FLINK (STEPHANIE) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: MAY 13, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-000994-MR
STEPHANIE FLINK
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JOHNSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN DAVID PRESTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-CR-00176
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON AND NICKELL, JUDGES; ISAAC,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
ISAAC, SENIOR JUDGE: Stephanie Flink appeals from a Johnson Circuit Court
judgment convicting her of first-degree wanton endangerment. Flink entered a
guilty plea conditioned on her right to appeal the trial court’s denial of her motion
to dismiss the indictment. We reverse.
1
Senior Judge Sheila R. Isaac sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
Flink gave birth to a son on August 7, 2009. Five days later, the child,
who was suffering from numerous health problems, was placed in the care of his
grandmother. Flink was indicted for wanton endangerment in the first degree
under Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 508.060. The indictment charged that on
or before November 2008 through August of 2009, she “engaged in conduct which
creates an extreme indifference to human life, substantial danger of death or
serious physical injury to another, namely (R.W.), her juvenile child.” The basis of
the indictment was the allegation that Flink had ingested illegal drugs while she
was pregnant and thereby injured her child.
At the time of Flink’s indictment, a factually-similar case,
Commonwealth v. Cochran, 315 S.W.3d 325 (Ky. 2010), was pending before the
Kentucky Supreme Court. Flink filed a motion to dismiss the indictment raising
the same arguments that were being addressed in Cochran. After a hearing, the
trial court denied her motion. She then entered a plea of guilty conditioned on her
right to appeal the trial court’s refusal to dismiss the indictment. She was
sentenced on May 25, 2010. On June 17, 2010, the opinion of the Supreme Court
in Cochran became final. It held that an indictment which alleged that Cochran
committed wanton endangerment in the first degree when she ingested cocaine
while she was pregnant was expressly precluded by the Maternal Health Act of
1992. On appeal, Flink argues that the indictment in her case was similarly
invalid.
-2-
We agree with Flink that, under Cochran, the indictment in her case
should also be dismissed. The Commonwealth has attempted to distinguish the
cases by arguing that Flink’s indictment was based in part on evidence that she
committed acts which constituted wanton endangerment during the five days
following the child’s birth and before his placement with his grandmother. The
Commonwealth contends that the indictment is therefore valid because it was not
based solely on Flink’s ingestion of illegal drugs during her pregnancy. We have
carefully reviewed the record but can find no evidence that the Commonwealth
raised this argument before the trial court. An appellate court “is without authority
to review issues not raised in or decided by the trial court.” Regional Jail
Authority v. Tackett, 770 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Ky. 1989).
The Commonwealth also argues, relying on the dissent in Cochran,
that the unilateral dismissal of an indictment by the trial court violates the doctrine
of the separation of powers. The dissent contended that “the judicial branch of
government has no authority to dismiss a valid indictment without the consent of
the executive branch represented by the Commonwealth’s Attorney or the County
Attorney.” Cochran, 315 S.W.3d at 331(Venters, J., dissenting). This Court,
however, “is bound by and shall follow applicable precedents established in the
opinions of the Supreme Court and its predecessor court.” Rules of the Supreme
Court (SCR) 1.030(8)(a). The majority in Cochran held that an indictment that is
invalid on its face may be properly dismissed by the trial court. Cochran, 315
S.W.3d at 330. Arguably, the indictment in this case was not facially invalid
-3-
because it did not specify, as did the indictment in Cochran, that the criminal
conduct occurred solely when the defendant ingested drugs while the child was in
utero. Nonetheless, as we have already stated, that is not the argument that was
raised by the Commonwealth before the circuit court.
The judgment of conviction is reversed and the case is remanded for
dismissal of the indictment.
CLAYTON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
NICKELL, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
J. Brandon Pigg
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Heather M. Fryman
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.