Broadwater v. State
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Lorinda Ann Broadwater v. State of Maryland, No. 123, Sept. Term 2006. CRIMINAL LAW - WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL - MARYLAND RULE 4-215(a) MAY BE SATISFIED WHERE A DEFENDANT, WHO PRAYS A JURY TRIAL IN THE DISTRICT COURT, THUS TRANSFERRING THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT, RECEIVES ALL APPLICABLE ADVISEMENTS AN D INQUIRIES, ALBEIT IN A PIECEMEAL AND CUMULATIVE FASHION ACROSS MULTIPLE APPEARANCES IN THE DISTRICT AND CIRCUIT COURT. CRIMINAL LAW - WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL - ABUSE OF DISCRETION - TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANT WAIVED BY INACTION HER RIGHT TO COUNSEL WHERE THE RECORD SHOWS THAT DEFENDANT APPEARED WITHOUT COUNSEL NUMEROUS TIMES BEFORE THE COURT, DEFENDANT DID NOT EVINCE ANY CONFUSION REGARDING HER RIGHTS AS THE RESULT OF THE METHOD OF RECEIVING THE ADVISEMENTS UND ER RU LE 4-215(a), THE TRIAL JUDGE INQUIRED INTO THE DEFENDANT S REASON FOR APPEARING WITHOUT COUN SEL, AN D THE COUR T DET ERMIN ED TH AT TH E DEFE NDA NT S EXCUSE WAS WITHOUT MERIT. Circuit Co urt for Frede rick Coun ty Case # 10-K-04-035747 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 123 September Term, 2006 _____________________________________ LORINDA ANN BROADWA TER v. STATE OF MARYLAND _____________________________________ Bell, C.J. Raker *Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene Wilne r, Alan M . (Retired, specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by Harrell, J. Bell, C.J., Ba ttaglia, and G reene, JJ., Diss ent. Filed: September 13, 2007 *Cathell, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion. We issued a writ of certiorari in this case to consider two questions: (1) whether the Circuit Court for Frederick County was correct in finding that, as a matter of law, a defendant in a criminal ca se may be he ld to have waived validly by inaction, pur suant to M aryland Rule 4-215(a) and (d), his or her right to be represented by counsel where the required preliminary litany of advisements under (a) was provided to the defendant by various judges in a piecemeal and cumulative fashion over the course of multiple appearances before the District Court and Circuit Court because the case w as initiated in the District Court pursuant to that court s exclusive o riginal jurisdiction and the de fendant re moved th e case to the Circu it Court by praying a jury trial; and (2) whether the Circuit Court abused its discretion by finding that Lorinda Ann Broadwater, defendant below and Petitioner here, waived her right to counsel, despite her proffered excuses for failing to engage counsel? The Court of Special Appea ls found no reversible erro r with the piecemeal approach to rendition of the litany of Rule 4-215(a) advisements and concluded that the Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in finding tha t Broadw ater waive d her right to c ounsel by inac tion. For the re asons set fo rth below, we affirm. I. A. Legal Context The Sixth Am endmen t to the Unite d States C onstitution pro vides that, [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation . . . and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. U.S. C ONST. amend. VI. Throug h the Fou rteenth Amen dment, 1 the duty to provide all criminal defenda nts with counsel applies to individual states because such provision is fundamental and essentia l to a fair t rial. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342, 83 S. Ct. 792, 795, 9 L.Ed.2 d 799 ( 1963) . Similar ly, Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights states that in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right to be informed of the accusation against him; to have a copy of the Indictment, or charge, in due time (if required) to prepare for his defence; [and] to be allowed counsel. M D. D ECL. OF R IGHTS, art. 21. These constitutional provisions guarantee a right to counsel, including appointed counsel for an indigent, in a criminal case involving incarceration. Parren v . State, 309 Md. 260, 262, 523 A.2d 597, 598 (1987) (quoting Rutherford v. Rutherford, 296 Md. 347, 357, 464 A.2d 228, 234 (1983)). As part of the implementation and protection of this fundamental right to counse l,2 we 1 Specifically, the Fourteenth Amendment, in pertinent part, provides: No State shall make or enforce any law w hich shall abridge the privileges or immun ities of citizens o f the Unite d States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liber ty, or p rope rty, without due proc ess of law ; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S. C ONST. amend. XIV. 2 See Parren v. State, 309 Md. 260, 263, 523 A.2d 597, 598 (1987) (explaining that the right to counsel is a fundamental constitutional right, basic to our adversary system of criminal justice ) 2 adopted M aryland Rule 4-215,3 which explicates the method by which the right to counsel may be waived by those defendants wishing to represent themselves, the modalities by which a trial judge m ay find that a criminal def endant w aived imp licitly his or her right to c ounsel, either by failure or refusal to obtain counsel, and the necessary litany of advisements that must be given to all criminal defendants before any finding of express or implied waiver of the right 3 4 to be represented by counsel may be valid. 4 The Rule The Marylan d Rule s of Pro cedure have th e force of law . M D. C ONST., art. IV, § 18. Maryland Rule 4-215, in pertinent part, provides: (a) First Appearance in Court Without Counsel. At the defendant s first appearance in court without counsel or when the defenda nt appears in the District C ourt without counsel, demands a jur y trial, and the record does not disclose prior complian ce with this s ection by a jud ge, the cou rt shall: (1) Make certain that the defendant has received a copy of the charging document containing notice as to th e right to cou nsel. (2) Inform the defendant of the right to counsel and of the importanc e of assistan ce of cou nsel. (3) Advise the defendant of the nature of the charges in the charging document, and the allowable penalties, inclu ding man datory penalties, if a ny. (4) Condu ct a waive r inquiry pursua nt to section (b) of this Rule if the defen dant indicates a desire to waive c ounsel. (5) If trial is to be conducted on a subsequent date, advise the defendant that if the defendant appears for trial without c ounsel, the c ourt could determine that the defendant waived counsel and proceed to trial with the defendant unrepresented by counsel. (contin ued...) 3 provides an orderly procedure to insure that each criminal defendant appearing before the court be represented by counsel, or, if he is not, that he be advised of his Sixth Amendment constitutional right to the assistance of counsel, as well as his correlative constitutional right to self-representation. Wright v. State, 48 M d. App . 185, 19 1, 425 A .2d 138 5, 1388 , cert. denied, 290 Md. 724 (1981). Any decis ion to waiv e counse l (or to relinquish the right to counsel through inaction) and represent oneself must be accompanied by a wa iver inquiry designed to ensure that [the decision] is made w ith eyes open and that the defendant has undertaken waiver in a knowing and inte lligent f ashion . State v. Brown, 342 Md. 404, 414, 676 A .2d 513 , 518 (1 996). (...continued) * * * (d) Wai ver b y Inaction - Circuit Court. If a defen dant appears in circuit court w ithout coun sel on the da te set for hearing or trial, indicates a desire to have counsel, and the record shows compliance with section (a) of this Rule, either in a previous appearance in the circuit court or in an appearance in the District Court in a case in which the defendant demanded a jury trial, the court shall permit the defendant to explain the appearance without counsel. If the court finds that there is a meritorious reason for the defendan t s appearance without counse l, the court shall continue the action to a later time and advise the defendant that if counsel does not enter an appearance by that time, the action will proceed to trial with the defendant unrepresented by counsel. If the court finds that there is no meritorious reason for the defendant s appearance without counsel, the court may determine that the defendant has waived counsel by failing or refusing to obtain counsel and may proceed with the hearing or trial. 4 As a threshold requirement to finding a valid waiver of co unse l by a defendant, a trial judge first must find that all requisite Rule 4-215(a) advisements have been rendered prev ious ly. Advisem ents (a)(1) thro ugh (3) are required to b e given to a defenda nt upon h is or her first appearance in court without counsel, or when a defendant appears before the District Cou rt, demands a jury trial, and the record does not reflect prior satisfaction of the required advisements. Ad visements (a)(4) and (5), on the othe r hand, are c ontingent in that they are required to be given o nly when a defendant expresses a desire to waive counsel or when trial is to be condu cted on a subsequ ent date, respectively. Md. Rule 4-2 15(a). Subsections (b) through (e) of the Rule provide four separate modalities by which the assistance of counsel may be waived. The right to counsel may be waived expressly, by inaction in the District C ourt, by inaction in the Circuit Court, o r by discharge of couns el. If, upon the occurrence of one of the aforementioned events, the record reflects that subsection (a) has been fully satisfied, the trial court then must follow the directives of the appropriate waiver modality before finding that a defendant waived his or her right to counsel. A court may not find an effective waiver pursuant to (b)-(e) unless the rec ord demonstrates comp liance w ith subs ection (a ). McCracken v. State, 150 Md. App. 330, 348, 820 A.2d 59 3, 604 (2003). Because the right to counsel is a basic, fundamental and substantive right, the requireme nts of Maryland Rule 4-215 are mandatory and must be complied with, irrespective of th e gra vity of the crime charged, the type of plea entered, or the lack of an 5 affirmative showing of prejudice to the accused. Taylor v. State, 20 Md. App. 404, 409, 411, 316 A.2d 296, 299, 300 (1974) (overturning a conviction where the defendant was not informed of the allowable punishments and the usefulness of the assista nce of co unsel in determining available de fenses be fore he w as found to have w aived his right to counsel); see also State v. Bryan, 284 Md. 152, 155, 395 A.2d 475, 477 (1978) (explaining that the Maryland Rules are not gu ides to the pra ctice of law but precise ru brics establish ed to promote the orderly and efficient administration of justice ). Strict, not substantial, compliance with the advisement and inquiry terms o f the Rule is required in o rder to support a valid waive r. Moten v. State, 339 Md. 407, 411, 663 A.2d 593, 596 (1995) (holding that strict complian ce with R ule 4-215 is mandato ry and that a trial judge s failure to inform a defendant of the allowable penalties for the offenses charged in the indictment cannot constitute harmless e rror); Webb v . State, 144 Md. App. 729, 741, 742, 800 A.2d 42, 4 9 (2002) (finding a failure to comply with Rule 4-215 where the nature of the charges w ere explained to the defendant by the State s Attorney and not the trial judg e); Evans v. State, 84 Md. App. 573, 580, 581 A.2d 435, 438 (1990). A failure to comply with the Rule constitutes reversib le error. Moten, 339 Md. at 411, 663 A.2d at 596. B. The Facts of the Present Case The facts material to the issues raised in Petitioner s petition for certiorari are not in dispute. On 25 June 2004, at approxim ately 2:00 a.m., Montgom ery County Police Officer 6 James Geary, a reside nt of Fred erick Cou nty, was driving home, no rthbound on Rou te 15 in Frederick County. Officer Geary observed a vehicle, with its headlights unlit, traveling directly towards him in his lane of traffic. He swerved in order to avoid a head-on collision. He subsequently called for a ssistance fro m Frede rick Coun ty law enforc ement pe rsonnel, made a U-turn, and followed the vehicle. As he pursued the vehicle, Officer Geary observed the car narrowly miss other vehicles in oncoming traffic and saw its headlights flickering on and off. Eventually, the car pulled into the parking lot of a tow nhouse develop ment. Geary approached the vehicle and identified Lorinda Ann Broadwater as the driver. She admitted to him to drin king at a ba r that night. Within minutes, Frederick County Deputy Sheriff Chris Schreiner arrived on the scene. He observed that Broadwater s eyes were watery and bloodshot and that an odor of alcohol emanated from her vehicle. He attempted to administer standard field sobriety tests, but Broadwater, who had difficulty keeping her balance, could not perform the tests as instructed. A prelimin ary breath test revealed that she had a breath alcohol content of .19.5 As a re sult, De puty She riff Sch reiner p laced B roadw ater und er arrest. Later that same day, Broadwater was charged in the District Court of Maryland, sitting 5 Under M aryland law, an individual may not drive or attem pt to drive an y vehicle while under the influen ce of alcoh ol or while im paired by alco hol. Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl. Vol.), Tran sportation A rticle, § 21-90 2(a)-(b). An individual is considered under the influence of alcohol per se when that individual has an alcohol concentration at the time of breathalyzer or blood testing of 0.08 or more. Maryland Cod e (1974, 2006 R epl. Vol.), Transportation Article, § 11-714.1. 7 in Fred erick Cou nty, 6 with negligent driving, failing to illuminate headlights, driving under the influence of alcohol, and driving while impaired by alcohol. She was taken prom ptly before a District Court Commissioner and received copies of the charging document and a Notice of Advice o f Right to C ounsel. Approaching three m onths la ter, on 21 September 2004, Broadwater appeared, without counsel, for trial before the Hon orable Janic e Amb rose of the District Cou rt. At this initial appearance, the following colloquy occurred: THE COURT: M s. Broadwater, you re charged with negligent driving, failure to display lighted lamps. Those are payable offenses. Each with a maximum penalty of a Five Hundred Dollar fine. One count of driving or a ttempting to drive a vehicle (ina udible) alco hol and on e count of driving or a ttempting to drive while impaired by alcohol. The alcohol offenses: one is a Five Hundred Dollar fine and/or sixty days and the other one is a Thousand Dollar fine and/or one year in jail. Did you receive copies of those charges? BROADW ATER: I received copies of it, yes. I did need more time. THE COURT: And you re here without a lawyer, Ms. Broadwater. Do you wish to perform without one? BROADWATER: Absolutely not. I do need more time because it s not the lawyer fee but I do - I m trying to get a polygraph done to bring in as evidence and those things take time and I ve only had three months. THE COU RT: What s the State s position? 6 Maryland Code (1974, 20 06 Rep l. Vol.), C ourts & Judicia l Proce edings Article, § 4-301(a) provides, in pertinent part, that the District Court has exclusive original jurisdiction in a criminal case in which a person at least 16 years old or a co rporation is charged with violation of the vehicle laws . . . or regulations adopted pursuant to the vehicle law s. Broadwater was over the age of sixteen at the time of her arrest and charging. 8 STATE S ATTORN EY: The State has two witn esses and w e re ready to proc eed t oday. THE COU RT: Well, Ms. Broadwater, what have you been doing for the last three months? BROADWATER: Uh, let s see, so far I ve lost my ho use. I m living out of my car. Oh, here THE COURT: Ms. Broadwater, when you were charged back on June 23rd,7 you were advised by the Court Commissioner about your right to have a lawyer. Do you recall that? BROADWATER: Yes. And I did contact one and I picked one to hire. But when my THE COURT: I m not continuing your case, ma am. BROA DW ATER: Oka y. THE COU RT: Yo u have the absolute righ t to have a jury trial if you want one. BRO ADW ATER : Yes, I wa nt a jury trial. THE COURT: I can t keep you here in District Court if you want to have a jury trial. BROA DW ATER: Oka y. THE COURT: Come see the Clerk. Your case is going to be sent to the Circuit Co urt. BROADW ATER: Thank you. Thus, at her sole appearance b efore a District Court judge, Broadwater received those 7 While the relevant transcript reflects that the date of Broadwater s arrest and arraignment was 23 June 2004, in actuality, both events occurred on 25 June 2004. 9 portions of the litany required by Ma ryland Rule 4-215(a)(1) and (3). As a result of her prayer for a jury trial, Broadwater appeared on 8 October 2004 at an initial appearance in the Circuit Court for Frederick County before the Honorable John H. Tisdale, aga in withou t counsel. In a ddition to settin g a trial date of 8 November 2004, Judge Tisdale described the right to be represented by counsel and the importance of having a lawyer, and a lso advised Broadw ater of the p ossibility that a further appearance without counsel might result in the court finding that she waived her right to counsel by inaction: THE COURT: Okay. You have a trial date set for the 8th of November. Now, have you mad e any e fforts to retai n an attor ney? BRO ADW ATER : I wanted to make su re it would g o to a jury trial. THE COURT: That s fine, but have you made any efforts to retain an attor ney? BROADWATER: I did go on e time to the p ublic defe nder after th e circuit court date that I had. I m sorry, I have fibromyalgia, it s a little hard sometimes. I did go there. They said in order for them to help me, they needed a paper saying somebody was supporting me, and basically for months I ve been going from place to place, different friends h ouses. I haven t been home in about three months, so if they mailed anything, I wouldn t have gotten it. THE COURT : Well, Ms. Broadwater, let s just get dow n to bras s tacks, o kay? I m not your friend, I m not your enemy either, all right? There are just some facts of life that exist. Now, you have a trial date of the 8th of November at 9 a.m. Now, I m g oing to tell you the whole nine yards, but let m e just be very clear. If you come to court on that date w ithout an attor ney, you probab ly won t be granted a continuance to retain one, okay? Now, I it s a lot easier for me to sit up here and say those things than it is to make it happen, but that s beside the point, ok ay? The C ourt s a big o le machin e and it s go ing to continue to run. It s your responsibility. Understand that if you re found guilty, you could be sentenced to up to one year at the local detention center 10 and a fine of up to $1,000, so you have a right to an attorney. If you can t afford to retain an atto rney who is in private practice, you may be eligible for representation with the Office of the Public Defender. Now, they need at least four weeks, which is what you ve got left, to process the whole thing, so I would do whatever it takes today to get started on that process. Certainly, you don t have to go there. You may be able to retain an attorney who is in private practice BROADW ATER: Not by this week. THE COURT: An attorney can assist you by evaluating the charges and the facts of the case and advising you how to proceed in conn ected court proceedings on your behalf. As I told you, if you come to court on the 8th of November with out a n atto rney, you likely won t be granted a continuance to retain one. Now, I know you ve heard this same advice on a number of occasions, and a judge is go ing to look a t this file and say, well, we ve told her and told her, o kay? BRO ADW ATER : I was afra id he d try and p lead it out. THE C OUR T: Wha t s that? BROADWATER: I was afraid if I got one b efore this, he d try to plead it without a ju ry trial. THE C OURT : Well, I ll leave that to you, Ms. Broadw ater. On 8 November 2004, Broadwater, without counsel, appeared b efore the Hon orable Theresa M. Ad ams for trial. Due to a previously-scheduled trial to which Judge Adams was committed and a shortage of other judges available on that day to try Broadwater s case, Broadwater s trial was continued to 24 January 2005. Before concluding the proceeding on 8 Novem ber, Judge Adam s stressed to Broadw ater the righ t to counsel and the potential for waiver b y inaction po rtions of the r equired R ule 4-215(a) litany relative to the new trial date: 11 THE COURT: M s. Broadwater, you came before the Court on October 8, correct, and you w ere advised of your right to be represented by a lawyer and you were ad vised of you r right for a trial, co rrect? BROADWATER: My first court date I asked for a continuance and she told me it was denied. THE COURT: And that was in district court, ma am? BROAD WATER : Yes. THE COURT: And you asked for a continuance in district court and that was denied, an d then you pr ayed a jury trial, correct? BROAD WATER : Yes. THE COU RT: An d then you ca me here f or what s c alled, we ca ll it a rule hearing, an arraignment, and initial appearance. You came here on October 8 and at that time the Cou rt advised you that you had the right to have a trial and advised you that you had the right to have a lawyer? BROAD WATER : Yes. THE CO UR T: N ow, wha t is it th at you d lik e to d o tod ay? BROADW ATER: I still would like to represent myself. * * * THE COU RT: I don t see, quite frankly, that I m going to have enough time this afternoon to try two jury cases in an afternoon. Now, so having said that . . . [y]ou have what s called 180 days, this case has to be tried in 180 days. That 180-day date is April 6, 2005, so I m going to continue your case, but that will give you a chan ce to thin k abou t wheth er you w ant a law yer. Do yo u understand? BROADW ATER: Thank you. THE COURT: Now , I m going to tell you again what the judge already told you in October. You have the right to hire a lawyer of your own choosing. 12 You have the right to represent yourself, you can do that, if you wa nt, but a lawyer can be helpful to you and co uld be help ful to you not o nly in the trial, but also in presenting informa tion to the Court in mitigation, o kay, to help you with, if you w ere found guilty, what the s entencing may be, to help you with any issues a lawyer mig ht think are a ppropriate, so that a law yer could help you. If you do not, cannot afford a lawyer, you can go to the Office of the Public Defender. If you qualify for their services, they will provide a lawyer for you. If you don t qualify for their services, they won t an d you ll have to decide if you want to hire one or make other arrangements with a lawyer. So I m telling you that one more time so that when this case comes back here, the record is going to reflect you were a dvised of your right to a lawyer once again, and if you come back without a lawyer, the judge could find that you have waived your r ight to be repr esen ted b y counsel, by a la wyer . Do you understand that, Ms . Broadwater? BROADWATER: Yes, ma am. On 24 January 2005, when Broadwater appeared for trial before the Honorable G. Edward Dw yer, Jr., she again was without counsel. Judge Dwyer ordered a three-week postponement and set a new trial date for 14 February 2005.8 On 14 February 2005, Broadw ater appea red before Judge T isdale for trial. After an inquiry into the reasons why Broadwater was present in Circuit Court for the fourth time without counsel, Judge Tisdale found that she had waived, by inaction, her right to counsel under Maryland Rule 4-215(d) and proceeded to trial. Broadwater represented herself. The pre-trial waiver colloquy went as follows: [STAT E S ATTORNEY]: Your Honor, it s my understanding that Ms. Broadwater is going to be entering a not guilty plea today, and the S tate is ready to proce ed with trial. 8 The Court granted Broadwater s request for a postponement because she claimed to be awaiting certain discovery responses from the State. 13 THE COURT: All right, and, Ms. Broa dwater, you were advised of your right to an attor ney. I s ee you re here w ithout an attor ney. BROAD WATER : Yes. THE CO UR T: H ave yo u ma de ef forts to re tain a n atto rney? BROADWATER: I did once I got discovery from the State, and what w asn t in there was the original signed statement of probable cause, and the story that the the pape r that they gave m e is significan tly different than my signed statement o f probab le cause, so I tried to figure out how I was g oing to work that until February 1, where I called the Public Defender and they said I wo uld have had to be in there the day before, so I m defending myself. I have questions (indiscernible). THE COU RT: All rig ht. Well, wh en you we re before J udge A dams ba ck in Nov emb er, sh e adv ised you th en of your righ t to an attor ney? BROA DW ATER: Yes . I m still o kay. THE COURT: So you had from November 8. Actually, you had from the time you were in district court BROADWATER: Um-hmm. THE COU RT: Bu t you certainly had tha t time. I find under the circumstances that yo u ve waived your r ight to an attor ney. BROADWATER: Oka y. Your H onor, actua lly what I wo uld like the S tate to do is provide the signed statement of probable cause. The significance [sic] difference that cause the problem was that in the original statement, it said that it was a Prince George s County police officer with no name that was listed, so I made arrangements for that, and in the statement they gave me, it s a Montgom ery County police officer. When I realized that and, plus, there were other significant differences between the two. That s when I realized I was in tro uble and tried to ge t an a ttorn ey. THE COUR T: What w hat s the what diff erence do es it make w hether in that regard? 14 BROADWATER: Because I guess I ll have to go through it. The person that confronted me at the time of the acciden t saying that I had not accid ent, but incident the person confronting me at the time is a different description than who s here right now. THE CO UR T: So you ve n ever seen the o ffic er w ho s here toda y? BROADWATER: Not the officer, the I m assum ing that is the Montgom ery County police officer that s sitting next to him, the State s other witness? THE C OURT : Well, these events occurred on the 25th of Jun e of last year. BROADWATER: Um-hmm. THE COURT: Have you made any efforts to contact the officers or prepare any witnesse s for your trial? BROADWATER: The two witnesses I had were there to testify that the person that confronted me saying I saw you driving, dah, dah, dah, matched the description of a person that had been sitting out in my parking lot in October of that year, the year before. All of a sudden, the officers changed. THE CO URT: Well, that s why we have trials. BROADWATER: Um-h mm. I m still okay, but wh at I couldn t w ork in, it was as if nob ody now it s a mythological person. There s nobody there that can there were five police off icers there, bu t there s nob ody to say that this officer w as there, so m y two witnes ses, what g ood is it? THE COU RT: Okay. So, are you prepared to proceed? BROAD WATER : Yes. THE CO UR T: A ll righ t, and I und ersta nd you wish to have a tri al by ju ry? BROAD WATER : Yes. THE CO UR T: A ll righ t, are we r eady f or the so , we ll ca ll the jury. At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Broadwater on all counts. After merging 15 the lesser included offense of driving wh ile impaired in to the conv iction for driv ing while under the influen ce, Judge T isdale sentenced Broadwater to six months in jail for the driving under the influence of alcohol conviction, suspending all but thirty days. The Court also fined her $750 for driving while under the influence of alcohol and $100 each for the convictions of negligent driving and failure to illuminate headlights. Represented by the Office of the State Public Defender, Broadwater appealed to the Court of Specia l Appeals . The Co urt of Spe cial Appe als affirme d, in a reported opinion, the judgmen ts of the Circuit Court for Frederick County, concluding that Maryland precedent and the specific language of Rule 4-215(a) and (d) suggested that the piecemeal advisement situation appearing on this record satisfied the requireme nts of th e Rule . Broadwater v. State, 171 Md. App. 297, 317-20, 909 A.2d 1112, 1123-25 (2006). The Court reasoned that the Rule does not require a unified set of advisements at a single hearing at which one judge provides each and every of the required Rule 4-215(a) advise ments. Broadwater, 171 Md. App at 317-20, 909 A.2d at 1123-25. Rather, the combined salvo of inquiry and information provided by Judges Ambrose, Tisdale, and Adams, on 21 Sep tembe r 2004 , 8 October 2004, and 8 November 2004, respectively, satisfied the advisements due Broadwater. Broadwater, 171 Md. App. at 322, 909 A.2d at 1126. Because Broadwater had been informed on numerous occasions of her right to counsel, as well as the importance of retaining an attorney for her defense, the intermediate appellate court opined that Judge Tisdale was correct in finding that Broad water w aived, by inactio n, her right to c ounsel. 16 Broadwater, 171 Md. App. at 327-28, 909 A.2d at 1129-30. We granted Broadwater s petition for writ of certiorari, 396 Md. 524, 914 A.2d 768 (2007), 9 to consider two questions: (1) whether the finding of waiver by inaction by the Circuit Court, pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-215(a) and (d), of Broadwater s right to be represented by counsel was valid where the required preliminary litany of advisements was provided to her on a piece meal basis b y a combina tion of D istrict and Circ uit Court judges because the case orig inated in the District Court under its exclusive original jurisdiction over the charges and the defendant prayed a jury trial, thereby transferring the case for trial to the Circuit Court; and (2) whether the Circuit Court abused its discretion in rejecting her excuses and finding instead that Broadwater waived her right to be represented by an attorney through her repeated failure to appear for trial with counsel, and requiring that she represent h erself at trial. II. Discussion A. Petitioner s Court Appearances as they Pertain to Md. Rule 4-215(a) Broadwater concedes that, collectively du ring the pro gress of this case, she received 9 The publication in the official state reporter of our action on Broadwater s petition for writ of certiorari contains an error. It indic ates that we denied ce rtiorari in this case . This error apparently misled at least one panel of the Court of Special Ap peals in a later case which referred in its opinion to a denial of certiorari in Broadw ater v. State. See Jones v. State, 175 Md. A pp. 58, 79, 924 A .2d 336, 348 (200 7). 17 each of the required advisem ents in Md. Ru le 4-215(a), namely (1), (2), (3), and (5). 10 In the District Court, Broadwater was advised of her rights under (a)(1) and (3). Specifically, Judge Ambrose confirme d that Broa dwater received the charging documents and advised her explicitly of the natu re of the ch arges and the potential p enalties attend ant to those charges. The District Court, however, did not advise her orally and on the record, as provided by 4215(a)(2), of the right to and importance of counsel, or (a)(5), of the potential for waiver by inaction upon a repeated appearance in court without counsel. Thus, standing alone, the adviseme nts given by the District Court would not have satisfied fully the requirements of Rule 4-215(a). After demanding a trial by jury, Broadwater appeared without counsel in the Circu it Court on 8 Oc tober 200 5. Judge T isdale, at this po int, complied with the missing requireme nts of Rule 4-215(a) and completed the litany of advisements. At this hearing, he provided Broadwater w ith the advisements und er (a)(2) and (a)(5), but did not repeat the subsection (a)(1) advisement confirming that Broadwater had received a copy of the charging documents. Regarding (a)(3), Judge Tisdale repeated only the flagsh ip charge a dvisemen t, nam ely, driving under the influence of alcohol, and that the potential penalty for a conviction thereof could be up to a $1000 fine and u p to one year o f imprison ment. 11 At this poin t in 10 Advisement (4) was not required to be given to Broadwater because the waiver of counsel in this case was foun d under 4-215(d ), waiver by inaction, rather than 4-215 (b), express w aiver of co unsel. 11 The Court of Special Appeals found that advising Broadwater of the flagship charge (contin ued...) 18 the case, Broadwater had received (a)(1) and (3) advisements from the District C ourt and adviseme nts of (a)(2) and (5) from the Circuit Court. Maryland Rule 4-215(a)(4) remained inapplicable. On 8 November 2005, before postponing the trial date, Judge Adams of the Circuit Court repeated th e advisem ents under M aryland R ule 4-2 15(a)(2 ) and (5 ). At Broadw ater s next appearance, befo re Judge Dw yer, where she requested a postponement because she had not received parts of the State s disco very responses, no further relevant adv isements were given. Finally, on 14 February 2006, Judge Tisdale conducted the subsection (d) waiver inquiry and determ ined from that that Broadwater waived by inaction her right to be represented by counsel by failing to retain counsel. Thus, prior to Judge Tisdale s finding of waiver by inaction, Broadwater had received each of the relevant subsection (a) advisements (some on multiple occasions) due under the Rule. B. Piecem eal and C umulative Satisfaction o f Rule 4-21 5(a) Advisem ents Despite conceding, as she must, that all of the advisements and inquiries mandated by subsection (a) occurred at one time or another before waiver was found, Broadwater finds (...continued) and the maximum p enalty for conviction of that charge satisfied fully the requirements of (a)(3). Because adviseme nt under (a) (3) already had been give n in full in the District Court by Judge Ambrose, who delineated each charge and attendant possible penalties, we need not decide whether the Circuit C ourt simply adv ising Broa dwater o f the flagship charge and penalty, standing alo ne, would have satisfied Rule 4-215(a)(3) had the 8 October 2005 advise ment b een the only occ asion w here (a) (3) wa s addre ssed. 19 fault with the method of advisement because she mainta ins that Rule 4-215(a) contemplates an omnibus hearing at which all of the required advisements must be given to a defendant at one time. She contends our holdings in certain prior cases support this interpretation. She alleges that, because she was advised of her right to counsel and the potential for waiver of that right through inaction in a piecemeal fashion , over at least two court appe arances before the District and Cir cuit Courts, Judge Tisdale was not at liberty to find waiver by inaction pursua nt to Ru le 4-21 5(d). We have addressed, albeit under different circumstances, whether a piecemeal approach to satisfying the advisement requirements of Rule 4-21 5(a) may surv ive appellate scru tiny. In Gregg v . State, 377 Md. 515, 833 A.2d 1040 (2003), we considered whether Maryland Rule 4-215(a) could be satisfied on a piecemeal basis by two different judges of a Circuit Court, over the course of two separate hearings.12 Gregg, 377 Md. at 528, 833 A.2d at 1046- 47. The defendant in that case was charge d in the District Court 13 with 2nd degree assault, but pra yed a jury tria l. Gregg, 377 Md. at 523, 833 A.2d at 1044-45. At his initial 12 While Gregg involved an express waiver under sub-section (b), the same litany of adviseme nts under Rule 4-215(a) was required as a pre-requisite to a finding of a knowing and voluntary waiver. 13 Gregg appeared in the District Court at a competency hearing where the judge confirmed that the defe ndant understood the ch arges again st him, the po tential penalty associated with that charge, and the importance of having counsel to assist in his defense. Gregg v. State, 377 Md. 515, 519-20, 833 A.2d 1040,1042-43 (2003). Because Gregg later received all of the Ru le 4-215(a) adviseme nts in the Circuit Court, whether he also received the advisements at the pre-trial compete ncy hearing in the District C ourt was n ot material to our analysis. 20 Circuit Court app earance, G regg receiv ed fully the adv isements d ue to him u nder Ru le 4215(a)(1) (confirmation of receipt of the charging documents); (a)(2) (the right to and importance of assistance of coun sel); and (a)(4) (waiver inquiry where the defendant expresses a desire to waive counsel). Gregg, 377 Md. at 550-51, 833 A.2d at 1060-61. Regarding 4-215(a)(3), the judge explained to Greg g the poten tial penalty he fac ed if convicted, but failed at that point to inform him of the nature of the charges against him.14 Id. The def iciency was c ured at his second Circuit Court hearing where another judge supplied the missing (a)(3) portion of the litany by asking Gregg if he understood that he was charged with se cond d egree a ssault. Gregg, 377 Md. at 552, 833 A.2d at 1062. G regg responded that he did. Id. We held that, becaus e Gregg received f rom the co mbined e fforts of the two Circuit Cou rt judges eac h and eve ry on-the-recor d advisem ent required by Rule 4-215(a) in his situation, h is waiver of counsel was effective and he was not entitled to a new trial. Gregg, 377 M d. at 554 , 833 A .2d at 10 63. As it was not presented in Gregg s case, we left open the question of whether a piecemeal combination of advisements by District and Circuit C ourt jud ges ov er multip le appe arance s migh t satisfy R ule 4-2 15. Id. The Court of Special Appeals s reasoning in McCracken, 150 Md. App. 330, 820 A.2d 593 (2003), is persuasive on the issue of the acceptanc e of District C ourt advise ments when considering whether a waiver found later in the Circuit Court, after the defendant 14 Because Gregg was found effectively to have waived his right to counsel on the same day that he was tried, the need to fulfill the (a)(5) advisement was not applicable. Gregg, 377 Md. at 554, 833 A.2d at 1063. 21 requests a jury trial, may be valid. In that case, McCracken originally appeared in the District Court, without counsel, and prayed a jury trial. McCracken, 150 Md. App. at 348, 820 A.2d at 604. The record showed that, at his appearance in the District Court, McCracken received a copy of the charging document, was informed of his right to counsel and of the importance of the assistance of counsel, was advised of the nature of the charges and the allowable and mandatory penalties, was advised that his next appearance without counsel could be considered a waiver, and was referred to the Public Defender s office. McCracken, 150 Md. App. at 348- 49, 820 A.2d at 604. Af ter dischargin g the Pub lic Defen der assigne d to represent him, McCracken appeared without counsel in the Circuit Court and requested appointment of an attorney in private practice, rather than another Public Defender. 150 Md. App. at 350, 820 A.2d at 605. The court found that he effectively waived his right to couns el, and p roceed ed to tria l with M cCrac ken rep resentin g hims elf. Id. The Court of Special Appeals, in affirming the finding of waiver b y the Circuit Co urt, held that, when a defend ant appea rs in District C ourt witho ut counse l, and prays a jur y trial, adviseme nts given by the District Court may be credited towards satisfaction of the requirements of Rule 4-215(a) when the Circuit Court considers whether waiver occurred. 150 Md. App. at 355, 820 A.2d at 608 (relying on Moore v. State, 331 M d. 179, 184, 626 A.2d 968, 970 (1993) and Felder v. S tate, 106 Md . App. 642, 648, 666 A.2d 872, 874-75 (1995), cert. denied, 341 Md . 648, 672 A .2d 622 (1 996)); see also Sm ith v. State, 88 Md. App. 32, 43, 591 A.2d 902, 907 (1991) (explaining that [t]he [1991] amendments also 22 permit a circuit court judge to rely on the advice of the right to co unsel prev iously given to a defendant by a District Court judge when th e defend ant requests a jury trial ). Thus, the intermediate appellate court found that the District Co urt advisements carried over to the Circuit Court because McCracken had appeared in the District Court without counsel, the District Court at the time had exclusive original subject matter jurisdiction over the crimes with which he was ch arged, a nd M cCrac ken pra yed a jury tria l. McCracken, 150 Md. App. at 355-56, 820 A.2d at 608. McCracken is consistent with our prior cases in terpreting R ule 4-215 (a) in which this Court repeatedly held that advisem ents provided to a defendant in the District Court may be relied on later by the Circuit Court in the same case to find waiver, by inaction, of the right to counsel, where the defendant appeared in District Court, pursuant to that court s exclusive original jurisdiction, and prayed a jury trial. In Moore, we noted specifically that, when a case begins in the D istrict Court and is transferred to the Circuit Court by way of jury trial demand, by virtue of a 1991 am endmen t [to the Ru le], the circuit co urt does no t have to comply [anew] with [4-2 15(a)] so lon g as the reco rd reflects tha t a District Court judge has already d one so . 15 Moore, 331 M d. at 184 , 626 A .2d at 97 0. Likewise, we have emphasized that the language of Maryland Rule 4-215(d) provides expressly that advisements administered by the District Court may be relied on in this 15 In Moore, whether a Circuit Co urt may rely on 4-21 5(a) advise ments pro vided to the defendant by the District Court, after he prayed a jury trial, was conceded by Moore. Moore v. State, 331 Md. 179 , 184, 626 A.2d 9 68, 970 (1993). 23 situation in the Circuit Court: If a defendant appears in circuit court without counsel on the date set for hearing or trial, indicates a desire to have counsel, and the record shows compliance with section (a) of this R ule, either in a p revious ap pearance in the circuit court or in an appearance in the District Court in a case in which the defendant demanded a jury trial, the court shall permit the defendant to explain the appearance without counsel. Md. Rule 4-215(d); see Richa rdson v. Sta te, 381 Md. 3 48, 364 -65, 84 9 A.2d 487, 49 7 (200 4). If the trial court finds the reason or reasons unmeritorious, it may determine that the defendant waive d coun sel by inac tion. Richardson, 381 M d. at 364 -65, 84 9 A.2d at 497. Broadwater submits that her case is controlled by our holding in Johnson v. State, 355 Md. 420, 735 A.2d 1003 (1999), where we considered whether a circuit court with exclusive original jurisdiction over the subject matter may determine that a defendant waived the right to counsel based on information provided to the defendant at his or her earlier bail review hearing before the Dis trict Cou rt. Johnson, 355 Md. at 424, 735 A.2d at 1005. In Johnson, the defe ndant w as ch arge d with fir st degree burg lary and theft, charges committed to the exclusive origina l jurisdict ion of th e Circu it Cour t. Johnson, 355 Md. at 428, 735 A.2d at 1008. Johnson first appeared, without counsel, in the District Court solely for a bail review hearing. Id. He wa s provided there with d ocumen ts that recited his r ight to coun sel. 16 Id. 16 Specific ally, in the District Court, Johnson was provided with a Notice of Advice of Right to Counsel and the Initial Appearance Report forms, which Johnson and the District Court Commissioner each signed, reflecting that the Commissioner informed Johnson of each of the charged offenses and the allowable penalties, and a Bail Review (contin ued...) 24 When Johnson appeared thereafter in th e Circuit C ourt, at none of his five appearances was he given th e sectio n (a) litan y by any of th e judge s presid ing. Johnson, 355 Md. at 454, 735 A.2d at 1021. At his trial, the jud ge found that, while the docume nts provide d to Johnson at the District Court bail review hearing did not qualify as a prior circuit court appearance [or] . . . a prior appearance before the District Court without counsel accompanied by a jury trial demand, the requirements of Rule 4-215(a) substantially had been fulfilled . Id. As a result, the trial judge found that Johnson waived h is right to coun sel. Id. When the case reached us, we concluded that, because the case was not transferred to the Circuit Court by way of a jury trial demand, an advisement given by the District Court, as opposed to one given in the Circuit Court, w as not suff icient to satisfy strict co mpliance with Rule 4-215 (a). Johnson, 355 Md. at 426, 725 A.2d at 1006. Specifically, we held that, to avoid confusion on the part of an accused a nd to protect the fundamental right to counsel, the 4-215(a) advisem ents mus t be g iven by the correct court and not on a piecemeal basis. Johnson, 355 Md. at 461, 735 A.2d at 1025. Our holding rested on the foundational premise that Johnson s offenses were within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the C ircuit Court and that, as a result, the preliminary matter of the bail review hearing in the District Court was not a relevant point from which to determine whether the required 4-215(a) a dvisemen ts had be en give n. Johnson, 355 M d. at 453 , 735 A .2d at 10 21. (...continued) Docke t form signed by a District Court j udge. Johnson v. State, 355 Md. 420, 454-55, 735 A.2d 1003, 10 21-22 (1999). 25 Johnson is easily distingu ishable from th e instan t case. First, and most important, the charges in Johnson brought the defendant within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. The District Court s sole role in that case was to conduct a bail review hearing. [B]ecause Johnson did not appear in District Court without counsel and demand a jury trial, he was required to receiv e his subsection (a) advisem ents from a circuit court judge. Johnson, 355 Md. at 457, 735 A.2d at 1023. This is not the case with regard to the charges against Bro adwater, w ho appea red initially in District Court, pursuant to that court s exclusive original jurisdiction, and pra yed a jury trial, resulting in a transfer to th e Circuit Court. Johnson, thus, governs only situations where the Circuit Court possesses exclusive origina l jurisdict ion. Further, in Johnson, the advisements in the District Court, if considered, nonetheless were deficient by virtu e of the fact that the record showed that the District Court neither delivered orally to Johnson anything approaching the content of all of the advisements nor determined whether he understood his rights. Moreover, the litany of advisements, to the extent given, were provided to Johnson by a District Court Commissioner, not a judge. Johnson, 355 Md. at 455, 735 A.2d at 1022. These distinctions reveal that our holding rested, not on the notion that Rule 4-215(a) may not be satisfied cumulatively by seriatim adviseme nts delivered in the District Court and a circuit court, but rather that Johnson simply never satisfactorily received proper and full advisements under any combination of 26 circumstances.17 Thus, the holding in Johnson, alluded to by B roadwa ter, that the Ru le did not contemplate Johnson receiving properly the section (a) litany at the combined District Court and Circu it Court app earances, is a t best dicta because the case ne cessarily rested on ly on the determination that the def endant did not receive a correct or complete litany of advisements at any time throughout the course of his countable court appearances. Our synthesis of the cases suggests that, so long as the Circuit Court did not possess exclusive original jurisdic tion over the charges, an d a defen dant s case is transferred from the District Court to the Circuit C ourt as the result of a jury trial demand , the requirem ents of Rule 4-215(a) may be fulfilled in piecemeal, cumulative fashion by advisements rendered by judges of the District and Circuit Courts. Although Johnson stands for the proposition that a Circuit C ourt judge m ay not rely on advisements g iven during a District Co urt bail review hearing where the charges involved ultimately were within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the C ircuit Co urt, Gregg indicates that a Circuit Court judge may rely on the advisements of oth er cir cuit c ourt judg es in a cas e to c omp lete a Rule 4-2 15 litany, necessarily filling in only the gaps in the litany from the prior appearances. The logical application of Gregg and Johnson, info rmed by Moore and Richardson and the Court of Special Appeals s McCracken, is that a circuit court judge may rely on the Rule 4-215(a) 17 Similarly, we noted that, because at his bail review hearing the chargin g docum ents had not been filed, advisements (a)(1) and (3) would have been impossible to satisfy at that stage and thus, co mbined w ith the fact tha t no Circuit Court judge gave Johnson the litany of advisements, (a)(1) and (3) never w ere satisf actorily giv en to the defen dant. Johnson, 355 Md. at 457, 735 A.2d at 1023. 27 adviseme nts given by a District Court judge, and supplement them as necessary, so long as the case properly began in the District Court s jurisdiction, based on the crimes charged, and was transferred to the Circuit Court when the defendant prayed a jury trial. This outcome is simply an extension of our reasoning in Gregg, and leaves Johnson to govern situations where the Circuit Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over the pertinent charges. An examination of the p urpose of Ru le 4-215 also supports our conclusio n. In submitting the proposed text of what substantive ly became Rule 4-215, the Court s Standing Committee on the Rules of Practice and Procedure recommended that the Rule 4-215(a) advisement of rights and penalties be conducted upon a defen dant s first appearance in court so that a subseque nt judge w ould have greater pow er to curtail . . . abusive tactics. Bowers v. State, 124 Md. App. 4 01, 412 , 722 A .2d 419 , 424-2 5, cert. denied, 354 Md. 113, 729 A.2d 405 (1999 ). The Rule w as not dev eloped, ho wever, in o rder to prov ide criminal d efendan ts with an added technical protection. Id. If a judge were to omit part of the litany of adviseme nts and inquiries due the defendant, [i]t was contemplated by the Committee that . . . the State could point out the problem to a subsequent judg e so that it can be rectified. Bowers, 124 Md. App. at 412, 722 A.2d at 425. Thus, the Rules Committee foresaw that a subsequent judge would be able to fill in gaps in the advisement litany created by omissions by h is or h er predec esso rs an d thu s com plete the required litan y. Fina lly, the wording of th e Rule suggests that a p iecemeal approach to 4-215(a) adviseme nts may be acceptable. Rule 4-215(a) states that the adviseme nts must be given if 28 the record does not disclose prior compliance. Md. Rule 4-215(a). It reasonably may be inferred from this language that the Rule contemplates that the mandatory advisements may be given by a co urt or courts over mu ltiple encounters with a defendant, and that judges may supplement the advisem ents omitted or incorrectly given by their predecessors. Md. Rule 4215(a); see Mackey v. Compass M ktg., Inc., 391 Md. 117, 141, 892 A.2d 479, 493 (2006) (explainin g that, [i]f the sta tutory languag e is unamb iguous w hen cons trued acco rding to its ordinary and everyday meaning, then we give eff ect to the statute as written ). Now here in the Rule is there the hint that all of the advisements must be given in a single, omnibus hearing, in a continu ous, un interrup ted recita tion, in al l situation s. See Harford County v. Saks Fifth Ave. Distrib. Co., 399 Md. 73, 86, 923 A.2d 1, 9 ( 2007) ( [ W]e w ill not read into the statute words that give it an interpretation that limits or extends its application beyond the words the Legislature used ). Although it may be desirable, or even a best practice , to administer the advisements at a single appearance, were we to adopt Broadw ater s interpretation of the Rule, the phrase , if the record does not disclose prior compliance, would be read out of the Ru le or ren dered m eaning less. See Patterson Park Pub. Charter Sch., Inc. v. Balt. Teachers Union, 399 M d. 174, 197 , 923 A.2d 60, 74 (20 07) ( W e begin our anal ysis by first looking to the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute, reading the statute as a whole to ensure that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory (quoting Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Corp. v. Yanni, 397 Md. 474 , 481, 919 A.2d 1 , 5 (2007)). 29 We acknowledge that a serialize d approa ch to com pliance w ith the advise ments required by Rule 4-215(a) ma y carry a somewhat heightened risk of fostering confusion or fall prey to forgetfulness on the part of a defendant as to his or her implicated rights and the peril of inaction on his or her part in effectuating the rights. This, we believe, may be protected against in the course of a case-by-case analysis of the particular record in a case where waiver is found. If sufficient indicia pers uade a trial or appellate co urt that a defendant s inaction was attributable, to a me aningful degree, to con fusion on his or her pa rt as to the right to counsel and the consequence of inaction because of the serialized rendition of the preliminary advisements, justice can be tailored in such a case. In the present case, we undertake that analysis nex t. C. Judge Tisdale s Finding of Waiver by Broadwater of Her Right to Counsel Broadwater alleges that, even if a piecemeal approach to the 4-215 (a) advisem ents is considered sufficient in her case, the Circuit Court nevertheless abused its discretion when it rejected her explanation for being without counsel on 14 February 2005, finding that she waived, through inaction, her right to be represented by counsel pursuant to R ule 4-215(d), and requiring that she represent herself at trial. In order to persuade us that the trial judge abused his discretion, Broadwater must demonstrate that the court ignored information relevant to whether her inaction constituted waiver or failed to meet its obligation to make such inquiry as is requ ired to perm it it to exercise discretion required by the rule. Mitchell 30 v. State, 337 Md. 509, 516 , 654 A.2d 130 9, 1313 (1995); see also Felder, 106 Md. App. at 650-51, 666 A.2 d at 876 (ex plaining tha t waiver de cisions mu st generally be entrusted to the wide discretion of the trial judge ). Broadwater s explanation on 14 February 2005 for why she appeared for trial without counsel was that certain perceived discrepancies revealed by discovery responses provided to her by the State convinced h er, only days befor e trial, that she ne eded to reta in an at torney, and that she could not proceed pro se as she had planned. Judge Tisdale determined that this was not a meritorious excuse, found waiver, and proceeded to trial, requiring that Broadwater represent herself. She now alleges that Judge Tisdale abused his discretion beca use o nly a two-week postponement was required in order for her to obtain representation from the Public Defender. She argues that, because the case required only a few witnesses and jurors, postponement would not have been a serious inconvenience to the court or the State. There is no prescribed or set form of inquiry that must precede a trial judge s finding of waiver u nder Ru le 4-215(b )-(e). Before the Circuit Court judge may find waiver pursuant to 4-215(d), howe ver, he or she must allow the defendant to exp lain his or her appearance without couns el and, th rough inquiry, d etermine wheth er the defe ndant s rea son is meritor ious. A s the Co urt of S pecial A ppeals has ob served , [i]n determining whether the defendant s reason is meritorious, the court s inquiry (1) must be sufficient to permit it to exercise its discretion . . . (2) must not ignore information relevan t to whether the def endan t s inactio n cons titutes w aiver . . . and (3) must reflect that the court actually considered the defend ant s reasons for appearing without counsel before making a decision. 31 McCracken, 150 Md. App. at 356-57, 820 A.2d at 609; see also Gra y v. State, 338 Md. 106, 112, 656 A.2d 766, 769 (1995) (explaining that [i]t is not enough that a defendant is allowed to make an explanatio n sufficien t to allow the court to dete rmine w hether the re ason is meritorious ; rather, the record must also be sufficient to reflect tha t the court actu ally considered those reasons (quoting Moore, 331 M d. at 186 , 626 A .2d at 97 1). We have concluded that a trial court abused its discretion in finding a waiver of the right to counsel: by not inquiring into the merits of a d efendant s reason fo r appearing before the court w ithout co unsel, Maus v . State, 311 Md. 85, 113, 532 A.2d 1066, 1080 (1987); by not inquiring further when a defendant explained that he had just become employed and, therefore, did not qualify f or the P ublic D efend er s Ser vice, Moore, 331 M d. at 182 , 626 A.2d at 970; and where th e trial court fou nd waiv er after a def endant ex plained tha t his lawyer, who also was representing a co-defendant, suffered from a conflict of interest and was forced to with draw h is appe arance . Crowd er v. State, 305 Md. 654, 664, 506 A.2d 240, 245 (1986). On the other hand, we have declined to find abuse of discretion in finding waiver where a defendant discharged counsel, without justification, shortly before trial, and requested the court to appoint new counsel. Fowlke s v. State, 311 Md. 586, 604, 536 A.2d 1149, 1158 (19 88). In the instant case, the record shows th at the Circu it Court complied with the requirements of Rule 4-215(d) in finding waiver by inaction. The trial court examined Broadwater s offered explanations as to why she had appeared numero us times in court without counsel, asked her about the problems she perceived with the State s particular 32 discovery responses, and determined that, in light of the fact that she had approximately five months in which to retain an attorney after being told the first time of the importance of counsel, she effectively waived her right to counsel by inaction. Our perusal of the record also leads us ine vitably to the con clusion that B roadwa ter was in no way co nfused a bout this right or the peril of inaction by the m anner in w hich she rec eived the ad visements under R ule 4-215 (a). Her contention on 14 F ebruary 2005 that she wou ld have been able to se cure representation from the Public Defender s Office had a two-week postponement been granted does not suggest remotely that Judge Tisdale abused his discretion in denying that relief and finding waiver. From the tim e of her first hearing in the Circuit Court, where she was informed of the importance of retaining counsel, and of her right to free representation by the Public Defender, if she qualified, B roadwa ter had fou r months to ascertain whether she so qualified o r, failing that, to fin d private counsel. She vacillated in her reasons from her 21 September 2004 representation to Judge Ambrose in the District Court, where she claimed to have selec ted a private c ounsel to represent her, to the 8 Octo ber 2004 hearing where she failed to explain adequately why, having contacted th e Public D efender, sh e neglected to follow up to determine whether she qualified for assigned legal counsel. Instead, she iterated that she did not know if the Public Defender tried to reach her as she had not picked up her mail at her residence address for three months (o r apparently m ade other a rrangeme nts to receive mail). S he alluded to suffering from fibromyalgia, but never explained how that 33 condition prevented her from securing counsel. Finally, she stated she did not seek to engage counsel earlier becau se she w as afrai d a Pub lic Def ender w ould p lead [h er case] out. Judge Tisdale again explained to her the importance of counsel and the potential for a future finding of waiver by inaction: THE COU RT: An attorney can as sist you by evaluatin g the charges and the facts of the case and advising you how to procee d in connected co urt proceedings on your behalf. A s I told you, if you come to court on the 8th of November without an attorney, you likely won t be granted a c ontinuanc e to retain one. Now, I know you ve heard this same advice on a number of occasions, and a judge is go ing to look a t this file and say, well, we ve told her and told her, o kay? One month later, Broadwater again was advised of her rights and the risk of waiver by inaction if sh e appeare d yet again w ithout coun sel: THE COU RT: No w, I m go ing to tell you again what th e judge alre ady told you in October . . . So I m telling you that one more time so that when this case comes back here, the record is going to reflect you were advised of your right to a lawyer onc e again, and if you come back w ithout a law yer, the judge co uld find that you have waived your right to be represented by counsel, by a lawyer. Do you understand that, Ms. Broadw ater? BROADWATER: Yes, ma am. After reviewing these nu merous a dmonition s on the reco rd, Judge T isdale ultimate ly determined that Broadwater, unjustifiably and without meritorious reason, refused or failed to secure cou nsel after ha ving amp le opportun ity to do so. On this record, w e are unwilling to conclude that that ruling constituted an abuse of discretion. III. Conclusion 34 We hold that the litany of advisements required by Rule 4-215(a) may be given satisfactorily to a defendant where the record shows a piecemeal and cumulative rendition of the advisements by successive judges of the District and Circuit Courts in those cases where the District Court had exclusive original jurisdiction of the charges at their inception and the case is transferred to the Circuit Court upon the defendant s prayer for a trial b y jury. Although these advisements also may be given at one time in a single omnibus hearing, which should be the preferre d mode o f rendering the advisem ents, that is not th e only modality through which compliance may be achieved under the R ule. The pr edicate to finding a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel lies in the giving of the complete litany, whether at one occasion or in seriatim over multiple appearances in the same case, although in the latter instance care must be taken not to foster confusion on the defendant s part as to the implicated right and the potential c onseque nces of ina ction in pursuit o f effec tuating t hat righ t. In the present case, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in finding that Broadwater waived her right to be represented by counsel through inaction. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECI AL APPEALS AFFI RM E D ; COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER. 35 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 123 September Term, 2006 LORINDA ANN BROADWA TER v. STATE OF MARYLAND Bell, C.J. Raker *Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene Wilne r, Alan M . (Retired, specially assigned), JJ. Dissenting Opinion by Bell, C.J., which Battaglia and Greene, JJ., join. Filed: September 13, 2007 *Cathell, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the 36 decision and adoption of this opinion. Tod ay, We hold that t he lit any of adv isem ents requ ired by Ru le 4-215 (a) m ay be given satisfactorily to a defendant where the record shows a piecemeal and cumulative rendition of the advisements by successive judges of the District and Circuit Courts in those cases where the District Court had exclusive original jurisdiction of the charges at their inception and the case is transferred to the Circuit Court upon the defendant s prayer for trial by jury. Although these adviseme nts also ma y be given at o ne time in a single omnibus hearing, which should be the preferred mode of rendering the advisements, that is not the only modality through which compliance may be achieved under the Rule. The predicate to f inding a kn owing a nd intelligent wa iver of the righ t to counsel lies in the g iving of the c omp lete litany, whether at one occa sion or in seriatim over multiple appearances in the same case, although in the latter instance care must be taken not to foster confusion on the defendant s part as to the implicate d right and th e potential co nsequen ces of inac tion in pursuit of effect uating th at right. ___ Md. ___, ___, ___ A. 2d ___, ___ [slip op. at 35]. This is an extraordinary holding, not simply for what it pres cribes or be cause it effe ctively margina lizes, if not ove rrules, Johnson v. State, 355 Md. 420, 735 A.2d 1003 (1999), a case under ten (10) years vintage, but for the path it takes to achie ve this result. B y this holding, the majority also fails to give effect to, and, in fact, completely disregards, the most basic rule of Rule construction - to discern the intention of the promu lgators of the Rule by reference to the word s the promulgators used, instead, ignoring those words in favor of a flawed precedent, a result-oriented rationale, and a strained interpretation of Johnson. Compliance with Maryland Rule 4-215 (a) is, as subsection (d)18 of the Rule, our 18 Rule 4-215 (d) provides: (contin ued...) cases, see Johnson, 355 Md. at 452, 735 A.2d at 1020 ( T he expres s languag e of M d. Rule 4-215(d) states that for there to be an effective waiver by inaction, the reco rd [must] show [ ] compliance with [the advisements found in] section (a) of this Rule.... ), and cases therein cited, and the majority acknowledge, a prerequisite for finding that a defendant has waived counsel by inaction. It provides: (a) First Appearance in Court Without Counsel. At the defendant's first appearance in court without counsel, or when the defendant appears in the District Court without counsel, demands a jury trial, and the record does not disclose prio r complian ce with this s ection by a jud ge, the cou rt shall: (1) Make certain that the defendant has received a copy of the charging document containing notice as to the right to counsel. (2) Inform the defendant of the right to counsel and of the importanc e of assistan ce of cou nsel. 18 (...continued) Waiver by Inaction--Circuit Court. If a defendant appe ars in circuit court without co unsel on th e date set for hearing or trial, indicates a desire to have counsel, and the record shows complian ce with sec tion (a) of this Rule, either in a previous appearance in the circuit court or in an appearance in the District Court in a case in which the defendant demanded a jury trial, the court sha ll permit the d efendan t to explain the appearance without counsel. If the co urt finds that there is a meritorious reason for the defendant's appearance without counsel, the court shall continue the action to a later time and advise the defendant that if counsel does not enter an appearance by that time, the action will proceed to trial with the defe ndant unrepresented by counsel. If the court finds that there is no meritorious reason for the defendant's appearance without counsel, the court may determine that the defendant has waived counsel by failing or refusing to obtain counsel and may proceed with the hearing or trial. (Emphasis added). 2 (3) Advise the defendant of the nature of the charges in the charging document, and the allowable penalties, including man dato ry pen alties, if a ny. (4) Conduct a waiver inquiry pursuant to section (b) of this Rule if the d efendan t indicates a de sire to waiv e counse l. (5) If trial is to be conducted on a subsequent date, advise the defendant that if the defendant app ears for trial witho ut counse l, the court could determine that the defendant waived counsel and proceed to trial with the d efendan t unreprese nted by coun sel. The clerk shall no te complian ce with this s ection in the f ile or on th e dock et. Md. Rule 4-2 15 (a) (hereinafter, Rule 4-2 15 (a) or the Rule ). Clearly and unam biguously, and by its terms neithe r prescribing nor implying the existence of any exception, Rule 4-215 (a) requires the trial court, to whom it is directed and before whom the d efendant is appearing , to discharge the duties precisely form ulated and enumerated in the R ule. It is significant, in other words, that the Rule imposes o n the court the burden of making each and every inquiry, and giving each and every advisement enumerated, whenever a defendant first appear[s] in court w ithout coun sel, or ... appears in the District Court without counsel, demands a jury trial, and the record does not disclose prior compliance with this section by a judge, and that it does not countenance or contemp late partial inqu iry and advisem ent, to be sup plemente d later by anoth er court. We construed Rule 4-215 (a) in Johnson, reaching two (2) conclusions, in the form of holdings, tha t inform, or I s hould say, should inform, the decision in this case. The first, that compliance [with Rule 4-215(a)] must be strict and not simply substantial, 355 Md. 3 at 446, 735 A.2d at 1017, that substantial compliance with Md. Rule 4-215 (a)(1)-(5) is not sufficient for there to be an effec tive M d. Ru le 4-215 (d) w aive r of c ounsel by a defendant[,] id. at 426, 735 A.2d at 1006, was in response to an argument by the State, reminiscent of the argu ment it makes here and that the majority accepts. The State, conceding that there had not been strict compliance with Rule 4-215 (a) in that case, argued nevertheless that the waiver was e ffective, there having bee n substantial compliance. In particul ar, it relied on, inter alia,19 findings of the trial judge: (1) during John son's first court appearance bef ore the District Court Commissioner, he was provided with a Notice of Advice of Right to C ounsel and an Initial Appearance Report, which indicated that he had received the subsection (a) advisements; and (2) when Johnson appeared the next day before the District Court judge for his bail review hearing, a Bail Review Docke t form was completed and signed by the judge, indicating compliance w ith Md. Rule 4-21 5[,] id. at 425-426, 735 A.2d at 1006, and the completed Initial Appearance/VOP Information Sheet, which had been given to Johnson on his first appearance in C ircuit Court and which indicated that the subsection (a) information had been provided to Johnson. Id. at 426, 735 A.2d a t 1006. In rejecting the State s argument, the Johnson court pointed to the plain language 19 The State believed als o that require ments of ( a) (1) and (3 ) were sub stantially satis fied by virtue o f the fact that t he ch arge s rem aine d the same bet wee n Joh nson 's District Court and Circuit Court appearances and that there was substantial compliance with subsection (a)(5) when Johnson received that advisement from a District Court judge during his bail re view h earing. Johnson v. State, 355 Md. 420, 425, 735 A.2d 1003, 1006 (1999). 4 of the Rule and review[ed] some of the primary cases in which this Court has examined Md. Rule 4-215 or its precursors, 355 Md. at 446, 735 A.2d at 1017, e .g., Parren v. S tate, 309 Md. 260, 523 A.2d 597 (1987) and Moten v. State, 339 Md. 407, 663 A.2d 5 93 (1995), 20 20 In Parren v. S tate, having reiterated that Md. Rule 4-215 detailed a precise procedure that must be followed in matters pertaining to waiver, 309 Md. 260, 278, 523 A.2d 597, 605-06 (1987), and that our rules are not guides to the practice of law but precise rubrics established to promote the orderly and efficient administration of justice and [that they] are to be read and followed, id. at 280, 523 A. 2d at 606-07, citing Isen v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 259 M d. 564, 570 , 270 A.2d 476 (197 0); State v. Bryan, 284 Md. 152, 154-55, 395 A.2d 475 (1978), we addressed the importance of Md. Rule 4-215 in protecting a defend ant's fundam ental constitu tional right to co unsel: We rem ain satisfied th at to protect the fundam ental rights inv olved, to secure simplic ity in proce dure, an d to pro mote f airness i n adm inistratio n ... the requirem ents of [Md .] Ru le 4-215 are to be co nsid ered as mandatory. We reac h this conclu sion with c onsideration of the natu re of the righ t with which the Rule is concerned and the unqualified recognition of the importance of that right by the Executive Department, the Legislative Department and the Judiciary Department of our State. Of great signific ance is th at the R ule is un iformly c ouche d in ma ndator y langua ge. The com mands to the court are that it shall do th e acts set out; th e Rule mand ates the c ourt's co nduct. We see no su pport in the Rule for a construction that substan tial complian ce with its req uirements is sufficient. We refuse to depart from our holding in Bryan. *** It is perfectly clear that the purpose of [Md.] Rule 4-215 is to protect that most important fundamental right to the effective assistance of counsel, which is basic to our adversary system of criminal justice, and which is guaranteed by the federal and Maryland constitutions to every defendant in all criminal prosec utions. 309 Md. at 280-82, 523 A.2d at 606-07. We adopted this discussion in Johnson, adding, however, the emphasis shown. 355 Md. at 447-448, 735 A.2d at 1017-18. In Moten v. State, 339 Md. 407, 663 A.2d 593 (1995), following Parren, this Court held that a harm less error ana lysis is inapplicable to a violation of Rule 4-215 (a) (3). Id. at 409, 663 A.2d at 595. We also he ld that [O]nce subs ections (a) (1)-(4) of R ule 4-215 were invoked, the trial court's failu re to comp ly fully with its requirements rende red waivers (contin ued...) 5 concluding: Md. Rule 4-215 is a bright line rule that requires strict comp liance in order for there to be a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel by a defend ant. In addition, the rule's provisions are mandatory, as indicated by the use of the word shall. In this case, we are concerned with subsection (a), the advisements, and subsection (d), the waiver inquiry. The express language of Md. Rule 4-215 (d) states that for there to be an effective waiver by inaction, the record [must] show [ ] compliance with [the advisements found in] section (a) of this Rule.... Along with the plain language of the rule itself, Parren, Moten, and Okon [21] leave no doubt that Md. Rule 4-215 mu st be strictly complied with in order f or a wa iver to b e effec tive. See also Smith v. S tate, 88 Md. App. 40, 591 A.2d 905, 88 Md. App. [32,] 43, 591 A.2d [902,] 907 (1991) ( [T]he [plain] language of the Rules [ requires us] to hold that the circuit court must comply with [Md.] Rule 4-215 in its entirety. ). Johnson, 355 Md. at 452-53, 735 A.2d at 1020. We had earlier noted that 20 (...continued) of counsel ineffective. Id. at 411, 663 A.2d at 596. 21 Okon v . State, 346 Md. 249, 696 A.2d 441 (1997), which reaffirmed Parren and Moten, was also identified as one of the trio of cases, in which this Court, resist[ing] attempts to e ase the strict req uirements o f Md. R ule 4-215 , found th at Md. R ule 4-215 is a precise rubric that mandates strict compliance in order for there to be an effective waiver of counsel by a criminal defendant. Johnson, 355 M d. at 446 , 735 A .2d at 10 17. The Co urt also ackn owledg ed that the C ourt of Sp ecial App eals had co nsistently so held in Smith v. S tate, 88 Md.App. 32, 40, 591 A.2d 902, 905 (1991) ( Maryland law is clear that the provisions of [Md.] Rule 4-215 are mandatory and substantial compliance is not sufficient. ) and in Evans v . State, 84 Md. App. 573, 581, 581 A.2d 435, 439 (1990) ( [S]tric t comp liance w ith the ru le is man dated.... ). Johnson, 355 Md. at 449, 735 A.2d at 1019. 6 [t]he standard in Maryland for an effective waiver of counsel echoes the standard established by the Supreme Court in Johnson [v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938 )], Adams [v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.C t. 236, 242, 87 L.Ed. 26 8, 275 (1942)] , and Argersinger [v. Hamlin , 407 U.S. 25, 37, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 2012, 32 L.Ed.2 d 530, 538 (1972)], ..., among other cases: to be valid, the waiver must be knowing and intelligen t. Fowlke s v. State, 311 Md. 58 6, 609, 536 A.2d 1149, 1161 (19 88); Maus v. State, 311 Md. 85, 112, 532 A.2d 10 66, 1079 (1987); Howe ll v. State, 293 Md. 23 2, 236, 443 A.2d 103, 105 (1982 ). Maryland Rule 4-215 (a) implements the constitutional mandates for waiver of counsel, detailing a specific procedure that must be followed by the trial court in order for there to be a know ing and intelligen t waive r. Vincenti v. State, 309 M d. 601, 6 04, 525 A.2d 1 072, 107 4 (1987); Fowlkes, 311 Md. at 609, 536 A.2 d at 1161. W hether the d efendan t's waiver is ex pressly made to the judge by requesting to proceed to trial pro se, by inaction through simply appearing at trial without counsel present, or through discharging an attorney whose appearan ce has bee n entered, th e trial court mu st comply w ith Md. Rule 4-215 in orde r for the defen dant's w aiver of couns el to be v alid. Johnson, 355 Md. at 443-44, 735 A.2d at 1016. The majority distinguishes Johnson primarily - [f]irst and most important - on the basis of jurisdiction. ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 26]. Therefore, it reasons that, because the charges against Johnson were within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, Johnson was required to receive his subsection (a) advisements from a circuit court judge, id., quoting Johnson, 355 Md. at 457, 735 A. 2d at 10 23. The m ajority concludes from this fa ct, that Johnson, thus, governs only situations where the Circuit Court possesses exclusive original jurisdiction. Id. Alternatively, the majority reasons, the deficiencies that we identified with regard to the advice received by Johnson in the District Court - the failure of the District Court judge to adequa tely advise him orally of the Rule 4- 7 215(a) information, and the fact that the only oral advisements given were given by a District Court Commissioner, rather than a judge, Johnson, 355 Md. at 455, 735 A. 2d at 1022, reveal that our holding rested, not on the notion that Rule 4-215(a) may not be satisfied cumulativ ely by seriatim adviseme nts delivered in the District Court and a circuit court, but rather that Johnson simply never satisfactorily received proper and full advisements under any combination of circu mstances. ___ M d. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___ [slip op. at 26-27]. 22 22 The majority suggests that the petitioner s reliance on the Johnson holding, which it ch aracterizes as that the Ru le did not co ntemplate J ohnson re ceiving pro perly the section (a) litany at the combined District Court and Circuit Court appearances, is at best dicta, ___ Md. ___, ___, ___ A. 2d ___, ___ (2007) [slip op. at 27], reasoning that the case necessarily rested only on the determination that the defendant did not receive a correct or co mplete litany of adviseme nts at any time thro ughout th e course o f his countable court appearances. Id. The majority is wrong. The Johnson court stated the issue as: [W]hether a circuit court judge with exclusive original jurisdiction may determine that a defendant waived the right to counsel based on information provided to the defendant at his or her bail review hearing before a District Court judge. Specifically, we are being asked to determine whether waiver of couns el by inaction, as d etailed in M aryland Rule 4-215 (d), m ay occur in the abs ence o f com pliance with M d. Rule 4-215 (a) (1)-(5 ). Johnson, 355 M d. at 424, 73 5 A.2d a t 1005. V iewed in th e context o f what fo llowed, it is clear that the iss ue was n ot the one th e majority claim s. Rather, the p etitioner s foc us is the correct o ne - she go t it right. The majority also relies on Moore v. State, 331 Md. 179, 184, 626 A. 2d 968, 970 (1993), Richards on v. State, 381 Md. 348, 364-65, 849 A. 2d 487, 497 (2004), and McCracken v. State, 150 Md. App. 330, 355, 820 A. 2d 593, 608 (2003), for the proposition that a circuit court judge may rely on the Rule 4-215 (a) advisements given by a District Court judge, and supplem ent them a s necessary, so lo ng as the ca se properly be gan in the District Court s jurisdiction, based on the crimes charged, and wa s transferred to the Circuit Court when the defendant prayed a jury trial. ___ M d. at ___, __ _ A. 2d a t ___ [slip op at 27-28]. Rule 4-215(d) now provides, as the cases cited confirm, that a Circuit Court judge can accept, and is not required to repeat, Rule 4-215(a) advisements when the record shows (contin ued...) 8 It is, to be sure, a fact that the charges in this case, unlike those in Johnson, are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the D istrict Court and the case, therefore, is in the Circuit Court for a jury trial, prayed in that court. It is not correct, however, that this fact explains the holding by this Court in Johnson. That hold ing was, you will recall, that R ule 4-215 is not only mandatory, but requires strict, not substantial, compliance. Johnson, 355 Md. at 446, 735 A.2d at 1017. It was by way of rationalizing this holding that we engaged in an extended discussion of the right to counsel, acknowledging its fundamental nature, and Maryland law on the subject. It was in that context tha t we related our historic re sistance to ef forts to change, ease, the standard by which waivers of counsel are judged. It was our focus on the standard to be applied to the application of the Rule to which that discussion was directed. The jurisdictional issue did not warrant, not to mention re quire, the fo cus that w e took in Johnson, and the extensive treatment we gave that approach. 22 (...continued) compliance with section (a) of this R ule, either in a p revious ap pearance in the circuit court or in an appearance in the District Court in a case in which the defendant demanded a jury trial. The ope rative phrase in the Rule is show s compliance. Th e Rule does no t require a repetition of compliance , but it does not excuse no n-compliance, and w hen the record shows partial - not complete - compliance, it does not show compliance. Thus, it is not correct to say that Rule 4-215(d), or either of the cases cited, permits supplementation of incomple te advisements; certainly, neither the Rule nor those cases expressly provides for supplementation. Implying such a provision, I submit, changes the strict compliance standard, so well settled in this State, to, dare I say it, a s ubstan tial com pliance one, a standard that, by the way, we rejected, and emphatically so, in Johnson. 9 As the majority correctly points out, the Johnson court, in rejecting the State s argumen t, referred to the difference in requirements, depending on the jurisdictional predica te. See ___ Md. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___ [slip o p at 25-26]. It is sign ificant that it did so in the context of the State s substantial compliance argument and, then, it offered that rationale not as a substitute for the strict compliance holding or as a stand alone holding, but only as an additional reason for the strict compliance holding. Only after the Court had stated its holding that the Rule must be strictly complied with and the reason for it - it vindicates the fundamental right to counsel23 - did it mention the jurisdictional issue: Further, a circuit court judge with exclusive original jurisdiction may not determine that Johnson waived counsel based on information provided to him at his bail review h earin g before a District Court ju dge. Bec ause John son's charges were not transferred to the circuit court on a jury trial demand, an advisement by a District Cou rt judge, as op posed to a circuit court ju dge, was not sufficient for strict compliance with Md. Rule 4-215. Johnson, 355 Md. at 426 , 735 A.2d at 100 6 (emphasis adde d). 23 On this po int the Cou rt was quite clear, even e loquent: This Court has on several occasions resisted attempts to relax the strictures of Md. Rule 4-215. We believe that any erosion of th e rule's requirem ents would begin the dangero usly slippery slope towards more exceptions. The right to assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings is a fundamental right; therefore, we indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver-whether such waiver is expressly made by the defendant or implied through his or her refusal or failure to o btain coun sel. Maryland Rule 4-21 5 exists as a safeguard to the constitutional right to counsel, providing a precise ch ecklist that a judge must com plete before a defendant's waiver can be considered valid; as such, it m andate s strict co mplian ce. Johnson, 355 Md. at 426, 735 A.2d at 1006. 10 The majority cites Gregg v. State, 377 Md. 515, 833 A. 2d 1040 (2003) as further support for the proposition that Ru le 4-215(a) ma y be satisfied in piecemeal, cumulative fashion by advisements rendered by judges of the District and Circuit Courts. ___ Md. at ___, ___ A. 2 d at ___ [s lip op. at 27]. It is true that one of this Court s holdings in that case was that cumulative piecemeal advisements by more than one Circuit Court judg e is sufficient where the charges are within the exclusive jurisdic tion of the C ircuit Court. 24 It must be pointed out, however, that the more substantial issue had to do with the trial court s obligation to inqu ire as to th e defe ndant s comp etency, sua sponte , consuming the vast majority of the ma jority s, and all of the dissent s, attentio n. Gregg, 377 Md. at 556, 833 A. 2d at 1066 (dissen ting op inion b y Bell, C.J ., in which Eldridge, J. joined). Indeed, as indicated, that issue divid ed the Co urt, and, as must be ob vious, was a dispositive issue. In any event, the reasoning of Gregg on the Rule 4-21 5 issue can withstand s crutiny to no greater extent than can the reasoning in the instant case. In this case, because, when the petitioner appeared in the Circuit Court, after having appeared in the District Court and prayed a jury trial, the record did not show compliance with the Rule 4-215 (a) advisements, Rule 4-215 (a) then imposed on the Circuit Court judge 24 Curiously, the petitioner in Gregg v . State, 377 Md. 515, 833 A. 2d 1040 (2003) argued that the advisements were deficient and could only be rendered sufficient if they were c ombin ed with advise ments g iven by th e Distric t Court . Gregg, 377 Md. at 553-54, 833 A.2 d at 1062- 63. There thus is reason to question w hether the issu e decided actually was presented in that case. 11 the duty to comply with its prescriptions. That duty was strictly to comply, not d o so partially or supplement advisements already given. When that judge did not comply fully or strictly, the record continued not to show compliance, thus charging the trial judge befo re whom the defendant may appear next with the corresponding and mandatory duty to comply. The second Johnson holding makes clear that this is so, a nd wh y. See Johnson, 355 Md. at 46061, 735 A.2d at 1025. Having rehearsed the advisements given Johnson, the Court rejected them as inadequate. Consequently, it held: In short, any Md. Rule 4-215 (a) (1)-(5) advisements that Johnson received were inadequate and given to him in an incomplete manner in different co urts by different ju dges, all resultin g in likely confusion on the part of the defen dant. Nowh ere in the record is there evidence that any one circuit court judge went through the section (a) litany with Johnson, point-by-point as required. Indeed, the record indicates that the only judge who mentioned Md. Rule 4-215 to Johnson was Judge Nalley on the day of his trial, and even then he did not go through th e comple te subsection (a) advisem ent. For the rule to be an effective constitutional safeguard, it contemplates defendants receiving the advisements during their firs t appea rance in court w ithout co unsel, well before the day of trial. We conclude that to avoid confusion on the part of an accused and to protect the fundamental right to coun sel, the subse ction (a) adv isements must be given in strict accordance with Md. Rule 4-215, by the correct court and not piecemea l. A knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel can only occur when there is s trict com pliance with th e rule. Johnson, 355 Md. at 461 , 735 A.2d at 102 5 (emphasis adde d). Thus, we made clear what strict compliance with Rule 4-215 (a) advisements entails: a judge going through the advisements with the defendant point-by-point as required, and 12 not piecem eal. O n this, the Court could not have been clearer. Yet, the majority in the instant case disregards these holdings, in favor of a rationale that is not justified by the Johnson opinion, but one that gets it to the result it seeks.25 In doing so, the majority overrules, sub silentio, at least Johnson, Parren, and Moten, and at the same time, undermines the right to counsel and sends the wrong message, a message diametrically opposite to that previously sent with regard to the rules governing waiver of counsel and the effect of failing to comply with them. Rather than finding a way to avoid giving consequence to a trial judge s failure to abide by a rule that is directed to trial judges, indeed, demands of trial judges before whom defendants without attorneys appear, some action for the protection of those defendants fundamental right to counsel, we would do well to enforce the Rule. Looking the other way begets nothing less than additional non-compliance; by so doing, we can look forward to o ther cases that will extend the limits. Enf orcing compliance, on the other hand, has the potential of reducing the number of th ose c ases . If, a t the e nd of the day, the majority is intent on changing the law and the effect of our Rules, perhaps because compliance is too diff icult to en forc e or m ay be seen as too solicitous of the rights of defendants, it would be better to have the Rules reflect the rea lity on the groun d. It simply will not do to h ave prec ise rubrics, inte nded to be read and f ollowed, to mean sometimes and sometimes not, depending on the Rule. I dissent. Judges Battaglia and Greene have 25 There is a k ind of H umpty-Du mpty quality to the majority s rationa le; it is as if it is saying, to paraph rase Le wis C arroll, T he law is wha t we say it is , no mo re, no les s. See L EWIS C ARROLL , T HROUGH THE L OOKING G LASS (London, M acmillan 1872). 13 authorized me to state th at they join me in this dissent. 14
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