did maintain an attorney tru st accou nt at the C hevy Ch ase Ba nk. Accord ingly, this Court shall proceed to determine the real questions at issue here, which are: whether the Respondent s fee may have become and unreasonable one under Rule 1.5; and, whether, reasonable or not, Respondent was required to have placed the flat fee in an attorney trust acco unt upon receipt. Examining the attorney trust account question first, Rule 16-604 provides, in r elevant par t, that: [A]ll funds , includin g cash, received and accepted by an attorney or law firm in this S tate from a client or third person to be delivered in 39 whole or in part to a client or third person, unless received as payment of fees owed the attorney by the client or in reimbursement for expenses properly advanced on behalf of the client, sh all be deposited to an attorney trust account in an approv ed fina ncial ins titution . . . . Rule 16 -609 prov ides that: An attorney or law firm may not borrow or pledge any funds required by these rules to be deposited in an attorney trust account, obtain any remuneration from the f inancial institution for depositing any funds in the account, or use any funds for any unauthorized purpose. An instrument drawn o n an attorney trust account may not be draw n payable to ca sh or to bearer . . .. Rule 1.1 5 provide s that: A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a law yer s possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer s o wn p rope rty. Funds sh all be kept in a separate account ma intained pu rsuant to Title 16, Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules. This Court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent violated each of these provisions in failing to deposit the $ 5,000.00 f ee into his attorney trust account upon receiving those fund s. While the Court of App eals has not held that all flat fees paid for future legal work, or advance payment fees must, under all circumstances, be placed in an attorney trust account (See, Attorney Grievance Commission v. Milliken, 348 M d. 486, 517 (note 14), 704 A.2d 1225 (199 8)), the C ourt has r egularly d eterm ined , in its case -by40 case examinations, that such flat fee payments must be placed in escrow upon receipt, if the work has not been perform ed at the time of receipt. See, Attorney Grievance Commission v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 53, 891 A.2d 1085 (2006); Attorney Grievance Commission v.Blum, 373 Md. 275, 818 A.2d 219 (2003); Attorney Grievance Commission v. McLaughlin, 373 Md. 467, 813 A.2d 1145 (20 02); Attorney Grievance Commission v. Briscoe, 357 Md. 554, 745 A.2d 10 37 (2000). Despite use of the words non-refundable and chargeable in the written Agreement, and the Respondent s efforts to try to explain what he meant by employing those terms, it is clear from the fourth sentence of paragraph four of the Agreement ( Any unearned portion of the $5,000.00 fee will be refunded to [sic] although, due to discounted rate you have been charged in lieu of the hourly fee of $250.00 per hour, the amount of legal time required for your case will likely exceed the amount your are [sic] required to pay out-of-pocket and this po ssibility is not likely under the circumstances. ) and from paragraph six ( After our services conclude, we will, upon your request, deliver your file to you along with any funds . . . of yours in our possession . . . . ) that a refund of these fees was con templated if Respondent s representation was to conclude prematurely. He also testified that he understood that the payment was refundable under certain circumstances. 41 Moreove r, since the Agreemen t required the Respon dent s representation through trial in this matter, the fee would not be earned until conclusion of the trial. For all of these reasons, this Court concludes that the evidence is clear and convincing that the Respondent violated Rule 1.15 and Rules 16-604 and 16-609 in failing to place a legal fee in a trust account, and to hold it the re throug h tria l, and certa inly, pending res olution of th e dispute that evolved between he and Dean over a refund of the fee. With regard to the reasonableness of the fee charged by the Respondent in this matter, he argues that Dean was an experienced business person who en tered into the arrangement with Respondent at arms length, and that this is proof vel non that the flat fee arrangement was reasonable. Moreover, there was proof that other lawyers of prominence had set fees of $10,000 .00 for repr esentation o f the defe nse throug h trial. This Court agrees that the fee arrangement initially entered into by and between the parties was not unreasonable. However, a legal fee that is initially reasonable can become unreasonable or excessive in cases where the attorney does little or no w ork. See, Attorney Grievance Commission v. Monfried, 368 Md. 373, 794 A.2d 92 (2002); Attorney Grievance Commission v. Dietz, 331 Md. 637, 629 A.2d 678 (1993). The fee can also become unreason able when the large bulk of work to be performed under the original agreement is left unperformed at the time of withdrawal, which is what 42 occurred here. Respondent did not represent Dean or any of the other entities through trial. He filed a Motion to Dismiss/for Summary Judgment and a Motion for Judicial Notice and Reply to Plaintiff s Response to Motion to Dismiss/for Summary Judgment; propo unded some written discovery requests and attended a single hearing on the Motion to Dismiss before withdrawing from the case. The evidence is not clear as to whether the pleadings that the Respondent fled were , in fact, the pleadings that had been drafted by Mr. Bell (or his associate), which had been the subject of the previous $2,500.00 charge. Howe ver, even if the Respo ndent auth ored all of th e pleadings and discovery requests without resort to Mr. Bell s drafts, a charge of $5,000.00 for prosecution of this unsuccessful motion is not a reasonable fee. It is clear that a more-than-reasonable $5,000.00 fee for representation through trial became an unreasonable $5,000.00 fee for filing of a single Motion and the propounding of some discovery pleadings in this case. Had the funds been maintained in the Respondent s trust account, where they belonged, perhaps a sensible and reasonable refund could have been arranged. In any event, th is Court concludes that the Petitioner has established, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent violated Rule 1.5 in this matter, because his fee became unreason able based on his withdraw al. His time records are confusing and contradictory and do not compel a different conclusion. 43 CONCLUSION The Petitioner ha s failed to establish violatio ns of R ules 1.3 ; 1.4 (b); 1.16 (d) or M aryland R ule 16- 603. The Petitioner has established, by clear and convincing eviden ce, viola tions of Rules 1 .4 (a); 1.5; 1.15; 8.4 and Maryland Rules 16-604 a nd 16-60 9. This Court observes that much of what transpired here may be ascrib ed to the R esponde nt s relative youth and inexperience, and also to the conduct of Mr. Bell in not only failing to thou ghtf ully mentor a younger lawyer to whom he had referred a c ase, but also, p erhaps, in consorting with Dean after the relationship between Dean and the Respondent soured to precipitate these charges. Ordinarily, these could be seen as mitigating factors. On the other hand, this Court is concerne d about the Resp ondent s apparent lack of can dor during his testimony in the hearing: his testimony that he did not know th at there were three (3) defenda nts sued in th e Baltimor e City litigation before setting the fee was not credible; nor was his testimony that he could not file a Counterclaim on behalf of Dean for ethical reasons. There is no doubt that the Respondent has failed, and seems to continue to fail to recognize the special obligations of a lawyer in setting a fee agreement with a client, and, more importantly, in adhering to it. When courts are asked to pass upon the reasonableness of legal fees, they must apply and will continue to apply far more rigorous standards than when examining sales 44 commissions and performance bonuses in the business marketplace, particularly in the mod ern legal clim ate, where leave to enter and withdraw appearances in litigation continues to be sough t and grante d virtually without restriction, and w ith incre asing f requen cy. Lawyers must not be permitted to threaten to abandon clients whenever it strikes them that they are in a position to renegotiate fees. Respondent should be taught, at a minimum, that bargaining techniques, posturing and subtle intimidation, all of which he employed with Dean in an effort to increase his fee, have no place in the lawyer-client relationship, particularly after a fe e agree ment is c onsum mated . (emphasis in original) ( [sic] s in origina l). STANDARD OF REVIEW In proceedings involving attorney discipline, this Court has original and complete jurisdiction and conducts an independent review of the re cord. Attorney Grievan ce Comm n v. Mininsohn, 380 M d. 536, 564 , 846 A.2d 353, 369 -70 (2004 ); Attorney Grievance C omm n v. Awuah, 374 Md. 505, 520, 823 A.2d 651, 660 (2003); Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Jaseb, 364 M d. 464, 4 75, 773 A.2d 516, 522 (2001). In our review of the record, the hearing judge s findings of fact generally will be accepted unless they are clearly erroneous. Maryland Rule 16-759 (b )(2);12 Attorney G rievance C omm n v. Goff, 399 M d. 1, 28, 922 12 Maryland Rule 16-759 (b) (2) provides: (2) Findings of fac t. (A) If no exceptions are filed. If no exceptions are filed, the Court may treat the findings of fact as (contin ued...) 45 A.2d 55 4, 570 (20 07); Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Gore, 380 Md. 455, 468, 845 A.2d 1204, 1211 (20 04); Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Potter, 380 Md. 128, 151, 844 A.2d 367, 380-381 (2004). As to the hearing judge s conclusions of law, such as whether provisions of the MRPC were violated , ou r con sideratio n is essen tially de novo. Maryland Rule 16-759 (b)(1); 13 Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Mba-Jonas, 397 Md. 690, 700, 919 A.2d 669, 675 (2007); Attorney G rievance C omm n v. McLa ughlin, 372 Md. 467, 493, 813 A.2d 1145, 1160 (2002); Mininsohn, 380 Md. at 564, 846 A.2 d at 370; Awuah, 374 Md. at 520, 823 A.2d at 660. DISCUSSION The hearing judge found violations of MRPC 1.4 (a), 1.5, 1.15, 8.4, and Rules 16-603, 16-607 and 16-609. We have reviewed the record and conclude that Judge Cahill s findings of fact are supported by clear and conv incing evid ence, exce pt for his find ing that De an paid 12 (...continued) established for the purpose of determining appropriate sanctions, if an y. (B) If exceptions are filed. If exceptions are filed, the Court of Appea ls shall determine whether the findings of fact have been proven by the requisite standard of proof set o ut in Rule 16-757 (b). The Co urt may conf ine its review to the findings of fact challenged by the excep tions. The Court shall give d ue regard to the opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the credibility of witnesses. 13 Maryland Rule 16-759 (b) (1) states: (b) Review by Cour ts of Ap peals. (1) Conclusions of law. The Co urt of Appeals shall review de novo the circuit court judge s conclusions of law. 46 Wallace $65,000 .00 in settleme nt of his claims. W e will discus s this below . With this one exception, we accept the he aring court s findings of fact for the purpose of determining the appropriate sanctio n. Both Petitioner and Respondent took exceptions to the hearing judge s finding s of fac t and co nclusio ns of la w, eac h of w hich w e shall ad dress. A. Petitioner s Exceptions to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Bar Counse l ( Petitioner ) took exce ption to Jud ge Cahill s f inding that Dean p aid Wallace some $65,000 to resolve all claims and presu mably to acq uire Wallac e s interest in the restauran t business a s it was not supported by any evidence in the record. As we have indicated, findings of fact made by a hearing judge are ordinarily entitled to deference unless clearly erro neous . Petitioner co rrectly states that it was Dean s uncontested testimony that he paid Wallace $65,000.00 at the termina tion of th eir joint v enture, prior to the filing of Wallace s suit against Dean, not in settleme nt of Wallace s legal claims. The hearing judge did not cite the basis for his finding, and it appears to be merely a misunderstanding of Dean s testimony. We therefore conclude that the hearing court s interp retation repre sents clear err or and w e sustain Petition er s exc eption. Bar Counse l also took ex ception to the hearing court s failure to find that MRPC 1.16 (d) was violated by Respondent s failure to refund the unearned portion of the $5,000.00 prepaid fee. Petitioner argues that the finding s which were the basis for Judge C ahill s conclusion that the prepaid fee was unreasonable in violation of MRPC 1.5 also provide clear and convincing evidence that MR PC 1.16 (d) was v iolated. Rule 1.16 (d) states in pertinent part: 47 (d) Upon termina tion of r eprese ntation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client s interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrend ering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law. In drawing his conclusion that Respondent had not violated 1.16 (d), the hearing judge focused on whe ther Resp ondent v iolated the rule b y failing to hand over his of fice files to Mr. Malone, the attorney who succeeded him in representing Dean and the other two defenda nts in Wallace s suit: Wallace and Dean Incorporated and T. D. Bistro, Inc. The hearing judge was correct in concluding that Respondent s failure to turn over his files prior to August 11, 2005, the date on which the Circuit Court for Baltimore City docketed the order allowing Respondent to withdraw from his representation, did not establish by clear and convincing eviden ce a violation of M RPC 1.16 (d ). The hearing court, however, neglected to consider whether Respondent s failure to return part or all of the $5,000.00 retainer violated the rule. We have held that MRPC 1.16 (d) can be violated when an attorney fails to protect his client s interests by refusing to refund unearned fees or by failing to return such fees in a timely fas hion. See Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Cherry-Mahoi, 388 Md. 124, 157, 879 A.2d 58, 79 (2005); Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Milliken, 348 Md. 486, 517, 704 A.2d 1225, 1240 (19 98). In the pr esent case, th e hearing c ourt foun d that Resp ondent s c laim to the $5,000.00 retainer represented an unreasonable fee and that his testimony that he had 48 properly earned these funds was not credible. Respondent failed to return to Dean any portion of the $5,000.00 flat fee, and so violated MRPC 1.16 (d). We therefo re sustain Bar Coun sel s exc eption. B. Respondent s Exceptions to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Respondent took exception to the hearing judge s finding that he knowin gly agreed to represent all three defendants in the Wallace suit, arguing that as only Dean signed the April 24, 2005 written fee agreement, Respondent was only obligated to represent Dean, regardless of his knowledge of the other co-defendants. We ove rrule Responden t s excep tion. Judge Cahill s finding that Respondent knew that there were three defendants who had been sued in the Baltimore City litigation and that he was to represent all three was clearly supported by the record. While it is true that the record reflects that Dean alone signed the fee agreement, it also is true that other evidence in the record substantiates a finding that Respondent undertook and continuou sly represented all three defe ndants. Jim my A. Bell, the lawyer who referred this matter to Responde nt, testified that Respondent kn ew that there were three defe ndants to b e represen ted in the actio n prior to A pril 24, 2005 . Also, on A pril 22, 2005, Respondent sent a letter to Dean which specifically discussed that three parties were named as defendants for which Respondent subsequently entered his appearance. Add ition ally, on Ma y 23, 2005, R esponde nt emailed D ean and s tated that I do want to continue to represent T. D. Bistro, Inc./T imothy Dea n Bistro. A s you know , I will vigorou sly represent all Defendants in the interim. Please do not retain separate counsel without first 49 discussing it with me a nd seekin g my input. M r. Bell s testimony and the actions of the Respondent which occurred both before and after the April 24, 2005 execution of the fee agreement are the underpinnings for Judge Cahill s findings that Respondent both knew about and intended to represent all three defendants despite the conflict with the fee agreem ent. W e theref ore ove rrule R espon dent s e xceptio n. Respondent also took exception to a number of Judge Cahill s conclusions of law. Specific ally, he took ex ception to the hea ring jud ge s co nclusio ns that h e violate d MR PC 8.4 (c) and (d), 1.4 (a), and 1.15. We overrule these exceptions. Respondent excepted to Judge Cahill s conclusion that he violated MRPC 8.4 (c) and (d), arguing that the evidence did not support his findings. Rule 8.4, sections (c) a nd (d) state in relevant p art that [i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: *** (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; (d) engage in conduc t that is prejudicia l to the administration of justice . . . . While the hearing judge did not conclude that Respondent entered into the Attorney-Client Fee Agreem ent with D ean with th e intent to later increase h is flat fee from $5,000.00 to $10,000.00, he did find that R esponde nt imprope rly sought to ren egotiate his fee in the midst of representation with threats of withdrawal of representation. Judge Cahill compared the present case to Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Kerpelman, 292 Md. 228, 438 A.2d 501 50 (1981), in which this Court concurred with the hearing court s conclusion that an attempt to alter a fee arrangement mid-way through representation through coercion involves dishonesty and deceit and is prejudicial to the administration of justic e . . . . Id. at 242, 438 A.2d a t 508. Judge Cahill corre ctly noted that K erpelman s presentatio n to his client of a new fee agreement during trial rep resents mo re egregiou s conduc t than occu rred here, bu t he also recognized that Kerpelman stand s for the propo sition tha t . . . it is deceitful and dishonest for a lawyer to threaten to cease advancing or protecting his client s interests in litigation in order to renegotiate his fee agreement. Respondent, like Kerpelman, improperly threatened withdrawal from rep resentation in attempting to renegotiate h is fee with Dean clea rly a coercive and intimidating act. Respondent, unlike Kerpelman, was not f ound cre dible when he testified before the hearing judge concerning his reasons for see king th e increa sed fee . Respondent improperly attempted to renegotiate his fee after commencing representation of his client and then later misrepresented his motives for doing so during the hearing before Ju dge Cah ill. These actio ns involve d dishonesty and deceit and were prejudicial to the administration of justice. We therefore find that there is clear and convincing evidence that Respondent s actions in renegotiating his fee under threat of withdrawal and misrepresenting h is motives before the he aring court violated MR PC 8.4 (c) and 8.4 (d), and we ov errule R espon dent s e xceptio ns. Respondent also took exception to the hearing judge s finding that he violated MRPC 1.4 (a), asserting that his conclusion was totally wrong. 51 Judge Cahill found that Respondent violated MRPC 1.4 (a) by failing to respond to his client s direct questions concerning the Mo tion to Dism iss filed in the C ircuit Court f or Baltimo re City. Rule 1.4 (a) states that (a) A law yer shall: (1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client s informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0 (f), is required by these Rules; (2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter; (3) promp tly comply with reaso nable requests for information; and (4) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer s conduct when the lawyer knows that the client exp ects assistance not permitted by the Maryland Lawyers Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. On June 21, 2005, Dean sent an email specifically stating [t]he purpose o f this e-mail is to find out what is the status of the M otion to Dismiss? Respondent s reply to this email was not to inform h is client of the h earing sche duled for J uly 6, 2005 bu t to transmit his proposed Motion to Withdraw as C ounsel. While Re spondent is correct in stating that D ean s appearance at the July 6, 2005 hearing was not n ecessary, Dea n was still en titled to a timely response to his specific question. Additionally, after having expressed concern over the status of the Motion to Dismiss, Dean should have been informed when the motion was denied, which Respondent did not do. We have held that failure to keep a client reasonably informed about the progress of his representation is a violation of M RPC 1.4 (a). See Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Lee, 390 Md. 517, 525 -26, 890 A.2d 2 73, 277-78 (200 5); McLa ughlin, 372 Md. at 501, 813 A.2d 52 at 1165. T he hearing court found that Re spondent neglected to respond to his client s question about the date of the hearing on his Motion to Dismiss in a timely manner and likewise never informed Dean of the outcome of that hearing . Respon dent argue s that this was error as Dean admitted to some uncertainty in his memories of specific communications with Respondent. Judge Cahill found credible Dean s testimony that he had concerns about Responden t s representation and did not feel that Respondent addressed to those concerns appropr iately. Respondent presents no e vidence o r specific arg uments to s upport his contention that the hearing judge s finding was clearly erroneous. We therefore find that Respondent did violate MRPC 1.4 (a) by failing to keep his client reasonably informed about the status of the Motion to Dismiss, especially when the client directly requested specific inform ation. Respondent also took exception to Judge Cahill s conclusion that he violated 1.15, arguing that there was clear and convincing evidence that he had earned his $5,000.00 flat fee. Rule 1 .15 provid es in relevan t part: (a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer s possession in connection with a representation sepa rate f rom the la wyer s ow n pro perty. Respondent argues that he did not violate MRPC 1.15 because he had already earned the fee when he received it from Dean as it was non-refundable and chargeable. Judge Cahill properly incorporated in his decision our holdings that fee payments, such as the one provided to Respondent by Dean, must be placed in escrow upon receipt, if the work had not yet been p erform ed at tha t time. See Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Guida , 391 Md. 33, 53, 53 891 A.2d 1085, 1097 (20 06); Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Blum, 373 Md. 275, 297-298, 818 A.2 d 219, 23 2-233 (20 03); McLa ughlin, 372 M d. at 504 , 813 A .2d at 11 67. We also agree w ith the hearing court s ana lysis that in the Fee Agreement itself, the $5,000.00 fee was contemplated to be refundable, particularly if Respondent s representation were to conclude prematurely, as in fact happened. Likewise, as the Agreement stated that the fee was in exch ange for Resp ondent s represe ntation throug h trial in th is matter , it was envisioned in this case that the fee would remain unearned until the end of the trial. We, therefore, concur with the hearing judge and conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence that the fee was not earned at the time that Respondent received it from Dean and failed to properly place it in his attorney trust account. Accordingly, we conclude that Respo ndent v iolated M RPC 1.15 an d overr ule Re spond ent s ex ception . C. Conclusions of Law The hearing judge determined that Respondent acted in violation of MRPC 1.5 when he agreed to represent Dean through trial for $5,000.00, failed to complete the representation by withdrawing prior to trial, and then refused to refund any of the $5,000.00 fee. Rule 1.5 provides in pertinent pa rt: (a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unre asonab le fee o r an unr easona ble am ount fo r expen ses. *** (b) The scop e of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which th e client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client, prefera bly in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, 54 except when the law yer will charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate. Any changes in the basis o r rate of the fee or expen ses shall also be com municate d to the client. Judge Cahill noted that while the $5,000.00 fee may have been reasonable at the time it was neg otiated, it became an un reasonab le fee wh en the Re sponden t withdrew his representation prior to trial, leaving unperformed much of the w ork originally contemplated when the parties entered into the Agreement. Additionally, the record is unclear as to the amount of work that Respondent did prior to his withdrawal, particularly given M r. Bell s testimony that he prepared drafts of the pleadings and provid ed them to the R espon dent. The hearing court found that even if Respondent made no use of the drafts, however, $5,000.00 remained an unreas onable fee for the filing of a single motion and the propounding of some discovery pleadings. This Court h as held that an in itially reaso nable f ee, eve n a flat f ee, may become excessive in cases where the attorney does little or no w ork. See G uida, 391 Md. 33, 53-53, 891 A.2d 1085, 10 96-97; Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Monfried, 368 Md. 373, 392-93, 794 A.2d 92, 103 (200 2); Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Dietz, 331 Md. 637, 647, 629 A.2d 678, 683 (1993). Given that Respondent withdrew his representation before the matter had proceeded through trial, and in light of his failing to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the amo unt of w ork he pe rformed justified the fe e, we find that Respondent violated Rule 1.5 by charging a fee that was unreasonable under the circumstances. The hearing judge also found that Respondent violated Maryland Rules 16-604 and 16-609 by failing to deposit the prepaid unearned $5,000.00 fee into an attorney trust 55 account. In failing to place the fee into the proper a ccount, R esponde nt also failed to hold any portion of the fee in trust until it was earned by representation through trial and neglected to hold the funds in trust pending resolution between himself and Dean over refund of the fee. Ma ryland Rule 1 6-604 state s in relevant p art: Except as otherwise permitted by rule or other law, all funds, including cash, received and accepted by an attorney or law firm in this State from a client or third p erson to be delivered in whole or in part to a client or third person, unless received as payment of fees ow ed the attorn ey by the client or in reimbursement for expen ses properly advanced on behalf of the client, shall be deposited in an attorne y trust account in an approv ed fina ncial ins titution. Maryland Rule 16-609 states: An attor ney or law firm may not borrow or pledge any funds required by these Rules to be deposited in an attorney trust account, obtain any remuneration from the financial institution for depositing a ny funds in th e accoun t, or use any funds for any unauthorized purpose. An instrument drawn on an attorney trust accou nt may no t be draw n payabl e to cash or to be arer. Before commencement of the January 31, 2007 hearing before Judge Cahill, counsel for Respondent proffered that while Respondent did maintain an attorney trust account, no portion of the $5,000.00 payment he obtained from Dean was ever placed in that account. The hearing court accepted this proffer and therefore found by clear and convincing evidence that Res pondent violated Maryland Rules 16-604 and 16-609 by failing to place unearned attorney fees in his attorney trust account. Having already dispensed w ith Responde nt s argument that the fee was earned at the time it was deposited in our discussion of MRPC 1.15 ante, we agree with the hearing court and conclude that there is clear and convincin g 56 evidence that the $5,000.00 was not earned at th e time that R esponde nt failed to pla ce it in his attorn ey trust acc ount an d that he thereby v iolated R ules 16 -604 an d 16-6 09. SANCTION In the case sub judice, Respondent has violated MRPC 1.4 (a), 1.5, 1.15, 1.1 6 (d), 8.4 (c) and (d), and Maryland Rules 16-604 and 16-609. Petitioner has recommended a sanction of disbarment, arguing that Respondent s engagement in dishonest and deceitful conduct in violation of MRPC 8.4 (c) compels imposition of the sanction of disbarment, absent compelling extenuating circumstances. Respon dent sugg ests that a pub lic reprimand is the appropriate sanction and urges us to consider the hearing court s findings that the events that are the subject of this inquiry may be ascribed to the Respondent s relative youth and inexperience, and also to the conduct of Mr. Bell. The appropriate sanction fo r a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct generally depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, including consideration of any mitigatin g facto rs, Attorney Grievan ce Comm n v. Zuckerman, 386 Md. 341, 375, 872 A.2d at 693, 713 (2005), in furtherance of the purposes of attorney discipline: to protect the public, to deter other lawyers from engaging in violations of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, and to ma intain the integrity of the legal profession. Id., quoting Awuah, 374 Md. at 52 6, 823 A.2d at 66 3. In Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1, 741 A.2d 1143 (1999), we said: Because an attorney s character must remain beyond reproach this Court has the d uty, since a ttorn eys are its officers, to insist upon the maintenance of the integrity of the bar and to prevent 57 the transgre ssions of an in dividual law yer from bring ing its image into disrepute. Disciplinary proceedings have been established for this purpose, not for punishment, but rather as a cathars is for the profes sion an d a prop hylactic fo r the pu blic. Id. at 27, 741 A.2d. at 1157, quoting Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Deutsch, 294 Md. 353, 368-69, 450 A.2d 1265, 1273 (1982) (emphasis in original). When imposing sanctions, we have enunciated that, [t]he public is protected when san ctions are imposed that are commensurate with the nature and gravity of the violations and the intent with which they were comm itted. Gore, 380 Md. at 472, 845 A.2d at 1213. Therefore, in this case we consider the nature o f the ethical d uties violated in light of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Sweitzer, 395 Md. 586, 598-99, 911 A.2d 440, 44 7-48 (2 006). We have looked at the aggravating factors found in 9.22 of the American Bar Association Standa rds for I mposi ng La wyer Sa nctions (1991 ). See Mininsohn, 380 Md. at 575, 846 A.2d at 376. These include: (a) prior disciplinary offenses; (b) dishonest or selfish motive; (c) a pattern o f miscond uct; (d) multiple offenses; (e) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplin ary ag ency; (f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process; (g) refusal to acknow ledge wr ongful n ature of co nduct; (h) vulnerability of victim; (i) substantial experience in the practice of law; (j) indiff erence to mak ing restitu tion. 58 Id. Several of these facto rs are presen t in this case, specifically (f), (g), and (i). This Court shares Judge Cahill s grav e concern s about R esponde nt s lack of re morse an d failure to recognize his obligations in setting a fee arrangement with a client. Respondent has not returned unearned fees to his client and has not demonstrated contrition. Respondent s lack of comprehension of the responsibilities peculiar to the legal profession gives us pause. We therefore a gree with J udge C ahill that Respondent should be taught, at a minimum, that bargaining techniques, posturin g and s ubtle int imidatio n, all of which he employed with Dean in an effort to increase his fee, have no place in the lawyer-client relationship, particularly after a fee agreement is consummated. The facts in the current case are very similar to those in Kerpelman, 292 Md. at 228, 438 A.2d at 501. In Kerpelman, we considered what sanction was appropriate for an attorney who renegotiated his fee in the midst of represe ntation und er the threat o f withdraw al in violation of Maryland Disciplinary Rules 1-102 (A)(4) and (5), the predecessors to MRPC 8.4 (c) and (d) , as well as Disc iplinary R ule 2-1 06 (A ), the pre decess or to M RPC 1.5. While we found that Kerpelman s conduct involve[d] dishonesty and deceit and [was] prejudicial to the administration of justice we did not find that his actions involved the type of de ceit that me rited disb armen t. Id. at 242, 438 A.2d at 508. Instead, we found that Kerp elman s actions represented an isolated incident and that the proper sanction was suspension from the practice of law for a pe riod of one year . Id. at 244-45, 438 A.2d at 509-10. In addition, one case of more recent vintage also involved a n attorney attem pting to renegotiate or raise fees subsequent to the commencem ent of repre sentation w hile 59 threatening withdrawal, and is therefore instructive in determining the sanction in the present case. In Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Korotki, 318 Md. 646, 569 A.2d 1224 (1990), an attorney was fou nd to have violated D isciplinary Rule 2-106, the precursor to MRPC 1.5, and Disciplinary Rule 5-103 (A), the predecessor to MRPC 1.8 (h) (2) (i), by demanding that his clients sign amended fee agreements at two crucial points in the proceedings, lest he cease to represent them. After su ccessfully litigating his client s claims at the trial level under a contingency fee agree ment by wh ich he wa s entitled to fo rty percent of their award, Korotki sought to force his clients to sign a new agreement under which he would be entitled to a total of sixty percent of all monies collected. Korotki told his clients that if they did not agree to the increase he would no longer represent them. Subsequent to the Court of Special Appea ls rendering a decision in favor of Korotki s clients, he once more requested that they sign a revised fee agreement which raised his contingency fee to seventy-five percent. Again, he threatened to withdraw unless his clients signed the new agreement. In deciding the proper sanction for Korotki s behavior, this court analogized to Kerpelman, as Korotki s actions also involve d fee gou ging wh ich harme d the publi c s perception of the legal profession. As the fees charged by Korotki were significantly higher than those charged by Kerpelman, this Court felt that a harsher sanction was warranted, suspending Korotki for eightee n mon ths. Id. at 671- 72, 569 A.2d a t 1237. Like the attorneys in Kerpelman and Korotki, Respon dent soug ht to increase his fees once he had begun representation of his client s interests under the umbrella o f withdraw al. Responden t s actions can be said to be less egregious than those of the attorneys in the earlier 60 two cases in that h e did not wait un til a crucial poin t in the proceedings to renegotiate his fees (as occurred in Kerpelman and Korotki), and the fees associated in the present case were less expansive compared with those in Kerpelman ($25,000) and Korotki ($471,424.36). The Responden t s actions, however, compare unfavorably with those of these attorneys in that he not only violated MRP C 8.4 (c) an d (d) by attemp ting to reneg otiate his fees while threatening to withdraw, but also by misrepresenting his reasons for doing so before the hearing court. In determinin g the appro priate sanctio n, we also consider any mitigating factors. These inc lude: absence of a prior disciplinary record; absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; personal or emotional problems; timely good faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct; full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings; inexperience in the practice of law; character or reputation; physical or mental disability or impairment; delay in disciplinary proceedings; interim rehabilitation; imposition of other penalties or sanctions; remors e; and f inally, rem otenes s of prio r offen ses. Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Floyd, 400 Md. 236 , 258-59, 929 A .2d 61, 74 (2007); Sweitzer, 395 Md. at 599, 911 A.2d at 448, quoting Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 488-89, 671 A.2d 463, 483 (1996 ). Looking to these factors, R espondent s relative youth and inexperience are considered in choosing the appropriate sanction. See Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Obi, 393 Md. 643 , 660, 904 A.2d 4 22, 432 (2006). Respondent also has no prior disciplinary record, and the instant violations are not part of pattern o f cond uct. 61 After analyzing analogous cases and considering all of the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, including both Respondent s relative youth and inexperience and his lack of remorse and apprehension of the wrongness of his actions, we determine that Responden t s deceitful and disho nesty conduct warrants an indefinite suspension from the practice of law with th e right to reapply f or adm ission af ter one ye ar. IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING C O S T S O F A L L T R ANSC R I P T S, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-761, F O R W H ICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION. 62

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