SOWDERS (PAMELA), ET AL. VS. CATRON (CHARLES P.), ET AL.
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 4, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001861-MR
PAMELA SOWDERS, MICHAEL BRADLEY
SOWDERS AND MICHAEL GLEN SOWDERS
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM WHITLEY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT OVERSTREET, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-00467
CHARLES P. CATRON, M.D., AND
CHARLES P. CATRON, P.S.C.
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND THOMPSON, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
CAPERTON, JUDGE: The Appellants, Pamela Sowders, Michael Bradley
Sowders, and Michael Glen Sowders, appeal the April 24, 2009, judgment of the
1
Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and the Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
Whitley Circuit Court in favor of the Appellees, Charles P. Catron, M.D. and
Charles P. Catron, P.S.C., in accordance with a jury verdict. On appeal, Appellants
assert that the court should have granted a mistrial on the basis of undisclosed
expert testimony provided at trial. Having reviewed the record, the arguments of
the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm.
In September of 1998, Michael Bradley Sowders, age twelve, was
suffering from hip pain, and was treated by the Appellee, Dr. Charles Catron. Dr.
Catron examined Michael on September 22, 1998, and again on September 29,
1998. Below, the Appellants argued that at the time Michael first saw Dr. Catron,
he was already showing signs and symptoms of a septic hip infection. It was the
Appellants’ theory that Michael suffered trauma to his hip when tackled on a
football field approximately ten days to two weeks before seeing Dr. Catron, which
ultimately led to the infection.
Dr. Catron eventually diagnosed septic arthritis, an infection of the
hip, in October of 1998. However, by that time, Michael had sustained irreparable
damage to the cartilage and joint. Accordingly, he underwent a complete hip
replacement in 1999. Contrary to the assertion of the Appellants, the Appellees
retained experts, most of whom opined that there was osteoarthritis present in
Michael’s femur which travelled to the hip area weeks after Dr. Catron had seen
Michael.2
2
In support of this assertion, Appellees draw the Court’s attention to the fact that there was a CT
scan conducted on Michael’s hip on October 8, 1998, which showed absolutely no indication of
infection in the hip.
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The Appellants argued that Dr. Catron should have diagnosed
Michael’s infection on September 22 or September 29, and that if he had done so,
Michael’s hip would have been saved. During the course of litigation, numerous
expert witnesses were retained by the parties. The Appellants retained orthopedic
surgeons Drs. John Ogden and Edwin Seasons, and Dr. Catron obtained orthopedic
surgeons Drs. James Harkess, Martin Schiller, and Paul Griffin. Extensive pretrial
discovery was conducted, including interrogatories concerning the expert witnesses
and their opinions. Additionally, the expert witnesses were disclosed and the
parties submitted expert disclosure statements setting forth the opinions of the
witnesses.
As noted, the opinions of the experts retained by the Appellants were
that Michael suffered from septic arthritis when he was seen by Dr. Catron in
September of 1998, and that Dr. Catron should have diagnosed that condition at
that time, which would have enabled Michael’s hip to be saved. Dr. Catron
responded with witnesses who essentially testified that his failure to diagnose the
septic arthritis in September was not a breach of the standard of care.
The parties agree that during the course of the time that discovery was
exchanged below, no witness opined that Michael’s septic arthritis resulted from
an infection caused by a heating pad burn. Likewise, no witness testified to this
effect during the course of a deposition. Nevertheless, during the course of trial
below, Dr. Griffin testified as to his opinion that Michael had burned himself with
a heating pad after he saw Dr. Catron on September 29, 1998, and that this burn
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caused the infection to be in his bloodstream, and to travel to his hip where septic
arthritis eventually formed. All parties acknowledge that Dr. Griffin had not
previously expressed this opinion. Prior to that time, it had been the defense’s
position that no one could say for certain when the underlying infection started. 3
Following this testimony from Dr. Griffin, Appellants moved for a
mistrial. In response, the Appellees agreed that the opinion had not been
previously disclosed, and had not been formulated until right before trial, stating:
We agree, your Honor. What happened was late
preparation for this case, when we finally deciphered Dr.
Weisert’s notes it was in Dr. Weisert’s notes and it’s
referred to in the Kentucky Physical Therapy records that
he had scars on his hip and in fact that Plaintiffs were
questioned about the heating pad burns when their
depositions were taken in 2004. The connection, frankly,
was not made until right before trial, and that’s why it is.
(T.R. 04-3-15, 9:07:37).
In response to Appellants’ motion for a mistrial, the court
acknowledged that according to Dr. Griffin’s testimony, Michael himself had
caused his hip infection by burning himself with the heating pad, and questioned
whether Dr. Griffin’s “heating-pad opinion” was the basis for the Appellee’s
tendered jury instruction on contributory negligence. Nevertheless, the court stated
that the case had been pending for years and overruled the Appellant’s motion for
3
In disagreement with that assertion, the Appellants direct this Court’s attention to the fact that
Dr. Catron’s expert, Dr. James Harkess, testified in his discovery deposition that a September 18,
1998, x-ray was consistent with septic hip, and that Michael had septic hip when he saw Dr.
Catron in September. Dr. Harkess further stated that if the septic hip had been diagnosed at that
time, treatment would have been drainage and IV antibiotic, and Michael would not have needed
hip replacement. Dr. Catron himself, during the course of his discovery deposition testified that
in retrospect, it appears the septic hip condition was in fact present when he saw Michael in
September of 1998.
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mistrial. It did, however, specifically admonish the jury at the request of the
Appellants, stating:
[F]or a number of legal reasons that testimony (the
heating pad testimony) was not appropriately given at
that time, and you as the jury … are admonished not to
remember or certainly take no notice of the heating pad
(testimony) that was given yesterday.
That testimony was not properly given and should not be
considered by you for any reason. (4-13-15; 9:28:23).
Appellants subsequently filed a Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 59
motion for a new trial, which was also overruled by the court, and this appeal
followed.
Our standard of review of a trial court’s ruling as to admitting or
excluding evidence is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its
discretion. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 577 (Ky.
2000). The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was
arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles. Clephas
v. Garlock, 168 S.W.3d 389, 393 (Ky. App. 2004). We review this matter with this
standard in mind.
On appeal, the Appellants make one argument, namely that the
introduction of Dr. Griffin’s undisclosed expert opinion deprived them of a fair
trial, and that, accordingly, the circuit court erred in overruling both the motion for
a mistrial and the CR 59.01 motion for a new trial. The Appellants direct this
court’s attention to the fact that Dr. Griffin’s opinion concerning the heating pad
burn was never mentioned before trial, and that, indeed, during the course of his
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discovery deposition, Dr. Griffin was asked whether he had any other opinions and
he replied that he did not. Further, Appellants argue that Dr. Griffin’s testimony
concerning the heating pad was not only a surprise but was also contrary to the
other expert testimony which was given4 and was the only evidence presented as to
when the underlying infection actually started. Moreover, Appellants assert that if
Dr. Griffin’s testimony were accepted, it would render the opinions of the
Appellant’s experts impossible, as the heating pad burn had not even occurred at
the time Dr. Catron examined Michael in September. Accordingly, they argue that
Dr. Griffin’s testimony was so unfair and prejudicial as to be a violation of
Appellee’s duties under CR 26.05, and to require a mistrial.
The Appellants rely on both the civil rules and on the decision of this
Court in Clephas v. Garlock, 168 S.W.3d 389 (Ky. App. 2004). They argue that in
Clephas the defendant had disclosed a certain physician as an expert witness but
failed to provide detailed opinion disclosures. The trial court nevertheless allowed
the introduction of the physician’s testimony, causing Clephas to appeal, arguing
that the introduction of the physician’s opinions resulted in an inherently unfair
trial by surprise. This Court agreed, holding that the admission of previously
unrevealed opinions resulted in an unfair proceeding, which constituted an abuse
of discretion. The Appellants argue that in the matter sub judice, as was the
situation in Clephas, the introduction of Dr. Griffin’s testimony concerning the
4
In support of that assertion, Appellants note that prior to trial, the Appellee’s experts opined that
Michael’s hip infection had started earlier, and note that both Dr. Catron and Dr. Harkess both
opined that in hindsight Michael did in fact have a septic hip infection at the time he was
examined in September of 1998.
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heating pad was prejudicial, and seriously undermined the opinions of their own
experts, thereby depriving the Appellants of a fair trial. Thus, they argue that the
trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant a new trial pursuant to CR 59.01.
As noted, the Appellees concede that none of their experts testified
prior to trial that a heating pad burn may have been a possible entry site for the
infection in Michael’s hip. However, the Appellees argue that this is ultimately not
of importance as the “heating pad theory” was simply not part of their explanation
as to how the infection invaded Michael’s hip. Indeed, the Appellees argue that
the actual manner of infection was not important, and that, regardless of how the
infection entered the hip, it did not invade the hip until long after Dr. Catron saw
Michael on September 29, 1998.5 Further the Appellees assert that, despite the
lack of immediate objection from the Appellants, they did not ask any follow-up
questions of Dr. Griffin concerning the heating pad testimony, that at no time was
the heating pad theory argued to the jury, nor was it mentioned to the jury by
counsel in any way.
Moreover, the Appellees argue that the Appellants’ reliance upon
Clephas is misplaced. They find Clephas distinguishable, insofar as there was a
total failure to disclose the opinions of the medical expert, and that at the time the
physician’s name was disclosed, the expert had no opinions on the medical
5
To that end, Appellees argue that if the testimony of Dr. Griffin is viewed in its entirety, it
supports their ultimate theory that Michael did not have a septic hip on September 22 or 29,
1998, nor were there any signs and symptoms of same because the infection was in the femur at
that time and not the hip. Further, the Appellees argue that Dr. Griffin clearly testified that he
disagreed with Appellant’s theory that trauma caused the infection of the hip, and stated instead
that there was “no way to know when the infection started.” (4-02-15;6:23:31).
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condition about which he ultimately testified. Secondly, they note that in Clephas,
the medical expert was never presented for a discovery deposition despite a court
order to do so. Third, they note that the physician in Clephas did not even
formulate his opinions until a few hours prior to his testimony at trial and that his
opinions were pivotal to the case. Finally, they note that, contrary to the matter
sub judice, there was no admonishment given to the jury in Clephas.
Instead, the Appellees direct this Court’s attention to the cases of
Matthews v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 11 (Ky. 2005), and Bills v.
Commonwealth, 851 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1993), which hold, respectively, that the
legally sufficient remedy for a nonresponsive answer that is not argued to the jury
or used in trial is an admonishment, and that an admonishment is sufficient when
the answer was not deliberately elicited and was isolated and brief. Thus, the
Appellees argue that in the matter sub judice, the admonishment given by the court
was sufficient to cure any prejudice caused by the unsolicited testimony of Dr.
Griffin.
We have long held that an admonition is usually sufficient to cure an
erroneous admission of evidence, and there is a presumption that the jury will heed
such an admonition. A trial court only declares a mistrial if a harmful event is of
such magnitude that a litigant would be denied a fair and impartial trial and the
prejudicial effect could be removed in no other way. Stated differently, the court
must find a manifest, urgent, or real necessity for a mistrial. The trial court has
broad discretion in determining when such a necessity exists because the trial
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judge is “best situated intelligently to make such a decision.” Ultimately, the trial
court's decision to deny a motion for a mistrial should not be disturbed absent an
abuse of discretion. See Matthews v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 11, 17 (Ky.
2005)(internal citations omitted).
Indeed, an admonition is insufficient only when one of the following
conditions exists: (1) there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will not
follow the admonition and the introduced evidence will be devastating to the
defendant, or (2) the question had no factual basis and was inflammatory or highly
prejudicial. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d 430, 441 (Ky. 2003).
Having reviewed the arguments of the parties and the applicable law,
we are in agreement with the Appellants that Dr. Griffin’s testimony was both
surprising and undisclosed prior to the time it was given. However, considering
the totality of the evidence presented, we simply cannot find that the testimony was
of such a magnitude as to deny the Appellants their right to a fair and impartial
trial. This is particularly so as the unexpected testimony was not argued in either
opening or closing, was not referred to in any other way, was not followed with
other questioning of a similar nature, and was testimony that was isolated and
brief. Ultimately, the trial court was in the best position to determine whether a
mistrial was appropriate. In the matter sub judice, the trial court believed that an
admonition was sufficient to cure the error. An admonition was given, and we find
no reason to assume that the jury did not follow that admonition.
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Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons, we hereby affirm the April 24,
2009, judgment of the Whitley Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Larry F. Sword
Somerset, Kentucky
Joe L. Travis
Somerset, Kentucky
Lee Turner
Southfield, Michigan
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