HOUSE OF IMPORTS VS. WRIGHT (BENJAMIN)
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 4, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-002359-MR
HOUSE OF IMPORTS, INC.,
D/B/A IN STYLE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARY M. SHAW, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-007849
BENJAMIN WRIGHT, JR.
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
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BEFORE: TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; DIXON, JUDGE; ISAAC,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE: House of Imports, Inc., d/b/a In Style, brings this
appeal from a November 20, 2009, judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court upon a
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Senior Judge Sheila Isaac sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant
to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 21.580.
jury verdict awarding Benjamin Wright, Jr., $120,863.67 in damages. We reverse
and remand.
This is a premises liability case. While shopping at the House of Imports for
a pair of shoes, Wright fell down a staircase located within the store. The staircase
consisted of three stairs and had a handrail located in the middle. The stairs
provided access from a lower level of the House of Imports to a slightly higher
level of the store.
Wright filed a complaint against House of Imports alleging that it
negligently failed to maintain the stairs in a reasonably safe condition, thus causing
Wright to fall and suffer personal injuries. Ultimately, the case was tried by a jury.
The jury found that both Wright and House of Imports were negligent and
apportioned 25 percent of fault to Wright and 75 percent of fault to House of
Imports. The jury also found that Wright’s total damages were $86,151.56 for
medical expenses and $75,000 for pain and suffering. Based upon the jury’s
apportionment of fault, the circuit court awarded Wright damages of $120,863.67.
This appeal follows.
House of Imports contends that the circuit court committed reversible error
in its admission of the expert testimony of John Schroering. The record reveals
that Schroering was a professional engineer and was board certified as a safety
professional. He was called to testify on behalf of Wright. At trial, Schroering
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presented extensive testimony as to building code safety standards related to the
stairs at House of Imports. He opined that the “Kentucky Building Code” applied
to the stairs found within the House of Imports and that the stairs violated sundry
provisions of the Building Code. He testified at length as to each Building Code
violation and gave his opinion that the stairs were unsafe. For the following
reasons, we believe the admission of Schroering’s testimony as to violations of the
Building Code constitutes clear and reversible error.
To establish an actionable negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish the
existence of a duty, breach of that duty, causation, and damages. Helton v.
Montgomery, 595 S.W.2d 257 (Ky. 1980).2 A legal duty may be found in the
common law, in a statute, or in an ordinance. Lewis v. B & R Corp., 56 S.W.3d
432 (Ky. App. 2001). A negligence claim premised upon a statute or ordinance is
referred to as a “negligence per se claim.” Id. In a negligence per se claim, a
“statutory standard of care [or duty] is substituted for the common law standard.”
Lewis v. B & R Corp., 56 S.W.3d 432, 438 (Ky. App. 2001). And, the applicability
of a statutory standard of care or duty squarely presents a question of law for the
court. If the trial court determines a duty contained in a statute, regulation, or
ordinance is pertinent, the court must then instruct the jury upon such statutory
duty. However, a statutory duty is not evidence, and facts revolving around
violations of a statutory duty may not be introduced into evidence absent a
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There is no dispute in this case that Wright was a business invitee on the business premises of
House of Imports, Inc., d/b/a In Style, for which a duty of care was owed to Wright. Lanier v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 99 S.W.3d 431 (Ky. 2003).
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concomitant jury instruction setting forth such statutory duty. The case of
O’Connor & Raque Co. v. Bill, 474 S.W.2d 344 (Ky. 1971), aptly sets forth the
law on this issue.
In O’Connor, appellee sustained a fall while shopping at appellant’s
business establishment. Id. During trial, an expert witness testified that the
entrance to appellant’s business was unsafe and violated the building code. Id. A
disagreement between the parties ensued as to which version (1950 or 1959) of the
building code was applicable. Id. The Supreme Court noted that “the trial court
did not resolve the question [of which code was applicable], nor were any of the
code requirements recited in the [jury] instructions included within the . . .
company’s duties.” Id. at 346. The Court held that the trial court erred by
allowing introduction of evidence concerning violations of the building code
without a concomitant jury instruction informing the jury of appellant’s duty under
the applicable code provisions. The Court explained its holding:
[T]hat after the authenticity and applicability of an
ordinance have been established it is within the discretion
of the trial court to determine whether it shall be read to
the jury. Generally speaking, however, it seems to us that
an ordinance or regulation creating rights and duties is no
different from a statute and should be treated in the same
way. For example, statutes regulating traffic on the
highways are not read to the jury in accident cases. To
the extent that they are applicable their substance is
incorporated in the instructions covering the law of the
case. So it should have been here. The building code or
codes from which portions were read to the jury either
did or did not place certain duties on the defendant
company which were applicable at the time of the
accident. If they did impose such duties, they either
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called for a directed verdict against the company on the
issue of its negligence (as requested by Bill) or they
should have been submitted to the jury under an
appropriate instruction on proximate cause. If they did
not impose such duties, or if as a matter of law the
company's failure to comply was not a proximate causal
factor in the accident, then they were not relevant to the
case and should not have been brought to the jury's
attention at all. As it is, the jury received the information
and was left to decide for itself what, if any, was its
relevance and legal effect.
O’Connor, 474 S.W.2d at 346.
In this case, Wright’s negligence claim against the House of Imports was
submitted to the jury based upon violation of the common-law duty of care. The
jury was not instructed upon any statutory or regulatory duty of care owed by
House of Imports to Wright despite substantial evidence being introduced
regarding the violation of building codes. As in O’Connor, the trial court herein
failed to determine the legal question of the applicability of the Building Code and
then compounded this error by admitting Schroering’s testimony detailing sundry
violations of the building code by House of Imports. See id. These errors resulted
in the jury being “left to decide for itself what, if any, was its relevance and legal
effect.” See id. at 346.
Considering the quantity and substance of the erroneously admitted
testimony, we are compelled to conclude that this error affected the substantial
rights of House of Imports and, thus, constituted reversible error. Kentucky Rules
of Evidence (KRE) 103; Crane v. Com., 726 S.W.2d 302 (Ky. 1987). Simply put,
the circuit court’s abdication of its role to the jury resulted in a tainted jury verdict
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in which this Court lacks confidence. Although we are generally reluctant to set
aside a jury verdict, reversal of the verdict in this case is warranted.
As to House of Imports’ other issues of error, we perceive same to be
without merit. Wright’s testimony concerning his gaze while transversing the
stairs did not constitute a judicial admission. See Zapp v. CSX Transp., Inc., 300
S.W.3d 219 (Ky. 2009). And, the House of Imports was not entitled to a directed
verdict. Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 50.01; Lee v. Tucker, 365
S.W.2d 849 (Ky. 1963).
In sum, we reverse the November 20, 2009, judgment of the Jefferson
Circuit Court. Upon remand and trial, we also direct the parties and the trial
court’s attention to the recent case of Kentucky River Medical Center v. McIntosh,
319 S.W.3d 385 (Ky. 2010), wherein the Kentucky Supreme Court has modified
the open and obvious doctrine in premises liability actions by adopting the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 343A(1) (1965).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court
is reversed and this cause is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
J. D. Raine, Jr.
Louisville, Kentucky
Damon B. Willis
Louisville, Kentucky
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