GEORGE (ROCKLAND) VS. ESTATE OF MARION DOUGLAS GEORGE , ET AL.
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RENDERED: AUGUST 19, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-001237-MR
ROCKLAND GEORGE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE C. DAVID HAGERMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00495
ESTATE OF MARION DOUGLAS
GEORGE, DECEASED; HON. MATTHEW
J. WIXSOM, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
ESTATE OF MARION DOUGLAS GEORGE,
DECEASED; THE ESTATE OF ELOISE
T. GEORGE, DECEASED; JAN THOMPSON,
NANCY WOLSKE AND VALERIE BOGDAN,
CO-ADMINISTRATRICES AND SOLE
BENEFICIARIES OF THE ESTATE OF ELOISE
GEORGE, DECEASED
APPELLEES
OPINION AND ORDER
DISMISSING APPEAL
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, LAMBERT, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: Rockland George appeals from the May 11, 2010, order of
the Boyd Circuit Court, which, after a Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR)
60.02 motion by the Estate of Eloise George, set aside the portion of its March 28,
2008, order requiring the real estate to be appraised, and then, to provide Rockland
with the right to purchase the other owners’ one-third (1/3) interest within thirty
(30) days or, if he does not, to sell the real estate to pay the debts of the Estate.
The estates of Marion Douglas George and Eloise George are the appellees. The
issue is whether the trial court erred in vacating its May 11, 2010, order under CR
60.02. We dismiss the appeal as interlocutory.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The disposition of a 110-acre piece of property in the Estate of Marion
Douglas George, which is owned one-third (1/3) by Eloise George’s heirs and twothirds (2/3) by Rockland George, is the focus of this action. The genesis of the
issue is whether the subject real estate is required to be sold by one set of joint
tenants, Eloise’s heirs, to another joint tenant, Rockland, based on the $105,000
appraisal amount. To address the primary issue, it is necessary to review the
protracted history of the case.
Rockland is the son of the decedent, Marion Douglas “Doug” George
(hereinafter “Doug”). Eloise T. George was the second wife of the decedent. Prior
to his marriage to Eloise, Doug acquired a farm in Boyd County. His acquisition
of the farm was represented by two (2) deeds, dated 1940 and 1946, respectively.
The farm of approximately 110 acres is located near the Cannonsburg interchange
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with Interstate 64. For some time, Rockland lived on property adjoining the farm.
Additionally, after Doug’s retirement from farming, Rockland used the farm as his
own.
In 1993, a guardianship proceeding concerning the care of Doug was
initiated in Boyd District Court. Rockland and Eloise were appointed coguardians. As a part of the process, an inventory and accounting were required.
Rockland was dissatisfied with the inventory and accounting as done by Eloise,
and filed exceptions to both. Following a hearing, the district court accepted
Eloise’s inventory and accounting. At that time the district court also dissolved the
co-guardianship. It appointed Rockland the conservator of certain real property
and various items of personal property. Eloise, however, remained Doug George’s
guardian.
On December 24, 1994, Doug died testate. According to Doug’s will,
his entire estate was to pass to Rockland, but Eloise, as the surviving spouse,
renounced the will. See Kentucky Revised Statues (KRS) 392.080. Further,
during the probate action, Rockland alleged that certain property claimed by the
Estate was owned personally by him. The district court, however, determined that
the ownership of the property had already been litigated in the guardianship action,
and therefore, could not be re-litigated in the probate proceeding. In addition, the
district court ordered that Eloise was to receive her statutory one-third (1/3) share
of the real property, including the farm.
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Next, in May 2004, the administrator of Doug’s estate, Matthew J.
Wixsom, filed a complaint to settle the Estate in the Boyd Circuit Court.
Rockland, as well as other persons, replied to the complaint by stating that they
had title to certain items of personal property listed on the above-mentioned
inventory and that these items were not the property of the Estate. In response to
these claims, the Estate filed a motion for summary judgment. It argued that the
issue of ownership had been already decided in the guardianship and probate
actions, and thus, the doctrine of res judicata barred re-litigation. On November 1,
2005, the Boyd Circuit Court granted the Estate’s motion for summary judgment.
Rockland appealed the court’s order of summary judgment to the
Court of Appeals. His appeal concerned whether the issue of ownership of
personal property was correctly interpreted as res judicata. Our Court determined
in case No. 2005-CA-002613 that summary judgment in favor of the Estate was
improper and remanded the case for an adjudication of the issue of the ownership
of the personal property claimed by the Estate. The reasoning behind the decision
was that the mere filing of an inventory in an estate proceeding in district court is
not determinative of the ownership interests. Therefore, the district court’s prior
adjudication of the disputed personal property is not entitled to the preclusive
effects of res judicata.
After the decision was rendered, the Estate filed notice to depose both
Rockland and Eloise to clarify the ownership of the disputed personal property.
But Eloise on several occasions failed to appear for the scheduled depositions.
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Ultimately, Eloise, through counsel, informed the court that other than making a
list of the property that was on the farm in 1993, she had no additional information
regarding the ownership of the property.
On March 17, 2008, the Estate of Doug George moved the court for
summary judgment as to the ownership of the personal property and for an order
directing the real property be appraised and sold. The basis of the motion to sell
the real property was the Estate had insufficient funds to pay the expenses of the
Estate. Thereafter, the circuit court, on March 28, 2008, entered an order granting
the Estate of Doug George’s motion for summary judgment as to the ownership of
the personal property. It declared that Rockland and the others who claimed
ownership of personal property on the farm inventory were, in fact, the owners.
The circuit court noted that besides appearing on the inventory compiled by Eloise,
no other evidence was presented indicating that the property belonged to the
Estate.
Second, the circuit court ordered that the real estate be appraised and
sold in order to the pay the expenses of the Estate. Upon the sale of the real estate,
the trial court further required that Rockland George be given thirty (30) days to
purchase Eloise’s one-third (1/3) share at the appraised value. And the trial court
ordered that a hearing would be held to ascertain any additional fees of the Estate
and whether Eloise would be required to pay any of Rockland’s attorney fees as a
result of the misrepresentation of the ownership interest of certain personal
property, which had been located on the farm.
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A close review of the March 28, 2008, order granting summary
judgment reveals that while it cites the language “[t]his is a final and appealable
order[,]” it does not contain the language “there is no just cause for delay.” As an
aside, the real estate was already the subject of a separate land partition law suit in
another case (No. 97-CI-00055).
An appropriate appraisal of the farm was obtained by the Estate
administrator and submitted to the circuit court. The appraisal valued the property
at $105,000. Rockland then tendered one-third (1/3) of the appraised value of the
property but before the deed could be executed, Eloise George died on October 14,
2008, and her will was probated on December 12, 2008. The will devised her
property to her nieces, Valerie S. Bogdan, Jan Thompson, and Nancy Wolske.
Then, on February 17, 2009, almost one year following the March 28,
2008 order, the attorney for Eloise’s estate, filed a motion objecting to the notice of
purchase and, on the same day, a CR 60.02 motion to set the order aside. In the
CR 60.02 motion, the attorney for Eloise George’s estate acknowledged that
previously the parties had been unable to agree on the payment of the cost for
settling Doug’s estate. These costs consisted primarily of attorney fees of
approximately $14,000. Eloise, however, had already paid $5,000 directly to the
Estate’s administrator for her pro rata share of the expenses, but Rockland had not
paid any of his pro rata share of the Estate expenses. Further, the attorney for the
estate of Eloise explained that her heirs were willing to pay their share of any
remaining Estate expense out-of-pocket. They maintain that Rockland will not pay
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his share of the costs because he wants to acquire their share of the property at its
current appraised value, which, according to them, is unreasonable and does not
reflect the true value of the property.
According to Eloise’s heirs, the real estate that is the subject of this
action is worth much more than the previous appraisal value of $105,000. In fact,
Eloise’s heirs obtained an appraisal that valued the real estate at $265,500, more
than twice the amount of the other appraisal. Reasons for the increased value of
the real estate is that it lies along Interstate 64, approximately one (1) mile or less
from Exit 185 and is near numerous businesses including a Pilot gas station and an
office building. It is the heirs’ contention that the court exceeded its authority
when it granted Rockland an option to purchase Eloise’s interest as the court has
no authority to force a fee simple owner to sell to a joint owner. Moreover, it
contends that because Eloise paid her share of the Estate expenses, her heirs have
the right to proceed in the pending land partition action concerning the property.
On May 11, 2010, after holding a hearing, the circuit court entered an
order granting the CR 60.02 motion of Eloise’s estate. In essence, the circuit court
vacated and set aside the portion of the March 28, 2008 order, which ordered an
appraisal and then gave Rockland an option, based on that appraisal, to purchase
Eloise’s interest, which is now her estate’s interest. The circuit court reasoned that
the previous order deprived Eloise’s heirs of due process, and further, that Eloise’s
heirs had established that they were able to pay the expenses of the Estate without
the sale of the property. The circuit court stated that the sole issue remaining in the
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consolidated case was the partition action. If the land cannot be partitioned then no
alternative would exist but to sell the real estate. The circuit court denied
Rockland’s motion to alter, amend or vacate this order, and he now appeals from
the May 11, 2010 order.
Here again with regard to the language in the May 11, 2010, order a
perusal shows not only a lack of any finality language; that is, it does not contain
the notation “[t]his a final and appealable order and there is no just cause for
delay,” but also the trial court clearly contemplates additional proceedings to
resolve the issues in the case.
ANAYLSIS
First, a judgment that adjudicates one but not all claims in an action is
interlocutory and may not be appealed. See Peters v. Bd. of Educ., 378 S.W.2d
638 (Ky. 1964). The language of CR 54.02 says:
(1) When more than one claim for relief is presented in
an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim,
or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are
involved, the court may grant a final judgment upon one
or more but less than all of the claims or parties only
upon a determination that there is no just reason for
delay. The judgment shall recite such determination and
shall recite that the judgment is final. In the absence of
such recital, any order or other form of decision, however
designated, which adjudicates less than all the claims or
the rights and liabilities of less than all the parties shall
not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties,
and the order or other form of decision is interlocutory
and subject to revision at any time before the entry of
judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and
liabilities of all the parties.
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Here, the March 28, 2008, summary judgment only resolved the issues of
ownership of the personal property and that the real property should be sold to pay
the expenses of the Estate, with Rockland having first right of refusal to purchase
the real property. It specifically reserved the additional issue of the administrator
and Rockland’s attorney’s fees. The May 11, 2010 order clearly reflected future
actions by the trial court. As noted above, even though the summary judgment
stated that it was a final and appealable order, it did not recite that there was no just
cause for delay. Moreover, the May 2010 order contained no finality language.
To conclude, a circuit court, however, may transform a judgment into
a final one by including the aforementioned recitals. See Derby Road Bldg Co. v.
Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 299 S.W.2d 122 (Ky. 1957). Still, it is wellestablished that both recitations must be included in the judgment in order that it be
final and, thus, appealable. See Vance v. King, 322 S.W.2d 485 (Ky. 1959).
Therefore, the orders are interlocutory, and we do not have jurisdiction to hear the
appeal.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, upon the Court’s own motion, it is hereby ORDERED
that the appeal is DISMISSED as being interlocutory.
ALL CONCUR.
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ENTERED: August 19, 2011
/s/ Denise Clayton
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE ESTATE OF
ELOISE GEORGE:
M. Kevin Lett
Ashland, Kentucky
John R. McGinnis
Greenup, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE ESTATE OF
MARION DOUGLAS GEORGE:
Matthew J. Wixsom
Ashland, Kentucky
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