SMITH (JOANNE) VS. MARTIN (ODELL)
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 4, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-002226-MR
JOANNE SMITH
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HART CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GEOFFREY P. MORRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-00240
ODELL MARTIN, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF
HORSE CAVE, KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
VACATING IN PART,
AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: FORMTEXT TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; STUMBO, JUDGE;
SHAKE, SENIOR JUDGE.
TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE: Joanne Smith brings this appeal from a November 17,
2009, summary judgment dismissing Smith’s defamation claims against Odell
Martin. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
Martin is the mayor of Horse Cave, Kentucky.1 In that role, he
presided over a special meeting of the city council on July 31, 2008. During the
city council meeting, members of the public expressed concerned over the removal
of trees at Horse Cave Cemetery. In particular, Smith, Martin’s predecessor as
mayor of Horse Cave and then a candidate for city council, complained about
Martin having the trees removed without informing the public. In response
thereto, the following exchange took place between Smith and Martin:
[Martin]
“May I ask you a question?”
[Smith]
“Yes, certainly.”
[Martin]
“You were the Mayor in ’06 between
August 31 and December 1 of ’06. When
you were Mayor, you purchased $30,000
worth of equipment [for the Police
Department].”
[Smith]
“Is that on the agenda?”
[Martin]
“I’m conducting the meeting.”
[Smith]
“The auditor will answer your question.”
[Martin]
“Is in [sic] secret.”
[Smith]
“I’m sorry; I’m not going to respond to you.
This is not on the agenda. You are sitting
there trying to set me up.”
[Martin]
“No, no. Maybe you can tell us where this
$30,000 worth of equipment is.”
1
Horse Cave, Kentucky, is recognized as a city of the fourth class. KRS 81.010. Odell Martin,
who was a former city council member, was elected mayor in the fall of 2006 and assumed the
position January 1, 2007. Martin defeated Joanne Smith, who had served as mayor from 1999 –
2006.
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[Smith]
“Ask the auditor.”
[Martin]
“I just thought I would ask you. I’d like to
find that equipment if I could.”
After the city council meeting, Martin distributed a publication called
News from Horse Cave City Hall (Horse Cave Newsletter). Martin published the
newsletter regularly to inform citizens of Horse Cave about activities of city
council. In a subsequent edition of the newsletter, the following excerpt of an
article appeared recounting the events of the July 31 city council meeting:
Former Mayor JoAnne Smith spoke out against
Martin’s actions. She said the tree near her future
graveside was one of those cut down. She was upset
because she wanted to be buried under a tree and had
picked that spot several years ago. ‘But what upset me
the most was that everything happens around here in
secret. Nobody – the public [or] council – knows what’s
going on, and I think we need to keep the people
informed, then maybe you won’t have so many
complaints.’
Martin asked former Mayor Smith, “May I ask you
a question.” She said “Yes.” Mayor Martin asked,
“Beginning August 31st and ending approximately
December 12th, 2006[,] during your term as mayor you
purchased $30,000 in equipment for the police
department. I cannot find that equipment. Could you tell
me where that equipment is?”
[Former] Mayor Smith said that is not on the
agenda and you can ask the auditor about that.
“I’m in charge of the meeting. Could you please
tell me where that equipment is?” Martin asked.
Former Mayor Smith said, “You are not going to
entrap me.”
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Mayor Martin asked, “Could you please help me
find the equipment?”
Later in 2008, Smith filed a complaint against Martin in the Hart
Circuit Court alleging libel and slander in relation to Martin’s oral statements
directed to Smith during the city council meeting and publication of the newsletter
recounting Martin’s statements directed to Smith during the city council meeting.
Eventually, Martin filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that his
statements were not defamatory and were privileged. Martin asserted he was
entitled to absolute immunity for any statements made during the city council
meeting. The circuit court agreed and dismissed Smith’s defamation claims by
summary judgment entered November 17, 2009. This appeal follows.
Smith contends that the circuit court erred by rendering summary
judgment dismissing her defamation claims against Martin. Summary judgment is
proper where there exists no material issue of fact and movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. When ruling upon a motion for summary judgment,
all facts and inferences are to be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure 56.02; Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel
Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991).
To establish a claim for defamation, the following elements must
exist: “[1.] defamatory language, [2.] about the plaintiff, [3.] which is published,
and [4.] which causes injury to reputation.” Stringer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 151
S.W.3d 781,793 (Ky. 2004)(footnote omitted). A claim of defamation may be
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defeated by establishing the truth of the matter asserted which is an absolute
defense. Additionally, a defamation claim may be defeated by assertion of a
“privilege.” A privilege is recognized as a defense to a defamation claim; the
defense may be either absolute or qualified. An absolute privilege affords a
defendant a complete defense to a claim of defamation; whereas, a qualified
privilege only affords a defendant a conditional defense to a claim of defamation.
Both privileges are pivotal to the resolution of this appeal.
In her complaint, Smith claimed that Martin defamed her by: (1)
Martin’s oral statements directed to Smith during the city council meeting, and (2)
Martin’s publication of the Horse Cave Newsletter recounting Martin’s statements
directed to Smith during the city council meeting.2 For the following reasons, we
conclude that Martin’s statements directed toward Smith during the city council
meeting are absolutely privileged and that Martin’s publication of the Horse Cave
Newsletter recounting Martin’s statements during the city council meeting may be
entitled to a qualified privilege. In analyzing the above claims of defamation, we
2
Historically, the common law required that the “precise actionable words” of the defamatory
conduct be set forth in the complaint. Jones v. Grief, 279 Ky. 579, 131 S.W.2d 487 (1939). The
modern rule is to allow “relaxation of the strict common law rules of pleading[.]” 50 Am. Jur.
2d, Libel and Slander § 437 (1995). Despite relaxation of the rule, it is still incumbent upon
plaintiff to prove the defamatory conduct as alleged in the complaint. Jones, 131 S.W.2d 487.
In the case sub judice, Smith’s complaint merely raised two claims of defamation: (1) Martin’s
statements to Smith during a 2008 city council meeting, and (2) Martin’s publication of those
statements in a 2008 newsletter from the mayor’s office to residents of Horse Cave. Smith later
attempted to raise two additional claims of defamation. As these two additional claims were not
presented in the complaint and Smith never sought to amend the complaint, we decline to
address same herein.
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observe that the existence of a privilege presents an issue of law, and our review
proceeds de novo. Stringer, 151 S.W.3d 781.
In Jacobs v. Underwood, 484 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Ky. 1972), the
Supreme Court recognized that the General Assembly enacted KRS 84.050 and
thereby bestowed upon members of secondary legislative bodies (city
commissions) an “absolute privilege under which they cannot be liable for
statements made during a debate before a formal meeting of the assembly.” KRS
84.050 was eventually repealed, but it was substantively reenacted in KRS
83A.060(15), which reads:
For anything said in debate, legislative body members
shall be entitled to the same immunities and protections
allowed to members of the General Assembly.
Under KRS 83A.060(15), members of secondary legislative bodies,
such as city councils, acquired an absolute privilege from liability for statements
made during such meetings.3 See Jacobs, 484 S.W.2d 855; 13 David J. Leibson,
Kentucky Practice – Tort Law § 15:9 (2010); Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 590
(1977). The absolute privilege enjoyed by members of secondary legislative
bodies is concomitant to the absolute privilege extended to members of the
Kentucky General Assembly by Section 43 of the Kentucky Constitution. See
Jacobs, 484 S.W.2d 855. As with the absolute privilege contained in Section 43 of
the Kentucky Constitution, the ambit of the absolute privilege contained in KRS
3
In Godman v. City of Fort Wright, 234 S.W.3d 362, 370 (Ky. App. 2007), the Court
commented that “absolute legislative immunity cannot be extended to municipal legislators.”
We observe that this comment was dicta, and the Court was not presented with KRS
83A.060(15).
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83A.060(15) is to be liberally construed and extends broadly to the publication of
defamatory matter while performing legislative duties. Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 590 (1977); Kraus v. Ky. State Senate, 872 S.W.2d 433 (Ky. 1994);
Wiggins v. Stuart, 671 S.W.2d 262 (Ky. App. 1984).
In this case, Martin was mayor of Horse Cave. Horse Cave is
organized and governed by a mayor-council plan. KRS 83A.030. Under the
mayor-council plan, the mayor presides at city council meetings and casts a vote in
case of a tie. KRS 83A.130(5). When Martin presides over a city council meeting,
he is performing a legislative duty and should be entitled to the same absolute
privilege afforded other members of the city council under KRS 83A.060(15). As
Martin’s statements directed at Smith occurred during a city council meeting, these
statements are absolutely privileged, and Martin cannot be liable for same in this
defamation action.
However, the defense of absolute privilege is not available to Martin
in regard to his publication of the Horse Cave Newsletter. Rather, we must look to
the qualified privilege contained in KRS 411.060.
KRS 411.060 provides, in relevant part:
The publication of a fair and impartial report of any
proceeding before any state or city legislative or
executive body, board or officer, or the whole or a fair
synopsis of any bill, report, resolution, bulletin, notice,
petition, or other document presented, filed, or used in
any proceeding before any state or city legislative or
executive body, board or officer, shall be privileged,
unless it is proved that the publication was maliciously
made.
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Under KRS 411.060, the publication of a “fair and impartial” report of a city
council meeting is privileged unless such publication was “maliciously made.” 13
David J. Leibson, Kentucky Practice – Tort Law § 15:19 (2010). Simply stated,
KRS 411.060 creates a qualified privilege. The privilege is qualified or
conditioned upon the report being fair and accurate and not being maliciously
made. If the report is fair and accurate and not maliciously made, the publication
of the report is considered privileged and will defeat the defamation claim. And,
the report is considered “maliciously made” if it is published “solely for the
purpose of causing harm to the person defamed.” Pearce v. Courier-Journal, 683
S.W.2d 633, 636 (Ky. App. 1985)(citation omitted). The determination of whether
the report was fair and impartial or was maliciously made presents an issue of fact.
Kremer v. Kopmeyer, 418 S.W.2d 237 (Ky. 1967).
In our case, the qualified privilege created in KRS 411.060
encompasses Martin’s publication of the Horse Cave Newsletter recounting
Martin’s statements directed to Smith during the city council meeting. As the
circuit court did not determine whether the qualified privilege of KRS 411.060 was
applicable, there has been no determination of whether material issues of fact exist;
i.e., whether the newsletter represented a fair and accurate report and whether
publication of the newsletter was maliciously made. Consequently, this matter
must be remanded for such determination.4
4
Our opinion should not be misconstrued as holding that material issues of fact exist. We only
hold that no such determination has been made by the circuit court and remand upon this basis.
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In sum, we hold that members of secondary legislative bodies are
entitled to an absolute privilege for statements made during official meetings of
those bodies under KRS 83A.060(15). At the Horse Cave city council meeting,
Martin was performing legislative duties; thus, Martin’s statements directed to
Smith at the meeting are absolutely privileged. As such, the circuit court properly
rendered summary judgment dismissing Smith’s defamation claim based upon
these statements. We also conclude that KRS 411.060 provides a qualified
privilege for the publication of a report recounting events at a city council meeting.
Martin’s publication of the Horse Cave Newsletter recounting statements made by
Martin to Smith comes within the ambit of KRS 411.060. We are, nevertheless,
unable to determine whether the qualified privilege operates as a defense to
Smith’s defamation claim in this case. Under KRS 411.060, the determination of
whether the Horse Cave Newsletter’s report was fair and accurate or was
maliciously made presents a factual issue, which was not addressed by the circuit
court. Thus, we remand Smith’s defamation claim as to the publication of the
Horse Cave Newsletter and affirm the dismissal of her defamation claim as to
Martin’s statements at the city council meeting.
We view Smith’s remaining contentions of error to be without merit
or moot.
For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment of the Hart Circuit
Court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT:
C. Mike Moulton
Elizabethtown, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Robert D. Hudson
Florence, Kentucky
Shawn Rosso Alcott
Bowling Green, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Shawn Rosso Alcott
Bowling Green, Kentucky
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