JONES (MAZIE) VS. ABNER (BILLY)
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RENDERED: MARCH 11, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001441-MR
MAZIE JONES
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM POWELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM B. MAINS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00033
BILLY ABNER, D/B/A
LIL’ ABNER MOTEL
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE AND STUMBO, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
LAMBERT, SENIOR JUDGE: Mazie Jones appeals from the Powell Circuit
Court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Billy Abner, d/b/a Lil’ Abner
Motel as to her personal injury lawsuit against the motel. Appellant was injured
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Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
when she slipped and fell while getting into a bathtub at the motel. Appellant
asserts that summary judgment was inappropriate because a genuine issue of
material fact existed as to whether the condition of the bathtub was unreasonably
dangerous and a substantial cause of her injuries. However, after our review, we
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
Appellant and her husband, Arnold Jones, arrived at the Lil’ Abner
Motel on Friday, July 21, 2006, for a weekend stay. Appellant showered upon her
arrival at the motel and again the following day. On Sunday morning, Appellant
went into the bathroom and once again began preparing to take a shower. With the
water running, she put her right foot into the bathtub. As she picked up her left
foot, she slipped and hit the side of her head against the end of the tub. She was
taken by ambulance to Clark County Regional Hospital and later transferred to the
University of Kentucky Hospital. Appellant suffered a concussion as a result of
her fall and was required to undergo a number of dental surgeries, including
procedures to attach plates to her jawbone.
Appellant subsequently filed a personal injury lawsuit against
Appellee in which she cited the bathtub’s condition as an unreasonably dangerous
condition that she encountered as an invitee on the motel premises. Appellant
specifically contended that the bathtub was slippery because of the methods used
to clean it and that this slipperiness was exacerbated by Appellee’s failure to install
and/or maintain appropriate non-slippage devices in the bathtub – including a
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handrail and non-slip safety strips at the bottom of the tub. Appellee denied
Appellant’s allegations, and the parties proceeded to take a number of discovery
depositions.
In her deposition, Appellant claimed that on the day she fell the
bathtub was slicker than it had been during her two previous showers, but she had
“no idea” why the tub was especially slick that morning. Appellant assumed that
the bathroom and tub had been cleaned between her Friday and Saturday showers
because there were no dirty towels in the bathroom, and she made a similar
inference that the bathroom had been cleaned between her Saturday and Sunday
showers. Appellant could not recall how many non-slip safety strips were in the
bathtub to stand on, but she noted that there was no safety rail in the tub. She also
acknowledged that she did not consider the bathtub to be unsafe prior to her fall.
Appellant’s husband, Arnold Jones, testified that he was the first
person to hear Appellant fall and that water was running in the bathtub when he
found her. When asked about whether there were any non-slippage safety devices
in the bathtub, Jones indicated that “it had about four (4) strips” and that they were
“just more or less in the center.” He further noted that they looked “old” and that
there were “strings . . . coming off the side,” an indication that they were worn.
Jones blamed Appellant’s fall on a lack of safety rails and “something better” on
the bottom of the bathtub, but he acknowledged that he had not told anyone at the
motel that he was concerned about the safety of the tub.
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Appellee disagreed with Arnold Jones’ depiction of the safety strips.
He testified that every bathtub in the motel contained slip-resistant strips and that
the ones in Appellant’s room were replaced in the spring prior to her fall. He also
produced a photograph of the bathtub taken in 2007 showing that there were eight
safety strips on the bottom of the bathtub and noted that to the best of his
knowledge, no changes had been made to the tub since Appellant’s fall.
Alberta Bowen, a housekeeper at the motel, testified that she cleaned
the subject bathtub on Saturday afternoon with a Clorox spray and water while the
Joneses waited outside. According to Bowen, her general practice was to use a dry
bath towel to wipe a bathtub down after cleaning it, and she noted that she
“always” did this – including on this occasion. She further indicated that the
cleaning solution in question was not particularly slick. Bowen testified that
Appellant was “irritated” because the room had not been cleaned earlier, but she
indicated that she cleaned the bathtub in her usual manner even though she felt
“rushed.” Bowen also noted that all of the bathtubs in the motel contained non-slip
safety strips “all over the bottom” and that those strips were replaced regularly if
they ever became loose. Bowen further testified that the bathtub was not cleaned
again prior to Appellant’s fall.
On June 12, 2009, Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment
asserting that Appellant could not show that she encountered an unreasonably
dangerous condition at the motel or that Appellee’s actions were a substantial
factor in causing her injuries. Appellee further argued that because the condition
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of the bathtub was open and obvious, Appellant should be barred from recovery.
The trial court granted summary judgment for Appellee on the grounds that
Appellant could only speculate as to what caused her to fall and that she was
unable to show that she had encountered any unreasonably dangerous condition
caused by Appellee. This appeal followed.
Analysis
On appeal, Appellant argues that summary judgment was
inappropriate because of the existence of genuine issues of material fact.
Appellant specifically contends that questions existed as to whether the number
and condition of the non-slip safety strips in the bathtub and the solution used to
clean the bathtub created a dangerous condition that caused her injuries. The
standards for reviewing a trial court’s entry of summary judgment are wellestablished and were concisely summarized by this Court in Lewis v. B & R Corp.,
56 S.W.3d 432 (Ky. App. 2001):
The standard of review on appeal when a trial court
grants a motion for summary judgment is “whether the
trial court correctly found that there were no genuine
issues as to any material fact and that the moving party
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The trial
court must view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party, and summary judgment should
be granted only if it appears impossible that the
nonmoving party will be able to produce evidence at trial
warranting a judgment in his favor. The moving party
bears the initial burden of showing that no genuine issue
of material fact exists, and then the burden shifts to the
party opposing summary judgment to present “at least
some affirmative evidence showing that there is a
genuine issue of material fact for trial.” The trial court
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“must examine the evidence, not to decide any issue of
fact, but to discover if a real issue exists.” While the
Court in Steelvest2 used the word “impossible” in
describing the strict standard for summary judgment, the
Supreme Court later stated that that word was “used in a
practical sense, not in an absolute sense.” Because
summary judgment involves only legal questions and the
existence of any disputed material issues of fact, an
appellate court need not defer to the trial court’s decision
and will review the issue de novo.
Id. at 436 (Internal footnotes and citations omitted).
The parties agree that as a guest in the motel, Appellant was a
business invitee. See generally Lanier v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 99 S.W.3d 431
(Ky. 2003) (discussing business invitees in “slip and fall” cases). Consequently, in
order to create a rebuttable presumption sufficient to defeat Appellee’s motion for
summary judgment, Appellant was required to show that:
(1) ... she had an encounter with a foreign substance or
other dangerous condition on the business premises; (2)
the encounter was a substantial factor in causing the
accident and the customer’s injuries; and (3) by reason of
the presence of the substance or condition, the business
premises were not in a reasonably safe condition for the
use of business invitees.
Martin v. Mekanhart Corp., 113 S.W.3d 95, 98 (Ky. 2003); see also Lanier, 99
S.W.3d at 435-36.
Appellant claims that the motel bathtub was unreasonably dangerous
for two reasons. First, she argues that the bottom of the bathtub was overly slick
and that this slickness was attributable to the cleaning practices of Appellee’s
employees – specifically, that cleaning residue was left on the bottom of the tub
2
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991).
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when it was cleaned the day before her fall. However, Appellant’s argument
amounts to nothing more than pure conjecture because she provides nothing of
substance to support her position. Alberta Bowen, the motel housekeeper, testified
that she cleaned the bathtub on Saturday morning with Clorox spray and that her
general practice was to then rinse out the bathtub and to wipe it down with dry
towels. She further claimed that she followed this same process after cleaning
Appellant’s bathtub. In response, Appellant offers only a speculative hypothesis
that a “slick residue” was left in the bathtub after it was cleaned.3 This does not
satisfy our standards for summary judgment. “The party opposing summary
judgment cannot rely on their own claims or arguments without significant
evidence in order to prevent a summary judgment.” Wymer v. JH Properties, Inc.,
50 S.W.3d 195, 199 (Ky. 2001). Accordingly, “speculation and supposition” are
not enough to survive a motion for summary judgment. O’Bryan v. Cave, 202
S.W.3d 585, 588 (Ky. 2006), quoting Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Yates, 239
S.W.2d 953, 955 (Ky. 1951). Appellant essentially assumes that something
slippery caused her fall without providing any evidence to support her assumption.
Thus, this claim provides no basis to reverse the trial court’s entry of summary
judgment.
Appellant next asserts that a lack of adequate non-slippage devices in
the bathtub created an unreasonably dangerous condition that caused her fall. The
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We also note that although Appellant contends that none of the motel employees observed any
water or soap in the bathtub after her fall, she admitted in her deposition that she turned on the
water in the bathtub immediately before attempting to get in.
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trial court’s order of summary judgment noted that Appellee had established that
the non-slippage safety strips in the tub were in good condition and changed
regularly. However, Appellant’s husband disputed this version of events,
testifying that the strips were worn and frayed. Appellant argues that the
conflicting testimony on this issue creates a genuine issue of material fact, but we
are not inclined to agree.
Even if Appellant’s husband’s testimony about the condition of the
safety strips was accurate and we were to grant his testimony the benefit of any
doubt, there remains the fact that Appellant had twice previously used the bathtub
without incident and must be assumed to have been fully aware of the condition of
the tub. “Reasonable care on the part of the possessor of business premises does
not ordinarily require precaution or even warning against dangers that are known
to the visitor or so obvious to him that he may be expected to discover them.”
Johnson v. Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon of Kentucky, Inc., 997 S.W.2d 490, 492
(Ky. App. 1999), quoting Bonn v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 440 S.W.2d 526, 528
(Ky. 1969). Moreover, Appellant has produced no evidence showing that even if
the strips were worn and frayed, they nonetheless failed to do their job or somehow
contributed to her fall. Appellant provided no substantive proof that the strips gave
way or slid out from beneath her feet or were so worn that they failed to provide
adequate traction. Instead, Appellant simply assumes that their allegedly
deteriorated state was a cause of her fall. As noted above, this speculation is not
enough to overcome a proper motion for summary judgment.
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We further note that the risks inherent in bathing or showering are
open, apparent, and obvious to anyone who has ever taken a bath or shower. See
Kutz v. Koury Corp., 377 S.E.2d 811, 813 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (“It is common
knowledge that bathtub surfaces, especially when water and soap are added, are
slippery and that care should be taken when one bathes or showers.”). Because of
this, we decline to assume, as a matter of law, that motels or hotels have an
automatic duty to provide precautions against such conditions. Appellant seems to
assume that a bathtub that is not equipped with safety strips or hand-holds is an
inherently dangerous condition, but she failed to produce evidence of any type of
industry standard, statutory law, or common-law rule that could arguably reflect a
duty on the part of Appellee to equip motel bathtubs with such safety devices. The
owner of a motel or hotel has “the duty to exercise that degree of care generally
used by ordinarily careful, prudent hotel operators in circumstances similar to
those proven in the case, to provide reasonably safe accommodations,” but he is
not an insurer of a guest’s safety. See Blue Grass Restaurant Co. v. Franklin, 424
S.W.2d 594, 599 (Ky. 1968); Brown Hotel Co. v. Marx, 411 S.W.2d 911, 914 (Ky.
1967). Appellant simply did not provide the trial court with anything of substance
to meet this burden.
We finally note that while “[a]n invitee has a right to assume that the
premises he has been invited to use are reasonably safe . . . this does not relieve
him of the duty to exercise ordinary care for his own safety, nor does it license him
to walk blindly into dangers that are obvious, known to him, or would be
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anticipated by one of ordinary prudence.” Rogers v. Professional Golfers Ass’n of
America, 28 S.W.3d 869, 872 (Ky. App. 2000), quoting Smith v. Smith, 441
S.W.2d 165, 166 (Ky. 1969). As such, and even if the non-slippage safety strips
were not in good repair, Appellant knew or should have known of the potential for
harm, and she had a duty to take care for her own safety because of the risks
attendant to using a bathtub. Accordingly, we believe that summary judgment was
appropriate in this case.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment entered by the
Powell Circuit Court is affirmed.
STUMBO, JUDGE, CONCURS.
ACREE, JUDGE, CONCURS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
ACREE, JUDGE, CONCURRING: Respectfully, I write separately
because I believe it important to consider Kentucky River Medical Center v.
McIntosh, 319 S.W.3d 385 (Ky. 2010). The case sub judice demonstrates that
summary judgment is still available in proper cases despite the fact that analysis
under McIntosh does not stop with a determination that a hazard is open and
obvious.
“[T]o allow known or obvious conditions to always absolve land
possessors from any liability ‘would be to resurrect contributory negligence[.]’”
McIntosh, 319 S.W.3d at 391. With “[t]he focus on foreseeability[,]” our Supreme
Court embraced the reasoning underlying Restatement (Second) of Torts §
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343A(1) cmt. f (1965) that “sometimes ‘the possessor has reason to expect that the
invitee’s attention may be distracted, so that he will not discover what is obvious,
or will forget what he has discovered, or fail to protect himself against it.’” Id.,
quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A(1) cmt. f. The Supreme Court
thereby recognized what it refers to as a plaintiff’s “defense of foreseeable
distraction” that undermines the formerly determinative open-and-obvious
doctrine. Id. at 394.
In McIntosh, the record demonstrated that the plaintiff (an emergency
medical technician moving a patient from an emergency vehicle to the hospital’s
emergency room) was foreseeably distracted from the open and obvious hazard of
an uneven curb between the ambulance dock and the emergency room doors. Id.
Noting it was “important to stress the context in which McIntosh sustained her
injury[,]” the Court emphasized that her “dire need to rush critically ill patients
through the emergency room entrance should be self-evident”; such a distraction
was unquestionably foreseeable by the hospital which had every “reason to expect
that the invitee will proceed to encounter the known or obvious danger because . . .
the advantages of doing so [preserving health and saving lives] would outweigh the
apparent risk.” Id. (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Consequently, in McIntosh, “the plaintiff had the defense of
foreseeable distraction, as she was attending her patient.” Id. Mazie Jones had no
such defense. Whereas McIntosh’s focus was properly and foreseeably on
something other than the hazard, Jones’ focus, necessarily, should have been on the
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hazard itself. Obviously, it was not. Jones presented no evidence whatsoever that
she was distracted from her “duty to act reasonably to ensure her own safety,
heightened by her familiarity with the location and the arguably open and obvious
nature of the danger.” Id. at 395.
Because this case is clearly distinguishable from McIntosh, I concur.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Melissa C. Howard
Jackson, Kentucky
James E. Davis
Stanton, Kentucky
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