Pasteur v. Skevofilax
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Aventis Pasteur, Inc. v. Skevofilax, No. 15, Sept. Term, 2006. CIVIL PROCEDURE - VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE SUM MA RY JUD GM ENT - A BU SE O F DI SCR ETI ON - PR OTECT ION OF M INO R'S RIGHTS IN LITIGATION Respon dents, the Sk evofilaxe s, individually and as next frien ds of their eig ht-year-old minor son, filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City seeking damages from several corporations engaged in the manufacture of pediatric vaccines. Respondents claimed that their min or son's a utism w as caus ed by tox ic levels of me rcury con tained in thimero sal, a preservative used in the v accines. A fter three-am ended sc heduling o rders and n early eleven months of discovery, Respondents' sole expert on specific causation withdrew from f urther p articipati on in th e case w ithout ev er havin g rende red his e xpert o pinion . The Circuit Court denied Respondents' motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice, and entered summary judgment in favor of Petitioners due to Respondents' "conceded inability to produ ce an exp ert witness o n the area o f specific ca usation in co nnection w ith this proceeding." The C ourt of Special Ap peals reversed, holding that the C ircuit Court improper ly applied the pe rtinent legal fa ctors in its analysis. T he interme diate appella te court held further that, because Maryland courts traditionally have been solicitous of the legal rights of minors, the plaintiff's minority status weigh ed heavily in favor of volun tary dismissal without prejudice. The dec ision to gran t or deny a mo tion for volu ntary dismissal p ursuant to M aryland Rule 2-506(b) is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing that the trial judge abused that discretion. So long as the Circuit Court applied the proper legal standards and reached a reasoned conclusion based on the fac ts before it, an appellate co urt should n ot reverse m erely because the appellate court would have reached a different conclusion. The trial court recounted properly the following four non -exclusive f actors wh ich instruct a d ecision w hether to gra nt a voluntary dism issal: (1) the no n-movin g party's effort an d expens e in preparin g for trial; (2) excessive delay or lack of diligence on the part of the moving party; (3) sufficiency of the reason of the need for dismissal; and (4) whether a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion is pending. Based on the record before the trial court at the time of its decision, a reasonable trial judge co uld adopt the view that a motion for volun tary dismissal was inappropriate. This Court has in the past held that a trial court has a special duty to protect the rights and interests a minor plaintiff who is represented by a next friend to ensure that the next friend does not prejudice those rights and interests through conflict of interest, fraud, or neglect. Absent conflict of interest, fraud, or neglect by a parent, guardian, next friend, or the minor's attorney, however, a motion for voluntary dismissal filed on behalf of a minor should not be analyzed any differently than a motion for dismissal without prejudice filed by any plaintiff. Despite thr ee amen ded sche duling ord ers and ap proximate ly eleven mo nths allotted to conduct d iscovery, Resp ondents w ere unable to produc e an expe rt who co uld testify to specific causation within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty. Respondents' claims must fail as a matter of law. Summary judgment, therefore, in favor of PetitionersDefendants w as proper. Circuit Co urt for Baltim ore City Case # 24-C-03-002575 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 15 September Term, 2006 AVE NTIS P ASTE UR, IN C., et al. v. JOHN SKEVOFILAX, INDIVIDUALLY, etc., et al. Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. Opinion by Harrell, J. Filed: January 8, 2007 On 14 April 2003, Helen and John Skevof ilax (Respo ndents he re), individua lly and as next friends of their eight-year-old son, Michael, filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City seeking damages from Defendants (Petitioners here), several corporations engaged in the manufacture of pediatric vaccines and the ingredients incorporated in the vaccines.1 The Plaintiff s-Re spon dents cla imed that M icha el's autism spectrum disorder was caused by thimerosal, a mercury-containing preservative used in pediatric vaccines administered to Michael as an infant. The disposition of the complaint on prelim inary motions is what brings this case to us. On 21 December 2004, the Circuit Court denied Respondents' motion for dismissal of the complaint withou t prejudice, and granted sum mary judgment in Petitioners' favor. The court, having extended discovery three times by way of amended scheduling orders, determined that summary judgment was appropriate in light of Respondents' "conced ed inability to prod uce an ex pert witnes s on the area of specific causation in connection with this proceeding." 1 The initial def endan ts were Aven tis Paste ur, Inc., M erck & Com pany, Inc ., and Wyeth, Inc. Alleged thimerosal manufacturer Eli Lilly and Company was added by a first amended complaint. A second amended complaint added SmithKline Beecham Corporation d/b/a/ GlaxoSmithKline and GlaxoSmithKline Biologicals, S.A. All are engaged in the manufacture of pediatric vac cines distribu ted in Ma ryland. These six defend ants hereinafter will be r eferred to som etimes a s the "V accine Defe ndants ." Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. ("BGE") and its parent corporation, Constellation Energy Group, In c., also were named a s defend ants. Specif ically, Plaintiffs claimed that Mic hael 's injuries were aggravated by toxic emissions originating from coal-burning powerp lants operated by BGE in Maryland. All claims against BGE and Constellation Energy Group, Inc., were dismissed on 17 February 2004. The disposition of the claims against BGE and Constellation Energy Group, Inc., are not before this Court in the present case. Respon dents noted a timely appea l, arguing tha t the trial court ab used its discretion in denying their motion to dismiss without prejudice pursuant to Maryland Rule 2 -506(b). 2 The Court of Special Appeals, in a reported opinion,3 agreed with the Skevofilaxes and reversed. The interm ediate appellate court reaso ned that the need to pro tect Mich ael's rights as a minor warranted a voluntary dismissal, in lieu of the summa ry judgment e ntered in Petitioners' favor. For reasons w e shall expla in, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. It was neither an abuse of discretion by the Circuit Court to den y Respondents' motion to dismiss nor error of law to enter summary judgment in favor of Petitioners. 2 Maryland Rule 2-506, in pertinent part, provides (b) By order o f court. Ex cept as prov ided in section (a) of this Rule, a party w ho has filed a c ompla int, coun terclaim , crossclaim, or third-party claim may dismiss the claim only by order of court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been filed before the filing of a plain tiff's motion for voluntary dismissal, the action shall not be dismissed over the objection of the party who filed the countercla im unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independ ent adjudic ation by the co urt. (c) Effect. Unless otherwise specified in the notice of dismissa l, stipulation, or order of court, a dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operated as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a party who ha s previously dismissed in any court of any state or in any court of the United States an action based on or including the same claim. 3 Skevofilax v. Aventis Pasteur, Inc., 167 Md. A pp. 1, 891 A.2d 4 16 (2006). 2 BACKGROUND Respondents' complaint in the Circuit Court alleged that toxic levels of mercury in the thimerosal contained in vaccinations, administered to Michael as a baby, caused his autism.4 This lawsuit thus became one of many thimerosal vaccine cases maintained throughout the country. On 30 September 2003 Judge Stuart R. Berger of the Circuit C ourt for B altimore C ity was assigned specially to preside over the case.5 The parties met on 13 November 2003 in order to discuss a scheduling order for discovery, preliminary motions, oppositions and replies, pre-trial conferences, and the trial itself. The court issued, on 18 November 2003, a Scheduling Order requiring completion of all discovery, including depositions and resolution of any fact discovery disputes, no later than 30 July 2004. The Order further directed the identification of Respondents' expert witnesses on or before 1 September 2004 and identification of Petitioners' experts by no later than 1 November 2004. The ex perts were required to be available for deposition no later than by 30 September and 30 November 2004, respectively. The Order also called for completion of all discovery of experts, 4 The complaint filed by Respondents contained twenty counts sounding in strict products liability, neg ligence , breach of implied warranty of merchantability, breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, fraud, conspiracy, and public nuisance in connection with the manufacture, marketing, and distribution of the pediatric vaccines. The com plaint addition ally alleged violatio ns of the M aryland Con sumer Pro tection Ac t. 5 The case was initially removed by Petitioners to the U. S. District Court for the District of Maryland on 11 July 2003. The case was remanded to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City early in September 2003. 3 including depositions, no later than 15 December 2004, requ ired all dispos itive motions to be filed no later than 15 February 2005, and directed that the parties attend a pre-trial conference on 4 April 2005. Trial was set for 2 May 2005. Discovery began with the depositions of Mr. and Mrs. Skevofilax, and the scheduling of several othe r depositions to be taken at a later date. By letter dated 24 May 2004, however, Respondents' counsel expressed doubt to the Circuit Court that the 30 July 2004 deadline for completion of fact discovery could be met. According to Respondents, GlaxoSmithKline recently was added as a defendant by the Second Amended Complaint filed on 24 May 2004, and Wyeth had served Respondents' counsel with approximately 20,000 documents in response to Respo ndents' disco very requests. T he Skev ofilaxes ac cordingly filed a Motion to Modify the Scheduling Order on 15 June 2004. Following a hearing, the court ordered on 13 July 2004 (the Amended Scheduling Order) that the following changes be made in the Scheduling Order: (1) the date for completion of fact discovery was extended from 30 July 2004 to 15 December 2004; (2) the deadline for designation of Re spon dent's expert witnesses was pushed-back two weeks to 15 September 2004, and the time for deposing those exp erts was like wise moved to 15 October 2004; (3) the date for identification of Petitioner's witnesses was moved back one week to 8 November 2004; and, (4) the deadline for deposing them was changed to 7 December 2004 from 30 November 2004. Judge B erger refus ed, how ever, to grant Respondents' request to move the trial date 4 to 19 September 2005 because tim e constraints imposed by operati on of the Circ uit C ourt's docket rotati on sys tem m itiga ted a gain st such a d elay. 6 Respon dents filed a Motion to Modify Amended Scheduling Order on 2 August 2004, citing the "extensive document production, numerous depositions of fact witnesses and corporate designees, and the appearance of [GlaxoSmithKline] . . . ." 7 After another hearing, the Circuit Court, on 2 Se ptember 2004, ag ain extended discov ery (Second Amended Scheduling Order). The time for design ation of R esponde nts' experts was extended another three weeks to 8 October 2004, and those experts were to be available for deposition by no later than 5 November 2004. The deadline for identification of Peti tioners' experts was changed to 29 November 2004, and they were to be available for deposition on or before 20 December 2004. Th e deadline f or comp letion of all d iscovery as to proposed ex pert witnesses was extended five days to 20 December 2004. Respon dents designated four expert w itnesses as to liab ility and four ex perts as to damages on 7 October 2004. One, James Jeffrey Bradstreet, M.D., was designated to testify to specific causation, i.e., "that significant amounts of mercury to which the minor plaintiff was exposed, including bolus doses received as a result of vaccination, was a substantial factor in causing [Michael's] current injuries and symptoms," and further, "that the exposure 6 According to the rotation system, Judge Berger would be re-assigned from the c ivil to the criminal docket fro m 1 Sep tember 2005 through 1 March 2006, and would be unauth orized to entertain any civil p roceed ings du ring tha t period . 7 The reasons cited first app eared in a lette r dated 19 J uly 2004, w herein Re sponden ts war ned Petitioners' counsel th at an othe r rou nd of ext ensions m ight be neces sary. 5 to toxic levels of mercury within the vaccines [w as] a substantial contributing factor to the minor Plaintif f's ultima te injurie s and sym ptoms ." Dr. Bradstreet was the sole expert named by Respondents on the question of specific causation.8 On 26 October 2004, Respondents notified Petitione rs, by letter, that "due to unforeseen circu msta nces [gen omic pro filin g] test res ults c ritica l to [D r.] Brads treet 's opinions" would be delayed up to sixty days.9 The relev ant genom ic susceptibility tests assertedly needed for D r. Bradstreet's expert m edic al op inion we re be ing p erfo rmed by a laboratory at the University of Arkansas. An affidavit completed by Dr. Bradstreet stated that an outbreak of leu kemia in N ew M exico cau sed the A rkansas lab 's director, Dr. Jill James, to be called o ut of tow n to consu lt on that outbreak, and that she would not be returning for several weeks. Drs. James and Bradstreet previously had collaborated on other projects. According to Dr. Bradstreet, he would be unable to formulate an expert m edical opinion regarding causation specific to M ichael's injuries u ntil the results of the genetic test results w ere rece ived fro m Dr. J ames' lab . Respon dents filed on 29 October 2004 a Motion for Continuance or, in the Alternative, Dismi ssal of A ll Claim s Witho ut Preju dice. The parties came before the court 8 Dr. Bradstreet held a Florida medical license and was the Founder and Director of a facility denominated as Clinical Programs for The International Child Development Resource Center; however, he neither held inpatient hospital privileges, nor was he boardcerti fied in an y particula r spe ciality. 9 Dr. Bradstreet asserted the need for the testing regarding a potential gene "polymorphism" (mutation) which, according to his theory, if it existed would in dicate Michae l's "genomic susceptibility" to ad verse effe cts from ex posure to th imerosal. 6 on 10 November 2004 to discuss the discovery issues raised by the motion. The court, after hearing from all parties, concluded that neither a continuance nor dismissal was appropriate, given the time constraints imposed by the court's docket rotation system. Judge Berger instead urged that the parties "ende avor to agree u pon a T hird A mend ed Sch eduling Order ." If the parties co uld not settle upon a m utually agreeable schedule, they each were to provide the court with a proposed order. The parties were unable to collaborate successfully on a unified, new scheduling order, citing disputes over specific dates for deposition of Respondents' expert witnesses. They submitted competing proposals on 17 November 2004. The Circuit Court entered a Third Amended Scheduling on 19 November 2004. The dates for dispositive motions, pre-trial conference, and the trial itself remained unchanged. The deadline for completion of all fact discovery, including depositions of fact witnesses and full resolution of disputes, was dela yed until 31 Dec ember 20 04. Of p articular releva nce to the posture of the case as it comes to us, the court ordered further that Dr. Bradstreet be made availab le for in itial depo sition on 19 No vemb er 2004 . Acco rding to the cou rt, [a]ppropriate topics of inquiry for this deposition, [were to] include, but not be limited to, the nature and purpose of the GST [glutathione-S-transferase, a particular family of enzymes in the human genome] M1 [a particular gene which encodes the GST enzyme] polymorphism [i.e., difference or variation] test, the work that Dr. Brad street [had] p erformed to date in this action, his qualifications, his affidav it submitted in connectio n with Plaintiff 's Motion for Continuance, all of his opinions on the subject of general causation, and the results of those tests that Dr. Bradstreet [had] performed or directed to be performed and that [were] av ailable as of th e date of [ the] initial discovery deposition. 7 In the event that the genomic suscep tibility tests from Dr. James' lab became ava ilable later, the court continued, Dr. Bradstreet would be made available for additional discovery by no later than 14 January 2005 in order to explain ho w those results pertained to h is expert opinion regarding specific causation. Counsel for Respondents informed the Circuit Court and opposing counsel, by letter dated 23 November 2004, that Dr. Bra dstreet declin ed to participa te further in the litigation. According to Respo ndents' cou nsel, Dr. Br adstreet with drew du e to outside "professional and personal comm itments and tim e const raints." 10 Respondents, pursuant to Maryland Rule 2506(b), renewed their Motion for Dismissal of All Claims Without Prejudice on 1 December 2004. Vaccine Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on that date. The court rendered an oral opinion from the bench on 21 December 2004 denying Respondents' motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice, and granting the motions for summary judgment in favor of Petitioners.11 The court began by acknowledging that it was a matter of discretion whether a dismissal without prejudice was appropriate. Judge Berger recounted several factors that he considered in deciding the motion, including: effort and 10 This reason originally was mentioned in an affidavit of Respondents' counsel in the national thimerosal litigation, attached to the Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Dism issal of All C laims With out Prejud ice in the pres ent case. A lso found in the record of the present case, Dr. Bradstreet maintained during a deposition in Easter v. American Home Products Corp., No. 5:03-CV-141, a thimerosal case pending in the U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, that the primary reason for his withdrawal was the impac t the time com mitment w ould have on his ability to spen d tim e with his fam ily. 11 Con siste nt w ritten orde rs were d ocketed the same day. 8 expense in preparing for trial; excessive delay or lack of diligence on the part of the movant; the sufficiency of the reason of the need for dismissal; and whether there were any dispositive motions pe nding. The court analyzed the facts of the case in light of these factors, and determined that dismissal without prejudice was not appropriate. Judge B erger reaso ned: [t]he Court does have to take into consideration in the facts of this case that there [][is a] minor plaintiff[] involved. And the Court is most empathetic with that issue. Nevertheless, the Court distinguishes this case from a case such as Berrain v. Katzen[,] [331 Md . 693, 629 A.2d 7 07 (1993)], or Fulton v. K & M Associates[,] [331 Md. 712, 629 A.2d 716(1993)], relied upon by the plaintiffs, where there was either parental, or guardian neglect, or even perhaps the neglect of attorneys. That is not an issue in this case. Critical to the circuit court's analysis was the significant time and money that had been expended in preparing pleadings and preliminary motions, and the conduct of extensive discovery. Turning to the pending motions for summary judgment pursuant to Maryland Rule 2501,12 Judge Berger opined tha t "[w]ithou t any expert testim ony on the issu e of specif ic 12 Maryland R ule 2-501 provides, in p ertinent part: (a) Mo tion. Any party may make a motion for su mmary judgment on all or part of an action on the ground that th ere is no genuine d ispute as to an y material fact a nd that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The motion shall be supported by affidavit if it is (1) filed before the day on which the adverse party's initial pleading or motion is filed or (2) based on facts not contained in the record. 9 causation, the Court must grant the vaccine defendants' motion for summary judgment as a matter of law." Causation, an essential element to the cause of action, according to Judge Berge r, simply w as not d emon strated o n the rec ord. On appeal by the Skevofilaxes, the Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that [t]he effort and expense incurred by appellees, much of which will not be wasted, cannot outweigh the unexpected withdrawal of a critical expe rt witness fo r personal re asons, prior to the end of discovery and five months before trial, in a dilige ntly prosecuted claim of a minor for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of ingesting certain pediatric vaccines. Skevofilax v. Aventis Pasteur, Inc., 167 Md. A pp. 1, 24, 891 A.2d 416, 430 (2006 ). We issued a writ of certiorari, on petition by the Vaccine Defendants, to address the following questions:13 1. Whether it was an abuse of discretion, under Fulton v. K & M Associates, 331 Md. 712, 629 A.2d 716 (1993) and Berrain v. Katzen, 331 Md. 693 , 629 A.2d 707 (1993), for the Circuit C ourt for B altimore C ity to deny a minor plain tiff's motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice when there is no evidence of neglect or improper action by the minor's next friend. 2. Whether the Circuit C ourt abused its discretion w hen it denied a minor plaintiff's motion to dismiss without prejudice, and instead entered summary judgmen t in favor of Petitione rs, after the co urt granted three extensions of the discovery schedule at the request of Respondents, and the Respondents' sole expert relating to specific causation withdrew from the litigation without ever having offered his expert opinion. 13 The questions presented in the petition for writ of certiorari are re- worded slightly for c larity. 10 DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review Regarding Dismissal Maryland Rule 2-50 6, as relevan t to voluntary dismissal by order of court, provides: * * * (b) By or der of c ourt. Except as provide d in section (a ) of this Rule, a party who has filed a complaint, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim may dismiss the claim only by order of court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been filed before the filing of a plain tiff's motion for voluntary dism issal, the action shall not be dismissed over the objection of the party who filed the countercla im unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independ ent adjudic ation by the co urt. (c) Effect. Unless otherwise specified in the notice o f dismissal, stipulation, or order of court, a dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a party who ha s previously dismissed in any court of any state or in any court of the United States an action based on or including the same claim. Rule 2-506(b) is patterned after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 41(a)(2 ). OwensCorning Fiberglas Corp. v. Fibreboard Corp., 95 Md. App. 345, 349, 620 A.2d 979, 982 (1993). "Under [FR CP] Rule 41 (a)(2) and [Ma ryland] Rule 2-506(b), the granting of a motion for voluntary dismissal is within the [trial] court's discretion, after weighing the equities and giving due regard to all pertinent factors." Owens-Corning, 95 Md. App. at 34950, 620 A.2d at 982; 8 J AMES W M. M OORE ET AL., M OORE'S F EDERAL P RACTICE ¶ 41.40[2] (3d ed. 1999) ("The decision to gran t or deny a volu ntary dismissal u nder Ru le 41(a)(2) is addressed to the soun d discretion o f the [trial] cou rt."); see also, e.g., Conafay v. Wyeth Lab., 11 793 F.2d 350, 353-54 (D.C. Cir. 1 986); Sinclair v. Soniform, Inc., 935 F.2d 599, 60 3 (3d. Cir. 1991); Gap, Inc. v. Stone Int'l Trading, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 584, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Thus, the trial judge's decision under Maryland Rule 2-506(b) will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing that the judge abused that discretio n. Owens-Corning, 95 Md. App. at 350, 620 A.2d at 982; 8 MOORE'S F EDERAL P RACTICE ¶ 41.40[1 1][a]; see also, e.g., Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth. v. Leith , 668 F.2d 46, 49 (1 st Cir. 1981) (holding that the trial court's "decision to grant a motion to dismiss under [FRCP] 41(a)(2) is reviewable only for abuse of discretion"); Conafay, 793 F.2d at 354. The analytical paradigm by which we assess whether a trial court's action s constitute an abuse of discretion has been stated frequently. In Wilson v. John Crane, Inc., 385 Md. 185, 867 A.2d 1077 (2005), for example, we iterated [t]here is an abuse of discretion "where n o reasona ble person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court[ ]". . . or when the court acts "without reference to any guiding principles." An abuse of discre tion may also be found where the ruling under consideration is "clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court[ ]". . . or when the ruling is "violativ e of fa ct and lo gic." Questions within the discretion of the trial court are "much better decided by the trial judges than by appellate courts, and the decisions of such judges sho uld be distur bed wh ere it is apparent that some serious error or abuse of discretion or autocratic action has occurred." In sum, to be reversed "[t]he decision under consideration has to be well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe o f wha t that cou rts deem s minim ally accep table." 12 385 Md. at 198-99, 867 A.2d at 1084 (quoting In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. 295, 312 -13, 701 A .2d 110, 11 8-19 (199 7)). An ab use of disc retion, therefo re, "should only be found in the extraordinary, exceptional, or most egregious case." Wilson, 385 Md. at 199, 867 A.2d at 1084. II. Dismissal of Claims without Prejudice A. Factors Informing the Circuit Court's Exercise of Discretion. "The decisional law under [FRCP] 41 serves as a guide to the circumstances under which dismissal w ill not be allowed [pu rsuant to Marylan d Rule 2-506 ]." P AUL V. N IEMEYER & L INDA M. S CHUETT, M ARYLAND R ULES C OMMENTARY 351-52 (2nd ed. 1992) (hereinafter "Maryland Rules Com mentary"). Courts will generally grant a mo tion for voluntary dismissal unless the d efendan t(s) will suffer some "plain legal prejudice" if the dismissal is granted. The mere possibility that the action could be refiled in the future, however, is not a sufficient reason to find the legal prejudice necessary to bar a court-g ranted dism issal. C HARLES A. W RIGHT & A RTHUR R. M ILLER, F EDERAL P RACTICE AND P ROCEDURE: C IVIL § 2364 (2nd ed. 19 95); M ARYLAND R ULES C OMMENTARY 351-52 (" Court app roval will us ually be granted unless so me prejud ice is show n. The m ere possibility that the action will be refiled is not sufficient reason to op pose the dismissal."); Ellett Bros., Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 275 F.3d 384, 388 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that dismissal of a case pursuant to court order should not be denied absent "p lain legal prejudice to the defen dant"); accord Davis v. USX Corp., 819 F.2d 1270 , 1273 (4th Cir. 1987) (h olding that the trial court 13 "must focus primarily on protecting th e interests of th e defend ant"); see also, e.g., Langley v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 407 F.Supp.2d 897, 904 (N.D. Ohio 2005) (reasoning that plain legal prejudice is re quired); Manshack v. Southwestern Elec. Power Co., 915 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir.1990) ("[T]he courts have generally followed the traditional principle that dismissal should be allowed unless the defendant will suffer some plain legal prejudice other than the mere prospect of a secon d lawsuit."); Andes v. Versant Corp., 788 F.2d 1033 , 1036 (4th Cir. 1986). Although this Court pre viously has no t decided p recisely what "p lain legal prejudice" entails, we find instructive the federal case law regarding FRCP 41.14 Whether a plaintiff is entitled to voluntary dismissal without prejudice, i.e., the defendant would not suffer "plain legal prejud ice" in the event of d ismissal, is resolv ed traditionally by an alysis according to the following four fa ctors: (1) the non-moving party's effort and expense in preparing for litigation; (2) excessive delay or lack of d iligence on the part of the moving party; (3) sufficiency of explanation of the need for a dismissal without prejudice; and (4) the present stage of the litigation, i.e., whether a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion is pending. Witzman v. Gross, 148 F.3d 988, 991-92 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Paulucci v. City of Du luth, 826 F.2d 780 , 783 (8th C ir. 1987)); Gross v. Spies, 133 F.3d 914, 1998 WL 8006, *5 (4th C ir. 1998) (un published opinion); Ohlander v. Larson, 114 F.3d 1531, 1537 14 Several federal circuits, including the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth, have defined "plain legal prejudice." The Fourth Circuit, although in an unreported opinion, additionally has weighed in with its conception of the phrase. 14 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Phillips U.S.A ., Inc. v. A llflex U.S.A., Inc., 77 F.3d 3 54, 358 (1 0th Cir. 1996) ; Kovalic v . DEC In t'l, Inc., 855 F.2d 471, 473-74 (7th Cir. 1988) (quoting Pace v. Southern Express Co., 409 F.2d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 196 9)); Langeley, 407 F.Supp.2d at 904-05 (N.D. Ohio 2005) (quoting Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 33 F.3d 716, 71 8 (6th Cir. 1994)); DirecTV v. Zink, 337 F.Supp.2 d 984, 98 7 (E.D. M ich. 2004) (s ame); Wilson v. E li Lilly and Co., 222 F.R.D. 99, 100 (D. Md. 2004) (quoting Teck General P'ship v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 28 F.Supp.2d 989, 991 (E.D. Va. 1998) (in turn quoting Gross, 113 F.3d 914, 1998 WL 8006, *5)). While some courts employ slightly different or augmented tests to determin e whethe r a defend ant wou ld suffer clear legal prejudice if voluntary dismissal is granted,15 we believe that these fo ur factors su fficiently weig h the equities in order to determine whether dismissal without prejudice is appropriate in a given case. B. The Circuit Court's Exercise of Discretion Here. The trial judge considered, in his articulated thought processes, the four factors in reaching his determination to deny Respondents a voluntary dismissal without prejudice: 15 In Zagano v. Fordha m Univ ersity, 900 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1990), for example, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Secon d Circuit em ployed five f actors in determining whether a dismissal w ould result in le gal prejudic e to the def endants: [1] the plaintiff's diligence in bringing the motion; [2] any 'undue vexatiousn ess' on the pla intiff's part; [3] th e extent to which the suit has progressed, inclu ding the d efen dant's efforts and expense in preparation for trial; [4] the duplicative expense of relitigation; and [5] the adequacy of plain tiff's explanation for the need to dismiss. 15 This Court notes in the context of this case that the initial complaint was filed in this case on April 14, 2003. There have been severa l, indeed, three amended scheduling orders, extending the time for cert ain dea dlines. Including discovery, the filing of dispositive motions. And, critically, in the context of this case, to come forward with expert evidence demonstrating causation. The Court notes that scheduling orders are not guidelines. They're not suggestions. They are orders. And the Court endeavored to work with counsel to arrive at scheduling orders that were acceptable to a ll sides. In the context of this motion, in considering the various factors that the Court has stated, there has been significant effort and expense on all sides in preparing for trial. The vaccine defenda nts themselves, according to the information that has been provided, have deposed several witnesses. Indeed thirteen witnesses. And there have been many corporate designees produced, which I understand to be nineteen for their various depositions. In addition, defendants have consulted and retained experts, and had an independent medical examination done pursuant to the M aryland ru le. So, clearly, notwithstanding plaintiffs' argument, that some of those efforts and expenses were cross designated in this and other cases throughout the country, there has been, in this Cou rt's eyes, significant effort and expense in preparing for trial. In terms of the second factor, excessive delay or lack of diligence on the part of th e movan t. I will say, as all counsel have stated here, there has been no lack of diligence whatsoever on behalf of [local counsel] in the context of the plaintiffs' efforts in this case. There has been some discussion a s to other counsel. But, I believe it's necessary to address tha t in the contex t of this motion. The third motion, insufficient explanation of a need for dismissal. There has been the explanation for this d ismissal. Whethe r or n ot it's sufficient or not, reall y is dependent on the facts of this case. And, the facts of this case dem onstrate that the plaintiffs have conceded that Dr. Brad street is, indeed, the so le expert on specific causation. And, without that op inion, they are un able to prosecute their claims. In ordering a third amended scheduling order, last mo nth this Court accepted th e affidav it presented to it that Dr. Bradstreet would b e able to render an expert opinion by the end of December, based on the affidavit that was 16 presented to me. And, several days after that, Dr. Bradstreet was withdrawn as an expert in this case. Many could note, implicitly or explicitly, the effect of that. But that's the factual circumstances that this case is presented to this Court. T here is no other expe rt noted by the p laintiffs who will replace D r. Bradstre et's previously anticipated testimony, or that there would be any evidence available by any other expert at this point to go forward in connection with these proceedings. In addition, the Court notes that there are two pending motions for summary judgmen t. Indeed, a motion fo r summary judgment filed by the vaccine defendants on the same day that the motion for dismissal of all claims without prejudice was filed by the plaintiffs. There has, as well, been a previo us motion for summary motion [sic] filed by Eli Lilly a nd C omp any, that the Court denied, at tha t time, for the so le purpose of allowing additional discovery to go forward before reconsidering that issue. The Court does have to take into consideration in the facts of this case that there are minor plaintiffs involved. And the Court is most empathetic with that issue. Nevertheless, the Court distinguishes this case from a case such as Berrain v. Katzen[,] [331 Md . 693, 629 A.2d 7 07 (1993)], or Fulton v. K & M Associates[,] [331 Md. 712, 629 A.2d 716(1993)], relied upon by the plaintiffs, where there was either parental, or guardian neglect, or even perhaps the neglect of attorneys. That is not an is sue in th is case. In that con text, the Court does not believe that a minor's motion for voluntary dismissal is, or should be analyzed any differently than any other voluntary dismissal motion. I have considered the cases relied upon by the vaccine defendants. Although admittedly, not all fours w ith this case, but a guidance to the C ourt in the context of determining whether good cause exist for the granting of a motion for voluntary dismissal with prejudice. And, un der a review of all those factors, including the efforts that the Court has undertaken to allow sufficient time to present these issues to the Court, the Court finds, based on those factors that is would be inapprop riate for this Co urt to grant a m otion to dism iss a claim voluntarily without p rejudice giv en the facts of this case. Critical to the Court is the extensive discovery that has been undertaken. The thirteen depositions. The corporate designees 17 that have been noted. The time, effort and expense in briefing the preliminary motions, and gathering discovery, and presenting dispositive motions to the Court, that are releva nt to the Court's consideration. A s a result, und er the fact sp ecific circumstances of this case, this Court denies the plaintiffs' renewed motion for voluntary dismissal of all claims without prejudice for the reasons so stated. Although finding it "clear from the transcript of the [21 December 2004] hearing that the circuit court carefully considered each of the [four] factors . . . ," and in spite of the deferential standard of review to be accorded the trial court's decision, the Court of Special Appeals nonetheless held that the trial court abu sed its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss the comp laint, withou t prejud ice. Skevofilax, 167 Md. App. at 22, 891 A.2d at 429. Specific ally, the Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court "made the first factor, [Petition ers'] effort and expense, determinative of its decision when that factor (a) is not compelling under the facts of the instant case, and (b) was the only one that the court found weighed in [Petitioners'] favor." Id. We hold that, in addition to misinterpre ting the Circ uit Cou rt's consideration of the four factors, the Court of Special Appeals failed to give the trial court's decision the deference it deserved. 1. Effort and Expense of the Non-Moving Party in Preparing for Trial The trial court spec ifically found that significant time and money had been expended by both sid es in this litigation . As indicated by Judge Berger, thirty-two total depositions had been taken as of the date of the grant of su mmary judg ment. Of these, thirteen w ere specific 18 to the Skevofilaxes' claims.16 Other forms of discovery, including interrogatories, document production, and independent medical evaluations also were conducted in connection with the pending litigation. The Court of Special Appeals observed that some of the depositions were cross-referenced with other thimerosal cases pending elsewhere, and hypothecated that selected depositions pertaining solely to the Skevofilaxes' suit might be reused if their suit were re-filed, with little or no need to upda te them . Skevofilax, 167 Md. App. at 16, 891 A.2d at 426. It is equally likely, however, that many of the depositions would need to be updated significantly if Responden ts filed anew. If Respon dents we re to re-file the la wsuit significantly later, following a dismissal without prejudice, but within applicable limitations periods, as Petitioners argued, some ex perts curren tly identified by the parties no longer may be available to testify. Of additional possible consequence, Michael's condition may change significantly such that entirely new independent medical evaluations would be necessary. The fact remains that the Skevofilaxes' litigation had been pen ding for n early twenty months at the time the dispositive motions were filed. Even if so me of the depositions could have been recycled in renewed litigation, significant effort and funds a lready had been expended in defend ing the causes of action. As Judge Berger noted, there had been significant discovery over and above the depositions, the parties had briefed significant preliminary motions, and had presented numerous dispositive motions before the trial court. 16 The record indicates that thirteen depositions were of fact and expert witness pertaining specifically to Michael's symptoms. The rem aining nineteen depo sitions were cross-referenced with other thim erosal c ases pe nding n ationally, and concerned generally the potential adv erse effec ts of pediatric exposure to thimerosa l. 19 That the intermed iate appellate court reached a different conclusion on this factor based on the facts before the trial court does not render the Circuit Court's decision an abuse of discretion, as long as a reasonable person could have adopted the view of the trial court. North v. North, 102 Md. App. 1, 14, 648 A.2d 1025, 1031-32 (1994) ("[A] ruling reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard w ill not be reve rsed simply be cause the a ppellate court would not have made the same ruling. The decision under consideration has to be well removed from any ce nter mark im agined by the reviewing court and b eyond the frin ge of what the court deem s minimally acceptable."). Based on the record before the C ircuit Court at the time of its decision, we are unwilling to hold that the trial judge abused his discretion in finding that the expense and effort exerted in preparing for litigation weighed in favor of denying Respo ndents ' request f or volu ntary dism issal wit hout pr ejudice . 2. Excess Delay or Lack of Diligence by Movant Contrary to what the Court of Special Appeals suggests, the time and money expended by Petitioners in preparing th eir defense was not the only factor the trial court considered that weighed against dismissal without prejudice. As to the second factor, excessive delay or lack of diligence on the part of the movant, the intermediate appellate court held that "[t]he trial court specifically found that there was no lack of diligence o n the part of appellants." T his interpre tation of the Circ uit Cou rt's reason ing is no t accura te entirely. It is a well-established principle that "'[t]rial judges are presumed to know the law and to apply it properly.'" State v. Chaney, 375 Md. 168, 179, 825 A.2d 452, 458 (2003) (quoting 20 Ball v. State, 347 Md. 1 56, 206 , 699 A .2d 117 0, 1194 (1997 ), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1082, 118 S.Ct. 866, 139 L.Ed.2d 763 (199 8)); see also Medical Mut. Liability Ins. Soc. of Md. v. Evans, 330 Md. 1, 34, 622 A.2 d 103, 11 9 (1993); Wagner v. Wagner, 109 Md.App. 1, 50, 674 A.2d 1, 25 (1996) ("[W]e presume judges to know the law and apply it, even in the absence of a verbal indication of having co nsidered it."). It is equally well-settled that there is a "stron g presu mption that judg es prop erly perfo rm their duties," and that "trial judges are not obliged to spell out in words every thought and step of logic." Beales v. S tate, 329 Md. 263, 273, 619 A.2d 10 5, 110 (19 93); see also Kirsner v. Edelmann, 65 Md. App. 185, 196 n.9, 499 A.2d 1313, 1319 n.9 (1985) ("[A] judge is presumed to know the law, and thus is not required to s et out in intima te detail each and every step of his or her thought process."); Zorich v. Zorich, 63 Md. App. 710, 717, 493 A.2d 1096, 1099 (1985) ("Because trial judges are presumed to know the law, not every step in their thought process needs to b e explicitly spelled out."); Bangs v. Bangs, 59 Md. App. 350, 370, 475 A.2d 1214, 1224 (1984) ("A chancellor is not required to articulate every step in his though t processes."). Thus, "[t]he trial judge nee d not articulate each item o r piece of e vidence sh e or he has considered in reaching a decision . . . . Th e fact that the court d id not catalog each factor and all the evidence which related to each factor does not require reversal." John O. v. Jane O., 90 Md. App. 406, 429, 601 A.2d 149, 160 (199 2); see also Cobr and v. A dventis t Health care, In c., 149 Md. App. 431, 445, 816 A.2d 117, 125 (2003) (holding that when a matter is reserved to the sound discretion of the trial court, a trial judge's failure to state each and eve ry 21 consideration or factor in a particular ap plicable stand ard does n ot, absent m ore, constitute an abuse of discretion, so long as the record supports a reasonable conclusion that appropriate factors were taken into account in the exercise of discretion.") (internal citations omitted). The trial judge here found that there had been no lack of diligence on the part of Respondents' local Maryland counsel, in representing the Skevofilaxes. The Circuit Court continued, however, that "[t]here has been some discussion as to other counsel." While the trial court did not elaborate further as to "other counsel," it would be reasonable to infer from discussion and documents in this record that the court was referring to Respondents' national counsel in the thi meros al litigatio n. It is clear from the transcript that the trial court at least considered the possible delay or lack of diligence attributable to the movant and commented tactfully upon it. We hold, therefore, that the Court of Special Appeals misinterpreted the trial court's consideration of this second fa ctor. 3. Sufficiency of Explanation for Need of Dismissal The Court of Special Appeals additionally misinterpreted the Circuit Cou rt's consideration of the third factor, the explanation of the need for dismissal. Judge Berger stated that "[t]here has been the explanation for this dismissal. Whether or not it's sufficient . . . really is dependent on the facts of this case." The trial court then reiterated Respondents' explanation that Dr. Bra dstreet was their sole exp ert on specif ic causation and that they would be unable to pursue th e causes o f action in the absence o f his exper t opinion. 22 According to the Court of Spe cial Appeals, how ever, had the trial court found Dr. Bradstre et's withdrawal pre-textu al, it s hould ha ve sa id so expressly. It therefore interpreted the trial court's articulation to mean that the Respondents' explanation was sufficient, and that it mitigated in favor o f the req uested dismiss al witho ut preju dice. Skevofilax, 167 Md. App. at 18, 89 1 A.2d at 426. The Circuit Court indeed considered the factual backgrou nd surrounding D r. Bradstre et's withdrawal from the case. A careful review of the trial court's decision, however, reveals that the court neither expressly no r impliedly rend ered an op inion as to whether this explanation was sufficient to merit dismissal without prejudice . We simp ly cannot determine from the 21 December 2004 transcript, as the Court of Special A ppeals purported to do, whether the trial court weighed this factor in favor of Petitioners or Respo ndents . Even if the trial court's comments were construed as a determination that Respondents' explanation was sufficient, we hold that it was not an abuse of discretion nevertheless to deny Respondents' motion. Each of the factors need not endorse a particular disposition in order to rule in a c ertain w ay. Ohlander, 114 F.3d at 1537 ("Each factor need not be reso lved in favor of the moving party for dismissal to be appropriate, nor need each factor be resolved in favor of the opposing party for denial of the motion to be proper.") (quoting Phillips U.S.A ., Inc., 77 F.3d at 3 58); see also K ovalic, 855 F.2d at 474 ("The enumeration of the factors to be co nsidere d . . . is not equivalent to a mandate that each and every factor be 23 resolved in favor of the movin g party before dismissal is approp riate . It is rathe r sim ply a guide for the trial judg e, in whom discretion ultim ately rests.") (quoting Tyco Laboratories, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 627 F.2d 54, 56 (7th Cir. 1980)). That a party provides an adequate explanation for the need to dismiss without prejudice does not compel the trial judge to grant the motion. 4. Pending Motions for Summary Judgment The fourth factor counsels a trial judge to consider the current pleading status of the litigation, i.e., whether there were any motions for summary judgment pending at the time the motion for dismissal without prejudice is filed. This f actor is prem ised, at least in pa rt, on the principle that a plaintiff confronting the potential for an adverse disposition of his, her, or its case may not dismiss unilaterally the cas e in order to f ile again in the future at a time when the con ditions m ay be mo re favo rable. See, e.g., Phillips U.S.A., Inc., 77 F.3d at 358 ("[A] party should not be permitted to avoid an adverse decision on a dispositive motion by dismissing a claim without p rejudice."); Grover, 33 F.3d at 719 ("At the point when the law clearly dictates a result for the defendant, it is unfair to subject him to continued ex posure to potential liability by dismissing the case without prejud ice."); Pace, 409 F.2d at 334 (affirming the denial of a motion to dismiss without prejudice on the ground that the plaintiffs were using the motion as a tactic to prevent summary judgment in favor of the defendants); see also M ARYLAND R ULES C OMMENTARY 351 (explaining that the purpose of 24 the present Maryland Rule 2-506 was to avoid a plaintiff's abuse of the right to unilateral voluntary dismissal at any time before the trial itself comm enced). 17 Judge B erger noted that [i]ndeed, a motion for summary judgment filed by [Petitioners] on the same d ay that the motio n for dism issal of all claims without prejudice was filed by the [R espondents]. There has, as well, been a previous motion for summary motion [sic] filed by Eli Lilly and Co mpany, that the Court den ied, at that time, for the sole purpose of allowing additional discovery to go forward before reconsidering that issue. The Court of Special A ppeals, how ever, held th at the Respondents' motion for dismissal without p rejudice w as motivate d solely by the with drawal o f Dr. Brad street, rather than an attempt to prevent an adverse disposition of the litigation by way of Petitioners' motions for summary judgm ent. Skevofilax, 167 M d. App . at 20, 89 1 A.2 d at 427-28. The Court of Special Appeals reasoned that "[a]lthough the trial court did not make any determination as to whether this factor favored [Respondents] or [Petitioners], the only conclusion supported by the record in this c ase is that this fa ctor favors the granting of [Res ponden ts'] motion to 17 Under former Maryland Rule 541, according to the commentators, plaintiffs often would use the Rule as a litigation tactic when the circumstan ces surrounding the trial w ere unfavor able for them . P AUL V. N IEMEYER & L INDA M. S CHUETT, M ARYLAND R ULES C OMMENTARY 351 (2nd ed. 1992) . If a plaintiff w as dissatisfied with the jury ve nire or with the judge assigned to the case, for example, he or she unilaterally could dismiss the case and, shortly thereaf ter, reco mmen ce the a ction un der pot entially mo re favo rable co ndition s. Id. Although this case clearly does not involve Respon dents' dissatisfa ction with the trial judge specially assigned to the case, a purpose of the new rule nonetheless remains to prevent abuse of voluntary dismissal as purely a litigation tactic. 25 dismiss without prejudice." Skevofilax, 167 Md. App. at 20, 891 A.2d at 428. The intermediate appellate court misstates the Circuit Court's reasoning. Petitioners' 1 December 2004 motion for summary judgment was filed the same day as Responden ts' renewed motion fo r voluntary dismissal. It is not clear from the record, based on the time each motion was filed, whether a reasonable inference could be drawn either that Respondents' Rule 2-506(b) motion was in response to the Vaccine Defendants' motion for s umm ary judgm ent, o r sim ply the res ult of Dr . Bra dstre et's withdrawal. W e are inclined to agree with Petitioners, however, that it was not a race to file at th at point. It is clear that Respondents legally were unable to maintain successfully their claims against Petitioners in the absence of an expert opinion on specific causation, nor did they have any basis to oppose summa ry judgment w ithout such a n expert. C ounsel fo r Respon dents quite proper ly conced ed as m uch at th e 21 D ecemb er 2004 hearing before the trial co urt. Even if the motion to dismiss w ithout preju dice was not in direct response to the prospect of an adv erse dispos ition of the ca se in favor of Petitione rs, Respon dents shou ld have foreseen that, witho ut an expe rt as to specific causation, V accine D efendan ts would seek summary judgme nt. According to Petitioners, they we re ready to file their dispositive motions at the completion of Dr. Bradstreet's deposition regardless of the outcome of the awaited genomic susceptibility tests.18 If motions for summary judgment were not pending 18 There was considerable discussion at the 21 December 2004 hearing as to the admissibility of Dr. Bradstreet's anticipated expert opinion . Critical to the formation of D r. Bradstre et's expert medical opinions wer e cer tain t est re sults rega rding the minor plainti ff's (continued...) 26 formally at the time of Respondents' Rule 2-506(b) motion, Respondents hardly could have been uncognizant of the likelihood that renewed motions for summary judgment would be forthcoming, following Dr. Brad street's withdra wal, consid ering espec ially that Petitioners had file d dispo sitive m otions a t virtually ea ch earlie r critical ju ncture o f the litiga tion. Of grea test s ignifica nt to the C ircuit Co urt, a pparently, was Eli L illy an d Co mpa ny's initial motion for summary judgment as to the fraud counts, although that motion was not 18 (...continued) susceptibility to the adve rse effects o f thimerosa l toxins. Dr. B radstreet stated in his deposition, ten days before the 21 December hearing, in another of the thimerosal cases pending elsewhere that there were no peer-reviewed scientific publications supporting a link between genetic polymorphisms and autism . Dr. Brads treet conced ed, furtherm ore, that a link between gene polymorphisms and autism was not accepted generally in the medical community. The Texas federal court in Easter (see fn.10, supra) dec lared Dr. B rads treet 's proffered testimony to suc h effect sc ientifically unreliab le and inadmissible under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2794 (199 3). Easter v. Aventis Pasteur, Inc., 358 F.Supp.2d 5 74, 576-79 (E.D . Tex. 2005). Dr. Bradstreet's similar testimony in Maryland would face an equally daunting hurdle. Although the standard for admissibility of expert opinions based on novel scientific principles, established in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), was displaced on the federal level by the Federal Rules o f Evid ence, Daubert, 509 U.S . at 588, 113 S. Ct. at 2794, Maryland specifically adopted the Frye standard in Reed v. Sta te, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978). The Frye-Reed standard continues to be the standard by which Maryland trial courts determine the admissibility of novel scientific evidence. Schultz v. Sta te, 106 Md. App. 145, 153 n.3, 664 A.2d 6 0, 64 n.3 (1995) (inte rpreting the C ommittee n ote to Md . Rule 5-702, the Maryland Rule which governs generally the admissibility of expert testimony). Under the Reed-Frye standard, no vel scientific evidence cannot be used as the basis for an expert opinion unless "the bases of that opinion [is] shown to be generally accepted as reliable within the expert's particular scientific field." Reed, 283 Md. at 381, 391 A.2d at 368. After conceding at his deposition, taken in connection with the Easter case, that no peer-reviewed scientific publications had drawn the connection between a GST-M1 polymorphism and autism, Dr. Bradstreet w as asked e xpressly: "Do you agree w ith me that it is not genera lly accepted in the medic al comm unity that the G ST-M 1 ['null'][geno type] is associa ted with autism? " Dr. B radstree t replied : "I think that's eas y to say. Yes ." 27 renewed formally until 3 December 2004, 2 days after Respondents' renewed motion for voluntary dismiss al was f iled. The initial motion was denied in May 2004 expressly in order to allow the p arties to cond uct discove ry. Considering that the time f or designa ting experts had passed, and that the bulk of fact discovery had been conducte d, it likely was app arent to Respon dents that Eli Lilly's motion for summary judgmen t would be renew ed subseq uent to Dr. Bradstreet's w ithdrawal. A reasonable trial judge, given the status of the pending litigation at the time of the relevant hearing, could conclude that the fourth factor weighed in favor of Petitioners. 5. Additional Considerations In This Case A primary thrust of the Court of Special Appeals's opinion was that "[t]he particular circumstances of the case sub judice present an additional factor that the trial court must consider in deciding a motion to dismiss w ithout prejud ice under M aryland Rule 2-506(b) Mic hael 's status as a minor." Skevofilax, 167 Md. App. at 20, 891 A.2d at 428. Federal courts interpreting FRCP 41(a)(2) have held that a trial court should consider the equities not only facing the non-moving party, but also tho se equities in f avor of the movant. Ohlander, 114 F.3d at 153 7; see also W RIGHT AND M ILLER, F EDERAL P RACTICE AND P ROCEDURE § 2364. Additionally, the four factors previously addressed are not exclusive, and any other relevant factors should be con sidered . Ohlander, 114 F.3d at 1537 (citing Phillips U.S.A ., Inc., 77 F.3d at 358 (10th C ir. 1996)). 28 The intermediate appellate court observed that Maryland courts traditionally have been solicitous of the legal rights of minors w hen a "ne xt friend" o r guardian s ues on the ir behalf for personal injuries or other similar causes of action. In affi xing this " spec ial du ty" to protect the interests of minors in litigation, the two low er courts he re looked p rimarily to two case s wh ere th is Co urt re vers ed trial co urt decisions denying plaintiffs' motions for voluntary dismissal without prejudice w here the minor plaintiffs' next friends failed to pursue diligently the claims: Fulton v. K & M Associates, 331 Md. 712, 629 A.2d 716 (1993) and Berrain v. Katzen, 331 Md. 693 , 629 A.2d 707 (1993). 19 According to the Court of Special Appeals, the trial court "failed to give a ny consideratio n to the add itional factor 'un ique to the context of the [the] case." Skevofilax, 167 Md. App. at 23, 891 A.2d at 429 (quoting Ohlander, 114 F.3d at 1537). This failure, furthermore, was found to constitute an abuse of discretion because the trial court failed to "exercise its discretion in accordance with correct legal standards." Skevofilax, 167 M d. App . at 23, 89 1 A.2d at 429. We concede that, where the record so reveals, a failure to consider the proper legal standard in reaching a decisio n cons titutes an abuse o f discre tion. Ehrlich v. Perez, 394 Md. 691, 908 A.2d 1220 (2006) (No. 137, Sept. Term 2005) (filed 12 October 2006), slip op. at 14 ("'[E]ven with respect to a d iscretionary matter, a trial court must exercise its discretion in accordance with correct legal standards.'") (quoting LeJeune v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 381 19 See also, e.g., Piselli v. 75th Street Medical, 371 Md. 188, 808 A.2d 508 (2002) (holding unconstitutional in a medical malpractice suit a statute of limitations which provided that the limitations period began to ru n before the mino r attained the age of ma jority). 29 Md. 288, 301, 849 A.2d 451, 459 (2004)); Alston v. Alston, 331 Md. 496, 504, 629 A.2d 70, 74 (1993); see also Ohlander, 114 F.3d at 1537 ("A clear example of an abuse of discretion exists where the trial court fails to consider the applicable legal standard or the facts upon which the exercise of is discretionary judgmen t is based."); McNickle v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 888 F.2d 678 , 680 (10th Cir. 1989). Because this Court concludes that the cases relied on by Respondents and the Court of Special Appeals do not compel here the grant of dismissal without prejudice, we determine that the Circuit C ourt properly considered the legal sta ndards regard ing pro tection o f the leg al rights o f mino rs. The issue in Fulton v. K & M Ass ociates was whethe r a circuit cou rt abused its discretion in denying a minor plaintiff's motion to dismiss without prejudice when the plaintiff lacked necessary medical evidence due to a lack of cooperation on the part of the next friend i n taking the min or plain tiff to be tested. 331 Md. at 713, 714, 629 A.2d at 717. In a complaint, filed through his next friend and mother, against several pro perty owners, the minor plaintiff alleged that he suffered chronic lead poisoning during infancy after ingesting deteriorated lead paint in variou s rental d welling s in Bal timore C ity. Fulton, 331 Md. at 714, 629 A.2d at 717. According to plaintiff's cou nsel, testing was necessary fo r medical ex perts to conclude whether exposure to lead was th e cause of plain tiff's perm anent b rain inju ry. Id. Because the p laint iff's next friend did not cooperate with efforts to conduct medical tests on the minor, medical evidence to support their claims could n ot be de velope d. Id. His coun sel, therefore, pursued voluntary dismissal without prejudice, under M aryland Rule 2-506(b), in 30 order to preserve the minor's cause of action. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion. Plaintiff filed a timely appeal with the Court of Special Appeals. Before the intermed iate appellate court considered the case, we issued a writ of certiorari on our initiative. 329 Md. 479, 62 0 A.2d 349 (1 993). In reversing the trial court's decision, we held that "the trial court owes a duty to infants represented by a next friend, to insure that the next friend does not prejudice the rights and interests of the minor though conflict of interest, fraud, or neglect." Fulton, 331 Md. at 715, 629 A.2d at 719. We concluded that "[i]n light of the apparent neglect of the next friend in pro secuting the claim of the infant plain tiff the trial court should have intervened on behalf of the minor and permitted dismiss al of the claim w ithout p rejudice ." Id. In Berrain v. Katzen,20 the issue was whether it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to enter default judgment against a minor plaintiff when the next friend and mother failed to comply with the defendants' reasonable requests for discovery. In Berrain, three siblings suffered permanent brain damage after allegedly ingesting lead paint flakes or chips while living with their mother in dwellings owned by the defendants. 331 Md. at 695, 629 A.2d at 707. Defense counsel propounded interrogatories to the plaintiffs on 2 December 1991. Berrain, 331 Md. at 696, 629 A.2d at 708. After waiting seven months for a response, the defendants moved for sanctions pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-432(a), which caused the 20 Berrain and Fulton wer e dec ided on th e sam e day. 31 circuit court to grant a defa ult orde r. Berrain, 331 Md. at 696-97, 629 A.2d at 708. The plaintiffs noted an a ppeal to the intermediate appellate co urt, and we again issued a writ of certiorari on our initiative. 329 Md . 337, 619 A.2d 5 47 (1993). After exploring the roots of the next friend's functions in ancient English statutory and common law, we reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that it was an abuse of discretion to enter def ault judgment in favo r of the defendan ts. We held that "the trial court has a special duty to protect the rights and interests of the minor plaintiff who is represented by [a] next friend to insu re that the nex t friend doe s not prejud ice those righ ts and interests through conflict of in terest, f raud, or, in this case, neglect." Berrain, 331 Md. at 706, 629 A.2d at 715-16. We find nothing in Fulton or Berrain to support re vers al of the C ircuit Co urt's decision here. There was no conflict of interest, fraud, or neglect on the part of minor's next friend. Judge Berger, in rendering his opinion from the bench, clearly took into consideration Michael Skevofilax's minority status.21 Also clear f rom the trial jud ge's oral opin ion is that, 21 The circuit court, in pertinent part, held: The Court does have to take into consideration in the facts of this case that there are minor plaintiffs involved . And the Cou rt is most empathetic with that issue. Nevertheless, the C ourt distinguishes this case from a case such as Berrain v. Katzen[,] [331 Md. 693, 629 A.2d 707 (1993)], or Fulton v. K & M Associates[,] [331 Md. 712, 629 A.2d 716(1993)], relied upon by the plaintiffs, where there was either parental, or guardian neglect, or even perhaps the neglect of attorneys. That is not an issue in this case. In that context, the Court does not believe that (continued...) 32 outside of some delaying tactics employed by national counsel alluded to briefly by the trial court, there was no neg lect on the part of ei ther Mic hael 's next friend or his attorneys. Judge Berger specifically held that "I will say, as all counsel have stated here, there has been no lack of diligenc e whatso ever on b ehalf of [ plaintiffs' cou nsel] in the co ntext of plaintiffs' efforts in this case." Nor is there any evidence that either counsel or the next friends engaged in the conflicts of interest or fraud against which we cautioned in Fulton and Berrain. We find that, absent conflict of interest, fraud, or neglect by a parent, guardian, next friend, or the minor's attorn ey, a motion fo r voluntary dism issal made o n behalf of a minor should not be analyzed differently than a motion for dismissal without prejudice filed by any plaintiff. In the circumstances of the pres ent case, it w as not an ab use of disc retion for the Circuit Court to treat the Ru le 2-506(b ) motion as it would any other motion for volun tary dismissal without prejudice. C. Analysis of the Circuit Court's Exercise of Discretion. 1. The Circuit Cou rt Considered the Prop er Legal Standard The "abuse of discretion" standard of review is premised, at least in part, on the concept that matters within the discretion of the trial court are "much better decided by the trial judges than by appellate courts . . . ." Wilson, 385 Md. at 198-99, 867 A.2d at 1084; In re Adoption /Guardia nship No. 3598, 347 Md. at 312-13, 701 A.2d at 118-19; Northwestern 21 (...continued) a minor's m otion for volunta ry dismissal is, or should be analyzed any differently than any other voluntary dismissal motion . 33 Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Samuel R. Rosoff, Ltd., 195 Md. 421, 436, 73 A.2d 461, 467 (1950). So long as the Circuit Co urt applies the proper lega l standards a nd reache s a reasona ble conclusion based on the facts before it, an app ellate court should not reverse a decision vested in the trial court's discretion merely because the appellate court reaches a diffe rent con clusion . See North, 102 Md. App. at 14, 648 A.2d at 1031-32 ; Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 195 Md. at 436, 73 A.2d at 467; see also Kern v. TXO Production Corp., 738 F.2d 968, 97 1 (8th Cir. 1984) ("The very concept of discretion presupposes a zone of choice within which the trial court may go either way [in granting or denying a m otion for vo luntary dismissa l]."); Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. Monada, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005) ("Discretion means the district court has a range of choice, and that its decision will no t be disturbed as long as it stays within that ra nge and is not influenced by any mistake of law.") (quoting Guideone Elite Ins. Co. v. Old Cutler Presbyterian Church, Inc., 420 F.3d 1317 , 1324 (11th Cir. 2005) ). The Court of Special Appeals's reversal of the trial court's refusal to dismiss without prejudice was based primarily on two incorrect positions: (1) that Judge Berger found only one factor weighing against dismissal without prejudice, yet nevertheless denied Respondents' motion; and (2) that Michael Skevofilax's minority status compelled dismissal without prejudice. It is clear from the transcript of the 21 December 2004 hearing that the trial judge con sidered all the relevant fac tors, including Michae l's minority status. The Court of Special Appeals even acknowledged that Judge Berger carefully considered all the proper 34 factors for a determination of whe ther volunta ry dismissal wa s appropria te. He refer red to the relevant factors, and gave a statement of reasons for denying the motion. Comp are with Conafay, 793 F.2d at 352- 53 ("In the spe cific fa ctual an d legal s etting, . . . , we find ourselves unable to resolve [whether the trial court acted properly within its discretion in denying the motion dismiss w ithout prejud ice] without the benefit of a statement of the reasons by the [trial court] for its decision denying the m otion."). He d id not abus e his discretion in this regard . 2. Other Trial Courts Similarly Have Refused to Dismiss Without Prejudice Several courts interpreting FRCP 41(a)(2) or its state analogues, including the U. S. District Court for the District of Maryland, have denied m otions for v oluntary dismis sal in circumstances not substantially different from the pres ent situation. F or examp le, in Hartford Acciden t & Indemn ity Co. v. Co sta Lines Cargo Services, Inc., 903 F.2d 352, 361 (5th Cir. 1990), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny a voluntary dismissal without prejudice when the case had be en rem oved to federa l court f or near ly ten mon ths, the court had convened on several occasions to resolve v arious dispu tes regarding the litigation, extensive discovery had been conducte d, summ ary judgmen t had been entered in favor of one defendant, and trial had already been set for the remaining defendants. In Andes, 788 F.2d at 1036-3 7, the Four th Circuit held that the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland had not abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss, w ithout prejud ice, a lawsu it where the defendant incurred 35 significant expense in respond ing to the co mplaint, filing motions f or summ ary judgment and supporting memoranda, deposing witnesses, produ cing documen ts, and obtaining expert opinions pertinent to the case.22 We find particularly persu asive the Su perior Co urt of Pen nsylvania's decision in Gray v. Magee, 864 A .2d 560 (Pa. Su per. Ct. 2 004). In that case, a minor, throu gh his parents and next friends, filed a complaint on 21 December 1998 alleging medical malpractice. Prior to filing the complaint, Eli Wayne, M.D., was retained by the plaintiffs in order to giv e expert testim ony in suppo rt of the claims. Dr. Wayne died during the pendency of the litig ation. Gray, 864 A.2d at 562. The case remained inactive on the docket until the trial court conducted a pre-trial conference on 20 August 2003, at which time the court set 11 De cember 2 003 as the deadline for the plaintiffs' filing of expert reports. Approx imately 3 months after the scheduling conference, plaintiffs requested an extension, 22 In Andes v. Versant Corp., the F ourth Circuit ultim ately reversed th e tria l cou rt's grant of dismissa l with prejudice in favor of the defendant. In that case, the trial judge entered an orde r grantin g dism issal, with prejudice, the same day that the defendants filed their response to the plaintiff's motion to dismiss without prejudice. Contained in the response was a request that the court dismiss the case with prejudice. According to the Fourth Circuit, it was uncertain whether the district c ourt considered the defen dant's opposition in dismissing with prejudice. Andes, 788 F.2d at 1036. It was clear to the reviewing court, however, that the district court entered the order without giving the plaintiff an opp ortunity to respon d to the d efend ant's requ est for d ismissa l with p rejudice . Id. Because it is clear on the record that all parties had ample opportunity to be heard on the issues before Judge Berger, the circumstances of Andes relating to the d ismissal with prejudice are distinguishable from the present case. The portion of Andes holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to d eny the dismiss al without prejudice, however, remains pertinent our analysis. 36 explaining that their expert, "Dr. Wayne[,] h ad passed away after f iling his expert report and that their new expert (who was not n amed in th e request) h ad not yet had time to file his expert report." Id. The trial court granted the plaintiffs' request, and extended expert discovery to 11 Ja nuary 20 04. In early January 2004, the plaintiffs had not identified yet their replacement expert, and requested another extension. Id. Even though the trial court granted this request, the plaintiffs w ere unable to comply w ith the amended scheduling order. On 11 February 2004, plaintiffs filed a petition for voluntary discontinuance (the Pennsylvan ia analogue to voluntary dismissal without prejudice), and the defend ants responded with a motion for summary judgment. Gray, 864 A.2d at 563 . The trial court "granted summa ry judgment in favor of [the defendant] and dismissed the case with prejudice due to [the plaintiffs'] failure to produce an expert report after being granted two 30-day extensions of time to produce the expert report." Id. On appeal, the Superior Court, Pennsylvania's intermediate appellate court, commented first upon the underlying plaintiff's minority status. Specifica lly, the court held that any trial court must con sider the intere sts of the min or in addition al to the "unre asonable inconvenience, vexation, harassment, expen se, or prejud ice" suffer ed by the def endants in the event of v oluntary discontin uance . Gray, 864 A.2d at 565; see also Fancsali v. Univ. Health Ctr. of Pittsburgh, 761 A.2d 1159, 1163 (Pa. 2000) ("[I]t is clear that in deciding whether to allow the discontinuance of an action involving a minor, the court must give some consideration to the interests of the minor in considering unreasonable inconvenience, 37 vexation, harassment, expense and prejudice."). Despite the minority status of the injured plaintiff, the Superior Court nevertheless held that the trial judge h ad not abu sed its discretion by granting the defenda nts' motion fo r summa ry judgment in lieu of plainti ffs' petition for voluntary continuance. The court reasoned that after numerous attempts to procure an expert witness and the trial court's repeated extensions of the discovery period, [plaintiffs] have failed to procure an expert witness to testify regarding their theory of liab ility in this case. Acc ordingly, [plaintiffs] have already experienced unreasonable convenience and expense in having to retain counsel and un dertake discovery to defend themselves in a cause of action for which [plaintiffs] could not provide evidentiary support during the previous five years. Gray, 864 A.2d at 565. Although not dire ctly on po int with the pres ent case , Gray, Hartford Acciden t & Indemn ity Co., and Andes underscore that we should no t upset the circ uit court's ruling here because a reasonable trial judge could have adopted the view that dismissal without prejudice was inappropriate. Similar to the circumstances in Gray, it is clear from this record that the trial court ende avored to a ccomm odate Re sponden ts while they attem pted to form ulate medical evidence to support their claims. In denying Respondents' Rule 2-506(b) motion, the trial court expressly commented upon the three extensions granted, at Respondents' request, in order to allow them to develop Dr. B radstreet's exp ert testimony. Th e Circuit Cou rt's decision to deny Respondents' motion was not so "clearly against logic" or "beyond 38 the fringe of what the courts deem minimally acceptable" that it constituted an abuse of discretio n. Wilson, 385 Md. at 198-99, 867 A.2d at 1084. III. Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment Because a trial court decides questions of law when conside ring a motion for sum mary judg men t, this Cou rt rev iews a trial co urt's grant of su mmary judg ment de novo in order to determine wheth er the tria l court w as legall y correct. Walk v. Hartford Cas., 382 Md. 1, 14, 852 A.2d 98, 105 (2 004); Todd v. Mass Transit Admin., 373 Md. 149, 154, 816 A.2d 930, 933 (2003); Sadler v. Dimensions Healthcare Corp., 378 Md. 509, 533, 836 A.2d 655, 699 (2003); Southlan d Corp. v . Griffith, 332 M d. 704, 712 , 633 A.2d 84, 87-88 (1993). A ppellate review, therefore, is c onfined to the legal grounds relied upon by the trial court in granting summary judgment. Lovelace v. Anderson, 366 Md. 690, 695, 785 A.2d 726, 729 (2001) (quoting PaineW ebber v. E ast, 363 Md. 408, 422, 768 A.2d 10 29, 1036 (2001 )); Sadler, 378 Md. at 536, 836 A.2d at 67 1; Cheney v. Bell Nat'l Ins. Co., 315 Md. 761, 764, 556 A.2d 1135, 1137 (1989) ("[ O]rdinarily we will not affirm the granting of summary judgment for a reason not relied upon by the tria l judge."); see also Warner v. German, 100 Md. App. 512, 642 A.2d 23 9, 242 (1994). A trial court shall enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Md. Rule 2-501(f). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment under Rule 2-501(f), we 39 independ ently review the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and construe against the movant any reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the facts. Jurgensen v. New P hoenix A tl. Condo. C ouncil of Unit Owners, 380 Md. 106, 114, 843 A.2d 865, 86 9 (200 4). It is clear in the p resent case th at a medical expert on specific causation was necessary in order to substantiate Respondents' causes of action. In Wilhelm v. State Traffic Safety Com m'n, 230 Md. 91, 185 A.2d 715 (1962), we held that [t]here are, unquestionably, many occasions where the causal connection between a defend ant's negligen ce and a d isability claimed by a plaintiff does not need to b e established by expert testim ony. Particularly is this true when the disability develops coinciden tally with, or within a reasonable time after, the negligent act, or where the causal connection is clearly apparent from the illness itself and the circumstances surrounding it, or where the cause of the injury relates to matters of common experience, know ledge, o r observ ation of laymen. . . . However, where the cause of an injury claimed to have resulted from a negligent act is a complicated medical question involving fact finding which properly falls within the province of medical experts (especially when the symptom s of the injury are purely subjective in nature, or w here disability do es not dev elop until some time after the negligent act), proof of the cause must be made by such w itnesses . 230 Md. a t 99-10 0, 185 A .2d at 71 9 (intern al citation s omitte d). In the present cas e, the suit would require the trial court to determine w hether vaccines adm inistered to eight-year-old Michael Skevofilax as an infant caused his autism. For such a complex medical question, a medical ex pert wou ld be necessary to prove specific causation within a reasonable degree of sc ienti fic c ertai nty. 40 The Circuit Court explained from the bench its decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Petitioners: Causation can not be demons trated in this case on the record that is presently before the Co urt. In that con text, proxim ate causation is a legal question, where the facts are either agreed upon or not in dispute. Without any expert testimony on the issue of specific causation, the Court must grant the vaccine defendant's motion for summary judgment as a matter of law. Indeed, Respon dents conceded at the 21 December 2004 hearing that they could not succeed with their claim s in the abs ence o f an ex pert op inion p ertainin g to spe cific ca usation . Nor were Respon dents able to argue that the case w as not ripe fo r summa ry judgment. Respondents' counsel instead argued that voluntary dismissal without prejudice w as more appropriate in light of D r. Bradstreet's w ithdrawal. 23 23 Specifically, Respondents' counsel stated at the 21 December 2004 hearing that Plaintiffs do not have evidence of specific causation. Because of the withdraw of the sole expert f or the Plaintif fs on spec ific causation. Tha t's Dr. Brad street, Plaintiffs d o not have the basis to oppos e summ ary judgm ent. Now, we made that clear in our pleadings. And, quite frank ly, Yo ur H onor, tha t's wh y I mentioned a few minutes ago, my response to their summary judgment motion is very succinct. And, it is, what it is. The Defend ants have gone to some length citing cases about the elements of the cause of action and all that sort of thing. We don't dispute that. The Plaintiffs' position today in the pap ers simply is, not that sum mary judgm ent is not available to this Court in the Court's discretion. But that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice is more ap propriate under all of the particular and peculiar circumstances of this litigation as it stands right now. 41 The trial court was correct in his legal conclusion that summary judgment was appropriate under the c ircumstanc es. Despite three amended scheduling orders, and approxim ately 11 months allotted to conduct d iscovery, Respondents failed to produce an expert who could testify to specific causation w ithin a reason able degre e of scientif ic certainty. Without such an expert, Respondents' claims must fail as a matter of law. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENTS. 42
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