LALONDE (JESSICA J.) VS. LALONDE (ADAM N.)
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 25, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-002279-MR
JESSICA J. LALONDE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GEORGE DAVIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-01308
ADAM N. LALONDE
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; KELLER, JUDGE; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
LAMBERT, SENIOR JUDGE: Jessica J. LaLonde appeals from that portion of a
decree of dissolution of marriage that confirmed the report of the domestic
relations commissioner and awarded her joint custody of a minor child but granted
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Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
physical custody of that child to her former husband Adam N. LaLonde. After our
review, we affirm.
The couple married on April 30, 2005 in Michigan. A son named
Tyson was born to the couple on August 1, 2006. Jessica was diagnosed with Bipolar II disorder and on the recommendation of her doctor, stopped working
outside the home in July, 2007. Adam worked different jobs primarily in sales or
factory work and played in professional softball leagues during the summer. In
April 2008, the family moved to Ashland, Kentucky when Adam was offered a job
as a softball coach and trainer. Jessica stayed home to care for her son while Adam
worked evenings and travelled on weekends with the softball team during the
summer.
In September 2008, Jessica moved back to Michigan with the couple’s
son. The couple agreed they would alternate time with their son approximately
every three weeks. Jessica found a job, moved into an apartment and enrolled her
son in a day care program. She returned her son to Kentucky and his father on
September 28, 2008 in accord with the original agreement. Jessica also filed a
petition for divorce in Michigan alleging her son was a Michigan resident. Adam
then filed a motion for temporary relief in Kentucky and obtained temporary
custody. The Michigan trial court determined the child was a resident of Kentucky
and that Kentucky was the appropriate venue for any divorce proceeding. Jessica
was only able to see her son twice in the following two months until a regular
schedule of visitation was developed.
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A final hearing was held on February 2, 2009 before a domestic
relations commissioner. That hearing was suspended in order to secure the
testimony of the mental health providers who had been treating Jessica in
Michigan. A telephonic deposition of Jessica’s psychiatric nurse practitioner was
taken on April 30, 2009 and she described Jessica’s medications and treatment for
the Bipolar II disorder. On May 28, 2009, Jessica’s psychologist was deposed and
confirmed that use of alcohol would have an effect on Jessica’s medications. On
August 11, 2009, Adam was allowed to submit rebuttal evidence in response to the
depositions of Jessica’s Michigan based mental health care providers.
The domestic relations commissioner filed a report on October 20,
2009 recommending the parties have joint custody with Adam being designated as
the primary physical custodian and with Jessica being awarded parenting time with
her son pursuant to the Boyd County Timesharing Guidelines. Jessica in turn filed
exceptions to the domestic relations commissioner’s report. Those exceptions
were overruled by the trial court which adopted the domestic commissioner’s
report and granted a decree of dissolution on November 9, 2009. This appeal
followed.
Jessica first argues the commissioner’s decision was partially based
on improperly admitted evidence. Adam introduced pictures of Jessica taken from
the social network site Facebook. These pictures in general display Jessica
enjoying parties and apparently consuming alcoholic beverages against the advice
of her mental health treatment providers. Adam argued she had obviously not been
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truthful with her treatment providers when she indicated she had suspended or
significantly diminished her consumption of alcohol. Jessica objected to the
introduction of the pictures which was overruled. She now argues Adam failed to
properly authenticate the photographs and their admission into evidence was
improper. We disagree.
Demonstrative evidence such as these pictures must be supported by
sufficient evidence to support a finding that the pictures are an accurate
representation of what is claimed. Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 901(a).
While typically, such supporting evidence is the testimony of the person who took
the picture that it accurately depicts the reality of the photographed situation that is
not the only manner to authenticate a photograph. Authentication only requires
“[t]estimony that a matter is what it is claimed to be.” KRE 901(b)(1). Here, it
was Jessica herself who acknowledged that indeed, she had been drinking alcohol
and the pictures accurately reflected that activity. That testimony was sufficient to
authentic the photographs and they were properly admitted into evidence.
Jessica additionally argues that because Facebook allows anyone to
post pictures and then “tag” or identify the people in the pictures she never gave
permission for the photographs to be published in this manner. She also argues
that with the advent of modern digital techniques, photographs may easily be
altered and the time and date stamps associated with the photographs left doubt as
to when they were taken. She does not however provide anything but argument to
support these propositions. There is nothing within the law that requires her
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permission when someone takes a picture and posts it on a Facebook page. There
is nothing that requires her permission when she was “tagged” or identified as a
person in those pictures. Similarly, although we acknowledge that modern digital
photography techniques may allow for the alteration of a photograph, Jessica did
not suggest such techniques were employed. She instead acknowledged the
photographs were accurate which leads to the conclusion they were not altered.
We find nothing to cause us to disagree with the admission of the photographs as
evidence.
Jessica next argues the trial court and the commissioner failed to
adhere to the standards of the determination of child custody required by statute.
We disagree. The trial court is required to consider
(a) The wishes of the child's parent or parents, and any de
facto custodian, as to his custody;
(b) The wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(c) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with
his parent or parents, his siblings, and any other person
who may significantly affect the child's best interests;
(d) The child's adjustment to his home, school, and
community;
(e) The mental and physical health of all individuals
involved;
(f) Information, records, and evidence of domestic
violence as defined in KRS 403.270;
(g)The extent to which the child has been cared for,
nurtured, and supported by any de facto custodian;
(h) The intent of the parent or parents in placing the child
with a de facto custodian; and
(i) The circumstances under which the child was placed
or allowed to remain in the custody of a de facto
custodian, including whether the parent now seeking
custody was previously prevented from doing so as a
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result of domestic violence as defined in KRS 403.720
and whether the child was placed with a de facto
custodian to allow the parent now seeking custody to
seek employment, work, or attend school.
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.270(2).
The record is clear and Jessica acknowledges the commissioner and
the trial court analyzed each required factor. Her argument continues however that
the trial court did not consider the weight of those factors specifically as Jessica
would wish them to be considered. She desires to give a greater weight to the
relationships a child may have with extended family members while diminishing
the weight given to her mental health condition. See KRS 403.270(2)(c) and (e).
There is nothing that requires the trial court to give any specific
weight to any particular factor. Absent an abuse of discretion or a decision that is
clearly erroneous, we will not overturn the fact finders view of which factor may
be considered more important in any individual situation when determining
custody. Cherry v. Cherry, 634 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Ky. 1982).
Jessica next argues the trial court did not consider her and Adam’s
environment and work schedules to determine which would provide “the most
appropriate school schedule and training for” their son. On the contrary, the record
is clear there was testimony from a number of individuals including Adam’s
employer, a minister who saw the child twice a week, a babysitter and a family
friend. All testified to the environment Adam maintained for his son. The trial
court considered that testimony in its decision.
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Jessica also argues that spousal abuse should have been considered by
the trial court. Adam did at one point in his testimony admit to striking Jessica at a
casino. There was no further elaboration from either party concerning this event.
Jessica never raised the issue of spousal abuse below and we will not consider it
now for the first time on appeal.
Finally, Jessica asserts the trial court failed to make specific findings
how her mental health affected her ability to be a custodial parent. It is clear from
the extensive report the commissioner and trial court relied on the significant factor
that not only was Jessica being treated for Bipolar II disorder but that she
seemingly ignored the advice of the mental health practitioners and continued to
consume alcoholic beverages in spite of the knowledge that it was not
recommended.
Additionally, some question remained about whether Jessica was
forthright with those mental health practitioners and concern that she would be
unable to be completely honest with the trial court. She now suggests that the
failure of the trial court to specifically find any relationship between her drinking
alcohol, her apparent misstatements of fact and her mental health is fatal to any
determination of the trial court. It was incumbent upon Jessica to request
additional findings of fact if she considered those provided inadequate. CR 52.04.
She did not do so.
Ultimately, this entire case and Jessica’s arguments boil down to
whether the record supports the trial court’s determination of custody. We will not
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disturb that decision unless the trial court is shown to be clearly erroneous. Moore
v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 353-54 (Ky. 2003). There is substantial evidence to
support the findings of the trial court and its decision will not be disturbed.
We therefore affirm the decision of the Boyd Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Elizabeth Opell Thomas
Ashland, Kentucky
Roger W. Hall
Ashland, Kentucky
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