WILSON (JASON) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MAY 27, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-000167-MR
JASON WILSON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GREGORY A. LAY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CR-00133
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND DIXON, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
DIXON, JUDGE: Appellant, Jason Wilson, appeals from an order of the Laurel
Circuit Court denying his motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to RCr 11.42.
Finding no error, we affirm.
In June 2006, Appellant and his then-fiancé, Amanda Vaughn, were
indicted by a Laurel County Grand Jury for murder and first-degree robbery,
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Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
stemming from the death of Vaughn’s father, Tommy Taylor, Jr. Appellant was
appointed counsel at his arraignment and the matter was eventually set for trial
July 16, 2007. However, in April 2007, the Commonwealth served notice to seek
the death penalty. The trial court thereafter granted a continuance and also ordered
that Appellant undergo a mental competency evaluation. In addition, the
Department of Public Advocacy assigned a capital trial team to defend Appellant.
Appellant was evaluated at the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric
Center (“KCPC”) and following a hearing in October 2007, was declared
competent to stand trial. However, on the advice of counsel Appellant entered a
guilty plea to both charges on February 2008. Pursuant to an agreement with the
Commonwealth, Appellant received a sentence of life without the possibility of
parole for 25 years on the murder charge and a concurrent twenty year sentence on
the first-degree robbery charge.
On March 3, 2009, Appellant filed a pro se RCr 11.42 motion alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel. He also filed motions for an evidentiary hearing
and the appointment of counsel. The trial court denied the motions by order
entered April 15, 2009. This appeal ensued.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion
without an evidentiary hearing because his claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel could not be refuted from the face of the record. We disagree.
In an RCr 11.42 proceeding, the movant has the burden to establish
convincingly that he was deprived of substantial rights that would justify the
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extraordinary relief afforded by the post-conviction proceeding. Dorton v.
Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Ky. 1968). An evidentiary hearing is
warranted only “if there is an issue of fact which cannot be determined on the face
of the record.” Stanford v. Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d 742, 743-44 (Ky. 1993),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1049 (1994); RCr 11.42(5). See also Fraser v.
Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Ky. 2001); Bowling v. Commonwealth, 981
S.W.2d 545, 549 (Ky. 1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1026 (1999). “Conclusionary
allegations which are not supported by specific facts do not justify an evidentiary
hearing because RCr 11.42 does not require a hearing to serve the function of a
discovery deposition.” Sanders v. Commonwealth, 89 S.W.3d 380, 385 (Ky.
2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 838 (2003), overruled on other grounds in Leonard
v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009).
Since Appellant entered a guilty plea, a claim that he was afforded
ineffective assistance of counsel requires him to show: (1) that counsel made errors
so serious that counsel's performance fell outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance; and (2) that the deficient performance so seriously affected
the outcome of the plea process that, but for the errors of counsel, there is a
reasonable probability that the defendant would not have pled guilty, but would
have insisted on going to trial. Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 482, 486-87
(Ky. 2001). See also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203
(1985); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984).
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A criminal defendant may demonstrate that his guilty plea was involuntary
by showing that it was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. In such a
case, the trial court is to “consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
guilty plea and juxtapose the presumption of voluntariness inherent in a proper
plea colloquy with a Strickland v. Washington inquiry into the performance of
counsel.” Rigdon v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 283, 288 (Ky. App. 2004)
(Quoting Bronk, 58 S.W.3d at 486. (footnotes omitted)). A defendant is not
guaranteed errorless counsel, or counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but
counsel likely to render reasonably effective assistance. McQueen v.
Commonwealth, 949 S.W.2d 70 (Ky. 1997), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1130 (1997).
The Supreme Court in Strickland noted that a court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065.
However, advising a defendant to plead guilty is not, by itself, sufficient to
demonstrate any degree of ineffective assistance of counsel. Beecham v.
Commonwealth, 657 S.W.2d 234, 236-7 (Ky. 1983).
Appellant argues that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing
to investigate his mental health records and failing to properly investigate and
consider an extreme emotional disturbance defense. Appellant claims that Vaughn
told him that Taylor had sexually abused both her and her daughter on a prior
occasion. The night after this revelation, Appellant and others had been smoking
marijuana and using methamphetamine at Appellant’s home. The next morning,
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Appellant and Vaughn proceeded to Taylor’s home to retrieve some personal
belongings. While there, Appellant confronted Taylor about the allegations of
abuse. This confrontation led to an altercation which resulted in Taylor’s death.
Appellant argues that he informed his counsel that he had also been sexually
abused as a child and that his version of events would have supported an EED
defense. Yet, he contends that counsel advised him that the Commonwealth had
him “pegged” and he needed to plead guilty or risk receiving the death penalty.
“Extreme emotional disturbance” has been defined as:
A temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as
to overcome one’s judgment, and to cause one to act
uncontrollably from the impelling force of the extreme
emotional disturbance rather than from evil or malicious
purposes. It is not a mental disease in and of itself, and an
enraged, inflamed, or disturbed emotional state does not
constitute an extreme emotional disturbance unless there is a
reasonable explanation or excuse there for, the reasonableness
of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in
the defendant’s situation under circumstances as the defendant
believed them to be.
McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464, 469 (Ky. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1057 (1987). Further, our Supreme Court has emphasized that EED “is
established only by a showing of some dramatic event which creates a temporary
emotional disturbance” and “[t]here must be a ‘triggering event,’ which triggers an
explosion of violence on the part of the defendant at the time he committed the
offense.” Baze v. Commonwealth, 965 S.W.2d 817, 823 (Ky. 1997), cert. denied,
523 U.S. 1083 (1998). Finally, although there need not be a definite time frame
between the triggering event and subsequent murder, the EED must be “sudden
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and uninterrupted.” Foster v. Commonwealth, 827 S.W.2d 670, 678 (Ky. 1991),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 921 (1992).
In determining that Appellant failed to demonstrate that counsel was
ineffective with respect to this claim, the trial court noted,
Here the movant claims his triggering event was the
allegation of prior sexual abuse against the victim made by his
fiancé. However, several hours passed between this triggering
event and the crime, and the movant also states that he spent
this time abusing controlled substances with friends and family,
rather than festering with uncontrollable rage. The movant
points to precedent in making an argument that a triggering
event may be a gradual build-up of emotion and need not be a
“’flash point’ normally associated with the heat of passion.”
McClellan, at 468. However, in a quote the movant includes in
his own motion, he notes that “precedents only require the
triggering event to be ‘sudden and uninterrupted’” Foster v.
Commonwealth, 827 S.W.2d 670, 678 (Ky. 1991) (emphasis
added). Given these facts, the Court must, under Strickland,
avoid the temptation “to second-guess counsel’s assistance after
a conviction or adverse sentence” and must “indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range
of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, at 687-688,
689.
We agree with the trial court that the facts as described by Appellant did not
rise to the level of EED. Furthermore, but for counsel’s plea negotiation,
Appellant was facing a potential death sentence. As our highest court stated in
Glass v. Commonwealth, 474 S.W.2d 400, 401 (Ky. 1971), “a defendant’s plea of
guilty motivated by the desire to escape possible greater punishment is not a basis
for vacating the judgment and . . . it is not improper for an attorney to influence a
client to reach such a decision.” There is a strong presumption that counsel
rendered effective assistance and, in light of the record before us, we will not
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second guess counsel’s decisions. We conclude that the trial court properly
determined that Appellant’s claims were refuted from the face of the record and a
hearing was not warranted.
The order of the Laurel Circuit court denying Appellant’s motion for postconviction relief pursuant to RCr 11.42 is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
M. Brooke Buchanan
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort Kentucky
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