PREWITT (CRYSTAL DENISE) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JUNE 3, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-002308-MR
CRYSTAL DENISE PREWITT
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KIMBERLY N. BUNNELL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-CR-00801
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND DIXON, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
DIXON, JUDGE: Appellant, Crystal Denise Prewitt, appeals from the Fayette
Circuit Court's denial of her motion to suppress the evidence underlying her
conditional plea of guilty to facilitation to trafficking in marijuana greater than five
pounds. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
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Senior Judge Joseph Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
On April 1, 2009, the Lexington Police Department was performing a
scheduled parcel interdiction operation at a Federal Express facility. Officer
Courtney Komara was working with Federal Express employees when she
identified a package she believed to be suspicious based upon the facts that (1) it
had handwritten labels; (2) it was sent from an individual to an individual; (3) the
source city was McCalin, Texas, a border city; (4) the source return address was a
Mailbox Store; (5) the source individual had prepackaged the item; (6) the package
was sent overnight priority delivery; (7) there was no signature required for
delivery; and (8) the Lexington destination, Hollow Creek Road, was an area
known to officers as receiving numerous complaints for drug activity. Officer
Komara later testified that although any one of the factors, standing alone, would
have been insufficient to raise her suspicions, the totality of the circumstances
made the package suspicious. Therefore, it was pulled off the line and placed with
four other non-suspicious packages. All were presented to Komara’s certified drug
dog, who alerted positively on the suspicious package.
After obtaining a search warrant, officers opened the package and
discovered eighteen pounds of marijuana, packaged in six separate bundles. Since
the scheduled delivery time had already passed, Officers Danny Page and Jennifer
Lube went to the delivery address the following day. Although the package was
addressed to a Joe A. Brizuela, officers were met by Jose and Claudia Perez, who
claimed they did not know Brizuela and had no knowledge of the package.
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Nevertheless, the Perezes voluntarily consented to a search of their apartment.
Officers found no evidence indicating they were connected to the marijuana.
Later the same day, Federal Express attempted delivery of a different
package to a Crystal Wetzel at 201 Spring Station Drive. Because the driver knew
that such was not a valid address he attempted delivery to 2001 Spring Station
Drive, however the person at the address refused acceptance of the package. After
the driver returned to the Federal Express facility, employees noticed that the
package was similar to the one seized the previous day and notified the police.
Upon arrival, Officer Komara observed that the package had all of the same
characteristics as the previous one, including origination and delivery method. As
a result, the package in question was placed with four other non-suspicious
packages and presented to the drug dog, who positively alerted on it.
After obtaining a second search warrant, police opened the package
and discovered eighteen pounds of marijuana, packaged in five separate bundles.
During this same time period, Officer Komara was advised that someone had
called the facility inquiring as to how to pick up the package. Police then resealed
the package and, at approximately 4:30 p.m., Appellant arrived at the facility to
claim the package. After signing for acceptance, Appellant was arrested and read
her Miranda rights. She informed police that she was picking up the package for a
friend who was waiting in the car. Police went outside and found Jose Perez.
Officers recognized him as being the same individual they had questioned the day
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before. Perez admitted that both packages were his, but that Appellant was aware
of what they contained. Perez was thereafter arrested as well.
On May 27, 2009, Appellant and Perez were indicted by a Fayette
County Grand Jury for trafficking in marijuana greater than five pounds.
Appellant initially entered a plea of not guilty and thereafter filed a motion to
suppress. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion and Appellant
entered a conditional Alford plea to an amended charge of facilitation to
trafficking, reserving the right to appeal the suppression issue. The trial court
sentenced Appellant to twelve months’ imprisonment, probated for a period of two
years. This appeal ensued.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to
suppress evidence “in violation of her state and federal constitutional rights to be
free of illegal search and seizure.” Specifically, Appellant claims that Officer
Komara had no reasonable suspicion to detain the first package, and, as a result,
the second package was tainted evidence as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Further,
Appellant contends that the second search warrant was invalid due to inaccurate
information contained in the affidavit. We find no merit in any of Appellant’s
claims.
Our standard of appellate review of a suppression ruling regarding a
search pursuant to a warrant is to determine first if the facts found by the trial
judge are supported by substantial evidence, RCr 9.78, and then to determine
whether the trial judge correctly determined that the issuing judge did or did not
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have a “substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]” that probable cause existed. Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983);
Commonwealth v. Pride, 302 S.W.3d 43, 49 (Ky. 2010). In doing so, we must give
great deference to the warrant-issuing judge's decision. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236,
103 S.Ct. 2317. We also review the four corners of the affidavit and not extrinsic
evidence in analyzing the warrant-issuing judge's conclusion. Commonwealth v.
Hubble, 730 S.W.2d 532 (Ky. App. 1987).
The trial court herein focused on two distinct questions. First, in
determining whether officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to
warrant inception and detention of the packages, the court examined the
circumstances surrounding the detention of both the first and second package.
Second, the court scrutinized whether the affidavit in support of the warrant on the
second package contained inaccurate information that would have rendered the
warrant invalid. With respect to whether the officers had reasonable and
articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the trial court found,
This Court finds that each of the packages was in fact
seized, even if for a short period of time, in order for the
drug dog to perform its duties. The question then becomes
whether police had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
to justify the temporary detention. U.S. v. Scarborough, 128
F.3d 1373, 1378 (10th Cir. 1997). Upon reviewing the totality
of the circumstances in each situation, as was presented by a
trained law enforcement officer in the area of postal inspection,
this court finds that the police did have reasonable and
articulable suspicion to briefly seize the packages.
The Defendants also argue that under the doctrine of
Fruit
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of the Poisonous Tree, the second parcel is tainted evidence
and should be inadmissible. The Court finds that even though
the second parcel was not identified as suspicious until delivery
was refused, the same factors that supported the reasonable
and articulable suspicion of criminal activity in the first
package were present in the [second] package.
“It has long been held that first-class mail such as letters and sealed
packages subject to letter postage . . . is free from inspection by postal authorities,
except in the manner provided by the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Van
Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 251, 90 S.Ct. 1029, 25 L.Ed.2d 282 (1970). Yet even
first-class mail is not beyond the reach of all inspection. Id. Further, “only
reasonable suspicion, and not probable cause, is necessary in order to briefly detain
a package for further investigation, such as examination by a drug-sniffing dog.”
United States v. Alexander, 540 F.3d 494, 501 (6th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, ___
U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1923 (2009) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 390 F.3d 853,
870 (6th Cir. 2004)).
We are of the opinion that the Scarborough case relied on by the trial court
has facts analogous to those herein. In Scarborough, a drug-sniffing dog alerted on
a suspicious package during a routine parcel interdiction at an airport mail facility.
In affirming the federal district court’s denial of a suppression motion based upon
unlawful search and seizure, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held:
The temporary detention of mail for investigative purposes
is not an unreasonable seizure when authorities have a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See United States v.
Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 250, 90 S.Ct. 1029, 1031, 25
L.Ed.2d 282 (1970). In the present case, the package shared
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some of the characteristics of a profile developed to identify
narcotics packages in that it contained a handwritten label;
was going from an individual to an individual; was coming
from a narcotics source state; bore no return zip code; had a
misspelled return address street; contained a correction in the
city portion of the return address; and was found to contain a
nonexistent return address street number. Scarborough argues
that each of these factors taken alone may be innocent, and they
cannot be combined to create reasonable suspicion. We do not
agree. A combination of seemingly independent innocent
factors may create a reasonable suspicion justifying detention
for a dog sniff if the factors substantially reflect elements of a
suspicious profile. See United States v. Lux, 905 F.2d 1379,
1382 (10th Cir. 1990) (package meeting three factors from
postal service's “drug package profile” gives authorities
sufficient reasonable suspicion to subject package to drug
detection dog); cf. United States v. Williams, 726 F.2d 661, 663
(10th Cir. 1984) (police recognition that individual's behavior
matches certain elements of drug courier profile provides
reasonable suspicion to justify stop and dog sniff of luggage).
U.S. v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d at 1378.
Appellant does not seem to dispute that Officer Komara identified several
suspicious indicators with the first package. Rather, she takes issue with Officer
Komara’s “fail[ure] to articulate how the indicators on this package were different
than similar indicators found on packages shipped by innocent parties,” and her
failure to establish the “percentage of alerts to packages she had identified as
suspicious . . . .” Thus, it is Appellant’s position that the first package was
detained without reasonable suspicion.
Reasonable suspicion is a flexible concept and must be applied in a
commonsense manner based upon the totality of the circumstances. Baltimore v.
Commonwealth, 119 S.W.3d 532, 539 (Ky. App. 2003). Further, “[i]n determining
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the totality of the circumstances, a reviewing court . . . must consider all of the
officer(s) observations and give due regard to inferences and deductions drawn by
them from their experience and training.” Id. (footnote omitted). As explained by
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Alexander, 540 F.3d 494,
501 (6th Cir. 2008), “[a]lthough we have not adopted the Postal Service’s “drug
package profile” as the test for reasonable suspicion, we have relied on many of the
same factors in analyzing an officer’s decision to investigate a package.”
The Postal Service’s “drug package profile” targets
packages based on: (1) the size and shape of mailing; (2)
whether the package is taped to seal all openings; (3) whether
the mailing labels are handwritten; (4) whether the return
address is suspicious, e.g., the return addressee and the return
address do not match, or the return address is fictitious; (5)
unusual odors coming from the package; (6) whether the city of
origin and/or city of destination of the package are common
“drug source” locales; and (7) whether there have been repeated
mailings involving the same sender and addressee.
Id. (FN 2).
We agree with the trial court that in reviewing the totality of the
circumstances given Officer Komara’s training and experience, she had reasonable
and articulable suspicion to detain the first package. Furthermore, we find
absolutely no merit in Appellant’s claim that the detention was unduly lengthy.
Officer Komara testified that she first noticed the package between 7:45 and 8:30
a.m., and the package was presented to the drug dog at 9:55. We fail to perceive
any prejudice or error in this time period. Finally, because we conclude that the
first package was properly detained and seized, we necessarily reject Appellant’s
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argument that the second package was tainted evidence as being “fruit of the
poisonous tree.”
Finally, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the affidavit supporting the
second search warrant. Specifically, Appellant argues that because the second
affidavit was essentially “cut and pasted” on the computer from the first affidavit,
it contained erroneous information pertaining to the first package rather than the
second. Further, Appellant points out that the affidavit contained no information
as to the drug dog’s reliability or information about the other non-suspicious
packages used in the line-up.
When a defendant challenges a search warrant based on the claim that the
information is inaccurate, he must prove that: “(1) the affidavit contains
intentionally or recklessly false statements, and (2) the affidavit, purged of its
falsities, would not be sufficient to support a finding of probable cause.” Hayes v.
Commonwealth, 320 S.W.3d 93, 101 (Ky. 2010). See also Commonwealth v.
Smith, 898 S.W.2d 496, 503 (Ky. 1995); Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98
S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). With respect to the second affidavit, the trial
court herein noted,
Upon review of the affidavit and the testimony of Officer
Komara, this Court finds that even though Officer Komara
testified that she had used “cut and paste” in preparing the
affidavit that there was sufficient accurate information
presented to establish probable cause for the issuance of the
search warrant. The fact that the officer did not specify with
particularity in the affidavit what the suspicious package
included, nor the similarities with the package the day before,
this does not deem the affidavit fatal. The Court finds that there
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is no evidence to establish intentional misleading or even
recklessness and there is a sufficient basis to establish probable
cause.
We too have reviewed the affidavit and believe that it was sufficient to
establish probable cause. Officer Komara did inadvertently include information
that the second package was discovered during a routine postal inspection, when in
fact it was the first package that was discovered during the inspection.
Notwithstanding, the affidavit clearly indicates that officers found indicators that
warranted presenting the package to the drug dog. The affidavit states that “[s]ome
of the factors displayed involved the packaging, city of origin, as well as address of
destination.” Further, the affidavit sets forth in detail the procedure followed with
the drug dog, his results, as well as his training and certification. Thus, we agree
with the trial court, that even after removing the inaccuracies, the remaining
information contained in the affidavit was more than sufficient to establish
probable cause justifying the issuance of the search warrant.
For the reasons set forth herein, the order of the Fayette Trial Court denying
Appellant’s motion to suppress to affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Emily Holt Rhorer
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Michael J. Marsch
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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