KEEYS (RONNIE) VS. KEEYS (GREG), ET AL.
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RENDERED: JULY 15, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-000548-MR
RONNIE KEEYS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ROWAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM EVANS LANE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-CI-90019
GREG KEEYS; MELISSA LYNN KEEYS;
JANICE ANDERSON; JACK ANDERSON;
MARY BETH MANNER; AND ROBBIE KEEYS
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: LAMBERT, NICKELL, AND WINE, JUDGES.
WINE, JUDGE: Ronnie Keeys (“Ronnie”) appeals from a directed verdict on his
claim to a parcel of real property which was part of the estate of his father, Jack
Keeys (“Jack”), now deceased. On appeal, Ronnie maintains the trial court erred
in failing to find that he had a partnership interest in the property. Having
concluded that no theory of law would support a judgment granting title to Ronnie,
we affirm.
History
Jack Keeys died intestate on February 3, 2007. Jack’s wife
predeceased him, but he was survived by his sons, Greg and Ronnie, his daughter
Janice, and the children of his deceased son Mike (collectively, “the appellees”).
At the time of his death, Jack owned two pieces of real property in
Rowan County, Kentucky. The first was an unimproved tract of land and the
second was an improved parcel of land containing a house (“the Pretty Valley
property”). After Jack’s death, the appellees filed a petition praying that both of
these properties be sold by the Master Commissioner. Ronnie filed an answer
claiming ownership to the Pretty Valley property.
At a bench trial on October 14, 2009, it was agreed that Ronnie would
make the presentation of his case first. Ronnie made claims to the property under a
partnership theory as well as in equity based upon the assertion that he cared for
his elderly parents, Goldie and Jack, in their later years while the other children did
not. Ronnie testified that he took out loans to care for his parents and to pay their
bills. However, the court found the issue of whether Ronnie supported his parents
was irrelevant, noting that same would have been proper in the probate case
(although it was represented by counsel that Ronnie’s claim was rejected by the
probate court).
Ronnie further testified that he had a power of attorney granted to him
by his father to transact business on his behalf, which was in effect from 1974 until
Jack died in 2007. Ronnie testified that Greg and his wife Melissa conveyed the
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Pretty Valley property to Jack and Goldie on March 8, 2000. However, Ronnie
claimed that he was a partner in a construction business with his father, Jack Keeys
& Sons, and that the Pretty Valley property was purchased by the partnership and
paid for with partnership funds. Ronnie further testified that he used his own
money to build a house on the Pretty Valley property.
During the bench trial, Ronnie’s brother, Greg (appellee herein),
testified that Ronnie was indeed in a business partnership with Jack and that the
pair built a house upon the property in which they both lived with Goldie.
However, Greg also testified that the property was conveyed to Jack and Goldie
individually, rather than to a partnership. Greg’s position was supported by a deed
dated March 8, 2000, purporting to convey the property only to Jack and Goldie.
The deed was entered into the record, reciting the purchase price to be $23,000,
and further acknowledged receipt thereof by the grantors. Despite the fact that the
deed acknowledged receipt of the purchase price, Greg testified that the full
purchase price was not paid at that time. A check was entered into the record
showing that Ronnie paid Greg $11,500 for the Pretty Valley property on March
10, 2000, made payable from the business account of Jack Keeys & Sons.
Although Greg claims he did not receive any other money toward the $23,000
purchase price, Ronnie claims that the rest of the purchase price was paid in cash
on the same day the check was written.
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Thereafter, a deed of correction signed and agreed to by Jack and
Goldie was filed on October 19, 2000, with the Rowan County Clerk. The deed of
correction stated as follows:
WHEREAS, prior to March 8, 2000, the Grantors
and Grantees had agreed that the Grantors would
convey to the Grantees and the Grantees would
purchase from the Grantors, either:
1. The real estate described in said deed of March
8, 2000, for a consideration of $23,000; or
2. The real estate described in this Deed of
Correction for a total consideration of $12,500.
AND the parties hereto agreed that the Grantees
would purchase and the Grantors would sell the
real estate described in this Deed of Correction
for a total consideration of $12,500.00, but
failed to so inform Paul W. Blair, attorney,
resulting in Blair’s preparing said deed of
March 8, 2000, based on the information
previously furnished to him,
NOW, in order to correct said deed of March 18
(sic), 2000:
1. The Grantors do hereby convey to the
Grantees the real estate on Donna Street
(now Westview Way) described as “Tract I”
on “Exhibit A” attached hereto.
2. The Grantees, Jack and Goldie Keeys, do
hereby re-convey to the Grantors the real
estate described as “Tract II” on “Exhibit A”
attached hereto, subject to all easements,
restrictions and reservations of record.
According to the deed of correction, Jack and Goldie kept a smaller portion of the
property (Tract I) and re-conveyed back to Greg and Melissa a large portion of the
property (Tract II). The house where Ronnie, Jack, and Goldie lived was located
on Tract I. At trial, Ronnie argued that the partnership purchased the entire
property (around 1.4 acres), and that he only learned of the above deed of
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correction conveying 1.029 acres of the property back to Greg and Melissa after
people began building on the remaining acreage.
Robbie Workman, a witness for Ronnie, testified that he had known
Ronnie and Jack for twenty years and that Ronnie and Jack were indeed partners.
Workman also testified that Jack “stayed home” after his health began to fail,
however. After Workman’s testimony, Ronnie rested his case and the appellees
moved for a directed verdict
The trial court entered a directed verdict in favor of the appellees,
finding that the property was conveyed to Jack and Goldie individually, that a
portion of the property was conveyed back to Greg and Melissa, and that Ronnie
had only an undivided interest in the property along with the other heirs of Jack
and Goldie Keeys. Ronnie now appeals to this Court.
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Analysis
On appeal, Ronnie claims that (1) the trial court erred in finding that
no partnership existed at the time of Jack’s death, and (2) the trial court erred in
failing to convey the Pretty Valley property to him as a matter of equity. He
claims that a partnership existed until the time of Jack’s death, despite the fact that
Jack was no longer active in the day-to-day dealings of the partnership. Ronnie
further argues that it was inequitable for the trial court to divide the Pretty Valley
property equally among the heirs because he solely funded the construction of the
home in question on the Pretty Valley property.
Ronnie first alleges that a partnership existed between Jack and
himself. “A partnership is an association of two (2) or more persons to carry on as
co-owners a business for profit . . . .” KRS 362.175. A partnership may be
evidenced from “[t]he receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business
. . . .” KRS 362.180(4). In the present case, Ronnie introduced checks drawn on a
business account named “Jack Keeys & Sons” upon which both he and Jack
apparently had the authority to draw checks. A check dated March 10, 2000, in the
amount of $11,500 was written on the account of Jack Keeys & Sons for the
purchase of the Pretty Valley property.
However, testimony at trial indicated that this business was a Limited
Liability Company (“LLC”) or corporation, rather than a partnership. There was
further testimony that this LLC or corporation was dissolved in 2001. Ronnie
argues that, under KRS 362.185(2), any “property acquired with partnership funds
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is partnership property.” However, in the present case, the property was not
purchased with partnership funds, but rather with the funds of an LLC or
corporation. Therefore, KRS 362.185 is inapplicable.
Thus, this is a situation where property was purchased by an LLC or
corporation, yet titled in the personal name of only one of its members, Jack
Keeys. This is also a situation where the LLC or corporation was dissolved shortly
after the property was purchased. A partnership may, or may not, have continued
after the dissolution of the LLC or corporation. Finally, this is a situation where
one of the two members of the partnership is now deceased. All of this is further
complicated by the fact that the property in question was not commercial property,
but was in fact residential property in which Ronnie, Jack, and Goldie all lived as
their primary residence.
This matter comes down to a question of the intent of the parties. The
intention of the parties must be determined by looking to the deed. The
construction of a deed is a matter of law. Florman v. MEBCO Ltd. Partnership,
207 S.W.3d 593, 600 (Ky. App. 2006). Absent an ambiguity in the deed, the intent
of the grantor is required to be gathered from the four corners of the instrument.
Phelps v. Sledd, 479 S.W.2d 894, 896 (Ky. 1972). As previously stated, the
property was conveyed to Jack and Goldie, individually, and not to the partnership.
Moreover, the deed in question was a deed with rights of survivorship which
vested the survivor with the property in fee simple. Indeed, the deed stated that the
property was conveyed “unto the said Grantees, Jack Keeys and wife, Goldie
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Keeys, for and during their joint lives and with remainder in fee simple to the
survivor of them.” There is no ambiguity in the deed concerning the identity of the
grantees. Furthermore, even though we do not consider the intent of the grantor
where there is no ambiguity, suffice it to say that the above language of
survivorship runs directly contrary to an intention that the property be partnership
property with vesting of survivorship in the remaining partner subsequent to the
death of the other.
While there may have been genuine issues as to how the property
should have been divided equitably in probate court because of Ronnie’s
expenditures in caring for his elderly parents and/or his financial contributions
toward the Pretty Valley house and property, the present action is unrelated to the
probate of the estate of the decedent Jack Keeys. Instead, this is a civil suit
regarding the title to real property and Ronnie has proffered no viable legal theory,
equitable or otherwise, by which this Court could grant him title to the property.
Accordingly, we affirm the Rowan Circuit Court.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Terry R. Anderson
Sharpsburg, Kentucky
Paula G. Richardson
Owingsville, Kentucky
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