B. (J. R.) II VS. J. (A. J.), ET AL.
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RENDERED: MAY 27, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-001061-ME
J. R. B., II
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM TODD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TYLER L. GILL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-AD-00014
J. C. J., A. J. J., AND
THE MINOR CHILD, K. N. B.
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: NICKELL AND VANMETER, JUDGES; SHAKE,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
NICKELL, JUDGE: J.R.B., II appeals from three orders entered by the Todd
Circuit Court: Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of Adoption
entered on April 2, 2010; Judgment of Adoption entered on April 8, 2010; and
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Senior Judge Ann O'Malley Shake sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
Order Denying Motion to Alter, Amend or Vacate entered on April 29, 2010.
Upon review of the briefs, the record and the law, we affirm.
J.R.B. and A.J.J. married in 1997. A daughter, K.N.B., was born of
their union on August 7, 1998. The couple separated in 2000 and divorced in
2001. The decree of dissolution awarded them joint custody of K.N.B. and ordered
J.R.B. to pay $200.00 in monthly child support.
Initially, J.R.B. exercised visitation with his daughter and called her
through 2003. However, as time passed, his visits with the child became sporadic
and then ceased completely for a period of years. He last corresponded with his
daughter in 2005 or 2006; he sent her a Christmas card. His last visit with the
child occurred in January of 2005. The last time he gave her a Christmas gift was
2005. When asked why he had no contact with K.N.B. for seven years, he testified
it was mostly due to his own failure to take steps to see her.
Besides not communicating or visiting with his child for years, he also
fell behind in his child support obligation, paying nothing in 2003, 2004 or 2007,
and only $200.00 a year in both 2005 and 2006. In 2008, he paid a total of
$5,411.00 by virtue of two tax intercepts and wage assignment. In 2009, he paid a
total of $3,250.00 by virtue of one $250.00 payment and wage assignment. As of
January 1, 2010, he was in arrears for a total of $10,252.00 ($7,639.00 in child
support plus $2,613.00 in interest).
J.R.B. acknowledged being healthy and strong enough to work and
not under any disability. He testified he did not pay child support because he was
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unemployed during a portion of the time following his honorable discharge from
the military because jobs in the telecommunications field were scarce. He returned
to his native Indiana to receive emotional support from his family and in the
summer of 2007 found a job as a fiber optic technician. While unemployed he
received assistance from his father, mother and sister. In 2005 he began receiving
compensation of pension benefits from the Veteran’s Administration which in
March of 2010 amounted to $580.00 each month. He continues receiving those
benefits due to permanent hearing loss, knee trouble and lower back issues.
J.R.B. admitted he was wrong to cease contact with K.N.B. and stated
he decided to rekindle their relationship after his aunt committed suicide and his
mother developed health issues and suffered a mild heart attack. In 2008 and
2009, he placed several telephone calls to his former wife’s home seeking to speak
with K.N.B. However, the child had moved on with her life and did not wish to reestablish a relationship with her natural father. Twice, A.J.J. forced K.N.B. to
speak with J.R.B. on the telephone and the child cried both times. J.R.B. testified
he is a changed man and will now be there for his daughter.
A.J.J. has since remarried and has a son and daughter with her new
husband, J.C.J. This case began when J.C.J. petitioned the court to allow him to
adopt K.N.B. and to terminate J.R.B.’s parental rights.
The court held a daylong hearing at which both natural parents and
K.N.B.’s stepfather testified. The court also spoke with K.N.B. in chambers in the
company of the child’s guardian ad litem (GAL) and a deputy circuit court clerk.
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The child, a sixth grader at the time of the hearing who tests on the high school
level and excels in dance and sports, told the court she did not want to see or talk to
J.R.B. and had felt that way since the second or third grade. She stated J.R.B. had
not been there for her when she needed him and now, as a stranger, he was trying
to insert himself into her life when she already had a father. She asked, “Why
now?” and expressed her concern that his reappearance would mess up her life.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the GAL stated there was a chance
K.N.B. could benefit from a relationship with her natural father, but admitted he
might feel differently if the child were older. He stated he was hesitant to cut off
J.R.B.’s parental rights.
Describing the case as a “close” call and a “tough” case, the court
acknowledged he had struggled with his decision and ultimately disagreed with the
GAL and granted the petition to terminate J.R.B.’s parental rights and to allow
J.C.J. to adopt K.N.B. The court made the following factual findings:
10. The Court finds that pursuant to K.R.S. §
199.500(4), there is clear and convincing evidence that
[J.R.B.], (Birth Father) abandoned the child, or
substantially or continuously or repeatedly neglected the
child by his direct failure to communicate with or
otherwise support the child.
11. The Court finds there is clear and convincing
evidence that the Birth Father caused the child to be
neglected; that the Birth Father abandoned this child for
well more than 90 days; and, for more than 6 months the
Birth Father continuously and repeatedly failed or
refused to provide or has been substantially incapable of
providing essential parental care and protection for the
child and that there is no reasonable expectation of
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improvement in parental care and protection, considering
the age of the child.
12. The Court finds that for reasons other than poverty
alone, the Birth Father continuously and repeatedly failed
or refused to provide or has been substantially incapable
of providing essential food, clothing, shelter, medical
care, or education reasonably necessary and available for
the child’s well being and that there is no reasonable
expectation of improvement in parental care and
protection, considering the age of the child.
13. The Court finds that pursuant to K.R.S. 625.080 the
best interest of the child dictates that the parental rights
of the Birth Father should be terminated.
14, The Court finds that in this case the grounds for
termination have been established and the biggest and
most important question is what would be in the best
interest of the child. It is very important for this child to
have permanency in her relationship with her mother and
father. Although there may be a chance that the Birth
Father could reinstate himself as the primary father in the
child’s life, it is not a likelihood. It is better to terminate
now than to give chance to allow any more damage to be
done in this child’s life. Furthermore, the Court finds
that the mother was justified in her actions by protecting
the child and preventing visitation with the Birth Father
after he had no contract (sic) with the child for at least
five years.
J.R.B. timely moved the court to reconsider the order of termination which it
denied. It is from these two orders, as well as the Judgment of Adoption, that
J.R.B. appeals and we affirm.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
J.R.B. first alleges the trial court erred in terminating his parental
rights because there was no evidence he abandoned his daughter for more than
ninety days.
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This Court's standard of review in a termination of
parental rights action is confined to the clearly erroneous
standard in CR2 52.01 based upon clear and convincing
evidence, and the findings of the trial court will not be
disturbed unless there exists no substantial evidence in
the record to support its findings. V.S. v.
Commonwealth, Cabinet for Human Resources, Ky.App.,
706 S.W.2d 420, 424 (1986).
M.P.S. v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 979 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Ky. App. 1998).
The testimony in this case, corroborated by J.R.B., was that he had no contact with
his daughter for about five years. Thus, the trial court’s findings are supported by
clear, convincing and substantial evidence and we will not disturb them.
Citing O.S., Jr. v. C.F., 655 S.W.2d 32 (Ky. App. 1983), for the
proposition that “abandonment is demonstrated by facts or circumstances that
evince a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental
claims to the child[,]” J.R.B. argues his attempted phone calls to K.N.B. in 2008
and 2009 show his desire to rekindle his relationship with his daughter. However,
the trial court was not so convinced and neither are we. This is an example of too
little, too late. As noted by the trial court in its opinion, J.R.B. abandoned his
daughter for well in excess of the ninety days and the six months mentioned in
KRS 199.502(1)(a), (e) and (g). Furthermore, as expressed by the trial court at the
conclusion of the hearing on March 19, 2010, summer vacation (which lasts about
three months) is a lifetime to a child, and here, J.R.B. voluntarily missed more than
five years of his daughter’s life. We will not fault the trial court for concluding it
2
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (footnote added).
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was in the child’s best interests to terminate her natural father’s parental rights and
to approve the adoption she so strongly desired.
J.R.B.’s second allegation is that the evidence did not support a
finding that there was no reasonable expectation of improvement in parental care
and protection. First, when termination is granted due to abandonment for a period
of not less than ninety days, KRS 199.502(1)(a), as it was in this case, no finding
of reasonable expectation of parental improvement is required. However, the trial
court went further and made the challenged finding.
Citing M.E.C. v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Health & Family Servs.,
254 S.W.3d 846 (Ky. App. 2008), J.R.B. argues the trial court was wrong to base
its prediction of his future conduct on his past behavior. However, in this case,
unlike M.E.C., there was little else for the court to consider. In M.E.C., a mother
with drug and legal issues took the initiative to begin parenting classes which she
paid for herself. She arranged her own transportation for visitation with her
children. She also enrolled in substance abuse counseling. In contrast to M.E.C.,
J.R.B. attempted to make a series of phone calls to a child who wanted nothing to
do with him. He also told the court that everyone involved would benefit from
family counseling yet he did nothing to develop his own parenting skills.
Furthermore, consistently attending family counseling sessions would be difficult
since he was living in Indiana and traveling weekly for work, even though he was
off from work every Friday. We are simply unconvinced the trial court erred in
concluding J.R.B.’s likelihood of parental improvement was bleak.
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J.R.B.’s third allegation is that the evidence did not support a finding
of neglect. This is the same as the first argument and will not be repeated here.
J.R.B.’s fourth and final argument is that the court wrongly concluded
termination of J.R.B.’s parental rights was in K.N.B.’s best interests. He bases his
argument on the fact that the GAL was hesitant to recommend termination. J.R.B.
cites no authority for his suggestion that a trial court must adopt a GAL’s
recommendation and we are aware of none.
A trial court has wide discretion in determining whether a child fits
within the abused or neglected category and whether such abuse or neglect justifies
termination. Dept. for Human Resources v. Moore, 552 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Ky.
App. 1977). Here, the GAL viewed the testimony differently, but even the GAL
admitted he might recommend termination if K.N.B. were older.
K.N.B. is a bright girl. At the age of twelve she has determined she
does not want a relationship with the father who was not there for her when she
needed him. We simply cannot say, under the circumstances of this case, that the
trial court erred in finding it to be in K.N.B.’s best interests not to force a
father/daughter relationship.
For the foregoing reasons, the termination of J.R.B.’s parental rights
and the Judgment of Adoption are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Jeffrey B. Traughber
Elkton, Kentucky
Robert L. Fears
Hopkinsville, Kentucky
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