King v. State

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Marnitta King v. State of Maryland No. 134, September Term, 2006 HEADNOTE: MARYLAND RULES -CONTEMPT - DIRECT CRIMINAL CONTEMPT-PROCEDURES When a court chooses not to summarily punish the contemnor during a proceeding in which the contumacious conduct was committed, or immediately thereafter, the court foregoes its opportun ity to proceed summa rily. Proceeding summa rily at a later date and as part of a new proceeding, is inconsistent with the requirements of Maryland Rules 15-204 and 15-205. In the Circu it Court for C harles Co unty Criminal No. K06-426 IN THE COURT OF A PPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 134 September Term, 2006 __________________________________ MARNITTA KING v. STATE OF MARYLAND __________________________________ Bell, C.J. Raker *Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene Wilner, A lan M. (R etired, Spec ially Assigned), JJ. __________________________________ Opinio n by Gre ene, J. __________________________________ Filed: July 31, 2007 *Cathell, J., now retired , participated in the hearing and conf erence of this case w hile an active member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution , Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion. We are asked to consider w hether a trial jud ge who elects not to summarily punish an attorney for direct contempt, pursuant to Maryland Rule 15-203, and instead issues a Show Cause Order and assigns a special prosecutor to prosecute the attorney for contempt, pursuant to Maryland Rule 15-204, may vacate the order initiating contempt proceeding s and convert to contempt proceedings that are summary in nature. We conclude that the trial judge erred and should have conducted proceedings consistent with Maryland Rules 15-204 and15-205. I. Factual and Procedural Background Petitioner, Marnitta King ( Ms. King ), was admitted to the Maryland Bar in December 2001, and, on M ay 1, 2006, was elected to the T own Cou ncil for the Town of Capitol Heights, Maryland. On June 7, 2006, Ms. King entered her appearance on behalf of Shawn Marcus Wooden in a criminal case in the Circuit Co urt for Charles County. Ms. King was notified by the Assignment Office of that court that Mr. Wooden s case was scheduled for trial on June 27, 2006. O n June 27, the trial judge called the c ase and, although M r. Wooden was present, Ms. King was not. The A ssistant State s Attorney, Benjamin I. Evan, offered the following regarding Ms. King s whereabouts: [STAT E S ATTO RNE Y EV AN]: T hat was . . . yes, Your Honor. I spo ke w ith M s. Ki ng appro ximately . . . well, we ve spoken about this case a number of times. About a week ago I received a call from Ms. King. She indicated to me she was going to request a continuance. She was going to be away on legislativ e duties . At that p oint . . . . With a jury panel waiting across the hallway, the trial judge asked his staff if they had any information regarding Ms. King s whereabouts: [THE COURT]: Um, hum. Perhaps my staff can shed some light. Mrs. Jones? [MRS. JON ES]: She indicate d tha t she is in O cean City. [THE COUR T]: Oh. [MRS. JONES]: In a legislative conference. [THE COURT]: And, what legislature is she a member of, to your knowledge? [MRS. JONES]: She is council[wo]man for the city of Capitol Heights, according to this. The Assistant State s Attorney added the following: [STAT E S ATTORNEY EVAN ]: Well, Your Honor, as far as the State is concerned, we would place in [sic] on the stet docket. That s the S tate s interest in th is case. Beyon d that, that if the Cou rt feels it can t tak e the stet beca use of that, we ll h ave to g o see Ju dge N alley and h ave the case res et. Displeased with proceeding without Ms. King, the court added the following: [THE COURT]: And, even though it sound s like a very favorable dispos ition . . . this is an old cas e in notic e . . . I am loathe to sever the attorney client relationship merely for the fact of moving a case. So why don t we take it up to Judge Nalley and then you can come back and tell me what happened. And, I will take the appropriate action dealing w ith someo ne wh o is not h ere. Whereupon the proceeding w as continued befo re the Honorable R obert C. Nalle y. Judge Nalley, in decid ing whe ther to resche dule the m atter said in relev ant part: [JUDGE NA LLE Y]: O kay. . . I just spoke to [the trial judge s] aide who told me that [his] position is that counsel needs to be present for that to . . . for the Court to be party to that. I don t -2- disagree. There is not in this file any . . . any request of the Court for legislative continuance. I see from the record and [the trial judge s] aid, Ms. Jones, has confirmed that this date was cleared with the assignment office for this procee ding. I noticed that Marn itta King s appearance came in here on June the 7 th . And, I reitera te there has been no request to the Court to reschedule this. One would think that as of June the 7th . . . that s more than three weeks ago . . . someone would have known about this kind of conference. I am forced, I suppose, to conclude that there is good cause in the legal, but no other sense, to reschedu le this matter. I don t know what else to do in light of this set of circumstances. So , I invite the State s Attorn ey to get a n ew da te from the assig nmen t office . After Judge Nalley concluded that there was good cause to reschedule the matter, the proceeding, nonethelesss, continued in front of the trial judge. Although Ms. King s precise whereabouts were, at that time, unknown, Mr. Wooden wished to proceed without an attor ney, and instead represented himself because he considered the State s offer of placing the case on the stet docket to be a favorable one. The court was hesitant to go f orward without Ms. K ing; however, the court ev entually accepted a waiver of M r. Wooden s right to an attorney and placed the charges ag ainst Mr. Wooden on the stet docket. At the conclusion of the m atter, the court addressed M s. King s failure to app ear. The co urt said: [THE COU RT]: O kay. We ll make . . . mark that disposition. Now, we have another m atter in this case. Mr. Zafiropulos? [ATTORNE Y ZAFIROPU LOS]: Yes Judge? [THE C OURT ]: I m going to appoint you spec ial prosecutor. I m issuing a contempt show cause for Ms. King. -3- The trial judge issued a Show Cause Order1 on June 29, 2006, and docketed the 1 The Show C ause Order issued b y the court contained the following factual recitals, in addition to, directions to Ms. King to show cause why she should not be sanctioned for direct crimina l contemp t: On March 24, 2006 , Marnitta King, a member of the Maryland State Bar, entered her appearance in the case o f State of M aryland, v. Sha wn M arcus W ooden, [in the] Circuit Court for Char les Coun ty, Maryland, case number K 04-71 0, by filing a Mo tion to Recall Warrant and to Issue a Writ of Attachment. On June 7, 2006, the R espondent filed an E ntry of Appea rance as co unsel for th e defend ant[,] Shaw n Marc us Woo den. Also on June 7, 2006, the assignm ent office o f this Cou rt mailed a no tice of trial to the Respondent. The notice stated that the Wooden case was set for a criminal jury trial on June 27, 2006, at 9:30 a.m. before the und ersigned. O n June 26 , 2006, the a ssignmen t office and the jury commissioner attempted to ascertain from the Respondent whether a jury panel should be summoned for the Wooden case. A member of the Respondent s staff told the assignment office that the Res ponden t was in a le gislative con ference a ll week o n the Easte rn shore of Maryland. The staff member further advised tha t the Respo ndent w as only available by email and that she w ould attempt to contact h er and get b ack to the as signmen t office w ith her response. The assignment office received no further communication from the Responden t s staff. D uring th e late af ternoo n of Ju ne 26, 2 006, the undersigned was contacted by the assignment office an d the jury commissioner w ho explained that they we re uncertain as to whether or not to summon s a jury panel for the Wooden case because neither the Respondent nor her staff had gotten back to them as to whether a jury panel was needed. The undersigned then had a member of his staff teleph one the R esponde nt s office to ascertain whether or not a jury pane l was needed fo r the Wooden case. The Resp ondent s staff indicated that Ms. King was not available, that she was out of Prince G eorge s co unty at a legislative conference and that [the staff] could not contact her. This staff member called back to chambers to find out h ow late the chambers would be open. She was told that the Judge would be here until 4:30 p.m. The message machine for chambers recorded a message from Ms. King at 5:03 p.m. Monday, June 26, 2006. This message said that Ms. King s client would be accepting the State s Attorney s offer to put the case on the stet docket. On the morning of June 26, 2006, when the Wooden case was called for trial, the Respondent failed to appear. Her client Mr. Wooden, informed the Court that he had talked to his attorney and that she had advised him to accept the State s Attorney s stet offer and that she would not be appearing on his behalf at tha t proceedin g. The un dersigned notes that a jury panel of 32 jurors had been summoned for the Wooden case. When Mr. Woo den arrived in the courtroom, he requested that the case proceed without the Responden t representing him. The C ourt was reluctant to hono r the defendant s (contin ued...) -4- contempt proceeding as a sep arate pr oceed ing, Cri minal 0 6-426 , State v. Marnitta King. Sub sequ ently, on August 22, 2006, the court held a hearing on the Show Cause Order. The following colloquy between special prosecutor, Mr. Zafiropulos, defense counsel for Ms. King, Mr. Jone s, and the co urt, details the co urt s attempt to determine the proper procedure the court should follow: [MR . ZAFIR OPU LOS]: If the C ourt inten ds to act th at way, sum marily, then my role is limited. H oweve r, I will state this 1 (...continued) request and the case was referred to the County Administrative Judge to rule on the issue of whether the case would be con tinued. The County Administrative Judge found good cause to continue the trial. The case was sent back to the undersigned s courtroom and M r. Wooden explained that he was incarcerated in the Prince George s County Detention Center and that the pendency of the Charles County charges acted as a detainer and prevented him from obtaining bond in the Prince George s County case. Reluctantly, the Court permitted Mr. Wooden to proceed without counsel after conducting a w aiver hearing. With M r. Wooden proceeding pro se, the charges were placed on the stet docket. Thereafter the 32 member jury panel was dismissed. The unjustified failure of an attorney to appear on [sic] court for trial at the appointed day and hour is a direct criminal contempt of Court. See State of Maryland v. Murphy, 46 Md. App. 13 8 (1980). P ursuant to Maryland Rules 15-204 and 15-205, the Court issue s this Show C ause Order. Upon consideration of the foregoing it is this 29th day of June , 2006, by the C ircuit Court for Charles County, Maryland, ORDERED that the respondent show cause, if any she has, why she should not be punished by confinement or fined for direct criminal contempt for failure to appear in Court for trial on June 27, 2006, on behalf of her client Shawn Marcus Wooden, provided a copy of this Order be served upon the Respondent on or before 11th day of July, 2006 ; and it is further ORDERED that this matter be set for a hearing on the 3rd day of August, 2006, at 9:30 a.m. before the [trial judge]. -5- for the re cord : If th e Co urt does n ot intend to ac t sum marily, then I wa nt to move to continu e the ca se . . . [a]nd to be quite honest with you, if it s go ing to be a f ull blown jury trial, then I m going to ask the Court to send this matter into the assignment office, because I don t believe under the case law that you, Judge, and take no offense from this, but could be [sic] the presidin g judge in a jury tria l. [TH E CO URT ]: Not a t the jury tria l, I wou ld be a w itness. [MR. ZAFIR OPU LOS]: But be that as it m ay, you kno w, I leave it up to the Court as to whether it s going to proceed summ arily or no t. [THE CO URT]: Mr. Jones? [MR. JONE S]: My first qu estion wo uld be, given the fact that my client was put on notice of 15-204 and 15-205, I don t believe the Court can summarily go forward, because [THE COUR T]: Well, I disagree. [MR. JONES]: And I just [THE COU RT]: She s not entitled to it, but, you know, as a courtesy, I could have just imposed sentence [in] absentia. [MR. JONES]: Had she been put on notice of [sic] by the Court in its order [THE COURT]: Um-hmm. [MR. JONES]: And by the documen t, the summons, is 204 and 205. And 204 specifically states in any proceeding involving a direct attempt by which the C ourt determines not to impose sanctions summarily, the judge promptly after the conduct shall issue a written order specifying the ev identiary hearing. But it says should the judge no t intend. So, she s been put on notice by the Court s documents, its order and by which she was s erved, and that the Co urt does no t intend to -6- proceed sum marily. And I would th ink, proced urally, it would be defective, or in my opinion may be improper for the C ourt to say, I changed my mind, now I m going to proceed summarily, when she [THE COURT]: She is not entitled as a matter of right to have a hearing under the Murphy case. [MR. JONES]: No, I agree with that; however, by the same token, if a Court issues an order telling the individual [THE COURT]: Then all I have to do is vacate the order. Right? [MR. JONE S]: And th e Court pr oceed if the Court s intent to proceed in that matter, that s fine; how ever, we w ould totally object to that and take that [TH E CO URT ]: You r objecti on is no ted, ove rruled. The court then granted the S tate s request that the court take judicial notice of the court file in the underlying crim inal case , State v. Wooden, case number K 04-710. Thereafter, the court found Ms. King in direct criminal contempt of court. The court then allowed Ms. King to testify. Ms. King testifie d that she w as elected as a council m ember in the town of Capitol Heights on May 1, 2006. After entering h er appearance on behalf of M r. Wooden, Ms. King soon realized that the trial date conflicted with a legislative conference in Ocean C ity2 . She further testified that she drafted a motion to postpone the trial date and 2 Ms. King s position as an e lected member o f the Town Council for the Town of Capitol Heights, Maryland did not qualify he r for a legislativ e continua nce availab le to members of the Ge neral Asse mbly, pursuan t to Md. C ode (200 2 Repl. V ol.) Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 6 -402. See also M aryland Rule 2-508 (d). -7- contacted the Assistant State s Attorney assigned to the case. Ms. King stated that she first spoke to the prosecutor two weeks before the trial date and that she was informed, at that time, tha t the Stat e was c onside ring a ste t. In light of the proposed disposition, Ms. King elected not to file for a continuance. According to her testimony, she visited Mr. Wooden in jail to relay the State s offer. Mr. Wooden indicated tha t he was in terested in accepting the stet, and Ms. King then attempted to find a stand-in attorney to cover the court date for her. One week prior to trial, Ms. King called the prosecutor and told him that she had another attorney that was willing to stan d in her place a nd accep t the State s of fer of plac ing the case on the stet do cket. Ms. King attended the confe rence in Ocea n City. According to her testimony, on June 26, she learned that there wa s a storm nearing Prince George s County, and she contacted the court that afternoon. At that time she discovered that the court was attempting to contact her to determine whether the Wooden case would require a jury. Ms. King further testified that she was unf amiliar with the procedures of the Circuit Court for Charles County and did not understand that it was he r responsib ility to notify the court whether a jury was needed. The following morning, Ms. King was notified that the storm was causing flooding in Prince George s Cou nty, and that because of the weather conditions, her stand-in counsel would not be able to get to the Circuit Court for Charles County. Ms. King testified that she called the court the morning of June 27, leaving a vo ice mail me ssage info rming the c ourt that she would not be able to atte nd the pro ceeding b ecause of an eme rgency session with the town, -8- because of [the] flooding. At the conclusion of Ms. King s testimony, the court heard additional testimony from the Assistant State s Attorney assigned to the Wooden case. At the close of evidence, the court stated that it did not find Ms. King to be a credible witness. The court concluded that Ms. King deliberately, intentionally, declined to show up, and found her in direct criminal contempt. The court imposed a fine of $2,500 and stated that $480 o f the fine w ould be us ed to defra y the cost of the ju ry. The court also placed Ms. King on unsupervised probation for a period of two years, subject to the following conditions: obey all laws, pay the fine by February 21, 2007 , and within one year, complete the MICPEL program dealing with professional conduct. The court offered Ms. King probation before jud gment under s ection 6-220 of the C riminal P rocedu re Artic le, which M s. King rejec ted in order to preserve h er right to app eal. Thereafter, Ms. King filed a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. On February 2, 2007, while the appeal was pending in the intermediate appellate court, this Court issued a writ of certiora ri on its o wn init iative. King v. Sta te, 397 Md. 107, 916 A.2d 256 (2 007). II. Standard of Review In Johnson v. State, 360 M d. 250, 757 A.2d 79 6 (2000), w e stated that: With respect to the interpretation of th e Mar yland Ru les, . . . [t]he canons and principles which we follow in construing statutes apply equally to an interpretation of our rules. In order to effectuate the purpose and objectives of the rule, we look to its plain text. To prevent illogical or non sensical interpretations -9- of a rule, we analyze the rule in its entirety, rather than independ ently constru ing its su bparts. If the wo rds of the ru le are plain and unambig uous, our in quiry ordinarily ceases and we ne ed not v enture o utside th e text of the rule. The venerable plain meaning principle, central to our analysis, does not, however, mandate exclusion of other persuasive sources that lie outside the text of the rule. We have often noted that looking to relevan t case law a nd appro priate secondary authority enables us to place the ru le in question in the proper c ontext. Johnson, 360 M d. at 264 -65, 75 7 A.2d at 804 ( citations and qu otations omitted ). III. Discussion In this case, the State contends that King s actions amounted to a direct criminal contempt for which King could be summarily sanctioned. The State argues that it is the contemptuous act, not the form of the proceedings, which determines whether the contempt is direct or constructive. The State also argues that the court could not impose sanctions on King on June 27, b ecause K ing was n ot present in court and [t]hat the court deferred imposition of the sentence to a later d ate and provided King an opportunity to provide evidence in mitigation did not alter the nature of the offense. The State posits that the record shows [the court] complied with the requirements of Rule 15-204 because [t]he court issued a Show Cause Order two days after finding King in co ntem pt of court. L astly, the State points out that the instant case is distinguishable from Smith v. Sta te, 382 Md. 329, 855 A.2d 33 9 (2004), b ecause th e court here expressly follo wed all of the procedures set forth in . . . Rule 1 5-205 " and th erefore Marn itta King suffer ed no p rejudice . -10- Ms. King concedes that an attorney s failure to appear as scheduled for a trial, may constitute a direct contempt of court that the court m ay summ arily adjud icate. According to Ms. Kin g, [t]he co urt in the instan t case elected not to impo se sanction s summa rily and instead issued a Show Cause Order indicating that it was proceeding pursuant to Maryland Rules 15-204 and 15-205. Ms. King s argument follows that, after deciding not to proceed summa rily and instead issuing a Show Cause Order and appointing a special prosecutor, the court was bou nd to follow the pro cedure s prosc ribed in Rules 1 5-204 and 15 -205. Ms. King posits that the court s later decision to proceed summarily was, therefor e, improp er. L astly, Ms. K ing con tends th at she w as entitle d to a fu ll jury trial as w ell as an i mpartia l judge. Contempt proceedings are [o]ne weapon in the court s arsenal [,] useful in defending its dignity. State v. Roll and Sch oll, 267 Md. 714, 717, 298 A.2d 867, 870 (1973). As we noted in Roll and S choll, [t]he history of contempt power is very old with roots stretching back to the early English monarchs and the common law. The power began as a means of assuring the efficiency and dignity of the sovereign, but it soon spread to protect representatives of the king. The contempt power o f the courts had a similar origin in that the lord chancellor s authority was derived from the king. But, as the courts becam e more independent of the crown and their power increased, the authority to punish for contempt was carried with them. In time, it was so established that the power was considered inheren t in the co urts. 267 Md. at 726-27, 298 A.2d at 875. Contempt proceedings in Maryland are now governed by the M aryland R ules. See Marylan d Rule s §§ 15 -201 th rough 15-20 8. -11- There exist two types of contem pt: direct and c onstructive. A [d]irect co ntempt means a contempt committed in the presence o f the judge presiding in court or so near to the judge as to inte rrupt the court s p roceed ings. Md. R . 15-20 2 (b). See also Smith, 382 Md. at 338, 855 A.2d at 344. Constructive contempt is any contempt other than a direct contem pt. Md. R. 15-20 2 (a). See also Smith, 382 M d. at 338, 85 5 A.2d a t 344; In re Lee, 170 Md. 4 3, 47, 18 3 A. 56 0, 562, cert. denied 298 U.S. 680, 56 S.Ct. 947, 80 L.Ed. 1400 (1936) ( Indirect or constructive contempts are those which do not occur in the presence of the court, o r near it, . . . but at some other place out of the presence of the court and beyond a place where the contempt would directly interfere with the proper functioning of the court. ); Dorsey v . State, 356 Md. 324, 344, 739 A.2d 41, 52 (1999) (noting that constructive criminal contempt proceed ings are treated like other . . . actions with regard to the initiation of pro secutio n, waiv er of co unsel, w aiver of jury trial, an d bail ). Both direct and constructive contempt proceedings can be eithe r civil or crimin al in nature. Civil contempt proceedings [are] intended to preserve and enforce the right of private parties to a suit a nd to com pel obedie nce to orde rs and dec rees primar ily made to benefit such parties. Archer v . State, 383 Md. 329, 345, 859 A.2d 210, 219-20 (2004) (quoting Roll and S choll, 267 Md. at 728, 298 A.2d at 876). On the other hand, [c]riminal contempt . . . constitute[s] positive acts which offend the dignity or process of the co urt. Holding an offending party in contempt of court [is] designed to vindicate the authority and power of the court and punish disobedience to its order. Archer, 382 Md. at 345, 859 A.2d -12- at 220 (quoting Roll and S choll, 267 Md. at 727, 298 A.2d at 875). Consis tentl y we have said that [t]he primary purpose of p unishment for crim inal contempt, wheth er direct or constructive is vindication of public a uthority, embo died in the court and represented by the judge, by punishing the contemnor for past misconduct, not to compel future compliance or to remedy the harm. Ashford v. State, 358 Md. 552, 563, 750 A.2d 35, 41 (2000) (citations omitted). Nonetheless, only that cond uct that is willful or intentional may constitute a criminal contempt. Ashford, 358 M d. at 563 , 750 A .2d at 41 (citation s omitte d). Direct contem pt may be summ arily punis hed. State v. R oll and Sc holl, 267 Md. at 732, 298 A.2 d at 878; see Md . R. 1 5-20 3. Th is Co urt has sa id that [ t]he term sum mary generally connotes an imme diate action u ndertaken without fo llowing the usual formal proced ures. Smith v. Sta te, 394 Md. 184, 215, 905 A.2d 315, 333 (2006) (concluding that the proceedings conducted in the case, giving rise to charges of co ntempt, were not sum mary in nature because it lacked the hallmarks of sum mary proceedings. In the resolution of the underlying case, the court conducted an independently docketed proceeding in which the contemnor s attorney was permitted to present a mitigating argument and also the court solicited sentencing recommendations from the State and the con temno r s coun sel.). A summary contempt proceeding is considered the exceptional case. State v. Roll a nd Scho ll, 267 Md at 733, 298 A.2d at 878. In those cases where the conduct of the alleged contemnor poses an open, serious threat to orderly procedure that instant, and summary punishment, as distinguished from du e and delib erate proce dures, is necessary, direct contempt procedures -13- are designed to fill the need for immedia te vindication of the dign ity of the court. See Ha rris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 86 S.Ct. 352, 15 L.Ed. 2d 240 (1965). In Kande l v. State, 252 Md. 668, 672 , 250 A.2d 853, 855 (1969), w e held that a n attorney s failure to pun ctually attend court is at least misbehavior on the part of an officer of the court and may amount to, and be punishable as, contempt. Further, we held that such a contempt can be punished summ arily. Id. In the case sub judice, both parties agree that because of Ms. King s absence, the court could have found that Ms. King committed a direct criminal contempt and imposed sanctions summarily pursuant to Md. Rule 15-203.3 See Ashford, 358 Md. at 564, 750 A.2d at 4 1 3 We do not mean to imply that the court should have conducted contempt proceedings in Ms. Kin g s absenc e. This Co urt has said o n numer ous occa sions that [a ] trial in absentia is not favored and it should be the extraordinary case, undertaken only after the exercise of a careful discretion by the trial court. Tweed y v. State, 380 Md. 475, 494, 845 A.2d 1215, 1226 (2004) (citations omitted). See Maryland Rule 4-231 (implementing the right to be present at trial). Furthermore, we do not suggest that Maryland Rule 15-203 permits a finding of wilfulness on the basis of hearsay evide nce offered aga inst the contemnor. Be fore the court could make a f inding of w ilfulness and direct contem pt, there mu st be legally sufficient evidence that would be admissible in a criminal case to support those findings. Here, because Ms. King failed to appear, the trial judge had direct evidence that Ms. King was absent, but only hearsay statements as to why she was absent. Without more, the trial judge did not have sufficient evidence to make a finding of direct contempt at the time he issued the Show Cause Order on June 29, 2006. See Dorsey v . State, 356 Md. 324, 352, 739 A.2d 41, 56 (1999 ) (noting that the mens rea element[] must be established by evidence, and cannot simply be assum ed. ) The evidence offered against the contemnor, including any evidence regarding the willfulness of the contemno rs conduct, must establish that party s guilt beyond a reasonab le doubt. See Ruffin v. State , 394 Md. 355, 363, 906 A.2d 360 (2006) (noting that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Unite d States C onstitution an d Article (contin ued...) -14- (2000) (noting that [a] direc t contemp t, such as failu re to appea r, or disruptive conduct in the courtroom, may be summarily punished after such hearing as the presiding judge may deem just and necessary ) (citations omitted). Specifically, Ms. King s failure to attend court on June 27, 2006, as well as her failure to notify the Assignment Office that jurors were not needed, resulted in an unneces sary disruption of the court s business and, constituted a contem pt of co urt, prov ided he r actions were n ot justifie d and w ilful. The state contends [t]hat the court [chose to] defer[] im position of the sentenc e to a later date and provided King an opportunity to provide evidence in mitigation and that 3 (...continued) 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights guarantee that a criminal defendant shall only be convicted upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt.) It is the exceptional case where an attorney fails to appear for a schedu led court proceeding, an d that court receives sufficient evidence, at that moment, to establish the attorney s willfulness such that it may sum marily find tha t attorne y in conte mpt of court. As indicated previously, where an attorney fails to appear, during the course of court proceedings, the trial judge ordinarily will not know all the relevant facts surrounding the alleged unjustified failure to a ppear. Th us, the better p ractice wo uld be for th e court to proceed with caution. The situation in Hermina v. Baltimore Life Ins. Co., 128 Md. App. 568, 739 A.2d 893 (1999), is instructive. A s suggested by the intermed iate appellate court in Hermina, in the instant case, the trial judge could have issued a bench warrant to have Ms. King brought before the court forthwith, if possible, for a summary contempt proceeding. He chose, however, not to do so and concluded the underlying criminal case by entering Mr. Wooden s stet on the record. In Jones v. Sta te, 61 Md. A pp. 94, 484 A.2d 10 50 (1984 ), the intermed iate appellate court held that a d efendan t s failure to time ly appear for a court proceeding resulted in an inconvenience to the trial court but not an interruption of the c ourt s business and therefo re was not a direct criminal contempt. The offended court should, at all times, remain ever mindful of the distinction noted in Jones. We note that while trial judges must be given wide latitude to punish contemptuous conduct, they must ever be on guard against confusing offenses to their sensibilities with obstructions to the administration of justice. Muskus v. State, 14 Md. Ap p 348, 361-62, 28 6 A.2d 783, 79 0 (1972). -15- [t]he only basis for further proceedings was to provide King an opportunity to provide evidence in mitigation. Similarly, the State points out that [t]he court issued a Show Cause Order two days after finding K ing in contempt of court. (Emphasis added.) This argument implies that the trial judge initiated contempt proceedings on June 27, 2006, and found Ms. King in contem pt and inten ded to imp ose sanctio ns summ arily, at a later date. Tha t, however, did not occur. If that had happened, consistent with the requirements of Rule 15203, the trial judge was required to summarily find[] and announce[] on the record that direct contempt ha[d] been committed, then defer imposition of sanctions until the close of the proceedings during which the contempt ha d been comm itted. See Md. R. 15 503 (a). As noted supra, the court did not announce on the record that a direct contempt had been committed. At no time on June 27 did the judge indicate that he was proceeding under the requireme nts of Rule 15-203. To the contrary, to the extent that the judge addressed Ms. King s fa ilure to appe ar, he said the following : [THE CO UR T]: O kay. We ll make . . . mark that disposition. Now, we have another m atter in this case. Mr. Zafiropulos? [ATTORNE Y ZAFIROPU LOS]: Yes Judge? [THE C OURT ]: I m going to appoint you spec ial prosecutor. I m issuing a contempt show cause for Ms. King. Furthermore, the langua ge contain ed in the Sh ow Ca use Orde r, specifically states that the Order was being is sued [ p]ursu ant to M aryland R ules 15 -204 an d 15-2 05. By reference to Rules 15-204 a nd 205, the court indicated that it was going to hold a p roceeding for -16- constructive criminal con tempt; it was not until that proceeding began that the court chose to proceed s ummarily. C onsistent w ith the proce dure con templated by the Show Cause Order, the trial judge separately docketed the new proceeding, as Criminal case No. 06-426 and design ated a sp ecial pro secuto r to try the ca se. We conclud e, therefore, that the judge s actions were consistent with the requirements of Rule 15-204, not the requirements of Rule 15-20 3. As noted supra, the court initially chose not to summarily impose sanctions as proscribed by Rule 15-203. M oreover, because he did not bring Ms. Kin g before h im forthwith for summary contempt proceedings, or adjudicate her in contempt as part of the underlying case, the court could not summarily sanction her after initiating a new proceeding. By choosing not to initiate summary proceedings, the court elected to follow Rule 15-204.4 This rule covers [those] situations in which a direct contempt is not sum marily san ctioned . Hermina v. Baltimore Life Ins. Co., 128 Md. A pp. 568, 585, 739 A .2d 893, 902 (199 9). The State contends, and the record supports the conclusion, that the court relied on a decision of the Court of Special Appeals, Murph y v. State, 46 Md. App. 138, 416 A.2d 748 (1980), as a guidep ost in adjudic ating Ms . King in contem pt of co urt. The court maintained 4 Maryland Rule 15-204 provides: In any proceeding involving a direct contempt for which the court determines not to impose sanctions summarily, the judge, reasonably promptly after the conduct, shall issue a written order specifying the evidentiary facts within the personal knowledge of the judge as to the conduct constituting the contempt and the id entit y of the contemnor. Thereafter, the proceeding shall be conducted pursuant to Rule 15-205 or Rule 15-206. -17- that, pursuant to Murphy, it could permissibly issue a Show Cause Order, separately docket that proceeding, assign a special prosecutor and, at a later date, proceed summarily against Ms. K ing. The factual circumstances in Murphy are similar to those in the instant case. In Murphy, an attorney w as charged with direct c ontempt o f court in the Circuit Court for Dorchester County for failure to appear in that court as defense counsel in two criminal trials scheduled for September 6, 1979. Murphy, 46 M d. App . at 139, 4 16 A.2 d at 749 . Because the attorney failed to appear, the Circuit Court issued a Show Cause Order on September 14, 1979, ordering Mr. Murphy to show cause why he should not be held in c ontem pt of co urt. Murphy, 46 Md. App. at 141, 416 A.2d a t 751. In the Order, [the Circuit Court] stated that although a direct con tempt ma y be summ arily punished p ursuant to Md. Rule P 3(a), [the trial judge] wished to preserve [Mr. Murphy s] right to due process and to therefore give him an opportun ity to show ca use why he should not be held in contempt [of court]. Murphy, 46 Md. App. at 141, 416 A.2d at 751. Following a hearing, the Circuit Court found Mr. Murphy in conte mpt. On appea l, Murp hy argue d, inter alia, that his behavior w as, at most, a constructive contempt that must be proceeded against within the strictures of Md. Rule P4. Murphy, 46 Md. App. at 145, 416 A.2d at 752. The intermediate appellate court rejected Murp hy s argumen t, hold ing that an at torney s unjustified failure to a ppear or to g ive reasona ble notice thereof is a contempt committed in the presenc e of the co urt and, there fore pun ishable -18- summa rily under M d. Rule P3. Murphy, 46 Md. App. at 149, 416 A.2d at 755. In addition, the intermediate appellate co urt reasone d that [in] ju risdictions [tha t] have held that the absence of an attorney from court does not occur within the pres ence of the court[,] [was because those] courts were chiefly conce rned that the contemn or be affo rded due process in the form of an opportunity to explain his absence. Murphy, 46 Md. App. at 149-50, 416 A.2d at 755. The Court of Special appeals further explained that Murphy was given sufficient time to prepare his defense and an opportunity to present it, even though the court was not required to do so in a case of direct co ntemp t. Murphy, 46 Md. App. at 150, 416 A.2d a t 755. While the factual circumstances in Murphy are similar to the instant case, that case was decided pursuant to former Rules P3 and P4. Ms. Kin g conced es that her ac tions could have been pun ished as a d irect contem pt. The issue before us, however, is whether the trial judge could summarily sanction Ms. King under the current Rules of Procedure because as Murphy pointed out the mere provision of a hearing d[oes] not transform [a] direct contempt into a constructive [contempt]. Murphy, 46 Md. App. at 150, 416 A. 2d at 755. In other words, we must decide wh ether Murphy is still good law in view of this Court s re visions to the Contempt R ules in 1996, sixteen years after Murphy was d ecided . At the time Murphy was decided, direct contempt proceedings were governed by Maryland Rule P3. That Rule provided: a. A direct contempt may be punished summarily by the court against which the contempt was committed. b. Where a direct -19- contempt is committed, the court shall sign a written order to that effect. Th e order sha ll recite the facts , be signed by the judge and entered of record. The order shall state which of the facts were known to the court of its own knowle dge and a s to any facts not so known, the basis for the court s finding with respect thereto. c. The record in such cases shall consist of (1) such order of contemp t, (2) any affidavit filed by the defendant, (3) any affida vit filed by the Sta te s attorney in support of the order of contem pt, if the court d irected him to investigate or prosecute the contempt, and (4) any testimony offered. Constructive contempt was governed by Maryland Rule P4. Rule P4 provided: a. Constructive contempt proceedings may be instituted by the court of its own motion , by the State s attorney or by any person having actual knowledge of the alleged contempt. b. 1. Show Cause Order (a ) Issuance. If the court de termines to cite the defendant for contempt, it shall issue an order requiring the defendant to show cause why an order adjudging him in contempt shall not be passed within the time stated therein. (b) Contents. The show cause order shall state the time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of the def ense, and s hall state the ess ential facts constituting the contempt charged. (c) Service. The show cause order shall b e served u pon the de fendant p ursuant to Rule 104 (Service of Process Generally) unless the defendant has appeared as a party in the action in w hich the co ntempt is charged, in which case serv ice shall be in the manner prescribed by the court. 2. Written Statement. A copy of any writing or document filed in support of the alleged contempt shall also be served upon th e defe ndant. c. If the defendant shall answer, the charge shall be set for h earing. If no cause be shown within the time named in the order, the case shall be heard ex parte. d. 1. Appointmen t of Prosecutor. The co urt may designate the State s attorney or any other member of the bar to prose cute the procee ding. 2. When Judge Disqualified. Unless a defendant otherwise consents, the judge who issued a citation for co nstructive co ntempt sha ll be disqualified from presiding at the hearing except where such contempt consists -20- of failu re to ob ey an ord er or jud gmen t in a civil c ase. The Court of Ap peals, by Order dated June 5, 1996, effective Janu ary 1, 1997 rescinded, inter alia, Subtitle P of Chapter 1100 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure. Currently, direct civil and criminal contempt proceedin gs are gov erned by M aryland Rule 15-203. R ule 15203 prov ides in pertine nt part: (a) Summary Imposition of Sanctions. The c ourt against which a direct civil or criminal contempt has been committed may impose sanctions on the person w ho comm itted it summ arily if (1) the presiding judge has personally seen, heard, or otherwise directly perceived the conduct constituting the contempt and has p erso nal k now ledg e of t he id entit y of the person committing it, and (2) the contempt has interrupted the order of the cou rt and interfe red with the dignified conduct of the court's business. The court shall afford the alleged contemnor an opp ortunity, consistent with the circumstances then existing, to present exculpatory or mitigating information. If the court summarily finds and announces on the record that direct contempt has been committed, the court ma y defer imposition of sanctions until the conclusion of the proceeding during which the contempt was committed. Maryland Rule 15-204, which forms the crux of this case, provides: In any proceeding involving a direct contempt for which the court determines not to impose sanctions summarily, the judge, reasonab ly promptly after the conduct, shall issue a written order specifying the evidentiary facts within the personal knowledge of the judge as to the conduct constituting the contempt and the identity of the contemn or. Thereafter, the proceeding shall be conducted pursuant to Rule 15-205[5] or 5 Maryland R ule 15-20 5 provide s: (contin ued...) -21- Rule 15-206,[6] whichever is applicable, and Rule 15-207[7] in 5 (...continued) (a) Separate action. A proceeding for constructive criminal contempt shall be docketed as a separate criminal action. It shall not be include d in any action in which the alleged contempt occurred. (b) Who may institute. (1) The court may initiate a proceeding for constructive criminal contempt by filing an order directing the issuance of a summons or warrant pursuant to Rule 4-212. (2) The State's Attorney may initiate a proceeding for constructive criminal contempt committed against a trial court sitting within the county in which the State's Attorney holds office by filing a petition with that court. (3) The Attorney General may initiate a proceeding for constructive criminal contempt committed (A) against the Court of Appeals or the Court of Special Appeals, or (B) against a trial court when the Attorney General is exercising the authority vested in the Attorney General by Mar yland Co nstitution , Art. V , § 3, by filing a petition with the court against which the contem pt was alleg edly committed. (4) The State Prosecutor may initiate a proceeding for constructive criminal contemp t committed against a court when th e State Pros ecutor is exercising the authority vested in the State Prosecutor by Code, State Government Article, § 9-1201 et seq., by filing a petition with the court against which the contempt was allegedly committed. (5) The court or any person with actual knowledge of the facts constituting a constructive criminal contempt may requ est th e Sta te's A ttorn ey, the Attorne y General, or th e State Prosecutor, as appropriate, to file a petition. (c) Appointment of prosecutor. If the p roce edin g is comm ence d by a court on its own initiative, the court may appoint the State's Attorney of the county in which the court sits, the Attorney General, or the State Prosecutor to prosecute the charge. (d) Contents; service. An order filed b y the court purs uant to sectio n (b)(1) of th is Rule and a petition filed by the State's Attorney, the Attorney General, or the State Prosecutor shall contain the information required by Rule 4-202(a). The order or petition shall be served, along with a summons or warrant, in the manner specified in Rule 4-212 or, if the proceeding is in the Co urt of Appeals or C ourt of Special Appeals, in the man ner directed by that court. (e) W aiver of co unsel. The provisions of Rule 4 -215 app ly to constructive criminal contempt proceedings. (f) Jury trial. The provisions of Rule 4-246 apply to constructive criminal contempt proceedings. 6 Marylan d Rule 15-20 6 cove rs proce edings involv ing con structive civil con tempt. -22- the same m anner as a c onstructive c ontempt. Former Rule P3 provided that a direct co ntempt m ay be punish ed summ arily by the court. The Ru le was silent a s to wheth er the court sh ould impo se sanction s immedia tely after the contumacious conduct was committed, or, whether the punish ment for th e conduc t could occur at a later time. Presumably, the court against which a direct contempt was committed could have imposed sanctions summarily, during that proceeding, immediately after the proceeding, or at some later date as in Murphy. In contradistinction to Rule P3, the current Maryland Rules, 15-203 and 15-204 make the procedure for the punishment of direct contempt clear, to the extent, that if a direct contempt is not summarily sanctioned, the direct contempt proceeding shall be conducted like a constru ctive co ntemp t procee ding. See Md. Rule 1 5-204 . Specifica lly, Rule 15-203 is d istinguishab le from R ule P3 in tha t, following a direct contemp t, the court may defer the imposition of sanctions until the conclusion of the proceeding during which the con tempt w as com mitted, only if the court summarily finds and announces on the record that direct contempt has been committed. The plain language of the rule contemplates that summary imposition of sanctions should occur contemporaneously with the proceeding in which the direct contempt occurred. This is further reinforced by the plain language of Rule 15-204 which mandates that when the court does not impose 7 Maryland Rule 15-207 primarily covers consolidation of criminal and civil contempt cases. -23- sanctions summarily, the proceeding shall be conducted pursuant to Rule 15-205 or Rule 15206 and 15-2 07. In other w ords, Rule 15-204 re quires that the direct contem pt shall be treated like a constructive contempt for purposes of adjudication and disposition. The former rules did not specify how a direct contemp t should be treated if the court de termined n ot to impose sanc tions sum marily. Thus, we conclude that if Murphy had been decided under the current rules, that court would have been required to follow Rule 15-204 and hold that summary contempt proceedings were improper because the trial court, initially, determined not to impose sanctions summarily. Therefore, the court s reliance on Murphy was misplaced.8 Because he did not summarily impose sanctions for King s direct criminal contempt, Maryland Rule 15-204 governed the procedure for adjudication of the direct contem pt and th e impo sition of sanctio ns. In addition to citing Murphy, the State also cites the committee note to Rule 15-203. The committee note suggests a scenario entirely different than that which occurred in this case. The committee note provides: Sanctions may be imposed immediately upon the finding of the 8 In the present case because the un derlying criminal case was term inated, summary imposition of sanctions was inappropriate. We are of the view that Hermina, 128 Md. App. at 585, 739 A.2d at 902 (holding that since the court postponed the trial because the defendant s attorney was a bsent, there was no need or reason for a summary proceeding to restore order and maintain the dignity of the court ) is more in accord with recent pronoun cements of this Court than Murphy, supra. See Sm ith v. State, 394 Md. 184, 215, 905 A.2d 315, 333 (2004) (noting that contempt procedures that were not immediate but were independently docketed proceedin gs in whic h to impose sanctions was inconsistent with the concept of summary proceedin gs ). -24- contemp t, or, in the court s discretion, may be deferred to a later time in the proceeding. Deferral of a sanction does not affect its summary nature. The sanction remains summa ry in nature in that no hearing is required; the co urt simply annou nces an d impo ses the s anction . The committee note is applic able in a situation in which the court finds the contem nor guilty of direct contempt, but ch ooses to impos e a sanc tion later in that pr oceed ing. See e.g., Mitchell v. State, 320 Md. 756, 580 A.2d 196 (1990) (in which the court summarily imposed sanctions for Mitchell s contempt during his sentencing proceeding immediately after imposing the sentence for the underlying crime). The rule does contemplate a deferral of sanctions as suggested by the State; however, it plainly contemplates that the defe rral results after a de minim is passage of time. Specifically, the court may defer the imposition of sanctions until the conclusion of the u nde rlying proceeding. The imposition of sanctions weeks after the contumacious conduct ignores the purpose for which sanctions are imposed sum marily, i.e., to vindicate the court so that a court . . . [will] not be at the mercy of the obstreperous and un couth. R. Go ldfarb, The Contempt Power 306 Columbia University Press (1963). We caution, however, that [t]he power to immed iately and sum marily hold a person in contempt is awesome and abuses of it must be guarded against. Roll and Scholl, 267 Md. at 73 2, 298 A.2d at 87 8. (Citations omitted.) Our discussion in Smith, 394 Md. 184, 905 A.2d 315 is instructive. In Smith the issue before the cou rt, inter alia, was whether Maryland Rule 15-204 applies where a co urt promptly finds that direct contempt has been committed, but declines to impose sanctions -25- until a separately docketed hearing after the conclusion of the proceeding during which the contempt allegedly was committed. Smith, 394 Md. at 19 7, 905 A .2d at 323. Je ffery Smith was called to testify as a prosecution witness, in a case , in the Circuit Court for Ba ltimore City. Smith r efused to testify. The trial cou rt announ ced that M r. Smith refu se[d] to answer the questions p roperly put to him by the State [an d that Smith s] contem pt . . . interrupted the order of the Co urt . . . and, therefo re, [that] the C ourt [foun d] him guilty of contempt beyond a reasonable doubt. Smith, 394 Md. at 195, 905 A.2d at 321-22. Two days after the conclusion of the case, the same judge conducted a separately docketed hearing and senten ced Sm ith to fiv e mon ths for d irect crim inal con tempt. On appeal, Smith argued that because th e sanction w as meted o ut in a separa tely docketed proceedin g, it [could n ot have be en] consid ered to have been imposed summa rily and as such, the trial judg e s actio ns did n ot com ply with th e appro priate M aryland R ules. Smith, 394 Md. at 214, 905 A.2d at 332. This Court agreed with Smith, concluding that [t]he procedures implemented in [that case] were neither immediate nor without the usual formalities of a hearing and that [t]he fact that the court held an independently docketed proceeding in which to dispense sa nctions is en tirely inconsistent w ith the concept of summary proceedings. Smith, 394 M d. at 215, 905 A.2d at 333. In that case, the court permitted Smith s attorney to present an argument in mitigation and solicited sentencing recommendations from both parties, and therefore the proceeding lack[ed] the hallmarks of summary imposition of sanctions under Maryland Rule 15-203(a). Smith, 394 Md. at 215, -26- 905 A.2d at 333. We held, therefore, that [b]ecause the trial judge did not summarily impose sanctions for Smith s direct criminal contempt, Maryland Rule 15-204 govern[ed] the imposition of sanctions. Id. The State conte nds that Smith is distinguisha ble becau se the court h ere expres sly followed all of the required procedures set forth in the Rules 15-205. We disagree. In the case sub judice, the court commenced and should have continued to follow the procedure set forth in Rule 1 5-20 4. As suc h, the court, re ason ably p romptly after Ms. King s co nduct, issued a written order specifying the evidentiary fac ts within his personal k nowled ge as to the conduct constituting the contempt and also identified Ms. King as the individual involved. See Md. R. 15-204. Thereafter, pursuant to that Rule, the court should have conducted a proceeding pursuant to Rule 15-205. Although the court complied with Rule 15-205 when it ap pointed an Assistant State s Attorney to prosecute the contempt proceeding, and also when it issued a Show C ause Order, it nonetheles s failed to satisf y all of the strictures of the Rule. Specifically, as the State concedes, Ms. King was not afforded a trial by jury. As a prerequisite to waiver o f a jury trial, and in a ccordanc e with Md. R ule 4-246,9 the court was required to conduct a waiver inquiry. In addition, because of the nature 9 Maryland R ule 4-246 provides: (a) Generally. In the circuit court a defendant hav ing a right to trial by jury shall be tried by a jury unless the rig ht is waived pursuant to section (b) o f this Rule. If the waiver is accepted by the court, the State may not elect a trial by jury. (b) Procedure for Acceptance of Waiver. A defendant may waive the right to (contin ued...) -27- of the proceedings, Ms. King w as entitled to all th e constitution al safegua rds applicab le to a defendant in a constru ctive crim inal con tempt p roceed ing. Roll and S choll, 267 Md. at 731 n.12, 298 A.2 d at 877 n.1 2; Dorsey, 356 Md. at 343-44, 739 A.2d at 51-52 (noting that a constructive criminal contempt has the characteristics of any other criminal case, including prosec ution, w aiver of couns el, waiv er of jur y and bai l). Pursuant to the plain language of Rule 15-203,10 the court ag ainst whic h a direct contempt is committed can pu nish that contempt sum marily at the time it is committed or immediately after that proceeding. When the court chooses not to summarily punish the contemnor, it foregoes its opportunity to proceed summarily. Proceeding summarily at a later 9 (...continued) a trial by jury at any time bef ore the com mencem ent of trial. The court may not accept the waive r until it determines, after an examination of the defendant on the record in open court conducted by the court, the State's Attorney, the attorney for the defendant, or any combination thereof, that the waiver is made knowin gly an d voluntarily. (c) Withdrawal of a Waiver. After accepting a waiver of jury trial, the court may permit the d efendan t to withdraw the waive r only on motion ma de before trial and for good cause shown. In determining whether to allow a withdrawal of the waive r, the court m ay consider the extent, if any, to w hich trial wo uld be delayed b y the withdraw al. 10 In Stewart v. S tate, 334 Md. 213, 215-16, 638 A.2d 754, 755 (1994), we held that the Maryland Rules of Procedure are not guides to the practice of law but precise rubrics established to promote the orderly and efficient administration of justice and [tha t they] are to be read and fo llowed (citatio n omitte d). See also Jones v. State, 379 Md. 704, 741, 843 A.2d 778, 800 (2004 ); Chambers v. State, 337 Md. 44, 58 -59, 650 A.2d 7 27, 734 (1994); Goins v. State, 293 Md. 97, 109, 442 A.2d 550, 556 (198 2); State v. Ricketts, 290 Md. 287, 292, 429 A.2d 1025, 10 27-28 (19 81); Countess v. State, 286 Md. 444, 463, 408 A.2d 1302, 1311 (1979); King v. Sta te Roads Com m n, 284 Md. 368, 371-72, 396 A.2d 26 7, 269 (1979); Robinson v. Bd. of Educ., 262 Md . 342, 346, 2 78 A.2d 71, 73 (19 71); Isen v. Pho enix Assurance Co., 259 Md. 564 , 570, 270 A.2d 4 76, 479 (1970). -28- date, in effect, circumvents compliance with Maryland Rules 15-204 and 15-205 and, therefore, is improper. Accordingly, we hold that the trial judge, in the present case, erred in imposing sanctions summarily in violation of the procedures delineated in Maryland Rules 15-20 4 and 1 5-205 . JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHARLES COUNTY REVERSED. CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT I N C O N S I ST E N T W I T H T H IS OPINION. COSTS IN THIS COURT TO BE PAID BY CHARL ES COUNTY. -29-

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